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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Being a refugee means taking refuge in a country other than one’s own. Many 
people are affected by the upheavals of refugee flight. In 1999 alone, the 
United Nations assisted approximately 17 million such people world-wide to 
live in another country or to return home.1 Australia was not immune from the 
upheavals of such massive global population movement. Some, however, made 
their way to Australia without first consulting with the relevant authorities. 
They arrived unannounced and by boat. Between 1999 and 2003, about ten 
thousand people arrived in Australia in such manner.2 Of these, the majority 
were refugees:  The cited report shows that Australian authorities conferred 
refugee status to 7,339 of the 10,289 arrivals during this time-frame. It is likely 
that the actual number of refugees among this group was even higher because 
2,085 people were in immigration detention, with at least some refugee 
determinations still in progress when the Department of Immigration and 
Multicultural Affairs published these figures. Whilst their claims for fleeing 
persecution thus were justified in most instances, the Howard government 
generally perceived uninvited refugees as a problem to the orderly process that 
regulated refugee intakes. This perception translated into a lack of enthusiasm 
and a hesitation to attend to a documented need among uninvited refugees 
who came to Australia. 
                                            
1 United Nations, (2004, 22 April). More Information/Humanitarian Affairs. [Website]. 
Humanitarian Action.  
2 Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, (2003, 12 September) Fact Sheet 74a. 
Boat Arrival Details. For the method of how the number of refugees and detainees was 
calculated from the total number of arrivals, see Appendix A.   
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Such perception is not new, and successive governments have been reluctant 
to accept uninvited refugees who arrived from the 1970s onwards.3 What is 
however remarkable is the observation that the Howard government 
frequently sought to justify its refugee policies to the electorate in terms of 
legal necessities. Such justification seems to state the obvious, because all 
individuals within Australia’s jurisdiction, including government officials, have 
to obey the law or risk adverse consequences. In contrast to other citizens, 
however, government officials also have official duties. These duties include 
the delivery of public policies, which at times means that the law has to change 
as public policies change. So the Howard government’s recourse to the rules 
and procedures or the law as a policy justification seemed intriguing. From this 
apparent anomaly emerged the idea to ask several questions that led to the 
research for this thesis. The initial questions were: Why the frequent recourse 
to the law? What purpose does this serve when there already exists a close 
relationship between law and public policy? These questions are not answered 
in this thesis, but served as a catalyst to generate other ideas that gradually 
translated into a researchable proposition.  
 
For reasons that will be discussed later, the central claim of this thesis is that 
the Howard government variously made recourse to the law to justify its 
refugee policies between 1999 and 2003, but the pattern of recourse took on a 
very particular form – that is, legal rationality was in effect colonised by an 
ideologically charged practice and discourse of legal rationalism. If 
substantiated, such a claim has significant implications for the legitimate 
exercise of state power in a system that requires a clear separation of political 
and juridical powers. Firstly, there is the potential for misuse of power if one 
system dominates the other. Secondly, there may be consequences for a system 
of democracy, public accountability, and the authority that the electorate 
                                            
3 For a detailed analysis of the historical developments between the 1970s and the mid-
1990s, see: Don McMaster, Asylum Seekers. Australia’s Response to Refugees 
(Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2001) especially chapters 1 and 2. 
 
 
  
 
  
- 7 - 
 
Introduction 
confers to their elected representatives. All these implications will be discussed 
throughout this thesis.  
 
The suggestion that the Howard government has made recourse to the law as a 
legitimising tool means that the government made claims to the law as the 
source of authority, either at symbolic or at concrete level, to justify a course of 
action. That is, the authoritative claim derives from what is commonly 
understood by legal rationality: the rules and procedures of the law and their 
institutionalisation within the structure of the state. However, it will be argued 
in this thesis that the Howard government’s recourse to legal rationality had a 
rhetorical edge, with the effect that the recourse was not to legal rationality per 
se, but to something else. This “something else” in this thesis is called “legal 
rationalism”, an ideological concept that will be elaborated throughout this 
thesis. Legal rationalism, it will be argued, tends to place overriding emphasis 
on the rules and procedures of the law without necessarily having concerns for 
consistency or continuity. In this way, legal rationalism emerges as an 
ideological projection that manifests itself in two forms. In its first form, legal 
rationalism manifests itself as the “misuse”, or selective use, of legal rationality 
that is carried as an ideological projection that often masks other rationales. In 
its second form of the ideological projection, legal rationalism manifests itself 
in the fetishism of legal rationality as an end in itself. There are more positive 
ways of conceptualising legal rationalism – that is, as simply the ideology 
associated with legal-rational practices. However, in this thesis it is used in the 
more critical sense. It is argued in this thesis that, although the Howard 
government did not fetishise legal rationality, it did misuse it as a legitimising 
device that did not consistently accord with its other practices.  
 
To investigate the claim of this thesis, the analysis traces how the Howard 
government responded to refugees who arrived by boat between 1999 and 
2003. The analysis focuses predominantly on how the members of the Howard 
government justified their refugee policies both in their own words, and in 
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their legislative policy outcomes. It focuses on the Minister for Immigration 
and Multicultural Affairs, the Prime Minister, and to a lesser extent, the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Minister for Defence, as it 
attempts to understand public pronouncements in the context of events and 
practices at that time. The context of this analysis is around four broad 
parameters that the Howard government identified as the cornerstone of its 
refugee policies: border protection, law-and-order, humanitarian concern, and 
orderly process.  
 
The motivation for researching the topic and writing this thesis came from 
events that were of greater personal significance than observing politicians’   
statements about refugee policies. During the year 2000, I practiced nursing as 
a Registered Nurse for twelve weeks at the Woomera detention centre in South 
Australia. So it was with the benefits of personal contemplation about an era 
that still shapes Australia’s current political debates that this PhD began, just 
weeks before the Howard government decommissioned the Woomera 
detention centre in April 2003. This thesis, however, is not about personal 
anecdotes or introspection, even if both dimensions stimulated an academic 
interest in the complex puzzle of government rhetoric about refugee policy and 
law which eventually led to a focus on government accountability as a central 
theme in this thesis.  
 
The major consideration for this thesis is that, if the ideology of legal 
rationalism influenced the refugee policies of the Howard government between 
1999 and 2003, does such influence translate into a concrete social reality that 
can be discerned from clearly identifiable practices? If so, how dominant was 
the influence of legal rationalism? And in the first instance, can it be verified 
that the initial observation (the observation that the Howard government 
justified its refugee policies in terms of legal necessities) was repeated 
consistently throughout the timeframe of the case studies? If so, were these 
justifications restricted to face-to-face practices with refugees, or was there a 
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more prevailing process that also affected institutional practices? From these 
initial considerations emerged the research question: how, and to what extent, 
did the Howard government resort to legal rationalism when justifying its 
refugee policies to the electorate between 1999 and 2003? The answer will 
come first, from mapping a pattern of policy justifications in the case studies 
and, second, from asking where, if indeed there is such a pattern, the parts of 
this pattern are located in the institutions where public policy is formulated and 
contested.    
 
The logic for answering the research question draws on the work on case study 
methodology that Robert Yin discusses in two books.4 The choice of method 
had to address the question that, if legal rationalism can be identified, does it 
occur as an isolated epiphenomenon at the level of government rhetoric, or 
does it affect other social practices? A “multiple-case study” design with cross-
case analysis was chosen, as discussed by Yin.5 This method incorporates the 
logic of a non-parametric analysis of variance that seeks to demonstrate an 
interaction effect between cells. The relevance of this method for the argument 
in this thesis is discussed in the Introduction to the Themes section, and 
schematically presented in Table 2. 
 
Pertinent to research are considerations of validity and reliability. To adapt 
Yin’s work to this thesis, the purpose of building construct validity into the 
design is that one can be reasonably certain that the method measures core 
aspects of legal rationalism and nothing else.6 Yin suggests that validity can be 
established by way of triangulation. Triangulation provides “multiple measures 
of the same phenomenon” from different data sources.7 In this thesis, these 
                                            
4 Robert Yin, Case Study Research. Design and Methods, ed. Leonard Bickman and Debra 
Rog, third edition, vol. 5, Applied Social Research Methods Series. (Thousand Oaks, 
California: Sage Publications, 2003). 
Robert Yin, Applications of Case Study Research, Second edition. (Thousand Oaks, 
California: Sage Publications, Inc., 2003). 
5 Yin, Case Study Research. Design and Methods, p. 109. 
6 Yin, Applications of Case Study Research, p. 35. 
7 Ibid., p 99. 
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multiple sources consist of documents from many sources, to account for 
different perspectives in the analysis. Yin lists types of sources that may be 
used for such purpose: parliamentary speeches, survey data, press releases, 
special reports, relevant court cases, newspaper clippings, transcripts from 
radio and television broadcasts.8 The sole criterion for including one of these 
listed sources is that the information assists with an analysis of how a member 
of the Howard government justified an aspect of its refugee policies. In 
addition to identifying these comments, I shall take into account the suggestion 
by MacDonald that documents should be examined for factual errors, hidden 
agendas, what the information does not state and what is over-emphasised.9  
 
Returning to Yin’s work, a few words about reliability. The wording of the 
research question seeks to answer the “how” and “what” of legal rationalism. 
Yin’s case study methodology suggests that an appropriate answer to “how” 
and “what” questions depends on “operational links needing to be traced over 
time, rather than mere frequencies or incidence”.10 It will be suggested 
throughout this thesis that the strategy of tracing relevant events over time 
assists in constructing a repeated pattern of legal rationalism. This identified 
pattern extends from the on-the-ground policy practices in the case studies to 
the institutional practices in Section 2 — Themes.  
 
This thesis is divided into two main sections, Section 1 — Case studies and 
Section 2 — Themes, each with its own synopsis and conclusion. Each section 
analyses different layers of policy justification, as it observes the workings of 
government. Within each section, the analysis occurs at the level of 
government behaviour and is concerned with how the government justified its 
own policies. Therefore, omitted are challenges to these justifications from 
other sources, such as input from individuals or lobby groups, unless these 
                                            
8 Ibid., pp. 85-89. 
9 Keith MacDonald, “Using Documents”, in Researching Social Life, ed. Nigel Gilbert 
(London: Sage Publications, 2001) pp. 197-99. 
10 Yin, Applications of Case Study Research, pp. 5-7. 
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contributions were reflected in the language of the government’s policy 
justifications.  
 
The thesis proper begins with Chapter 1 — Background; an exploration of the 
refugee issue and how the Howard government responded to this issue. From 
these responses by the Howard government emerge some unanswered 
questions, and Chapter 1 — Background finishes with the rationale for the 
research question. Three case studies in Part 1 seek to analyse three defining 
moments of the Howard government’s refugee policies: the arrival of the 
Tampa and its aftermath, the policy of mandatory detention, and the detention 
of children. The conclusion to Section 1 — that the Howard government did 
resort to legal rationalism when justifying its refugee policies to the electorate – 
leads to answering the second part of the research question: how, and to what 
extent, did this occur?  
 
In the Themes section, the argument is still about the dominance of legal 
rationalism in refugee policy, but the presentation of the argument changes. 
There is a departure from the chronological approach and detailed analysis of 
the case studies, toward an identification of institutional factors and power 
relationships. All three chapters of Section 2 — Themes are about government  
accountability and the role of political process in the exercise of power within 
the institutions of the bureaucracy, the law, and the public as the legitimate 
source of government authority and power. There also emerges the theme of 
colonisation, and it will be argued that there are instances where legal 
rationalism has replaced, or colonised, legal rationality. Chapter 8 — Conclusion 
reflects on how legal rationalism has manifested itself as a systemic force that 
permeates different layers of social practices, and speculates on the influence 
of legal rationalism beyond refugee policy. This is followed by a Postscript to 
highlight that the ideology of legal rationalism did not disappear in 2003.  
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Introduction 
Before concluding this Introduction, some definitions are in order. Firstly, there 
is the term “refugee”. Within the meaning of this thesis, refugees are 
individuals who arrived, or intended to arrive, in Australia, and intended to 
claim refugee status from Australia. Most arrived uninvited between 1999 and 
2003, usually by boat and without valid travel documents. As will become clear, 
the Howard government disputes that they are refugees until government 
officials have confirmed their refugee status. In this thesis, however, they are 
called “refugees” because they identify themselves as refugees. Article 1 of the 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, to which Australia is a signatory, 
strongly ties self-identification to the definition of “refugee”, with a clear 
indication that people become refugees when they have left their home state.11  
 
Another term is the title of the government department that administers 
refugee policies. Throughout my PhD candidature, this department has had 
several titles: Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, and 
then back to the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. The 
last name change occurred on 30 January 2007, to Department of Immigration 
and Citizenship (DIAC), with the appointment of Kevin Andrews as the new 
Minister.12 For clarity and uniformity, and because one name applied 
throughout most of the timeframe for the case studies, the department will be 
referred to in this thesis as the “Department of Immigration and Multicultural 
Affairs”, or “DIMA”.  
 
Obviously, the title of a Minister is accompanied by the name of the relevant 
department. For the reasons stated in the previous paragraph, the Minister 
responsible for refugee policy is referred to as the Minister for Immigration 
and Multicultural Affairs, or in short, the “Immigration Minister”. 
                                            
11 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (1951). 
12 Department of Immigration and Citizenship. (2007, 30 January). New Arrangements for 
Department of Immigration. [Website].  
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Officially, the Howard government refers to immigration detention centres as 
“Immigration Reception and Processing Centres”. However, the term 
“detention centre” is more commonly used in the media and in official reports. 
Therefore, the term “detention centre” is used in this thesis.  
 
It will also be noted that some cited references do not specify page numbers. 
The reason is that, generally, these were references that were downloaded in 
html format. In such cases, the URL is included in the bibliography. 
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Chapter 1 
Political and Theoretical Background 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis analyses the policy responses of the Howard government to 
refugees between 1999 and 2003. During this time, the government 
progressively changed its policy, first from offering permanent asylum to 
temporary asylum;  second, by intensifying the policy of mandatory detention 
that previous Labor governments had followed; third, by building, staffing and 
financing detention centres overseas whilst effectively retaining jurisdiction; 
and third, by putting into place a set of legal and bureaucratic measures that 
have made it increasingly difficult for refugees to claim protection from 
Australia.  
 
This chapter discusses the background to these events. It holds that the 
Howard government’s policy on refugees was driven by legal rationalism, under 
the cover of legal rationality; both terms will be discussed at length later in this 
chapter. The first part of this chapter outlines the political issues surrounding 
refugee policies and the Howard government’s policy responses to these issues.  
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Chapter 1 
Political and Theoretical Background 
 
 
Policy responses to refugees 
 
Australia is a party to both the UN Convention and 1967 Protocol.1 The last of 
these documents, the Optional Protocol, was signed in December 1973.2 In both 
documents, Australia committed itself to a formal rights based approach to 
refugees. According to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, a refugee is 
a person who, 
 
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside his 
country of nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear is unwilling to avail himself 
of the protection of that country.3 
 
The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees sets out the rights that member 
states have agreed to make available to refugees, but excludes from refugee 
protection those individuals who have committed serious crimes, including war 
crimes and crimes against humanity.4 The Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees situates Australia in an international law context of individual claims 
and state obligations that become realised through national legislation within 
each member state.5 There is considerable variation in how states apply the 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees within their jurisdictions, to allow for 
economic differences between signatory states.6 Compliance with the 
instrument is not legally enforceable, but often depends on the United Nations 
                                            
1 For both instruments, see 
• Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees 1951.  
• Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Protocol Relating to the Status 
of Refugees 1967. 
2 Roz Germov and Francesco Motta, Refugee Law in Australia (South Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 2003) p. 839. 
3 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees 1951. Article 1 A (2). 
4 Ibid., ([cited) Article 1 B (6) F. 
5 Ibid., ([cited) Article 36. 
6 Ibid., ([cited) Preamble and Articles 20, 23, 24.4. 
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or the international community resorting to moral persuasion or diplomatic 
pressure on states which attempt to evade their obligations.7  
 
In accordance with this scope for national legislation, uninvited refugees in 
Australia have been treated differently from refugees who were selected from 
camps overseas. Mandatory detention was introduced in 1989, seven years 
before the Howard government came to power. The government frequently 
stated that it did not change existing policy, but acted in accordance with 
obligations under international law, whilst at the same time protecting 
Australia’s national interests. Like the previous governments, the Howard 
government played on negative stereotypes of refugees by connecting the law 
with refugee boats. According to political commentator Mungo MacCallum, 
the Howard government used the power of language to remove the word 
“refugee” from its official vocabulary and used words such as asylum seekers, 
queue jumpers, and unlawful.8 This connected the issue of refugee flight and 
refugee protection with legal issues, as if law breaking was an innate trait of 
refugees. Such vocabulary also detracts from the stipulation of the Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees that criminals do not qualify for refugee status, as 
previously stated.  
 
Refugee boats were not a new phenomenon. In this paragraph, I will draw on 
Don McMaster’s comprehensive overview of the recent history of refugees 
who came to Australia by boat.9 Accordingly, the boats that began to arrive in 
1999 marked the beginning of a new wave of refugees, one of several waves 
that brought in the boats: the Vietnamese between 1975 and 1979;10 the 
Cambodians came ten years later between 1989 and 1994;11 shortly afterwards, 
                                            
7 Geoffrey Stern, The Structure of International Society. An Introduction to the Study of 
International Relations. (London: St. Martin's Press, 1995) pp. 127-8. 
8 Mungo MacCallum, "Girt by Sea. Australia, the Refugees and the Politics of Fear," 
Quarterly Essay 5 (2002): pp. 42-43. 
9 Don McMaster, Asylum Seekers. Australia's Response to Refugees (Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 2001). 
10 Ibid., p. 70. 
11 Ibid., p. 73. 
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the Chinese from 199412 until March 1995.13 Whilst the Howard government 
continued with the overall policy framework of mandatory detention and 
border protection, it also introduced significant changes before the latest wave. 
In May 1996, two months after coming to office, the Howard government 
continued with the changes commenced by previous governments. Eventually, 
as will be seen later, these changes resulted in Australia turning away all 
refugees who arrived by boat. In March 1996, immigration intakes were cut by 
almost 10 per cent to just over 100,000, and preference was given to people 
who had special employment skills.14 Immigration Minster Philip Ruddock 
proposed a new structure that would bring the benefits of reduced costs and 
counter the delays of the court system, whilst at the same time strengthening 
“bureaucratic authority” and increasing ministerial control over the application 
process.15 The Howard government also restricted the intake of refugees who 
arrived “without prior application”, and thereby departed from the previous 
practice of taking in refugees “on the basis of need rather than on the basis of 
numbers available”.16 Three years later, the ‘Humanitarian’ entry category, 
which includes refugees, was capped at twelve thousand per year, of which 
four thousand was for refugees and another two thousand for refugee 
applications made after people arrived in Australia.17  
 
One can infer from the changes cited in the previous paragraph a strong 
commitment by the Howard government to reduce the intakes of onshore 
refugees. Another significant change occurred in October 1999, one month 
before the first boat of the new wave arrived. The Howard government 
introduced a policy of temporary protection only and scrapped family reunion 
from the program. Immigration Minster Philip Ruddock justified these changes 
in the following terms:  
                                            
12 Ibid., p. 89. 
13 Ibid., p. 93. 
14 Ibid., p. 61. 
15 Ibid., p. 97. 
16 Ibid., p. 62. 
17 Ibid., p. 63. 
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Why do I argue that the temporary entry arrangements are likely, over time, to have 
some impact? It is because most of the people who are arriving in Australia 
unlawfully by boat, undertaking what I acknowledge can be a hazardous journey, are 
essentially unaccompanied males. They are leaving behind spouses and children in the 
expectation that within our Refugee and Humanitarian Program, they obtain a 
permanent residence outcome.18  
 
Some commentators described the significance of these changes as a way to 
maintain national security at the border and second, at maintaining an orderly 
assessment process that would lead to the exclusion of some refugees. Political 
journalist Paul Kelly wrote that the boats “represented a potential challenge to 
Australia’s border security” that governments could not ignore.19 Other 
commentators suggested that governments need to regulate refugee entry as a 
way of preserving cultural identity, whilst opening the borders to some, and 
closing it to others.20 Some writers objected to the mode of arrival, and argued 
for a reduction of intakes from this source, on the basis that intakes from the 
Middle East were likely to disturb social harmony.21 Others argued for 
restriction on the basis of social, economic and cultural considerations.22  
 
The Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs linked the refugee 
boats as people-smuggling operations and announced in December 1999 
significant changes to its refugee policies.23 In the cited media release, the 
government planned for an increased naval presence at sea, and foreshadowed 
greater co-operation of the Australian Federal Police with law enforcement 
                                            
18 Philip Ruddock. (1999, 22 November). Border Protection Legislation Amendment Bill 
1999: Second Reading. Parliamentary Speech, House of Representatives. Official Hansard. 
Commonwealth of Australia, p. 12,318.  
19 Paul Kelly, "The New Ground Rules of Australian Politics," in The Australian Political 
Almanac, ed. Peter Wilson (South Yarra, Vic: Hardie Grant Books, 2002) p. 4. 
20 Kanishka Jayasuriya, Howard, Tampa, and the Politics of Reactionary Modernisation. 
[Website]. School of Economics and Political Science, University of Sydney, 2003. 
21 Katharine Betts, "Boatpeople and Public Opinion in Australia," People and Place 9, no. 4 
(2001). 
22 Russell Blackford, "Racism and Refugees," Quadrant April (2002). 
23 Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. (1999, 1 December). Immigration 
Minister Takes Anti-People Smuggling Campaign to WA (Media Release, number 
99/r99169).  
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agencies abroad to launch “disruption operations” to prevent the boats from 
coming to Australia. Immigration Minister Ruddock announced an 
“information campaign” in “high risk countries”, which included China and 
Iraq, where refugees were most likely to come from. The cited media release 
continues that the intention of such campaign was to send “a clear message 
that people thinking about undertaking such a trip will fail, will be ruined 
financially and could even die undertaking such a hazardous journey”. This 
“information” included claims that parts of Australia were infested with snakes 
and crocodiles, and that women may end up as prostitutes. 
 
The new policy directives created political pressures. Far from preventing 
families from coming to Australia, more families arrived by boat with their 
children. An inquiry by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission notes an increase in the number of arrivals in mid-1999 onwards, 
many of whom were children.24 The changing policy directive of removing 
family reunion from the onshore refugee program was followed by an even 
larger number of refugee families who arrived together by boat. Robert Manne 
suggests that the scrapping of family reunion, rather than preventing families 
from arriving in Australia, actually encouraged this.25 However, it is unlikely 
that the policy change fully explains the emerging trend, because the changes 
occurred a few months before the legislative changes in November 1999. 
Nevertheless, the accelerating trend was maintained until 2002, as evidenced by 
the number of children placed into immigration detention.26 Accordingly, the 
number of children in immigration who arrived by boat and without visa 
amounted to 748 in 1999-2000; 1,616 in 2000-01; 1,440 in 2001-02; and 
declined to 180 in 2002-03. Regardless of the reason, the resulting prolonged 
detention of families, especially of children, was criticised on moral and 
                                            
24 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. A Last Resort? A Summary Guide to 
the National Inquiry into Children in Immigration Detention, pp. 25-26. 
25 Robert Manne and David Corlett, "Sending Them Home. Refugees and the New Politics 
of Indifference," Quarterly Essay, no. 13 (2004). 
26 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. A Last Resort? A Summary Guide to 
the National Inquiry into Children in Immigration Detention, Tables 1-4, pp. 62-63. 
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humanitarian grounds, as were the conditions of detention. The topic is so 
complex, that one case study is devoted in thesis to discussing the mandatory 
detention of children.  
 
The new policy directive was expensive. In addition to its previously authorised 
2001–02 budget, the government asked the Senate to approve additional 
funding of $214.54 million to the Department for Immigration and 
Multicultural Affairs.27 The report just cited reveals that of this money, over 
$192 million was requested for “additional funding to address unauthorised 
arrivals”. In September 2003, the Herald Sun newspaper was critical of the 
escalating costs.28 The article cited in the previous sentence calculated that the 
costs of mandatory detention, which included transporting refugees on naval 
vessels to detention centres, amounted to $627 per person per day at the 
Christmas Island detention centre, and $415 at the Baxter detention centre. 
The cited article compared this with a cost of $161.40 to house a prisoner in a 
high-security jail. The Herald Sun reported in April 2004 that the immigration 
detention costs per individual had increased by 150 per cent between 
November 2002 and April 2004.29 Despite this increased need, evidenced by 
the increase in refugee flow, Australia’s total refugee intake between 2000 and 
2001 remained more or less constant at around 12,000 per annum.30 However, 
it took about two years before a change occurred in the number of onshore 
refugee arrivals. Between 1999-2000 and 2000-2001, just over 4,100 individuals 
arrived by boat per year.31 In the following year, the numbers reduced 
dramatically. Between 2001-2002, there was a 70 per cent reduction of arrivals, 
and in the following year, “only one unauthorised arrival reached Australian 
                                            
27 Commonwealth of Australia, (2002). Portfolio Additional Estimates Statements 2001-02. 
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs Portfolio (Explanation of Additional 
Appropriations Specified by Outcomes and Outputs by Agency). Department of Immigration 
and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs. 
28 Mark Phillips, "Boat People Costs Soar," Herald Sun, 15 September 2003. 
29 Jason Frenkel, "Asylum Policy Costs $400,000 a Day," Herald Sun, 30 April 2004. 
30 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2005). "2003 UNHCR Statistical 
Yearbook Country Data Sheet – Australia." [Figures taken from: Host Country Indicators for 
Australia, Table 1, Population of Concern to UNHCR] p. 63. 
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territory by boat”.32 The cited source quoted Immigration Minister Philip 
Ruddock’s announcement that this reduction in the numbers of arrivals was 
due to success of the new policy. Such a claim, however, is debatable. Philip 
Ruddock told Parliament in August 2001 that the measures of his government 
to “search and detain vessels … have not been as effective as we would have 
liked”.33 In the speech cited in the last sentence, the Minister also said that 
10,000 people have already arrived, another “900 intended to come this week”, 
and quoted an ABC report that “as many as 5,000 people are in Indonesia”, 
and added that “there are people further upstream”. Political commentator 
Robert Manne adds that the policy of military deployment after August 2001 
led to a reduction in the number of refugee arrivals: 
 
By August 2001, it was clear that mandatory detention and temporary protection had 
failed. During 2002, however, it gradually became obvious that the successor 
measures – plausible threats of military repulsion and Pacific Island incarceration – 
actually worked. When the aftermath of Operation Relex had been mounted and the 
Pacific Solution put in place, not one asylum seeker boat arrived.34 
 
Internationally, the new policy generated attention. The American organisation, 
US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, which observes global trends in 
refugee issues and published the changing numbers of onshore refugees cited 
in the previous paragraph, was critical of the Howard government.35 The cited 
report argued that the allocation of resources by the Howard government to 
pursue its exclusionary policy indicated a trend that surpassed previous policy 
in Australia and abroad, and that Australia may indeed be the first “Western” 
nation to put such broad and significant legal effort behind the rhetoric of 
discouraging the “spontaneous” arrival of asylum seekers in favour of a more 
                                            
32 Jana Mason and Nancy Vogt, (2003). East Asia and the Pacific. Australia (U.S. 
Committee for Refugees and Immigrants. 
33 Philip Ruddock. (2001, 30 August). Question without Notice: Illegal Immigration: Border 
Protection. Parliamentary Speech, House of Representatives. Official Hansard. 
Commonwealth of Australia, p. 30,666.  
34 Manne and Corlett, "Sending Them Home. Refugees and the New Politics of 
Indifference." p. 59.  
35 Immigration and Refugee Services of America, Sea Change: Australia's New Approach to 
Asylum Seekers (2002). U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants. 
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orderly, predictable, discretionary, and political system of selecting refugees for 
resettlement from overseas.  The United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, however, took a different view.36 
 
Accordingly, the Howard government’s strategies were not a new policy, but 
the implementation of restricted measures among several industrialised nations 
to keep refugees out, in order to control “irregular migration”.37  The cited 
report contextualised these strategies as a general trend, as matters of 
sovereignty claims and control measures over entry into Australia.38  
 
Whilst the debate was going on, the Howard government stated the objectives 
of its refugee policies. For now, I wish to define these objectives. From the 
detailed discussion of the case studies, it will be noted that the Howard 
government claimed that it conducted a refugee policy that met its 
international obligations to refugees, whilst at the same time maintaining 
Australia’s national interests. There were four parts to this policy. First, there 
were border protection and sovereignty considerations, which meant 
protecting the borders from ‘unwanted’ persons who arrived without visas and 
travel documents. Secondly, there was mandatory detention, which meant 
detention in immigration detention centres until the identity and refugee claims 
were verified and health and security checks were conducted. Third, the policy 
consisted of orderly and lawful assessment procedures. Fourth, the policy was 
intended to be humane, so that the procedures aimed to address what was 
necessary, without causing unnecessary distress to refugees. In its media and 
parliamentary statements, the Howard government committed itself to these 
four broad policy parameters, and one may assume on this basis that border 
protection, mandatory detention, law-and-order process, and a humanitarian 
approach formed the essential elements for its refugee polices. I will return to 
                                            
36 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, The State of the World Refugees 2000. 
Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action. 
37 Ibid., pp. 182-82. 
38 Ibid., p. 280. 
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these parameters in the next section when I outline the analysis of the case 
studies. 
 
Mandatory detention and the exclusion of refugees had its critics. Some 
commentators argued that the Howard government has adapted national 
Australian law to lessen Australia’s commitments under the human rights 
treaties of the United Nations.39 Other legal critics argued that the Howard 
government, through removing the scope of decision-making from the courts, 
has bypassed the court system.40 Some reports provided eye-witness evidence 
that conditions inside detention centres damaged peoples’ health.41 Formal 
investigations confirmed abuse of refugee applicants in immigration detention 
and mismanagement of these centres.42 Several political commentators 
suggested that the government politicised the refugee issue and over-stated the 
need for a legal approach to maintain order.43 The Howard government 
countered its critics by increasingly framing onshore refugees in terms of 
national security; less so in terms of refugee needs. For instance, the 
                                            
39 Francine Feld, "Tampa Case: Seeking Refuge in Domestic Law," Australian Journal of 
Human Rights (2002). 
Wayne Morgan, "Passive/Aggressive: The Australian Government's Responses to Optional 
Protocol Communications," Australian Journal of Human Rights 22, no. 5(2) (1999). 
40 Julian Burnside, "Authoritarianism the Name of Freedom. How Our Detention Camps 
Breach the Most Basic Human Rights," Arena Magazine 56, no. Dec 2001-Jan 2002 (2001); 
Mary Crock, "You Have to Be Stronger Than Razor Wire": Legal Issues Relating to the 
Detention of Refugees and Asylum Seekers," Australian Journal of Administrative Law 10, 
no. 1 (2002); Mary Crock and Ben Saul, Future Seekers, Refugees and the Law in Australia 
(Annandale, NSW: Federation Press, 2002); Savitri Taylor, "Achieving Reform of Australian 
Asylum Seeker Law and Policy," Just Policy, no. 24 (2001). 
41 Derek Silove, Zachary Steel, and Richard Mollica, "Detention of Asylum Seekers: Assault 
on Health, Human Rights, and Social Development," Lancet 357 (2001); Amer Sultan and 
Kevin O'Sullivan, "Psychological Disturbances in Asylum Seekers Held in Long-Term 
Detention: A Participant-Observer Account," Medical Journal of Australia 175 (2001); 
Heather Tyler, Asylum. Voices Behind the Razor Wire (South Melbourne: Thomas C. 
Lothian, 2003). 
42 Human Rights and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, (1998). Those Who've 
Come across the Seas. Detention of Unauthorized Arrivals; Philip Flood (2001, February). 
Report of Inquiry into Immigration Detention Procedures. Commonwealth of Australia; 
Commonwealth Ombudsman. (2001, March). Report of an Own Motion Investigation into the 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs' Immigration Detention Centres.  
43 MacCallum, "Girt by Sea. Australia, the Refugees and the Politics of Fear."; Robert 
Manne, The Barren Years. John Howard and Australian Political Culture (Melbourne: Text 
Publishing Company, 2001); David Marr and Marian Wilkinson, Dark Victory (Sydney: Allen 
& Unwin, 2003); Kathy Marks, "Howard Surfs Home on a Wave of Xenophobia," 
Independent, 11 November 2001; Peter Mares, Borderline: Australia's Response to 
Refugees and Asylum Seekers in the Wake of the Tampa, Second ed. (Sydney: University 
of New South Wales Press, 2002). 
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Immigration Minister declared in mid-November 1999 on the 7.30 Report: “If it 
was a national emergency two weeks ago, it’s just gone up ten points on the 
Richter scale”.44 
 
Several inconsistencies made questionable the government’s policy 
justifications in terms of border protection and orderly process. Until the late 
1990s, the greatest number of onshore refugee visas were issued to those who 
arrived with a valid visa, and subsequently lodged their onshore refugee 
application.45 One may infer from the report cited above that the people who 
arrived on a visa before lodging their onshore refugee application also 
disrupted the orderly process and took up resources. Furthermore, issuing a 
larger number of visas to the group who arrived on a visa raises the question if 
this was not a greater source of disruption than the disruption generated by 
boat arrivals, who received a lesser number of refugee visas. Viewed from this 
perspective, the Howard government’s reasons remain unclear for directing 
political attention and increased resources to thwart the arrival of refugees 
without visas. There also remains the issue of how framing refugees as law-
breakers contributes to an approach based on law-and-order. From these 
anomalies, two questions emerge that will be asked throughout the thesis. How 
did the government go about maintaining to the electorate that its justifications 
of the changing refugee policy were plausible? To what extent did the Howard 
government promote an orderly process?  
 
 
                                            
44 William Maley, (Undated). Australia's New Afghan Refugees: Contexts and Challenges 
Refugee Council of Australia. 
45 Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. (2001, 15 September). Fact Sheet 8. 
Unauthorised Arrivals by Air and Sea. 
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Policy as an instrument of framing 
 
Public policy has an important role in the affairs of a state, and the business of 
the state is conducted through the process of public policy. The Prime Minister 
bears ultimate responsibility for the formulation and delivery of public policy, 
and appoints ministers to be in charge of policy portfolios.46 So important are 
policies that Ministers are expected to resign if there is maladministration.47 
Bridgeman and Davis convey a sense of how policy flows through the 
structure of governance and becomes “the outcome of ideas, interests and 
ideologies that impels our political system”.48 Accordingly, policy flows from 
the level of government and is translated into rules and procedures that are 
carried out in accordance with the Minister’s decisions.49 Policy is then 
administered through the public sector, which may have special legal discretion 
or special resources that are needed to deliver this policy.50 Many of these 
policies become expressed in statute law, so that there is an inescapable link 
between law and public policy. Thus, refugee policy and any changes to 
relevant legislation and policy practices can be attributed directly to the 
directives determined by the Howard government, issued though the 
Immigration Minister.  
 
Given the structure of public policy, one may even perceive that policy is 
instrumental in implementing the values and visions of the government in 
power. Given the importance of public policy, it is not surprising that 
                                            
46 Peter Bridgman and Glyn Davis, Australian Policy Handbook, Second ed. (St Leonards, 
NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2000) p. 18. 
47 John Summers, "Parliament and Responsible Government," in Government, Politics, 
Power and Policy in Australia, ed. John Summers, Dennis Woodward, and Andrew Parkin 
(Frenchs Forest, NSW: Pearson Education Australia Pty Limited, 2002) p. 24. 
48 Bridgman and Davis, Australian Policy Handbook, p. 3. 
49 Ibid., p. 136. 
50 Michael Howlett and Michael Ramesh, Studying Public Policy. Policy Cycles and Policy 
Subsystems. (Ontario: Oxford University Press, 1995) p. 62. 
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governments seek to justify their public policies to their electorate and debate 
policies in parliament and in the media. As in any debate, the extent to which 
ideas and visions are realised often depends on how an issue is presented, or 
framed. According to Béland, framing is not about the policy itself, but about 
attempts to change our understanding of an issue by putting it into an 
acceptable ideological context.51 Considered in this way, framing has the 
potential to take public perception of refugee policy in a fundamentally 
different direction, provided the public accepts this new way of framing.  
 
What, then, is framing? William Gamson gives a two-fold description of how 
framing is used in the social sciences.52 Gamson’s working description of 
framing resonates with the two-layered approach that is used throughout this 
thesis as it places the Howard government’s justifications for its refugee 
policies in the case studies, and the emerging institutional themes in Section 2 
— Themes in the context of framing. This thesis does not engage with 
Gamson’s work other than to acknowledge that his two-fold description of a 
frame has been used in planning the broad structure of this thesis. 
 
The first part to Gamson’s work on social framing cited in the previous 
paragraph is the metaphor of a picture frame, a frame that includes and 
highlights some areas and excludes others. Second, a frame can be thought of 
as a supportive structure, which lends form and shape to underlying ideas and 
concepts, but is no longer visible once the structure is complete.53 These 
aspects of framing are a useful metaphor for analysing the political processes 
by which the Howard government attempted to bring about public acceptance 
for its refugee policies. The metaphor of the superficial frame, which will come 
to the fore in the case-studies, gives insight into the slant given to issues in 
public debate, where matters are either considered important or 
                                            
51 Daniel Béland, "Ideas and Social Policy: An Institutionalist Perspective," Social Policy & 
Administration 39, no. 1 (2005). 
52 William Gamson, "Framing Social Policy," Nonprofit Quarterly 7, no. 2 (2000). 
53 Ibid. 
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inconsequential. One example of framing is how the Howard government re-
interpreted the meaning of article 31.1 of the Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees. In its re-framed form, article 31.1 retained the stipulation that refugees 
are not to be penalised even if they enter a country illegally. What was new is 
the re-framing of the arrival of refugees without travel documents into an issue 
of border protection, national sovereignty, international crimes syndicates, and 
compliance with orderly process. The frame, as Béland noted in the citation 
above, is not about the policy but about how the issue is to be understood.  
 
Gamson’s second meaning of framing is more difficult to analyse, because it is 
a frame that supports the structure and hence may not be visible. However, as 
will become clearer in Section 2 — Themes, the framing metaphor does give 
insights into what holds together the working of government and what makes 
social practices durable. Oliver and Johnston take this idea of framing further 
and argue that analysts need to distinguish between framing and ideology.54  
Oliver and Johnston describe the frame as the mental construct that selects 
these issues, where framing is the process that gives meaning to issues. 
Ideology, on the other hand, is a political concept that refers to the ideas and 
norms, and is related to how to best achieve a particular vision of society. 
Framing thus gives meaning to an issue, while “ideology focuses attention on 
the whole content of beliefs … and on the way the ideas are related to each 
other”. Oliver and Johnston make the point that it is not frames, but 
ideologies, which have a value system. Accordingly, frames only select the 
conceptual issues. Ignoring this difference and focusing on the frame, the 
authors argue, leads us to ignore the political influences, and treats this merely 
as a difference of opinion.  
 
Extrapolating from Oliver and Johnson’s work, one gets a sense that the frame 
itself becomes the way in which the Howard government presented the refugee 
                                            
54 Pamela Oliver and Hank Johnston, "What a Good Idea! Frames and Ideologies in Social 
Movement Research," Mobilization: An International Quarterly 5, no. 1 (2000): pp. 5-13. 
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issue through a political vision of refugees that was accepted by the public. 
Though one may add that the selection of these framing topics depends on a 
system of underlying values derived from an ideology that guides what is 
included in the frame. Ideology in this sense would emerge in this thesis as an 
unstated overlay that guides the major assumptions and practices of refugee 
policies between 1999 and 2003. McMaster illustrates the difference between 
stated and unstated objectives when discussing Australian refugee policy, 
which is officially non-discriminatory.55 However, McMaster cites examples 
where, under the auspice of free speech, public discussion of refugee policy 
occurred in a discriminating context.56 Such practices actually led to policy 
practices of discrimination against targeted groups.57  
 
In this sense, discrimination may still occur from the unstated slant that is 
being promoted in public discourse, which in turn also slants social norms and 
practices in a particular direction. The role of values and ideology in the 
refugee policies of the Howard government is only a tangential concern within 
this thesis, which, nevertheless, emerges as a strong contributing factor to 
policy and institutional practices, as will be argued in Chapter 7 — Formation of 
the Public Voice and Chapter 8 — Conclusion. Bearing in mind that there may be 
differences between stated and unstated justifications, there emerges the 
consideration as to whether there is a deeper meaning to the Howard 
government’s constant framing that its refugee policies are legally defensible. I 
will return to this point shortly when I discuss the difference between legal 
rationality and legal rationalism. For now, I just wish to state the possibility 
that giving legal reasons may mask other ideologically charged practices and 
rationales by which the Coalition government is conducting its refugee policies.  
 
                                            
55 McMaster, Asylum Seekers. Australia's Response to Refugees, p 62. 
56 Ibid., pp. 153-55. 
57 Ibid., p. 190. 
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Eagleton suggests that the role of ideology as a guide for framing is difficult to 
identify.58 In the text just cited, Eagleton reasons that, although there is a lack 
of “invariable characteristics” to ideology, ideology nevertheless exerts its 
effects through the institutions of the state in an objective manner through an 
impersonal political process that is not subjective. However, Eagleton 
continues, Habermas adds to the discussion that ideology is a “non-subjective” 
component can be observed. Ideology becomes evident through 
“emancipatory critique … which brings these institutional constraints into 
awareness”.59 To gain an understanding of how the influence of ideology may 
become evident in this thesis, if at all, the thesis will not ignore the possibility 
that an ideology may be inferred from the framing practices and political 
process behind the politicised representations of refugee issues, even if the 
policies can be defended in terms of legal necessity. Even the assumption that 
policy ought to be delivered in legally rational manner is derived from the 
taken-for-granted assumption that the law definitively settles disputes and thus 
gives certainty to social practices. 
 
According to Habermas, the paradigm of the social sciences is not grounded in 
observation, but in dialogue.60 Through dialogue, Habermas continues, society 
achieves intersubjective understanding because “the understanding of 
meanings” relies on language, not on the measurements themselves. The task 
of critical theory, Habermas writes, is to ask “what lies behind the consensus, 
presented as a fact that supports the dominant tradition at the time, and does 
so with a view to the relations of power surreptitiously incorporated in the 
symbolic structures of the systems of speech and action”.61 In these embedded 
meanings, one can find ideology in how the language delivers an issue for 
discourse. This guides a major orientation to conducting the case studies, 
                                            
58 Terry Eagleton, Ideology. An Introduction (London: Verso, 1991) p. 223. 
59 Ibid., p. 132. 
60 Jürgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, trans. John Viertel, Heinemann Educational 
Books Ltd (London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd, 1974) p. 11. 
61 Ibid., p. 12. 
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which examines rhetoric as a way of distorting and hiding issues and their 
unstated assumptions.  
 
Examining the discourse requires an analysis of processes, rather than 
observations of factual events, and uncovers the deeper motives behind social 
action. Critical theory, especially from a Habermasian perspective, directs us to 
discover meaning within social dialogue, and to identify an intersubjective 
understanding, which is a product of society; not of individual but mutual 
understanding.62 This intersubjective understanding holds the key to rationality 
within a given society. It is at the level of mutual understanding, where analysis 
of discourse becomes an analytical tool to identify interference with 
communication.63  
 
How may the analysis of this thesis reveal an ideology behind the justifications 
for refugee policy? Whilst some language analysis is required, this thesis is not 
primarily about analysing texts, but then looks beyond the texts and infers an 
ideology from the policy justifications and the political process behind these 
justifications. As will be argued shortly, much of this process can be traced 
back to a skewed definition of legal rationality that is traced throughout the 
case studies and finds its way into institutional practices. It is through these 
distorted communications, as Habermas argues, that ideological purposes that 
drive an issue, become masked. This assumption that there are distortions 
becomes arguable from an exploration of two layers of the dialogue between 
the Howard government and the electorate. This will be seen from the 
practices that accompany the language claims in the case studies, and assume 
even greater significance in the Themes, where the meaning of these language 
claims is reflected in an intersubjective understanding of a social construct that 
                                            
62 Emilia Steuerman, The Bounds of Reason: Habermas, Lyotard and Melanie Klein on 
Rationality (London: Routledge, 1999) p. 9. 
63 Andrew Parkin, "On the Practical Relevance of Habermas's Theory of Communicative 
Action," Social Theory and Practice 22, no. 3 (1996). 
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continues as a political force within the institutions of the state, and sets the 
rational basis for institutional practices.  
 
Whilst much of this thesis uses transcripts of court and government statements 
about the law, this analysis is not about the law, but about how the Howard 
government has manipulated the law in order to justify its policies. This 
distinction is important, because the influence of critical theory has led to its 
own developments in legal circles. By deconstructing and mapping the 
limitations of other legal theory, critical theory has led to a critique of legal 
theory itself.64 These developments have led to questioning the rationality of 
legal theory. However, this thesis does not attempt to examine these claims as 
truth or false propositions within jurisprudence, or whether the laws that are 
being discussed reflect legal rationality, normative consensus, or justice. The 
analysis presented in this thesis assumes that the recourse to legal rationality by 
the Howard government is prone to ideological distortion, and seeks to point 
out these distortions.  
 
Similarly, the word legitimating needs to be differentiated from its use in the 
legal sense. For instance, when the Howard government fulfils the 
requirements to pass new legislation, which include passage by majority vote 
through both the House of Representatives and the Senate, and subsequently 
secures Royal Assent for the legislation the resulting legal statute is legitimate. 
It is thus “lawful” and legally binding, and does not require further legitimating, 
unless the High Court repeals the law.65 Habermas, by contrast, views 
legitimating as a process by which people delegate power to the government and 
accept the workings of government as legitimate. Whilst the law itself “requires 
purely legal behaviour”, Habermas argues that the body of citizens does not 
                                            
64 Hillaire McCoubrey and Nigel White, Textbook on Jurisprudence. (London: Blackstone 
Press, Limited, 1993) p. 209-11. 
65 Robert Hughes and Geoff Leane, Australian Legal Institutions. Principles, Structure and 
Organisation. (South Melbourne: FT Law & Tax, 1996) p. 40-41. 
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obey unless they accept the legislation as legitimate.66 In the Habermasian 
sense, the authoritative base for the law rests on the legitimacy that 
autonomous citizens confer by giving “generally and motivated rational assent” 
through communicating such “assent” in a democratic process”.67 It is in the 
Habermasian sense that the word legitimating will be used in this thesis. 
 
From the clarification in the previous paragraph, one can now see the potential 
of the power of rhetoric in the justification of public policy by governments: 
legitimating government policy occurs in discourse, the public sphere, where 
rhetoric not only systematically hides ideological distortions in language, but 
also affects the structure and workings of legal rationality. This generates the 
possibility for legal rationality to become colonised by an ideology. In this 
thesis, this ideology is called legal rationalism, and is depicted as undermining the 
imperatives that have become legitimated as normative aspects of legal 
rationality.  
 
If legitimating refugee policy involves a process of justification through the use 
of language by the Howard government, then how does the analysis of these 
justifications identify the systematic distortions that derive from ideological 
bias? Forester suggests that the Habermas’ assumption of systematic distortion 
in the communication process “opens up a rich set of practical influences to 
investigate.68 According to Forester, Habermas proposes “three processes of 
social reproduction”: cultural reproduction through elaboration of views, social 
integration through norms and rules, and socialisation, which leads to the 
development of, or alterations in, social identity.69 By drawing on the insights 
of Habermas cited in this paragraph, Forester argues that there are two aspects 
                                            
66 Jürgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other. Studies in Political Theory, ed. Thomas Mc 
Carthy, Ciaran Cronin, and Pablo De Grieff, trans. Ciaran Cronin, Studies in Contemporary 
German Social Thought (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1999) p. 215. 
67 Ibid. 
68 John Forester, Critical Theory, Public Policy, and Planning Practice. (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1993) p. 78. 
69 Ibid., p. 115. 
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to such social reproduction of language analysis.70 Firstly, analysis occurs at the 
level of language that does, however, not rely on the meaning of words alone: 
Social reproduction occurs, and leads to loyalty when claims become anchored 
into institutionalised practices. Forester’s second point in the argument cited 
above is that political analysis thus necessarily incorporates knowledge of the 
issue, of how consent was obtained, and of the changing perception of an 
identity that occurs as the result of social reproduction.  
 
Forester’s work thus provides a rationale for going beyond the case-studies and 
asking if there are components in social structure that relate directly to the 
Howard government’s presentations and framing practices. Adding such 
insight to the discussion so far, one expects that public discourse about the 
framing of refugee policies generates knowledge about institutional practices. 
From this perspective, one may expect that governments not only participate 
in public discourse but also seek to control the discussion. Forester’s emphasis 
on cultural, social, and institutional dimensions cited in the previous paragraph 
thus broadens the discussion of this thesis and introduces the potential for 
drawing clear connections between on-the-ground policy practices and the 
broader practices within the institutions of the state.  
 
 
Arguing legal rationalism 
 
Before continuing to develop the background to this analysis, it is important to 
discuss three theoretical concepts that Habermas discusses in the second 
volume of his book, The Theory of Communicative Action.71 These three concepts 
are the lifeworld, the system and colonisation. Habermas identifies two parts of 
                                            
70 Ibid., pp. 116-9. 
71 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action. Lifeworld and System: A 
Critique of Functionalist Reason. Translated by Thomas McCarthy, vol. 2 (Cambridge, UK: 
Polity Press, 1987) pp. 146-55. 
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society, the system and the lifeworld.72 The lifeworld is the place of social and 
cultural communication and reproduction, where social actors “develop, 
confirm and renew their membership in social groups and their own 
identities”, a place of “integration and socialisation” .73 In other words, the 
lifeworld is the seat where social norms are developed and contested. 
Habermas gives an example of system and function differentiation as the social 
formation with “economic and bureaucratic spheres ... in which social relations 
are regulated only by money and power”.74 Accordingly, specialised parts 
operate independently, with their own logic dictated by economic 
requirements. Another example is the “authority of office” in modern states, 
where hierarchical stratification is determined by the state, rather than kinship 
lines.75  
 
Habermas continues that the system does not operate independently of the 
lifeworld. Instead, the system’s mechanisms need to be “anchored in the 
lifeworld” and become “institutionalised”, where they become “consolidated 
and objectified into norm-free structures”.76 In the cited work, Habermas 
argues that colonisation may occur at the junction where the mechanics of the 
system intersect with the lifeworld. Accordingly, a process may develop at such 
intersection whereby the system colonises the lifeworld and displaces the 
normative characteristics of the lifeworld with its own functional and rational 
requirements. As the gap between the rationality of the system and the 
normativity of the lifeworld increases, the rationality of the system becomes 
increasingly specialised and dominates the lifeworld until the system gains 
“more and more independence from normative contexts” and separates from 
the lifeworld.77 At this point of separation, Habermas argues, rationalism 
replaces, or colonises, rationality: the system separates (“uncouples”) from the 
                                            
72 Ibid., p. 151. 
73 Ibid., p. 139. 
74 Ibid., p. 154. 
75 Ibid., p. 167. 
76 Ibid., p. 154. 
77 Ibid., p., 155. 
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lifeworld not because of its complexity, but because system logic and 
rationalisation result in a disregard for “normative contexts”, as the system 
increasingly “instrumentalises” the lifeworld in accordance with “system 
imperatives”.78 The problem arises when system rationality becomes such a 
dominant force that it replaces the capacity of the lifeworld to contest social 
norms. When these conditions occur, according to Habermas, the lifeworld 
becomes unstable, or “challenged”, by this separation and becomes 
increasingly “objectified” as it “uncouples” from the lifeworld.79 
 
Habermas points out that uncoupling does not mean the end of the lifeworld, 
but the system exerts its changes in a lifeworld that has now become 
rationalised to extremes. It is “structurally differentiated”, permeated by 
“functional specification” where “specialised tasks of cultural transmission, 
social integration and child rearing are dealt with professionally”, where 
previously informal relationships are permeated by the rationality of the 
system.80 System rationality thus expresses itself in the lifeworld with a 
colonising effect, when it moves beyond the rationality of its own discipline. 
As rationality is being colonised, it becomes a rationality where “modern 
natural science, jurisprudence with specialised training and autonomous art 
break down the quasi naturalness of ecclesiastic traditions”.81 Eventually there 
may be a point where colonisation begins and replaces rationality with 
rationalisation: 
 
In the end, systemic mechanisms suppress forms of social integration … where the 
symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld is at stake. In these areas, the mediatization of 
the lifeworld assumes the form of a colonization.82 
 
                                            
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid., p., 173. 
80 Ibid., p., 146. 
81 Ibid., p., 147. 
82 Ibid., p., 196. 
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Habermas uses the system/lifeworld metaphor to describe a change in society 
where norms operate according to mechanistic system logic. Once uncoupling 
has occurred, system logic operates for its own sake, without consideration for 
the norms themselves, or for the values that are expressed through these 
norms. Colonisation represents an extreme form, where the system logic 
replaces the logic of the lifeworld. Habermas views rationalisation, in the 
context of uncoupling the system from the lifeworld, as a systemic process that 
results in pathology; not in historical inevitability.83 This distinction does not 
make rationalisation inevitable, but leaves open a direction into the 
“development of the cognitive as well as the expressive and normative domain, 
which could have allowed for the development of new subsystems”.84  
 
From the discussion in this and the previous section it becomes apparent that 
Habermas acknowledges the power of public discourse as a means for citizens 
to define the extent of both system logic and legitimation of state power. 
Casual observations of the Howard government’s refugee policies raise the 
question of whether or not there has been a process of colonisation that is 
consistent with the Habermas metaphor of colonisation. As noted in the last 
section, there was debate about the changing emphasis in refugee policies. This 
change came about through a re-framing of the policies from refugee 
protection to greater emphasis on the protection of state borders. The thesis 
therefore asks whether colonisation, or a displacement of rationalities, has 
occurred. This will be explored in Section 2 — Themes. Is legal rationalism a 
systemic process, or is it a surface phenomenon, perhaps a rhetorical gesture 
that does not exert in a significant way a systemic effect throughout the 
institutions of public policy? This thesis, therefore, endeavours to generate 
insight into the contestability of normativity, by arguing that there were key 
points where rationality was distorted and channelled the direction of 
rationalism. Especially in Section 1 — Case studies, there is speculation on how 
                                            
83 Arie Brand, The Force of Reason: An Introduction to Habermas' Theory of Communicative 
Action (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1990) p. 53-54. 
84 Ibid., p. 53. 
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the rationality/rationalism course may have altered, had the Howard 
government pursued a different course of action.  
 
To Habermas, discourse analysis is the method of identifying this bias. Central 
to Habermas’ discourse theory is the “proceduralist view”, a concept he 
derived from combining aspects of the philosophical assumptions of the 
Republican and Democratic political parties in America.85 Accordingly, the 
legitimation of state power as a combination of informal, as well as formal 
structural processes: rather than being underpinned by rationality, official 
decisions instead are a matter of “practical reason” which comes about by way 
of public discourse within society. Discourse thus, according to Habermas, 
consists of clusters of “communication processes that unfold in the 
institutionalised deliberations of parliamentary bodies … and in the informal 
networks of the public sphere”, such as the media and political interest 
groups.86 Critical Theory focuses on the social control aspect of legal 
rationality. Habermas argues that the state enforces its decisions “with the 
legitimating force of a legislative procedure that claims to be rational”.87  
Habermas’ discourse theory thus critiques of the dual function of the state, 
where the state has the authority to either persuade, or to force, its citizens to 
submit to the rules and regulations of the law.  
 
It is now time to return to the earlier point: the claim that legal rationality has a 
systemic bias toward ideological distortion. Should there be such bias, and 
could it lead to, or perhaps mask, a policy rationale that is of benefit to the 
Howard government? If legal rationality is the issue, then what is rationality? 
According to Habermas, democratic decision-making is not solely a matter of 
“compromises between competing interests”, nor the deliberation of “an 
ethical discourse of self-understanding”, but the integrated combination of 
                                            
85 Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other. Studies in Political Theory, p. 247. 
86 Ibid., p. 248. 
87 Ibid., p. 255. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
- 39 - 
Chapter 1 
Political and Theoretical Background 
both elements that brings about “an ideal procedure for deliberation and 
decision-making”.88  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, Habermas’ argument means that, as rationality 
is a social process that is the outcome of agreement during discourse, then 
legitimation places governments into a systemic process of exercising power 
that requires ongoing affirmation from the electorate. But how does this 
assumption sit with the rationality of a legal system that is structured to work 
relatively independent of government? The legal system receives ongoing input 
from government, as new legislation is written to conduct the business of 
governing through public policy and at the same time, government is mandated 
to operate within the limits of the law. As will be discussed in Chapter 6 — 
Politicisation of the Law, legislation does reflect the purpose of the legislator, in 
this case parliament, but these statutes must be situated within the legally 
rational code and the process of the law.  
 
One may conceptualise the rationality of the law as a system of rules and 
procedures which form part of the institutions of government. Together, these 
three components of rules, procedures and institutions give the law its rational 
character, with clearly identifiable features, predictable procedures and 
outcomes that exist regardless of which party is in office. The discussion earlier 
acknowledged that the use of rationalism can mean different things in every 
day usage. It should be possible that, where rationality and rationalism are 
separated for analytical purposes, they have the potential to unmask a 
communicative bias toward an ideological use of the rationality of the law. 
Within this distinction, rationality is the use of the law within its rational 
framework of rules, procedures, and institutions, whilst rationalism is the use of 
these for purposes that cannot be found within the rationality constructs of the 
law.  
 
                                            
88 Ibid., p. 246. 
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Legal rationality is only one of four aspects of the Howard government’s stated 
parameters for refugee policy. The broad discussion on refugee policy in the 
first part of this chapter suggests that the government may have placed 
excessive emphasis on the legal rules and procedures, when justifying the 
policy to the electorate. This thesis tests this suggestion. One would also 
expect from a legally-rational oriented policy that all parts of the policy — 
sovereignty, border protection, law-and-order and humanitarian outcomes — 
are applied more or less equally. Legal rationalism is defined as the process in 
which overriding emphasis is placed on the rules, procedures and rational 
instrumentality of the law. Rhetoric aimed at persuading an audience about the 
merits of the law does not constitute legal rationalism in itself, because the use 
of language does not necessarily influence the way in which the law operates. 
However, as will become apparent throughout this thesis, the rhetoric about 
the role of the law in refugee policy was, in the case of the Howard 
government, accompanied by a political process that drove institutional 
changes which significantly slanted the operation of the law into the direction 
of the political ideology of that government.  
 
The suggestion that the Howard government excessively pointed to the rules 
and procedures of the law as policy justifications, emerged from the research 
question. This question is: how, and to what extent, did the Howard 
government resort to legal rationalism when it justified its refugee policies to 
the electorate? If the answer suggests that the resort to legal rationalism was 
excessive, then this raises questions about the potential for political influence 
and power over the workings of the institutions of the state.  
 
The three case studies that we are about to enter follow, more or less, the 
chronological developments of events that shaped refugee policy, and this 
analysis is structured around how the Howard government framed and 
popularised these events. When following these events throughout the case 
studies, I will ask the question: did legal rationalism feature significantly as a 
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policy justification? The case studies conclude that legal rationalism was the 
dominant justification for the refugee polices, for the following reasons. First, 
legal rationalism emerged as a dominant pattern among other policy 
justifications. Second, the Howard government justified these policies to the 
public during media interviews and in parliamentary speeches in a way that 
framed refugee policies within the context of government ideology. Case Study 
1 — Showdown at Sea: The Tampa analyses how some policies were justified as 
the legal necessity to prevent refugees from arriving; externally through police, 
military and customs operations and internally through restrictions on refugee 
determination and settlement. Case Study 2 — Detention in the Desert: Woomera 
analyses how the government justified the practical delivery and enforcement 
of the policy of mandatory detention as the requirement of orderly process. 
Case Study 2 — Children in Detention analyses the government’s justifications for 
the effects of the policy of mandatory detention on children.  
 
From the description of the pattern of legal rationalism in these case studies 
emerge its three features: policy justifications predominantly as claims to legal 
rules and procedures, inconsistent application of these legal rules and 
procedures in practice, and systemically distorted information that assists the 
plausibility of these justificatory claims. I will argue that these features of legal 
rationalism, whilst inconsistent with the Howard government’s stated policy 
objectives, nevertheless form an integral part of government strategies for 
achieving these objectives.  
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The goal of the case studies is to answer the research question of how, and to 
what extent, if at all, the Howard government justified its refugee policies to 
the electorate by resorting to legal rationalism. For reasons set out in the case 
studies, this section argues that the government justified many of its decisions 
in refugee policy as legal necessities, while effectively making rhetorical 
recourse to legal rationality. Such rhetorical recourse to the law may be 
conceptualised as legal rationalism. This section endeavours to answer two 
questions: first, did such rhetorical manipulation for ideological purposes 
occur? Second, if legal rationalism did feature in the decision-making about 
refugee policies of the Howard government, was legal rationalism used 
occasionally, or was there an ongoing and systemic process that was integral to 
the delivery of refugee policy?  
 
Each case study begins with a story that illustrates how the Howard 
government justified its policy approaches. This is followed by an overview of 
how the Howard government justified its policy approaches as the case 
progressed chronologically. As has been pointed out, the government 
identified the policy goals of its refugee policies between 1999 and 2001 as 
sovereignty, legal-rational, orderly process, and humanitarian concerns, and 
frequently justified the policies within those parameters. In the three chapters 
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of this section, these four justifications make up the pool of possible policy 
justifications for the refugee policies that are examined in the case studies. 
 
This analysis tests for legal rationalism in two ways. First, it asked whether the 
Howard government used legal rationality as the dominant policy justification 
for its refugee polices between 1999 and 2003. A justification was deemed to 
be legally rational when a member of the Howard government justified the 
policy by pointing to the rules, procedures, or institutionalisation of the law. 
“Members of the Howard government” in this context are senior government 
ministers who made public statements that gave reasons for decisions and 
practices under refugee policy.  
 
It should be noted from the outset that the analysis failed to establish a 
dominance of legally rational inferences among the justifications for refugee 
policy in all cases. The Howard government used legal-rational justifications 
approximately equally with justifications that pointed to the sovereignty, 
orderly process, and humanitarian policy goals. At this point, these 
observations should have led to the conclusion that legal rationality was not 
always the dominant justification and that therefore, the Howard government 
did not overwhelmingly use legal rationalism to support its refugee policies.  
 
Such a simple conclusion, however, sat uneasily with another observation that 
was not anticipated before the analysis commenced. Policy practices abounded 
that were incongruent with the government’s justificatory language claims. For 
example, there were instances where a language claim was humanitarian, but 
such claim became questionable when accompanied by practices that were 
inconsistent with what could be expected from humanitarian language claims. 
Such inconsistency suggested that the prime concern was not humanitarian 
outcomes. Another layer was introduced to the analysis. Instead of analysing 
for statements of how members of the Howard government justified the 
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refugee policies, the policy practices were also analysed. The revised analysis is 
shown in Table 1.  
 
 
Table 1. Assessing Legal Rationalism as Language Claims and Practices. 
 
 Cases Language Claims Practices Legal 
Rationality 
 
 
Tampa 
• Sovereignty Issues 
• Legal Rationality 
• Orderly Process 
• Humanitarian 
Outcomes 
 
Congruent  
      or  
Incongruent 
 
Dominant  
      or 
Not Dominant 
 
 
Woomera 
• Sovereignty Issues 
• Legal Rationality 
• Orderly Process 
• Humanitarian 
Outcomes 
 
Congruent  
      or  
Incongruent 
 
Dominant  
      or  
Not Dominant Le
ga
l 
R
at
io
na
lis
m
 
 
 
Children 
• Sovereignty Issues 
• Legal Rationality 
• Orderly Process 
• Humanitarian 
Outcomes 
 
Congruent  
      or  
Incongruent 
 
Dominant  
      or  
Not Dominant 
 
 
Let us go back a step. Table 1 predicts four possible outcomes. First, legal-
rational language claims predominate as policy justifications, as suggested by 
the research question. Such dominance would indicate an overbearing recourse 
to the rules and procedures of legal rationality, and thus would be indicative of 
legal rationalism. A second outcome could be that the language claims consist 
of a mixture of several response types. Third, another of the four language 
claims predominates. Such a conclusion would refute the claim of the thesis. 
Fourth, no justification predominates, and the government justified its policies 
equally among all four policy parameters, as it claimed to. The fourth 
possibility would answer the research question by decisively refuting the claim 
of this thesis. Outcomes two and four would indicate a random distribution of 
policy justifications, and also refute the claim of the thesis. However, as I have 
begun to suggest, there may be the scope for the fourth outcome to be further 
interrogated in terms of practices that go beyond language claims. 
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The four language claims in Table 1 serve as ideal types that will guide the 
analysis of the case studies. The notion of ideal types is derived from sociologist 
Max Weber, who constructed them as a methodological tool to enable 
researchers to observe social behaviour against an ideal model that encapsulated 
the essence of such behaviour.1 Rather than existing in real life, the ideal type is 
an exaggeration for heuristic purposes:  a “one-sided accentuation” based on 
the “pure elements” of an analytical construct.2 In this thesis, the ideal 
descriptions will be used as a classificatory tool that helps map a pattern of the 
four possible policy justifications, based on ordinary usage of the words. For 
instance, a humanitarian ideal type shows mercy, benevolence, and compassion. 
One would not expect somebody operating from this ideal type to advocate 
torture or to administer corporal punishment. A sovereignty ideal type is primarily 
concerned with government, about a state making its own decisions within its 
territorial borders, and with having the power to regulate who crosses these 
borders. A legal-rational ideal type subscribes to the ideology of authoritatively 
settling disputes through the legal system, where pre-defined rules and 
procedures operate through the institutions of the state. Such an ideal type 
opposes martial law, or individuals fighting out their disputes in the streets. 
The orderly process ideal type presents a sense of unity, predictability and certainty, 
and carries out tasks methodically, in accordance with pre-defined rules. 
 
The visual presentation of the analysis in Table 1 may imply, incorrectly, that 
the case studies arrive at a frequency distribution of the policy justifications. 
Instead, these four policy justifications will be analysed for the intensity of their 
rhetorical value. This idea comes from Michael Billig’s methodology in his 
book, Arguing and Thinking.3 Billig’s focus is on the effects of rhetoric, not on 
conversational detail. Billig does not mean empty rhetoric constructed for 
                                            
1 Dirk Käsler, Max Weber. An Introduction to His Life and Work (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1988) pp.151-52. 
2 Kieren Allen, Max Weber. A Critical Introduction (London: Pluto Press, 2004) p. 77. 
3 Michael Billig, Arguing and Thinking. A Rhetorical Approach to Social Psychology, second 
ed. (Cambridge University Press and Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 1996). 
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entertainment purposes. His is a rhetoric that produces what Habermas refers 
to as “communicative rationality [as] the necessary condition of a free and 
rational society”.4 It is a rhetoric that leads to clearly identifiable material 
consequences. Rhetoric, as discussed in Chapter 1 — Theoretical and Political 
Background in relation to Habermas, hides a distortion and generates new 
meaning through intersubjective understanding in the taken-for-granted 
assumptions that lead to public acceptance of government policies. The aim, as 
Billig puts it, is not to examine detail but “to play with the text” in order to get 
to the punchline.5 
 
It [Billig’s method to identify rhetoric] does not analyze the precise words, in order to 
examine the text’s rhetorical stake, as the story leads up to the triumphant punchline. 
Instead, the chapter re-tells the tale, in its own words, in order to make its own 
point.6 
 
The punchline in these three case studies consists of identifying legal 
rationalism in its various empirical presentations, derived from the public 
discourse of the government’s justificatory language claims. As the analysis 
progressed, it became obvious that this discourse did not follow the categories 
set out in Table 1, but instead was more flexible than Table 1 suggests. Some 
of the ideal types overlapped, especially when the government framed some 
events as requiring a balanced approach that met the objectives of a legal-
rational, orderly process and sovereignty-oriented policy that was also humane. 
These mixed ideal type language claims created some ambiguity over how to 
categorise the justifications, and made this analysis less certain than if the 
Howard government had only ever used one ideal type at any given time. The 
reason for mentioning this now is not to build a “disclaimer” into this thesis, 
but rather to build greater confidence into the analysis by going beyond the 
government’s language claims and accessing additional material from academic 
                                            
4 Ibid. p. 16. 
5 Ibid. p. 21. 
6 Ibid. In the cited example, Billig uses text from the Talmud to argue that his method of 
analysing for rhetoric is more likely to get to meaning than the method of discourse analysis. 
Such discussion, however, goes beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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publications to assist with the interpretation of these language claims. Other 
information that helped interpret the language claims and policy practices of 
refugee policy often did not become known until after the case studies were 
initially drafted. This information came from official investigations that were 
made public after the events of the case studies had occurred. Additional 
information came from the Howard government’s subsequent policy 
justifications. Whilst this inadvertently stretched the timeframe of the case 
studies, such retrospectivity was necessary to argue the claim of this thesis with 
greater confidence than would have been otherwise possible.  
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On 23 August 2001, the Indonesian fishing vessel Palapa became distressed at 
high sea, about 160 km north of Christmas Island.1 Its 433 passengers survived 
the ordeal, and were rescued by the crew of the Norwegian freighter ship 
Tampa two days later. The Tampa sailed toward Merak in Indonesia, with the 
intention that the rescued passengers should disembark there. The survivors 
had boarded the Palapa for the purpose of claiming refugee protection from 
Australia, and had paid an exaggerated fee to people smugglers to bring them 
to Australia. Intent on arriving in Australia, the rescued survivors forced the 
Tampa crew to turn the ship around and sail toward the Australian outpost of 
Christmas Island. At this point, a standoff between the Australian and 
Norwegian governments began to emerge. The Australian government denied 
the Tampa entry into Australian waters, but after a five-day standoff over where 
the rescued passengers should disembark, Tampa captain Arne Rinnan ordered 
the ship into Australian waters near Christmas Island. In response, forty-four 
Australian soldiers boarded the ship on the morning of 29 August 2001. On 3 
September 2001, the Australian navy took the passengers from the Tampa to 
HMAS Manoora, and from there to a detention centre in Nauru. Among the 
rescued Tampa passengers were four Palapa crew. Australian Federal Police 
                                            
1 Except where otherwise indicated, the summary of the events in this and in the following 
paragraph  were taken from  chapters 1 and 2 of David Marr and Marian Wilkinson, Dark 
Victory (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2003). 
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arrested these four individuals, charged them with the offence of people 
smuggling and took them to the Christmas Island police station.2 
 
After arrival of the Tampa, refugee policy changed in three major ways. First, 
the Howard government significantly changed its policy of mandatory 
detention. Passengers from refugee boats would no longer mandatorily be 
taken to detention centres to have their refugee claims assessed. Under new 
legislation, the boats could instead be turned around. Second, the Howard 
government established refugee detention centres abroad; in Nauru and on 
Manus Island in Papua New Guinea. Third, islands in areas where refugee 
boats were most likely to arrive, were “excised” from Australian territory to 
prevent people from lodging refugee applications under the Australian legal 
system. The Howard government passed the legislation for the policy changes 
on the evening of 29 Aug 2001, about twelve hours after Australian soldiers 
boarded the Tampa. One month later, the Border Protection Act  received assent 
and was backdated to 27 August 2001.3  Effectively, the Act took effect one 
day before Tampa Captain Arne Rinnan sent the first emergency signal that 
asked for assistance from Australia.  
 
This chapter analyses the events that surrounded what has become known as 
the “Tampa crisis”, an incident that illustrates in practical ways the difference 
between legal rationality and legal rationalism. Throughout this analysis, the 
question will be asked: how did the Howard government justify these policy 
changes to the electorate? The analysis concludes that, although the Howard 
government justified these changes as necessary to preserve Australia’s 
sovereignty, legal rationalism was the dominant mode of justification. It will be 
argued throughout this chapter that the support for this conclusion comes 
from observations of inconsistencies between language claims and practices in 
refugee policy by senior members of the Howard government.  
                                            
2 Australian Federal Police, (2001, 4 September). Indonesian Crew Arrested and Charged 
(Media Release). 
3 Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement of Powers) Act 2001. 
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New framing of an old issue 
 
The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees sets out the rules on how member 
states ought to protect people who have left their home country on the basis of 
a realistic fear of death or persecution, when they seek to engage the protection 
of member states to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Article 36 of 
this Convention leaves the discretion of how to implement these principles of 
refugee rights to the signatory states.4 This stipulation gives much scope on 
how refugee protection is to be realised within the national borders of that 
state. Within this discretionary scope to implement refugee rights within 
Australia’s jurisdiction, the Howard government established two categories of 
refugees. As the refugees of interest to this thesis began to arrive at the end of 
1999, Immigration Minister Philip Ruddock described the government’s policy 
of treating refugees differently, depending on whether they arrived in 
“authorised” or “unauthorised” manner.5 The changes consisted of the issuing 
a Temporary Protection Visa that was valid for three years, the scrapping of 
family reunion, and combining the onshore and offshore refugee intake 
numbers. In the paper just cited, the Minister justified the changes in terms of 
restricted resources. Otherwise, Philip Ruddock argued, the “unauthorised 
arrivals” would take up resources that were set aside for the “authorised” 
arrivals. 
 
Journalist Peter Mares, known for his pro-refugee advocacy stance, concurred 
that the Minister’s logic based on resources and numbers was essentially 
                                            
4 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, (1951). Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees. 
5 Philip Ruddock, “Recognising the Real Challenge in Refugee Protection.” [e-Journal] 
Online Opinion (1999, 15 September).  
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unanswerable.6 In a personal interview with Peter Mares, the Minister argued 
that, unless Australia was prepared to take all of the 22,000,000 refugees, there 
would always be a cap on intake numbers and costs. The Howard government 
capped these resources at a total intake of 12,000 people, including both 
onshore and offshore refugees. Mares continues that this capped intake 
included not only refugees, but also people who entered Australia for other 
humanitarian reasons.  
 
Although the practical reasons in terms of lack of resources were compelling, 
there appeared also an underlying political implication for restricting resources. 
According to Frank Brennan, the link between onshore and offshore places to 
seek a maximum outcome for “refugees in greatest need” was “a moral 
calculus completely of the government’s own construction”.7 Brennan 
continues that, under the terms of the three-year Temporary Protection Visa, 
refugees took “the places of the offshore refugees who would be granted 
permanent residence”. In this reference just cited, Brennan’s argument was 
based on the presumption that, because the claim for refugee protection had to 
be reconsidered after three years, there already was  a cap on the number of 
successful refugee claims, and hence intakes. The Howard government worked 
from the opposite presumption. Regardless of the resources that were actually 
available, the argument that a limit had to be placed on such resources justified 
a policy that uncoupled onshore refugees (who also fitted the definition of 
“refugee” under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees) from their 
offshore counterparts.  
 
After the arrival of the Tampa, Philip Ruddock published a paper in the online 
discussion forum Online Opinion.8 In the online publication just cited, the 
                                            
6 Peter Mares, Borderline: Australia's Response to Refugees and Asylum Seekers in the 
Wake of the Tampa, Second ed. (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2002) 
pp.111-12. 
7 Frank Brennan, Tampering with Asylum. A Universal Human Problem (St. Lucia, Qsl: 
University of Queensland Press, 2003) p. 25. 
8 Philip Ruddock, “Australian Government Position on the MV Tampa Refugees.” [e-Journal] 
Online Opinion (2001, 15 October). 
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Minister justified the legal and policy changes by appealing to the goals of 
maintaining Australia’s sovereignty and combating international crime, and 
sharpened the dividing line for onshore and offshore refugees. The paper 
contained two broad changes to refugee law and policies, which will be 
discussed later in this chapter: the implementation of the Pacific Solution and 
changes to the Border Protection Act. Philip Ruddock continued with an outline 
of three distinct policy measures that impacted on the processing of refugee 
claims, according to where the boat first came in contact with Australian 
authorities. If such contact occurred at sea, officials had the discretion to turn 
the boat around, taking into account safety considerations such as weather 
conditions or seaworthiness of the vessel. If the boat arrived “in an excised 
shore place”, Ruddock continued, Australia would finance the operation of 
taking the passengers to a “declared place”. At the “declared place”, refugee 
protection claims would be conducted under the rules of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees, instead of under the more generous system 
of the Australian legal system. Third, if the boat entered “Australian territorial 
waters”, refugee claims would be assessed “under the coverage of Australia’s 
protection obligations”.  
 
In the paper, cited earlier, the Minister suggested two motives for the policy 
changes by the Howard government:9 First, these measures would send “the 
strongest possible message to smugglers and their clients” whilst, second, also 
observe Australia’s “international obligations” toward refugees. The same 
paper also outlined three arguments why a national legally rational framework, 
that offered fewer rights to refugees than under the previous policies, did not 
put Australia in breach of international law. First, a return to Indonesia did not 
constitute refoulement, because on return to Indonesia, passengers had access 
to Australian funded refugee assessment by officers of the International 
Organisation of Migration.10 Second, Australia retained the discretion to 
                                            
9 Ibid.  
10 Article 33.1 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defines refoulement as 
“no contracting state shall expel or return … a refugee to the frontiers or territories of a state 
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conduct refugee assessments abroad, because “there is nothing in the 
Convention that directs where those procedures take place”. Third, Philip 
Ruddock argued, the assessment under the rules of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, whilst different from the Australian assessment, 
was “adequate”. As will be seen in this chapter, these arguments by Philip 
Ruddock in favour of the post-Tampa refugee policies outlined a new legally 
rational framework that, for practical purposes, depended on the ability of the 
Howard government to physically prevent refugees from arriving in areas 
where they could lodge refugee applications under the Australian legal system. 
 
At the time of the arrival of the Tampa, neither the policy nor the legislation 
that applied at that time, had been written. Marr and Wilkinson wrote that 
when Captain Rinnan ordered the Tampa into Australian waters, he expected 
that the survivors would disembark at Christmas Island. Instead, the Australian 
government threatened to arrest and charge Rinnan with people-smuggling.11  
The international awards that Rinnan later won for his handling of the Tampa 
issue contrasted sharply with the Howard government’s view that Rinnan had 
engaged in criminal activity and threatened Australian sovereignty. Rinnan won 
several international awards, including the title Officer of the Norwegian Order of 
Merit and Shipmaster of the Year from Lloyds of London.12 The United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees honoured Rinnan with the Nansen Award, a 
distinguished recognition for “great personal courage and a unique degree of 
commitment to refugee protection”, in the face of the “risk of substantial 
delays and a large financial loss” to his employer.”13  
 
The way in which the Howard government framed the arrival of the Tampa 
gives a sense of the power of rhetoric to define material reality. As Arie Brand 
                                                                                                               
where his life or freedom would be threatened …” The avoidance of refoulement by member 
states is the strongest purpose behind the Refugee Convention. 
11 Marr and Wilkinson, Dark Victory, p. 292. 
12 Ibid. 
13 United Nations Information Service. (2001, 21 June) Secretary-General Pays Tribute to 
Winners of 2002 Nansen Refugee Award for Rescue of 438 Boat People in Indian Ocean 
(Media Release, number SG/SM/2879). 
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puts it, in his discussion on Habermas’ work in the Theory of Communicative 
Action: truth and falsity all depend “on the basis of a definition of the situation” 
that seems reasonable and is agreed to.14 Brand argues that Habermas views 
public discussion as a matter of “raising claims” among participants, mediated 
through the use of language that establishes a rationality basis for assessing 
these claims.15 According to this view, the rhetoric of the Howard government 
was not a matter of truth or falsity, but of downplaying some events and 
highlighting others in order to arrive at a version that was acceptable to the 
electorate. The pertinent question to the present analysis is: to what extent did 
the rhetoric reflect the stated policy goals? 
 
 
Entry without permission 
 
This section analyses how the Howard government framed the Tampa as a 
threat to Australian sovereignty, and how the logic of this framing became the 
basis in law and policy to deny entry to refugee boats in future.  
 
After the Tampa interrupted its voyage to Singapore and picked up the Palapa 
survivors and sailed toward Indonesia, the Tampa itself became the site of an 
emergency, as the rescued Palapa survivors put the crew under duress and 
demanded that the Tampa set course for Australia. The Australian government 
responded by framing this change of course as a threat to the sovereignty to 
Australia. Prime Minister Howard refused permission for the Tampa to enter 
Australian waters, and argued that the Tampa had nothing to do with Australia. 
He told Parliament that this was “a matter to be resolved between the 
government of Indonesia and the government of Norway”.16 Yet in some 
                                            
14 Arie Brand, The Force of Reason: An Introduction to Habermas' Theory of Communicative 
Action (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1990) p. 17. 
15 Ibid., p. 20. 
16 John Howard. (2001, 27 August). Question without Notice: Illegal Immigration: MV Tampa. 
Parliamentary Speech, House of Representatives. Official Hansard, p. 30,234.  
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ways, Australia was already involved, because the intention of the Palapa 
passengers to enter Australia had become linked with the safety of the Tampa 
crew. A Senate Inquiry learned later that, although the duress exerted by the 
rescued passengers did not endanger the lives of the Tampa crew, at the time of 
the event, Australian Search and Rescue personnel suspected a hijack and 
feared for the safety of the Tampa crew.17 In arguing from a sovereignty 
perspective, John Howard’s claim that this had nothing to do with Australia 
dismissed the safety issue for the Tampa crew, as it was understood at the time, 
and also ignored the underlying refugee issues behind these events. 
 
Those six days between the 23 August 2001, when the Palapa first became 
distressed in the Indian Ocean, and 29 August, when soldiers boarded the 
Tampa, set the scene for the framing of the Tampa’s movements as a national 
emergency. A Senate Inquiry learned later that Australian surveillance aircraft 
initially spotted the sinking Palapa, and that Australian Search and Rescue 
subsequently asked other ships in the area to pick up the Palapa survivors.18 
According to an expert on international protocol, the rescue by the Tampa 
should have been the end of Australian involvement, because once the 
passengers were safe, they should have been taken to Indonesia.19 But it was 
not the end of the matter. Marr and Wilkinson describe how on board the 
Tampa, which was designed to carry cargo rather than passengers, the situation 
worsened as overcrowding with approximately 450 people led to medical and 
sanitary problems that rendered the ship unseaworthy.20 The effects of effects 
of dehydration, dysentery and food poisoning in an overcrowded environment 
began to take hold, further complicated by lack of adequate number of toilets. 
These circumstances also provoked psychological problems and concerns for 
                                            
17 Commonwealth of Australia. (2002, 25 March – 30 July). Senate Select Committee on a 
Certain Maritime Incident (Official Committee Hansard). Statement by Clive Davidson, Chief 
Executive Officer, Australian Maritime Safety Authority. 1 May 2002. p. 1,381. 
18 Ibid., Statement by Mark Bonser, Rear Admiral, Director General, Coastwatch. 22 May 
2002, p. 1,642. 
19 Ibid., Statement by Clive Davidson, Chief Executive Officer, Australian Maritime Safety 
Authority. 1 May 2002, p. 1,375. 
20 The summary of the situation on board the Tampa comes from the description by Marr 
and Wilkinson, Dark Victory, pp. 68-72, 68, 123. 
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physical safety as passengers threatened suicide and other forms of self harm. 
Captain Rinnan sent several distress calls that Australian authorities did not 
answer, before ordering the Tampa to enter Australian waters.  
 
One day after Australian navy personnel boarded the ship, the Prime Minister 
framed this event as a threat to sovereignty brought about by the actions of the 
Tampa passengers: 
 
After picking them up—I stress, at the direction of the Indonesian search and rescue 
authorities—the MV Tampa then proceeded towards the Indonesian port of Merak 
where the ship had been granted approval—I repeat: the ship had been granted 
approval—to dock and for the group to disembark. However, under a form of 
duress, with some people threatening to jump overboard, the master turned the ship 
around and headed for Christmas Island … The current situation is that the Tampa is 
still lying within Australian territorial waters. It is our view that it should return to 
international waters.21  
 
John Howard here equated state sovereignty with territorial borders, and any 
crossing of borders as a violation of sovereignty. Sovereignty notions that 
linked the development of the modern nation-state with state borders 
developed in the 1800s, concurrently with notions of “national interests”, and 
nationalism as an ideology.22 The ideology of nationalism was expressed as 
“great nation advance and consolidation”, which closely related to territorial 
national borders that required protection.23 Developments in the late twentieth 
and early twenty-first centuries witnessed a “lowering” of borders driven by 
economic factors, with a concurrent magnification of “identity politics” that 
linked a human element of meaning and fate to these borders.24 In the context 
of the arrival of the Tampa, the Prime Minister linked the ideology of 
                                            
21 John Howard. 2001, 30 August). Question without Notice: Illegal Immigration: MV Tampa. 
(Parliamentary Speech, House of Representatives. Official Hansard. Commonwealth of 
Australia, p. 30,663.  
22 Tom Nairn and Paul James, Global Matrix. Nationalism, Globalism and State-Terrorism 
(London: Pluto Press, 2005) p. 11. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., p. 12. 
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nationalism as a form of identity with territorial borders and framed both as 
the safeguarding of Australia’s national interests by the military. 
 
Based on the ideology that borders required “protection” in the absence of 
war, rather than rules and procedures that regulate permission to cross them, 
the Howard government justified military intervention. This intervention 
consisted of two broad strategies: first, to deal with the Tampa and its rescued 
passengers and second, to formulate a policy on the assumption that all refugee 
boats threatened Australian interests, and hence required military involvement. 
First, a few words about how the second strategy that began with Operation 
Relex relates to this thesis on legal rationalism. Operation Relex transferred the 
usual functions of peacetime border surveillance from Customs to the Defence 
Department.25 At the time of its inception, the military operation was politically 
sensitive and under direct control of the Executive. Defence Minister Peter 
Reith personally set the “rules of engagement” for Operation Relex, with 
approval from the Prime Minister, as the Australian Defence Force practiced 
“a much more aggressive border control policy”.26 Usual media practices were 
restricted.27 The framing of refugee boats as a threat to Australia’s sovereignty 
not only provided a rationale for separating onshore from offshore refugees, as 
discussed earlier. Such framing also provided the legislative basis for treating 
refugees as illegal border crossers, as is discussed in Chapter 6 — Politicisation of 
the Law.  
 
As one commentator observes, the government’s military response was 
necessary when the Tampa disobeyed instructions not to enter Australian 
waters, but the Tampa was also a catalyst for changes to refugee policy.28 Here, 
the military presence not only visually displayed strength to keep outsiders out. 
                                            
25 Commonwealth of Australia. (2002, 25 March – 30 July). Senate Select Committee on a 
Certain Maritime Incident (Official Committee Hansard). Statement by Mark Bonser, Director 
General, Coastwatch, Australian Customs Service.  22 May 2002, p. 1,629. 
26 Brennan, Tampering with Asylum. A Universal Human Problem, p. 60. 
27 Marr and Wilkinson, Dark Victory, pp. 134-35. 
28 Michael Wesley, "Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy, 2001," Australian Journal of 
International Affairs 56, no. 1 (2002). 
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The military also became engaged in practices that uncoupled the refugees in 
the boats from refugee policy. This uncoupling, even if performed under the 
auspice of national sovereignty, required a new set of legal rules that changed 
how the Australian government interpreted its duty to protect refugees in 
accordance with the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Such policy 
extension, if politically motivated, has the potential to feed into legal 
rationalism. The framing of refugee applicants as a threat to sovereignty 
introduced the element of legal rationalism, because it would mean recourse to 
re-interpretative legislation for the purpose of denying entry to refugees under 
international law.  
 
The first strategy, the military involvement, began on 29 August 2001, when 
Australian soldiers boarded the Tampa. This strategy began to wind down 
about two weeks later, with the transportation of Tampa passengers to a 
detention centre in Nauru. When Australian soldiers boarded the Tampa, a Bill 
to authorise this move was rushed through Parliament later that day. These 
legal changes led to significant amendments to the Migration Act and to the 
Border Protection Act. The legalities of such changes based on the new 
perception, however, was far from resolved. Prime Minister John Howard 
indicated this when he told Parliament: “It is an unusual situation, but it does 
require a very quick comprehensive and unambiguous response from the 
representatives of the Australian people”.29 The Prime Minister said in the 
speech cited in the previous sentence that the Attorney General had already 
advised him that Parliament’s actions in relation to the Tampa were legal. This 
raises the speculation as to whether there was doubt about the other purpose 
of urgently re-writing the Border Protection Act, the purpose to the effect that 
refugee boats were equally considered a threat to national sovereignty.  
 
 
                                            
29 John Howard. (2001, 29 August). Border Protection Bill 2001: Second Reading. 
Parliamentary Speech, House of Representatives. Official Hansard. Commonwealth of 
Australia, p. 30,569.  
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It is acknowledged here that an understanding of the military involvement and 
changes to Australian legislation cannot be limited to an analysis of 
government rhetoric. On the contrary, the Tampa issue raised many legal 
arguments over international refugee and maritime law, over the constitutional 
powers of the executive to act when national borders are perceived to be under 
threat, and over the “right” of individuals to cross state borders to seek 
asylum.30 Nevertheless, it is arguable that the new legislation served as a pretext 
to keep future refugee boats out. This points to legal rationalism, where legal 
rationality facilitated an ideology behind the refugee policy. The difference 
between the legislative intent of parliament and utilising the law for an 
ideological purpose, and how this difference impinges on the interpretation of 
legislation in court judgements, will be discussed as an institutional issue in 
Chapter 6 — Politicisation of the Law. For now, I wish to infer from the Prime 
Minister’s urgent request for unambiguous legislation, at a time when he said 
that ordering soldiers to board the Tampa did not present a legal ambiguity, the 
possibility that the Border Protection Act was aimed at another purpose. 
Immigration Minister Ruddock alluded to this when framing refugee issues as 
sovereignty issues: 
 
Obviously, there will be circumstances in which vessels enter our territorial sea for 
unlawful purposes, and in such situations the law of the sea enables us to deal with 
such unauthorised entry. But the Bill is designed to put these matters beyond doubt 
as a matter of domestic law.31  
 
                                            
30 Such discussion goes beyond the scope of this thesis. For an exploration of the 
complexities of different legal constructions presented by various legal sources, of 
the ambiguities inherent in the legislation that was relevant to the arguments, and 
the political context that provoked these arguments, see: 
Mary Crock, “In the Wake of the Tampa: Conflicting Visions of International 
Refugee Law In The Management of Refugee Flows,” Pacific Rim Journal of Law 
and Policy, (2003) 12: pp 49-95. 
Saunders, Cheryl, Michael Taggart (eds), The Tampa Issue. (Riverwood, NSW: 
Lawbook Co, 2002). 
31 Philip Ruddock. (2001, 30 August). Matters of Public Importance: Illegal Immigration: MV 
Tampa. Parliamentary Speech, House of Representatives. Official Hansard. Commonwealth 
of Australia, p. 30,682.  
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The “certainty” that the Minister alluded to consisted of unambiguous 
language in the Border Protection Act that sought to remove the practices of 
refugee policy from the ambit of court decisions. Whilst clear and 
unambiguous legislation is desirable, one can observe a tendency toward 
ideological bias if the legislation is directed at achieving a political goal. This 
connection with the ideology of the Howard government became evident 
when clarity in legislation ensured that Australia, despite having signed the 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, did not a have legal obligation toward 
them, as long as Parliament framed them as a threat to Australian sovereignty. 
 
 
Tampa and a humanitarian policy 
 
This section explores how the Howard government justified the changes to 
refugee policy by arguing that these changes were necessary to deliver a 
humane policy. It should be noted that these arguments occurred concurrently 
with the earlier justifications by the Howard government, but have been 
separated here, for the purpose of analytical clarity.  
 
It should be noted here that in the material discussed in all three case studies, 
the humanitarian policy justifications emerged as the least persuasive. In Case 
Study 1 — Showdown at Sea: The Tampa, language claims about humanitarian aid 
were generally tied to the purpose of ensuring that the Tampa left Australian 
waters, or by pointing out that rendering of humanitarian assistance was to 
Australia’s detriment. This rhetoric about placing conditions on humanitarian 
assistance, or denying that such need exists in the first place, relates to what 
Michael Billig calls categorisation and particularisation.32 By drawing on 
observations from the field of psychology, Billig describes categorisation and 
particularisation as two opposing forces in human thought. Accordingly, the 
                                            
32 Michael Billig, Arguing and Thinking. A Rhetorical Approach to Social Psychology, second 
ed. (Cambridge University Press and Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 1996) pp. 160-62. 
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mind sorts incoming information (a stimulus) into categories (categorisation), 
but also attends to the unique features of the information (particularisation). 
Particularisation creates a “special case” that opposes “routine categorisation” 
and gives scope for stretching the category, due to the unique features of the 
special case. Billig argues the ability to conceptualise of information in 
accordance with this model bestows to humans the ability to construct 
arguments:  
 
Moreover, humans, through their use of language, possess that most important 
capability which makes rhetoric possible: the ability to negate. It is not just that we 
have different categories which we can apply to things; but we can argue the merits of 
categorising one way rather than another. One category can be placed in opposition 
to other potential categories. This opposition of categories might then be a matter for 
justification and criticism.33 
 
If, as Billig argues, rhetoric is a matter of juggling categories, then one 
appreciates that the framing of an event leads to justifications of how the 
matter was dealt with. Such was the case when Immigration Minister Ruddock 
framed refugee flight as a quest for opportunities that negated the surrounding 
humanitarian issues He told Parliament: “we have created an environment 
where as many as 2,500 people are sitting in Indonesia believing that it is more 
attractive to get to Australia.”34 Two days later, the Prime Minister framed this 
matter from a different perspective, when he categorised humanitarian refugee 
policy as a competition of interests between Australia’s national interests and 
the interests of individuals. Refusing permission to the Tampa became a matter 
of “balance against the undoubted right of this country to decide who comes 
here and in what circumstances.”35 Such categorisation, whilst adding rhetorical 
punch to public debate, omitted other factual information. As James Jupp 
                                            
33 Ibid., p. 165. 
34 Philip Ruddock. (2001, 27 August). Question without Notice: Illegal Immigration: 
Unauthorised Arrivals. Parliamentary Speech, House of Representatives. Official Hansard. 
Commonwealth of Australia, p. 30,236.  
35 John Howard. (2001, 29 August). Ministerial Statements: Illegal Immigration: MV Tampa. 
Parliamentary Speech, House of Representatives. Official Hansard. Commonwealth of 
Australia, p. 30,234.  
 
 
  
- 64 - 
Chapter 2 
Showdown at Sea — Tampa 
noted, Australian governments have decided who entered the country ever 
since the Immigration Restriction Act was proclaimed in 1901.36  
 
Framing a humanitarian response to the Tampa as a question of “balance” also 
assisted the Howard government to tip the balance in favour of its own 
political interests in the federal election of November 2001. During the 
politicised debate over how refugees ought to arrive in Australia, the phrase 
“we decide who comes into this country and the circumstances in which they 
come” became a major election slogan that was sent on postcards to voters in 
marginal seats just a few days before polling day.37 As Peter Mares observed: 
“The federal government’s response to the Tampa may have been questionable 
policy, but it was certainly good politics.”38 
 
The Howard government translated the “compromise” rhetoric between the 
competing interests of Australia and those of the Tampa refugees into a 
conditional form of humanitarian assistance. John Howard restricted 
humanitarian assistance to physical assistance, in the form of “food, water, 
medical supplies and safety equipment to enable the Tampa to leave with its 
recently acquired passengers”.39 In another speech to Parliament on the 
following day, John Howard stretched the particulars of the case, so that a 
need for humanitarian assistance also necessitated a need for military 
involvement. Despite the unseaworthiness of the Tampa and the unsanitary 
conditions on the overcrowded vessel, the Prime Minister indicated that 
previous requests for urgent medical assistance were exaggerated, which 
further strengthened the justification for military involvement: 
                                            
36 James Jupp, From White Australia to Woomera. The Story of Australian Immigration. 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002) p. 196. 
37 Andrew Markus, "Of Continuities and Discontinuities: Reflections on a Century of 
Immigration Control," in Legacies of White Australia, ed. Kanishka Jayasuriya, David 
Walker, and Jan Gothard (Crawley. WA: University of Western Australia Press, 2003) p. 
187. 
38 Mares, Borderline: Australia's Response to Refugees and Asylum Seekers in the Wake of 
the Tampa, p. 133. 
39 John Howard. (2001, 28 August). Question without Notice: Illegal Immigration: MV Tampa. 
Parliamentary Speech, House of Representatives. Official Hansard. Commonwealth of 
Australia, p. 30,359.  
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The government was left with no alternative but to instruct the Chief of the 
Australian Defence Force to arrange for Defence personnel to board and secure the 
vessel ... we have subsequently been advised by the ship's captain, in contradiction of 
earlier advice given, that the reason he decided to enter Australian territorial waters 
was that the spokesman for the survivors of the Indonesian vessel had indicated that 
they would begin jumping overboard if medical assistance was not provided quickly ... 
nobody — and I repeat: nobody — has presented as being in need of urgent medical 
assistance as would require the removal to the Australian mainland or to Christmas 
Island … The SAS personnel on the vessel have put it to the captain that the 
appropriate thing would be for the captain to return to international waters.40 
 
The framing of a need for military involvement also signified a major policy 
shift. As John Howard framed resorting to the military as repelling a 
sovereignty threat, it was also clear that “compassion for genuine refugees” 
was to occur through framing them within the context of border control.41 Yet 
there were “genuine” refugees on the Tampa, a possibility that the Prime 
Minister ignored when the rhetoric also excluded the need for compassion. 
Within this perceived hierarchy of competing claims, assistance was restricted 
to minimal levels. Foreign Minister Alexander Downer argued for “an 
outcome” that addressed “any humanitarian needs of the rescued passengers”, 
yet also framed this as a matter of observing “our immigration laws and our 
sovereign rights” -  a context that meant there was no obligation “to accept the 
rescued persons into Australian territory”.42 According to the rhetoric, the 
Howard government was taking measures to protect Australia from becoming 
a victim. On board the Tampa, the soldiers incurred the nickname “the 
humanitarian assistance workers”.43  
 
                                            
40 John Howard. (2001, 29 August). Ministerial Statements: Illegal Immigration: MV Tampa. 
Parliamentary Speech, House of Representatives. Official Hansard. Commonwealth of 
Australia, p. 30,516.  
41 Ibid. 
42 Alexander Downer. (2001, 28 August).  Question without Notice: Illegal Immigration: MV 
Tampa. Parliamentary Speech, House of Representatives. Official Hansard. Commonwealth 
of Australia, p. 30,360.  
43 Marr and Wilkinson, Dark Victory, p. 103. 
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The justifications for the government’s response can be evinced by reference 
to actions that achieved three overlapping policy goals: narrowly qualified 
humanitarian assistance, sovereignty and legal considerations. However, some 
“justifications” were so circumstantial, they barely deserve mention. For 
instance, Immigration Minister Philip Ruddock told Parliament that it was 
physically impossible to let the Tampa in, because this would destroy the 
moorings at Christmas Island.44 The issue was about refugees entering 
Australia, not about finding a harbour capable of accommodating large ocean 
liners. When it later suited the government, passengers were transferred on to 
naval boats in deep water, as they were taken to Nauru. Similar rhetoric 
became evident when Philip Ruddock deflected from Australia’s restricted 
humanitarian assistance by accusing the Norwegian government of lacking 
compassion: 
 
One could be forgiven for thinking that the matter that is driving those who want to 
see a resolution of these issues by forcing these survivors on Australia in these 
circumstances has more to do with commercial profit and getting the vessel back on 
the line than it has to do with the circumstances of the individuals involved … There 
have been no offers from those who own the ship to bring humanitarian assistance to 
bear, and yet they use agents around the world, they ply their trade around the world 
and gain commercial advantage from that …   I do not know whether the Norwegian 
government was complicit in it or not, but certainly the captain was determined to 
bring the vessel into our territorial waters.45 
 
In reality, the shipping company had already provided humanitarian assistance 
by rescuing the survivors, and continued to incur financial losses until the 
Tampa was able to resume course. Here, Philip Ruddock’s rhetoric turned the 
argument around and implied how humanitarian the Australian policies were, 
which in turn served as a justification for restricting assistance to the Tampa. 
                                            
44 Philip Ruddock. (2001, 29 August). Illegal Immigration: MV Tampa. Parliamentary 
Speech, House of Representatives. Official Hansard. Commonwealth of Australia, p. 30,520.  
45 Ruddock. (2001, August 30). Matters of Public Importance: Illegal Immigration: p. 30,682. 
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However, it is suggested here that the government’s humanitarian assistance 
lacked generosity. 
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Morphing borders, morphing policies 
 
As will be seen throughout the case studies, orderly process as a policy goal in 
refugee policy was as much about regulation as it was about regulating in order 
to exclude. In this speech, Immigration Minister Philip Ruddock encapsulated 
how the ideology of orderly process also contained the hidden meaning of 
skewing such process toward a differentially orderly process for at least some 
refugees: 
 
Australia does accept its international obligations and does so honourably. It exercises 
them conscientiously, but it does not accept that our refugee and humanitarian 
program will be managed by people smugglers.46  
 
Yet the new policy direction contained in this announcement did precisely 
what Ruddock denied. The new Border Protection Act and resulting changes to 
the processing of refugee applications were directed at controlling people 
smuggling operations. At the same time, the legislation to effect this change 
had to introduce a new category of criminal: the “people smuggler”. A more 
detailed discussion of this legislation will commence shortly. For now, I only 
wish to highlight the impact of these changes on the institutions of the state. 
The link with orderly process and international crime syndicates was rhetorical: 
irrespective of their mode of arrival, most applicants were refugees. If such a 
link was not rhetorical, the legislation may have resulted in charging refugees in 
relation to this crime, perhaps with aiding and abetting the criminal activity of 
people smuggling or being an accessory to a crime. I do not advocate such 
measures, but merely wish to point out that the link between an orderly 
                                            
46 Philip Ruddock. (2001, 28 August). Illegal Immigration: Unauthorised Arrivals. 
Parliamentary Speech, House of Representatives. Official Hansard. Commonwealth of 
Australia, p. 30361.  
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process in refugee policy and international crime syndicates was about 
formulating a new deterrent policy, under the auspice of orderly process.  
 
The new legal changes, aimed at reducing “the continuing influx of 
unauthorised arrivals to this country”, were framed as assisting orderly 
process.47 Yet achieving this ideologically motivated goal relied on feeding the 
revised notion of an orderly process through the institutions of the state. In the 
speech quoted at the beginning of this paragraph, Philip Ruddock said that 
“the second major challenge” to an effective operation of the Migration Act was 
“the increasingly broad interpretations given by the courts to Australia’s 
protection obligations”. Therefore, the Minister continued, his proposed 
changes would give “clear legislative guidance” to curtail such “generous 
interpretations” by the judiciary.48 In a process of orderly exclusion, the new 
changes were specifically aimed at curtailing the interpretative powers of the 
courts. The Immigration Minister argued that, “because the law has already 
been determined”, passed by parliament and applied by the Refugee Review 
Tribunal, there was no need to go to the courts.49 Yet the Minister himself, as 
will be noted in Chapter 6 — Politicisation of the Law, frequently litigated against 
court decisions that he did not approve of: 
 
I am the most litigious minister of the Commonwealth, with over 2,000 cases 
currently before the courts. Why would you not want to put in doubt the possibility 
of legal actions that would prevent the exercise of these powers? It is not just a 
question of putting it beyond doubt in terms of its legality; it is a question of putting it 
beyond doubt in terms of the possibility to argue that there may be a case for doubt.50 (Italics 
added). 
 
                                            
47 Philip Ruddock. (2001, 28 August).  Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 6) 2001: 
Second Reading. Parliamentary Speech, House of Representatives. Official Hansard. 
Commonwealth of Australia, p. 30,420. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., p. 30,236.  
50 Ruddock. (2001, 30 August). Matters of Public Importance: Illegal Immigration: MV 
Tampa, p.30,682.  
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One may view the legal and policy changes since the Tampa as a development 
of how the Howard government established a legal structure that removed 
judicial influence from the delivery of refugee policy. To a large extent, this was 
achieved through an overbearing appeal to the rules, a feature that was 
characteristic of legal rationalism where rules featured as ends in themselves. 
Fetishising the rules, justified by an appeal to orderly process, led to concrete 
outcomes in terms of political power and structural changes. The strategies by 
which this was achieved will be discussed in Chapter 6 — Politicisation of the 
Law. But first, more discussion is needed on the case studies to illustrate the 
Howard government’s preferences of how the rules ought to be interpreted.  
 
The perception that orderly process of refugee policy was under threat was 
further augmented when in December 2001, the mere sighting of a boat 
prompted the Howard government to write more legislation designed to 
prevent refugees from reaching Australia. At that time, the government 
“temporarily excised” four islands near Carnarvon “as a precaution after the 
sightings of a boat sailing toward the mainland on the weekend” was suspected 
of “possibly carrying illegal entrants”.51 Here, one gets a sense of legislation 
being directed specifically against refugees, as well as being suitable for 
assisting a politicised campaign against refugees. The passing of legislation for 
such political and ideological purposes is part of the pattern of legal 
rationalism.  
 
                                            
51 Philip Ruddock. (2001, 17 December). Temporary Excision  (Media Release MPS 
111/2002).  
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The end of mandatory detention 
 
The new Border Protection Act retrospectively legalised all actions taken by the 
government in relation to the Tampa, and other refugee boats that arrived 
since.52 Under this legislation, officers became authorised to search people and 
boats in national and international waters without a warrant, to detain people 
in their boats or on military vessels, to forcibly return persons to their vessel, 
or to take individuals to Australia or elsewhere. Schedule one of the Migration 
Act transferred the oversight from Customs to the military, and authorised 
customs officials to use similar powers as defence personnel.  
 
David Marr and Miriam Wilkinson viewed the government’s recourse to the 
military as a political opportunity before the pending election.53 Accordingly, 
some members of the Howard government argued from early 2001 that the 
navy should be utilised to send back the boats. However, when the Tampa 
approached in August, John Howard was still undecided about this option. At 
that time, Indonesia had already rejected a plan for Australia to finance a 
detention centre in Indonesia to prevent boats from travelling to Australia. 
Additional pressure, Marr and Wilkinson suggest, came from the already 
overfilled detention centres inside Australia. Furthermore, there had been 
escapes from the Villawood detention centre and another boat with 340 
passengers had arrived at Christmas Island.  
 
The Howard government framed the passing of the new legislation as “a 
strong message to people smugglers and their clients that Australia is not a soft 
touch and that the government will continue to demonstrate leadership in 
                                            
52 Amendment of the Customs Act, 1901. Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement of 
Powers) Act. 
53 Marr and Wilkinson, Dark Victory, pp. 46-47. 
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protecting our borders”.54 Marr and Wilkinson suggest that the Tampa 
presented itself as “an opportunity for Howard to show Canberra was in 
control”.55 As the Tampa was sailing toward Australia, the Prime Minister told 
listeners of Melbourne’s 3AW radio station:  
 
Many of them are frightened to go back to those countries and we are faced with this 
awful dilemma of on the one hand trying to behave like a humanitarian decent 
country, on the other hand making certain that we don’t just become an easy touch 
for illegal immigrants … You see the only alternative strategy I hear is really the 
strategy of using our armed forces to stop the people coming and turning them back. 
Now for a humanitarian country that is not an option.56 
 
But this is in effect what happened. Three days later, the Howard government 
rushed the Border Protection Bill through Parliament; legislation that authorised 
the armed forces to turn the boats around. However, the passengers were not 
sent “to those countries” that the Prime Minister referred to in the radio 
broadcast quoted above. Instead, as will be seen shortly, refugees were forced 
back to Indonesia, or taken into newly established detention centres to Nauru 
and New Guinea. At face value, John Howard’s statement was about a 
humanitarian policy. There was no mention of the law or of sovereignty. Yet, 
the Prime Minister also outlined the legitimacy of two competing claims that 
served as justification for the change in refugee policy: by contrasting a strong 
commitment to humanitarian values with the outcome of being perceived as an 
“easy touch”, John Howard also left open the possibility that some 
qualifications may be imposed on a humanitarian policy. Three days later, the 
Prime Minister directed soldiers to “take whatever action was necessary to stop 
the Tampa from moving into or further into Australian territorial waters.57 The 
new policy retained minimalist humanitarian elements in that “obviously 
                                            
54 Philip Ruddock. (2001, 26 September). Australia's Border Integrity Strengthened by New 
Legislation (Media Release, number MPS 164/2001). 
55 Marr and Wilkinson, Dark Victory, p. 47. 
56 John Howard on Radio 3AW, cited in Ibid. 
57 Howard. (2001, 29 August). Ministerial Statements: Illegal Immigration: MV Tampa. 
Parliamentary Speech, House of Representatives. Official Hansard. Commonwealth of 
Australia, p. 30,516 
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vessels will not be sent back to the high seas in circumstances where that 
would endanger people’s lives.”58 It was also clear that the goal to repel all 
threats to Australian sovereignty, no matter how slight, dominated the 
humanitarian goals.  
 
Then, the policy shift occurred, with the Prime Minister linking the Tampa with 
refugee boats. This is a good example of legal rationalism. John Howard said 
that the purpose of the new legislation was to ensure that in future, boats did 
not have the authority to enter Australian waters.59 As the words imply, 
“unauthorised vessels” never had such authority. But now, the law identified 
refugee boats as a threat to sovereignty, without alluding to the possibility that 
these may be refugee boats, as John Howard continued in his speech to 
Parliament quoted earlier in this paragraph:  “There is no doubt that the 
integrity of the borders of Australia has been under increasing threat from the 
rising flood of unauthorised arrivals.” Under the terms of the Pacific Solution, as 
the new policy known became known, defence personnel turned around 
refugees at sea or took them to detention centres abroad. Whilst this policy 
was officially about intercepting illegal border crossers, it was written in a 
political context of turning refugees away: 
 
The [previous] Border Protection Act gave the government powers to intercept 
vessels in international waters and it gave officers power to board, search and detain 
vessels where they suspected that people smuggling is involved, and we have been 
doing this - we have been using these powers. But they have not been as effective as 
we would have liked.60 
 
These initial decisions of where passengers from the intercepted boats would 
go, which significantly impacted on the processing of refugee claims, were not 
                                            
58 Ruddock. (2001, 30 August). Matters of Public Importance: Illegal Immigration: MV 
Tampa, p. 30,682. 
59 Howard.  (2001, 29 August). Border Protection Bill 2001: Second Reading,  p. 30,569.  
60 Philip Ruddock. (2001, 30 August). Questions without Notice: Illegal Immigration: Border 
Protection. Parliamentary Speech, House of Representatives. Official Hansard. 
Commonwealth of Australia, p. 30,666.  
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made by refugee assessment personnel, but by naval and customs personnel. 
The new legislation resulted in mandatory sentencing with mandatory non-
parole periods for people smugglers.61 But the law went beyond utilising the 
armed forces to keep refugee boats away, and also impacted on the legal 
system. The new legislation also granted a qualified immunity to “the 
Commonwealth, or a Commonwealth officer, or any other person who acted 
on behalf of the Commonwealth”, whilst acting under the provisions of this 
legislation.62 The wording of the legislation made it clear that prosecution of 
individuals for breaches of criminal or civil law could occur solely at the 
discretion of Parliament. This established the potential for the ideology of legal 
rationalism to determine how the law would be applied in the politicised 
context of refugee boats. This legislation, which introduced a privative clause 
under section 157 of the Border Protection Act, had significant repercussions for 
the structure of the state and will be discussed again in Chapter 5 — 
Bureaucratic Process and Ministerial Power. 
 
Officers were authorised to board or detain a boat at high sea, or to disable the 
vessel, and to use “reasonable force” for this purpose.63 Under its new powers, 
the Border Protection Act stipulated that “any restraint on the liberty” resulting 
from such detention was not unlawful, and the legality of detention of 
individuals affected by the laws could not be challenged in court.64 Although 
those taken to detention centres were deprived of their liberty, the Howard 
government carefully avoids the word “arrest”. This is another example of 
legal rationalism, where rhetoric minimises the impact of the policies on 
individuals. It also raises the question of how much damage individuals can 
suffer as the consequence of the legitimate and routine exercise of state power. 
These questions will be revisited when discussing how the courts contemplated 
the relationship between the law and the psychiatric damage sustained whilst in 
                                            
61 Amendment to the Migration Act, 1958. Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement of 
Powers) Act. 
62 Ibid., Schedule 7 (1). 
63 Migration Act 1958 No 157 (2001 as Amended) 1958, Section 245. 
64 Ibid., Section 245D (8A). 
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immigration detention by then six-year old Shayan Badraie, the teenagers 
Alumdar and Muntazar Bakhtiyari, Mr Behrooz, and two men identified only 
as “S” and “M”.   
 
As refugee policy became fused with defence policy, military and customs 
officers decided at sea whether to take a person to “the migration zone” or to 
“a place outside Australia.65 The detention of refugees thus no longer was 
mandatory but discretionary. Customs officials and military personnel 
exercised such discretion, without a legal requirement that such officers had 
formal qualifications in refugee assessment procedures. Section 245 (18) (a) of 
the Migration Act confers such powers to “any person in command or a 
member of the crew”. Section 245FB (1) legitimates the use of force to detain 
a person on an Australian ship and to subsequently return the detained person 
to their vessel. The Prime Minister justified the new powers and the bypassing 
of the court system in the absence of a physical threat as a matter of Australian 
sovereignty: 
 
The protection of our sovereignty, including Australia’s sovereignty to determine who 
shall enter Australia, is a matter for the Australian government and its Parliament. 
Consequently, sections 4, 8 and 9 ensure that a direction given under section 4, and 
actions taken as a consequence of that direction, will not be eligible to be challenged 
in any court in Australia. In particular, the Bill confirms that the person on board the 
vessel will not be able to seek to delay the removal from the territorial sea under the 
Migration Act.66 
 
Through the end of the mandatory detention of refugees, the ideology of legal 
rationalism manifested itself in two ways. First, the law supported the 
government’s ideological agenda that refugees should be kept out of Australia. 
Through the denial of entry of onshore refugees to Australia meant that 
offshore refugees were considered almost exclusively as the only legitimate 
refugee source. Second, the legislation served government ideology by 
                                            
65 Ibid., Section 245D (8B). 
66 Howard. (20001, 29 August).  Border Protection Bill 2001: Second Reading, p. 30,569.  
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enhancing the power of Parliament within existing state structures. The 
discussion in this section identified how the Howard government set the legal 
groundwork that allowed for later manipulation of these rules through 
language claims and policy practices.  
 
 
Detention of refugees abroad 
 
The detention of refugees abroad under the Pacific Solution meant that onshore 
applicants could apply for refugee entitlements from Australia. The Prime 
Minister justified this step by framing refugee boats as giving rise to a national 
emergency, and claimed that the previous system had disadvantaged Australia: 
 
Something has to be done internationally to ensure that people who seek to be 
treated as refugees are commonly, fairly and equitably assessed, and that is not 
happening now ...  what is happening with people smuggling is that the principle of 
fairness is being grossly violated. We hope that, by the action we have taken in 
relation to the Tampa, we have not only upheld the principles of international law 
and acted in Australia's national interests but also sent a message of our concern to 
the rest of the world, the international community, regarding the situation that has 
developed.67 
 
One outcome of the Pacific Solution was a refugee assessment system with fewer 
rules and processes to ensure fairness toward refugees. The Immigration 
Minister supported the Prime Minister’s claim to add that Australia was being 
treated unfairly by other countries. Philip Ruddock, when responding to 
international criticisms that Australia had closed its borders to refugees, said 
that “lamentably”, the international community ignored Australia’s concerns.68 
                                            
67 Howard. (2001, 29 August). Ministerial Statements: Illegal Immigration: MV Tampa, p. 
30,516. 
68 Philip Ruddock. (2001, 30 August). Question without Notice: Illegal Immigration: Border 
Protection. Parliamentary Speech, House of Representatives. Official Hansard. 
Commonwealth of Australia, p. 30,666.  
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Here, the Prime Minister and the Immigration Minister implied that Australia, 
rather than refugees, deserved considerations of fairness. It is a theme on state 
power that will be discussed in the next section. 
 
The link between people smugglers and refugee boats was unarguable, because 
people smugglers steered refugee boats to Australia. Political and economic 
analyst in Southeast Asian affairs Greg Clancy supports the government’s view 
that onshore refugees are essentially people smuggling operations.69 In the 
article just cited, Clancy views the onshore refugee matter as a clash of interests 
between the aspirations of people smugglers and their paying customers with 
Australia’s national interests, and implies that the Howard had to stop the 
boats. Accordingly, the ever increasing number of boats during 2001 meant 
that “at some point the Australian government would be forced to act”.70 In 
this context, Clancy claimed that any electoral gain arising from this was 
irrelevant, because “the government had acted in the interests of the 
community at large.”71  
 
The notion that the Howard government’s response to refugee boats was 
inevitable, or that people smugglers prompted such action, was only part of the 
story. Other evidence suggests that, by closing “legitimate” channels of entry 
to refugees, western nations actually encouraged the international people 
smuggling trade. Frank Brennan observed in his book, Tampering with Asylum, 
that Europe had already practiced the framing of refugee policy was as an anti-
people smuggling policy for almost a decade.72 Accordingly, Germany 
developed a model during 1992 and 1993, which “has since been replicated by 
many first-world countries.” This model, as Brennan explained in his 
comparative analysis of refugee policies in western countries, maintained a 
refugee protection program, but excluded those people who had travelled 
                                            
69 Greg Clancy, The People Smugglers. The People Smuggling Industry and the Secret 
Costs to Australia (Gordon, NSW: Sunda Publications, 2002). 
70 Ibid., p. 104. 
71 Ibid., p. 108. 
72 Brennan, Tampering with Asylum. A Universal Human Problem, pp. 74-75. 
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through countries where they would previously have been safe. Through 
several legislative changes, the European Union effectively closed its border in 
1995 to citizens “of countries affected by civil war and unrest”. One may view 
this development as the criminalisation of refugee flight: 
 
The success of first-world governments in closing the legal routes gave rise to the 
phenomenon of people smugglers who for a fee will engage in criminal behaviour in 
order to deliver the asylum seeker to a country with a transparent asylum process.73 
 
When linking this international development to the Australian context, 
Brennan observes that around 1999 and 2000, as the political situation in Iraq 
and Afghanistan deteriorated, “people smugglers were offering cheaper deals 
to Australia than to Europe”.74 This observation makes Australia an accidental, 
rather than a carefully chosen, destination by onshore refugees, and suggests 
that claims that the passengers are wealthy people may be exaggerated. 
Arguments that view onshore refugees from the people smuggling perspective 
tend to play down the refugee component. One example is how Robert 
Illingworth, Assistant Secretary of the Onshore Protection Branch of the 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, interprets the increase in 
the number of onshore refugees: “…between July 1999 and April 2001, 7,484 
people arrive[d] unauthorised in Australia by boat”, and among those, “there 
has been an increase in the percentages of these arrivals who presented 
protection claims”.75 The problem intensifies, according to Illingworth, “when 
smuggled people also seek refugee status”, because this limits the sovereign 
right to decide who can enter and stay.”76 In support of the argument of the 
government’s framing of refugees as a people smuggling issue, Illingworth 
concludes that the “single most serious threat to the continued viability of the 
international protection system” arises through the combination of “illegal 
                                            
73 Ibid., p 76. 
74 Ibid., p. 106. 
75 Robert Illingworth, "Durable Solutions: Refugee Status Determination and the Framework 
of International Protection," in The Refugee Convention 50 Years On, ed. Susan Kneebone 
(Aldershot,  England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003) p. 95. 
76 Ibid., p. 97. 
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entry” with the choice of “country of protection and [the achievement of] a 
simultaneous migration outcome.”77  
 
These arguments about people smugglers and the impact on state resources 
ignored the increasing international need for refugee protection, which may 
have generated the refugee flight in the first place. Instead, the Howard 
government increasingly directed its framing of the refugee issue in terms of 
Australia’s national interests and responded by isolating these refugees from 
Australia’s legal obligations toward refugees. Measures to refine the legal 
framework for that purpose were in place well before the Tampa arrived. It was 
a matter of extending existing legislation and existing policies to support the 
Howard government’s ideology of framing refugees in public discourse. 
 
Such measures were under consideration one year before the Tampa arrived. 
Foreign Minister Alexander Downer mentioned this plan during the Tampa 
issue.78 Accordingly, the Minister sought to combine refugee policy with “the 
broader issue of people smuggling” through a regional arrangement with 
Indonesia, the International Organisation of Migration and the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees since April 2000. However, it was not until 
the post-Tampa legislation that a national legal framework primarily considered 
the new refugee policy as an anti-people smuggling operation. This framing of 
refugee issues as criminality issues was characteristic of legal rationalism, 
because it allowed the Howard government to justify the ideology behind 
refugee policy as a legal necessity to protect Australian interests. The rhetorical 
recourse to the law disguised that refugee policies had become people smuggler 
policies, and thereby uncoupled the legal statutes from their original purpose of 
protecting refugees. 
 
                                            
77 Ibid. 
78 Alexander Downer. (2001, 29 August). Question without Notice: Illegal Immigration: 
People-Smuggling. Parliamentary Speech, House of Representatives. Official Hansard. 
Commonwealth of Australia, p 30522. [Downloaded 15 March 2004].  
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One outcome of these legislative changes was the Pacific Solution. Peter Mares 
summarises the fast-forwarding of the events of setting up detention centres 
abroad: 
 
By Saturday, 1 September, it looked as if the government’s impulsive decision to 
block the Tampa might backfire. Its draft legislation had been defeated, Indonesia’s 
president was refusing to even take a phone call from John Howard and Australia’s 
actions had provoked a storm of international criticism. SAS commandos were on 
board the Tampa but the ship was going nowhere and remained inside the 12-mile 
exclusion zone around Christmas Island … Urgent cables had been sent to the heads 
of Australian diplomatic missions around the region, instructing them to sound out 
their host governments about the possibility of warehousing asylum seekers on 
Australia’s behalf. Diplomats were given to understand that they had an open 
checkbook to get results … In the end, it was near-bankrupt Nauru that agreed to 
help.79 
 
The other developments were also highlighted in Peter Mares’ research.80 On 3 
September, the refugee applicants left the Tampa and boarded the naval vessel 
HMAS Manoora. The government deployed naval vessels and aircraft to patrol 
the “north-western approaches” to Australia. On 9 September, Defence 
Minister Peter Reith struck an agreement with Nauruan President Rene Harris 
that the Tampa passengers, and other people who were picked up by the naval 
patrols, would be held on Nauru for a maximum of six months. This contract 
was re-negotiated in December 2001 and extended to keep asylum seekers in 
Nauru “as long as reasonably necessary”. Subsequent information revealed that 
this agreement was re-negotiated again in 2004, at the cost of $22.5 million.81 
 
Peter Mares’ research gives insights into the huge expenses of these 
arrangements to Australia.82 The deployment of the naval troops at Christmas 
                                            
79 Mares, Borderline: Australia's Response to Refugees and Asylum Seekers in the Wake of 
the Tampa, p. 125. 
80 Ibid. pp. 126-28. 
81 Orietta Guerrera, "Deal Keeps Nauru for Asylum Seekers," Age, 6 March 2004. 
82 Mares, Borderline: Australia's Response to Refugees and Asylum Seekers in the Wake of 
the Tampa, pp. 126-30. 
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Island to deal with the cost $3 million per day. Coast surveillance costs “were 
estimated at $20 million per week”. Initial aid money to Nauru, in return for 
agreeing to host the refugee applicants, amounted to $20 million. This was 
followed by “promises of $10 million in development assistance” in December 
2001, “in return for agreeing to detain an additional 400 asylum seekers”. 
Mares continues that in October 2001, the Howard government  negotiated 
with Papua New Guinea a detention centre on Manus Island to host 200 
asylum seekers, initially for six months.83 Information from the Department of 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs reveals that in January 2002 alone, the 
government sent an additional one hundred and eighty people from the 
Christmas Island detention centre to Manus Island and Nauru.84  
 
Most of the money was directed at keeping refugees out, rather than toward 
assisting refugees. In what Mares85 calls a “glaring imbalance”, the Howard 
government spent between 2000 and 2001 a total of $572 million on matters 
pertaining to “unauthorised boat arrivals”. Of this, the $11 million spent on 
“funding migration agents to provide application assistance” contrasted sharply 
with the government’s “core grant” of $14 million dollars during this period.  
 
John Howard announced that New Zealand accepted 150 of the 433 Tampa 
passengers.86 For the remaining 302 who went to Nauru, the new refugee 
policy had dire consequences. Under the new assessment rules, the refugee 
applications were successful in only 79 cases.87 This contrasted sharply with 
results when assessments were conducted in Australia, where most boat 
passengers in the past had passed the refugee tests, either immediately or as the 
result of legal appeals. For those 79 refugees who went to Nauru in September 
                                            
83 Ibid., p. 130. 
84 Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. (2002, 1 February). 180 Asylum 
Seekers Transferred to Manus and Nauru (Media Release, no. DPS 6/2002).  
85 Mares, Borderline: Australia's Response to Refugees and Asylum Seekers in the Wake of 
the Tampa, pp. 236-37. 
86 John Howard. (2001, 1 September). MV Tampa - Unauthorised Arrivals  (Media Release, 
not numbered). [Prime Ministerial Website].   
87 Cynthia Banham, "They're In: Tampa Refugees PM Wanted Out," Sydney Morning 
Herald, 3 September 2003. 
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2001, freedom was a long way off. In July 2003, Australia accepted 26 people 
from this group, almost one year after confirmation of their refugee status. 
Freedom came only at the insistence of the Nauruan authorities, which 
prompted Philip Ruddock to say: “the only reason this is occurring is because 
we have an agreement with Nauru that refugees do not remain there.”88 
 
The Minister’s comment cited in the previous sentence testifies to the selective 
commitment of the Howard government to international obligations that was 
indicative of legal rationalism. Some refugees could come to Australia, as long 
the agreement with Nauru meant that the vast majority could not. Had 
Australian refugee policy been humanitarian, instead of a legal manoeuvre 
enforced by the military, the government would have accepted the Tampa 
refugees earlier. The cited comment also contradicted Philip Ruddock’s 
justificatory claim in August 2001, when he said that people spent a long time 
in detention because they used their right of appeal, and that removing appeals 
rights from the legal process would lead to a shorter time in detention, and 
hence greater certainty.89 There is even a hint at the suggestion that under the 
new legal rules, refugees may remain in detention unless external pressures 
prompted their release.  
 
After the politicisation of the Tampa subsided, the Howard government 
justified its refugee policies less in terms of sovereignty issues and more as 
attempts to stop people smugglers. One year after the Tampa, Immigration 
Minister Philip Ruddock stated in a media release that the Pacific Solution 
thwarted the criminal activities of people smugglers and also resulted in a 
humanitarian outcome for the asylum seekers without exhausting Australia’s 
resources.90 Accordingly, the Minister announced that no boat has arrived for 
one year, and that “most importantly, the new measures have stopped people 
                                            
88 Mike Steketee, "Australia Accepts Refugees," Herald Sun, 29 July 2003. 
89 Ruddock. (2001, 27 August). Question without Notice: Illegal Immigration: Unauthorised 
Arrivals, p. 30,236.  
90 Philip Ruddock. (2001, 17 December). No Boats for Twelve Months (Media Release, 
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risking their lives in dangerous journeys organised by unscrupulous people 
smugglers”, with the additional benefit “to ensure that the asylum system 
protects those at greatest risk and is not abused by those seeking migration 
outcomes”.  
 
Philip Ruddock, in his new role as Attorney-General, justified the success of 
the “Pacific Strategy” as humanitarian policy: 
 
Overall, these strategies save lives – because they reduce the likelihood of people 
putting themselves in the hands of unscrupulous people smugglers and risking 
dangerous journeys in overcrowded boats. They also save space – by allowing us to 
keep offshore places for those unseen refugees in parts of the world, such as Africa, 
who are in need of resettlement but are not in a position to use people smugglers to 
get to Australia.91  
 
Similarly, Philip Ruddock’s successor Amanda Vanstone committed to the 
strategy to delay the acceptance of bona fide refugees from Nauru to Australia, 
when announcing one year later, in 2004, that Tampa refugees continued to 
arrive “in dribs and drabs”:  
 
We only have to look at the success of offshore processing, realise that once the 
people smugglers can't guarantee to get their sorry cargo to Australia, they lose 
business. It's been the most effective way of shutting down the dreadful business of 
people smuggling.92 
 
 
The explanation failed to note the fact that onshore refugees were also 
refugees, and that the Howard government reneged on protecting these 
refugees. The Pacific Solution went beyond establishing government control over 
an orderly process. It consisted of relieving Australia of obligations to refugees 
                                            
91 Philip Ruddock, "The Principles of Australian Migration," New Zealand International 
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in a legally rational manner, and of detaining them without the expectation that 
they would be released quickly once their refugee status was confirmed. Apart 
from the knowledge that they were not welcome by the Howard government, 
onshore refugees did not know in which country they would eventually live. 
The emerging aim of the refugee policy of the Pacific Solution was to devise 
strategies to exclude refugees. Philip Ruddock hinted at this when he 
responded to a Senate committee report that recommended closing all 
detention centres abroad, because they led to problems with accountability and 
Australia’s international image.93 Ruddock then told reporters that the Pacific 
Solution “hasn’t failed, it’s worked and it’s worked exceedingly well” because it 
had stopped the “large number of unauthorised border arrivals” in Australia, 
and because “it’s saved Australia hundreds of millions of dollars.”  
 
 
Tampa aftermath 
 
The Border Protection Act, as discussed in the previous section, authorised the 
interception of vessels and passengers, to physically prevent their arrival in 
Australia. To recap, amendments to the Migration Act removed Australia’s 
obligations to offer protection to refugees from these intercepted boats. As 
part of the excision laws, Christmas Island and Cocos Island were deemed not 
to be part of Australia for migration purposes under section 46 of the Migration 
Act.94 This legislation was later extended to include other islands. Section 46 of 
the Migration Act also introduced the new category of  person, an "off-shore 
person”, which meant that uninvited refugees from the boats would never be 
eligible to claim refugee protection from Australia. The legislation left intact 
the refugee rights under Australian law for people whose boats travelled 
undetected through to the excised migration zone, and arrived in areas that 
were not excised. 
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This section analyses how the Howard government utilised these legal changes 
in the delivery of refugee policy. As will be seen shortly, the Howard 
government did not apply these new legal rules consistently, but did apply 
them in situations that favoured the ideological position of its refugee policy. It 
will be argued that these policy practices were consistent with legal rationalism: 
a misuse of the law for ideological, rather than legal purposes.  
 
Before elaborating on the previous two paragraphs, a few words about the 
significance of the legislation. Frank Brennan pointed out the differences 
between the Australian system and the system of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).95 Accordingly, under the rules of the 
UNHCR, a case officer decided on the outcome of the refugee application, and 
another case officer could review this decision. Under Australian rules, there 
was a much more elaborate system of appeals through the courts. Germov and 
Motta note that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
expressed concern over the “denial of the right to apply for Protection Visas 
and the forced removal of asylum seekers to other countries”.96  
 
Rather than refining the legal rules toward achieving fairness, as the Howard 
government claimed, the new legislation aimed at preventing refugees from 
entering Australian soil, because that prevented them from accessing 
Australia’s legal rules. Marr and Wilkinson note that the United States had 
already enacted a similar model when they stopped refugees from reaching 
American soil.97 Accordingly, during the 1980s and 1990s, when “thousands of 
people fled Haiti … the United States scooped them out of the sea and took 
them to be processed at its military base in Guantanamo Bay.” Marr and 
Wilkinson continue that, although these people had arrived at the “beaches of 
                                            
95 Brennan, Tampering with Asylum. A Universal Human Problem, p. 147. 
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Florida”, they were literally prevented from “setting foot on land” for the 
purpose of accessing American refugee laws.   
 
The above example hints at how the excision legislation of the Australian 
Migration Act was about a legalistic interpretation of migration law that gave rise 
to the claim that refugees did not arrive in Australia. Operation Relex, which 
operated at full capacity between September and December 2001, played an 
important part. Navy and helicopter patrols surveyed international waters, and 
this military intervention was scaled down at the end of the year, a few weeks 
after John Howard won the November 2001 elections.98 During Operation 
Relex, the Navy intercepted almost fourteen boats with 1,800 passengers.99  
 
Harapanindah, or Siev 5, was the first boat to be turned back to Indonesia after 
Operation Relex began. The circumstances of the return by the navy had the 
hallmarks of minimal humanitarian assistance: just enough assistance to turn 
the boat around toward Indonesia and enough force to prevent it from arriving 
in Australia. Marr and Wilkinson describe the human face of the pre-election 
policy, as the naval ship Warramunga intercepted the Harapanindah near 
Ashmore Reef: 
 
Its [Harapanindah] engine had failed two days out from Lombok. Food ran low. Water 
was rationed. Mechanics among the passengers got the engine going again. In the 
eight days at sea, the people suffered all the usual afflictions: sea sickness, diarrhoea, 
scabies. A baby died in the heat. Another was born whom the mother would name 
Ashmorey.100  
 
                                            
98 Four Corners [ABC Television Broadcast]. (2002, 15 April). To Deter and Deny Reporter: 
Debbie Whitmont. 
99 Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. (2003 13 August). Fact Sheet 76. 
Offshore Processing Arrangements. Public Affairs Section of the Department of Immigration 
and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs. 
100 Marr and Wilkinson, Dark Victory, p. 216. 
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For five days, the navy gave food and medical assistance. Then, the Prime 
Minister approved that the boat be sent back.101 The Harapanindah was escorted 
back to Indonesian waters, equipped with “food and water, new fire 
extinguisher and charts”, and enough fuel to make it back to Indonesia.102 The 
Prime Minister “claimed the first success” under the new policy and told 
reporters that “the return to Indonesian waters … was due to the tougher 
laws.”103 One can infer from the statement just cited the goals of the new 
refugee policy that was executed by Australian soldiers: to turn around refugee 
boats, accompanied by careful monitoring to prevent loss of life.  
 
This strategy of giving minimal humanitarian aid for the purpose of fulfilling 
the objectives that were justified by an overbearingly legalised approach, 
continued well beyond the timeframe of the Tampa. Almost five years later, in 
May 2006, a family travelled by boat from Papua New Guinea to the nearby 
Australian island of Saibai. The Afghan family was taken to “a secret location” 
in Brisbane and kept away from “legal and community contact”  whilst the 
nine-year old son underwent hospital treatment.104 Approximately one month 
after their arrival, immigration officials returned the family to Papua New 
Guinea because the island had been excised from the migration zone and the 
family were therefore “not entitled to have their claims heard in Australia”.105 
In this game of legalistic interpretations, the family was prevented from 
invoking Australian refugee legislation, although having physically entered the 
mainland.  
 
Whilst Operation Relex operated at maximum capacity until the end of 2001, two 
boats attracted the most media attention. Neither arrived in Australia. The first 
boat was the Oblong, which was sighted by a navy ship on 6 October 2001.106 
                                            
101 Ibid., pp. 216-17. 
102 Ibid., p. 220. 
103 Phillip Hudson and Kerry Taylor, "Howard Claims Victory on Boat People," Age, 20 
October 2001. 
104 Sasha Shtargot, "Nauru Detention Fear for Afghan Asylum Seekers," Age, 2 June 2006. 
105 ABC Online [News]. (2006, 23 June). Asylum Seekers Returned to PNG.  
106 Marr and Wilkinson, Dark Victory, p. 181. 
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To avoid repetition, the events pertaining to the Oblong, which later became 
known as the children overboard affair, will be discussed in Chapter 7 — Formation 
of the Public Voice. The next boat sank on 19 October 2001 in the Indian Ocean, 
leaving behind only forty-six survivors107. The boat was allocated only a 
number, and became known as Siev X108.  
 
News of the Harapanindah and children overboard had barely subsided when the 
Siev X sank. Already, there were comments that the government’s refugee 
policies may well lead to such an outcome, as critics questioned the legal and 
the moral basis of these new policies. David Marr for instance, when 
commenting on the outcome of the Tampa case, called the new refugee policy 
“a policy of expulsion”.109 The Sydney Morning Herald called the passing of the 
new Border Protection Act “an unconstitutional, inhumane piece of legislative 
rubbish which potentially allows asylum seekers to die”.110 Perhaps the most 
scathing criticism came from former Human Rights Commissioner Chris 
Sidoti, when he told a conference: “Australia is becoming a nation of thugs, 
betrayed by its political leader through an inhumane and absurd policy”.111 
 
Against this political backdrop, the Siev X sank one month before the 
November 2001 federal election. An article in the Sydney Morning Herald 
speculated that the Howard government now used a different approach to its 
refugee policies, when reporting that John Howard felt “saddened for that 
terrible human tragedy”.112 The article just cited also reported that Philip 
Ruddock, whilst stating that 90 percent of the passengers were looking for 
“family reunion outcomes”, and drawing attention to the fact that they had not 
                                            
107 Ibid., p. 229. 
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109 David Marr, "Boat People Solutions Are Now Dead in the Water," Sydney Morning 
Herald, 20 September 2001. 
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September 2001. 
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Herald, 28 September 2001. 
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applied for refugee protection in Indonesia where they were safe, also 
announced that the Howard government would accept survivors with “family 
linkages” to Australia. This concession to Siev X survivors was a temporary 
exception to refugee policies that did not amount to a policy change to, or an 
acknowledgment that the Siev X was a refugee boat. In effect, Philip Ruddock 
framed this as a legal and criminal matter when he responded to criticisms that 
many of the dead were women and children related to men who had already 
been granted refugee status in Australia:  
 
I'm not going to be made to feel guilty about people who put themselves in the hands 
of smugglers and who pay large amounts of money knowing that they're going to 
break our law.113 
 
The law that the Immigration Minister referred to came from a national 
Australian perspective that was self-confirming. Cecelia Bailliet pointed out the 
tension between international law, which Australia was also obliged to uphold, 
and the dangerous precedent that has been set by the Tampa under national 
law.114 In this article just cited, Bailiett argued that breaches of the International 
Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, of the International Convention for the Safety 
of Life at Sea, and of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, as well as 
breaches of long established international norms by Australia, may have set a 
precedent whereby ships in future ignore distress signals at sea because it is too 
inconvenient to render assistance.  
 
The government’s power to make temporary exemption to the policy and to 
suspend applying the legislation behind the policy was a humane gesture to the 
affected individuals. However, it also reveals the power of Parliament as an 
institution of the state. The remainder of this case study cites a few examples 
of how this exercise of power was applied to other refugee boats. There 
                                            
113 Australian Associated Press [AAP Newswire]. (2001, 26 October). I Won't Feel Guilty: 
Ruddock. 
114 Cecilia Bailliet, "The Tampa Case and Its Impact on Burden Sharing at Sea," Human 
Rights Quarterly 25, no. 3 (2003). 
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emerges a picture of applying legislation in politically expedient manner. At 
times, the rules were applied strictly and consistently to keep refugee boats 
away, but temporarily suspended when the same rules did not achieve the 
political ideology behind this legislation. The mechanistic recourse to a rule-
driven policy, so characteristic of Legal Rationalism Form 1, turned into Legal 
Rationalism Form 2 – a misuse of legal rationality – when the rules did not fit 
with the political imperatives of the Howard government.  
 
In July 2003, a boat with 53 refugees slipped past the naval blockade and 
arrived three kilometres from the Port Hedland coast. They arrived with 
personal identification papers. The captain, an Australian citizen who 
attempted to bring members of his extended family from Vietnam to Australia, 
was charged with people smuggling and later received the minimum mandatory 
sentence of five years.115 When the boat arrived, officials were unable to 
determine initially if the boat had arrived within the designated migration zone. 
Whilst these investigations were in progress, Immigration Minister Philip 
Ruddock said:  
 
If they are within the migration zone, then the more complex,  
time-consuming and expensive arrangements will be engaged, in which  
people will be able to appeal decisions to the Refugee Review Tribunal  
and probably to the courts if they wish. It would be disappointing but that would be 
the outcome.116 
 
After authorities determined that the boat had made it into the migration zone, 
the government’s practices became inconsistent with its policy. Consistent 
practice would have been to mandatorily detain these people in an immigration 
detention centre on the Australian mainland. However, Legal Rationalism 
Form 2 would override the practical application of the existing rules, and 
would treat these refugees even more harshly than could be expected from 
                                            
115 Tim Clancy, "People Smuggler Policy Hit," Age, 6 May 2004. 
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these rules. The Age reported that, although the nearest detention centre in Port 
Hedland was only several kilometres away, the Minister ordered that people be 
taken to the isolated detention centre at Christmas Island, 1,800 kilometres 
away.117 The article just cited also reported that the re-location to an isolated 
area created greater difficulty for the passengers to stay in contact with relatives 
and lawyers in Australia. The report continues with a statement by Philip 
Ruddock that they would not be taken to Port Hedland, "in order to make it 
abundantly clear that people are not reaching the Australian mainland”.  
 
At this point, the story takes a twist. It appeared from the developments cited 
in the previous paragraph that the Minister now contradicted his earlier 
statement that the refugee applications would be processed under Australian 
rules. Such was my impression when writing an earlier draft of this chapter: 
under Legal Rationalism Form 2, refugees would never get in, no matter what 
the legally-rational constructed rules said. This interpretation was strengthened 
when the Prime Minister supported Philip Ruddock’s orders: 
 
We have a very clear policy and that is that people who seek to come to the country 
illegally will not be allowed to come to the mainland.118 
 
It appeared, incorrectly, from the comments by Philip Ruddock and John 
Howard that, because the refugee applicants did not come to Australia, their 
applications would not be processed under Australian law. However, sending 
the refugees to Christmas Island was an expensive political manoeuvre that did 
not stop the legal process. It was revealed one month later that it cost 
$2,326,170 to re-open the mothballed Christmas Island detention centre and to 
detain those 53 people for 70 days.119 
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118 Russell Skelton, Orietta  Guerrera, and Fergus Shiel, "Island Strategy Justified, Says 
Howard," Age, 5 July 2003. 
119 Daniel Clery, "Island's Detainee Cost Balloons," West Australian, 13 September 2003. 
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Getting back to the twist in the story, my initially incorrect interpretation of 
these events suggests an even greater level of complexity to legal rationalism 
than anticipated: it comes from the rhetoric that preventing these refugees 
from getting to the mainland meant preventing them from accessing Australian 
refugee law. They did access Australian refugee law whilst detained on 
Christmas Island.  
 
Regardless of my interpretation, the Howard government’s response to the 
Vietnamese refugee boat is still an example of legal rationalism, because it is an 
example of a mismatch between language claims and policy practices as set out 
in the introduction to this section. However, I did not anticipate a mismatch in 
the direction in which the Howard government implied that it did not follow 
existing legislation, but actually did so in practice. Yet one may infer that such 
instance of legal rationalism was politically useful for the government, because 
it assisted in convincing the electorate that no uninvited refugee would get into 
Australia. Indeed, the earlier quoted comments by Philip Ruddock and John 
Howard about getting into Australia, contrary to their political pitch, only 
referred to the venue of detention rather than what is generally meant by 
entering the country.  
 
These practical difficulties to analytically separating legal rationalism from legal 
rationality and from political process also generate insight into the complexities 
of legal rationalism. First, the apparent flexibility by which the Howard 
government resorted to legal rationalism raises the question of what is behind 
the recourse of the Howard government to legal rationalism. Such flexibility 
tentatively supports the claim by Jürgen Habermas that politicians frame their 
public policies in a way that gains favour from the electorate. A second 
complexity arises from the extent to which the policy practices that were 
justified by legal rationalism have modified institutional practices. There are 
other examples in this thesis where the Howard government quietly followed 
the legal rules, or fixed problems with the policy, but presented arguments in 
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public discourse that suggested otherwise. The institutional requirement for 
governments to obey the law gives rise to a third complexity that will be noted 
throughout this thesis. It is argued that there were instances where the Howard 
government actively prevented situations from occurring, where following the 
legal rules would have led to changes in refugee policy that were incompatible 
with the political arguments that justified these policies. Legal rationalism, it is 
argued especially in Chapter 6 — Politicisation of the Law and in Chapter 8 — 
Conclusion, helped overcome this tension between policy justifications and legal 
requirements.  
 
A final example in this case study illustrates how government rhetoric brings 
out the three claims outlined in the previous paragraph: the tendency to 
portray policy practices in politically advantageous manner, the political impact 
of policy practices on institutional practices, and the fine balance between 
rhetoric and enacting the law. Senator Amanda Vanstone, who became 
Immigration Minister in October 2003, continued with the legal rationalist 
strategy, as is argued in this instance. A newspaper reported on 5 November 
2003 that fourteen Kurdish men arrived at Melville Island, that they were not 
allowed to disembark and that the navy vessel HMAS Geelong towed the boat 
to a secret location.120 Hours after the boat arrived, new legislation was to 
excise an additional 3,000 islands from the migration zone, including Melville 
Island.121 The newspaper article just cited also reported that the government 
backdated the legislation to take effect from midnight of that day. Amanda 
Vanstone framed the arrival of the boat as intent to break Australian law, 
backed by evidence that damaged identification papers were found on the boat: 
"That is a typical indicator ... of people associated with people smuggling that 
identity documents are destroyed".122 Despite this indicator, the Defence and 
the Immigration Ministers denied that the men applied for refugee status, and 
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even if they had applied, such application would be irrelevant because they did 
not arrive in Australia.123 The comments by the ministers were correct in the 
technical-legal sense, and then only because the legislation was backdated. 
Here, the distinction between legal rationalism and legal rationality becomes 
stark. The Howard government , by simultaneously manipulating the law and 
appealing to it as an authority, had entered the realm of legal rationalism.  
 
Further developments of how the case assisted the legal rationalist strategy may 
be inferred from the current affairs programme Lateline. The program revealed 
that after their return to Indonesia, the men told reporters that they told 
Australian authorities they were refugees.124 Lateline also reported that lawyers 
in Darwin lodged an application to allow the men to apply for refugee status 
under Australian law. However, when the case was heard in court on 9 
November 2003, the boat had been towed to Indonesian waters, and was 
therefore outside the jurisdiction of Australian courts. Amanda Vanstone then 
conceded on Lateline in the broadcast cited above that “some people said 
something about human rights and mentioned a refugee” but insisted that this 
did not amount to a valid refugee claim.  
 
One can see clearly how the legal rationalism was enhanced by the secrecy 
surrounding the issue, which allowed the Howard government to implement 
only that part of the legislation that suited an ideological purpose. That is, the 
law was applied, and specifically written, for the purpose of turning the refugee 
boat around. Whilst it may be legally rational for governments to write and 
retrospectively apply legislation, such practices in this case were specifically 
aimed at preventing refugees from exercising their rights.  
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One can also note the categorisation and particularisation strategies described by 
Michael Billig.125 After the refugees were excluded from the “refugee” category, 
the Howard government focussed exclusively on the categories  of illegal entry, 
people smuggling and violation of Australian law and sovereignty. This 
becomes clear from Immigration Minister Vanstone’s media release after the 
fourteen Kurds left Indonesia.126 Published in mid-January 2004, the Media 
Release stated that “all men had voluntarily returned home” after the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees turned down the applications of 
those six men who lodged applications. The Minister called these events “a 
slap in the face to people smugglers:” 
 
The message to people smugglers is simple – dropping your customers on our 
doorstop does not get entry into Australia … Our best interests are served by 
processing people outside of Australia and away from our legal system, which 
provides potential for significant delay and abuse.127 
 
Notable in Senator Vanstone’s statement cited above is the question as to 
whose rights are addressed in refugee issues: the rights of the state that 
individuals ask for protection or the rights of the person asking for protection? 
The cited statement also refers to the institution of the law as a potential 
problem to the Howard government’s delivery of refugee policy. Other 
examples will be noted in the case studies, where the government continues to 
suggest that the law may stand in the way of good governance, at least of the 
governance of those framed as outsiders. One may predict at this point that 
strong inputs are required throughout the various layers of governance and the 
legal system, if indeed legal rationalism colonises legal rationality.  
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Conclusion 
 
This analysis had two goals: first, to establish if any of the four parameters, 
which the Howard government identified as goals to its refugee policies, 
predominated. A second goal was to investigate if there was a mismatch 
between policy justifications and policy practices by the Howard government.  
 
Two policy justifications, humanitarian and orderly process, were least 
convincing. Humanitarian policy goals were constantly undermined by the 
over-arching goal of keeping refugees out of Australia. Whilst there was no 
shortage of offers of humanitarian assistance, such assistance was offered for a 
highly restricted purpose. Measures that addressed security needs did little to 
address human security needs, but focused on security needs of the state. The 
other policy parameter, orderly process, became a euphemism for bringing the 
process under greater government control and restricting the influence of the 
courts. Such policy justifications under the auspice of orderly process generally 
had in common preventing refugees from accessing a system of dwindling 
benefits and rights.  
 
Policy justifications in terms of legal rationality and national sovereignty were 
almost equally strong. It is held here that legal rationality justifications 
predominated. The reason for such suggestion is that the sovereignty 
justifications often occurred together with recourse to the law in order to 
strengthen the framework that preserves national sovereignty. Such argument, 
however, cannot be made strongly because most changes to public policy do 
occur concomitantly with legal changes. Therefore, the evidence from this case 
study cautiously suggests that legal rationality may have predominated among 
the justifications. More evidence is required from the other case studies before 
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suggesting with confidence that the Howard government made overbearing 
recourse to the rules and procedures of the law.  
 
The strongest evidence for legal rationalism in this case study comes from the 
painstaking and overbearing adherence to the rules, as if the rules had an 
existence of their own. Even stronger evidence came the selective manner in 
which the Howard government applied these rules. Strongest adherence to the 
rules under refugee policies was observed in situations that aided the ideology 
of excluding refugees. These rules became so refined that it excluded some 
refugees to access the benefits of refugee policy. In general, the rhetoric of the 
Howard government in public discourse consisted of comments that framed 
refugee policy as protecting Australia’s borders and sovereignty, in part by 
combating international crime. This may have indirectly contributed to 
electoral gain, because it can be safely assumed that the electorate approved of 
such policy.  
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This case study investigates how the Howard government justified its policy of 
mandatory detention, by focussing on Woomera, without disregarding 
developments at other detention centres in Australia. Figure 1 shows the 
detention centres within Australian jurisdiction. The Woomera detention 
centre was located in outback South Australia, about 180 kilometres north of 
Port Augusta and five kilometres north-west of the township of Woomera. It 
housed refugee applicants between November 1999 and April 2003, and has 
since remained in readiness to become operational again, if required by the 
government. Located amid the salt lakes of the almost treeless gibber desert 
and small stones polished by the relentless action of the sun and the wind, it 
was also subject to temperature extremes from freezing point on a cold 
winter’s night to 50 degrees centigrade in summer. During less than its three 
years of operation, the Woomera detention centre gained notoriety as the 
symbolic expression of the harsh policy of mandatory detention.  
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Figure 1: Map of Immigration Detention Centres.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The history of the township of Woomera was as imposing as its natural 
landscape. A website outlining the history of Woomera states that since its 
inception in 1947 as a town for conducting rocket launching experiments and 
other defence projects, Woomera has always had a close link with government 
polices.2 The cited site also states that during the 1960s, more than 6,000 
people lived in Woomera, consisting of defence personnel and their families. 
However, defence priorities changed. The Advertiser newspaper reported that it 
was estimated in November 1999, that only about 500 people would remain in 
                                            
1 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. “Figure 8.1: Location of Australia's 
Immigration Detention Centres.” [Map]. Copied map from above source. Approximate 
location of Manus Island was added later and is not part of the downloaded graphic.  
2 Mark Rigby. (2004, 9 November). Woomera Village (1997-2004). [Personal Website]. 
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Woomera.3 The cited newspaper article also reported that at that time, the 
government announced that it would refurbish the disused army barracks at 
Woomera west and establish a new immigration detention centre there. Even 
prior to this announcement, refugees were no strangers to the area. Seven 
months earlier, some Kosovars, who had survived massacres in the former 
Yugoslavia, found temporary refuge there. The Kosovars lived in an open 
centre, and Immigration Minister Ruddock said that he did not intend to 
“imprison people".4 However, the uninvited refugees from the Middle East 
were treated less generously as they were locked behind razor fences and 
prevented from escaping by guards in khaki-brown uniforms.  
 
Unlike the Kosovar refugees, the Howard government did not frame the new 
refugees in November 1999 as people in need, but as rich people who 
demanded resources they were not entitled to. When announcing that a four-
and-a-half metre tall fence would surround the Woomera detention centre, 
Philip Ruddock told the press that these people had come to Australia 
unlawfully and stolen “places that would otherwise be available to the most 
vulnerable”.5 Security measures tightened, and the Woomera detention centre 
continued to enlarge, as the Howard government implemented a new phase of 
the policy of mandatory detention. In 2003, the Department of Immigration 
and Multicultural Affairs informed that the outer perimeter of the detention 
centre was extended with several surrounds of new fences and a “sterile area” 
between them.6 The cited source also stated that the Woomera centre was 
being refurbished to accommodate up to 3,500 people. 
 
                                            
3 David Eccles and Paul Starrick, "Refugees to Be Held at Woomera," Advertiser, 10 
November 1999. 
4 Miles Kemp, "Woomera and Hampstead Bases to Take 750 in Refugee Airlift," Advertiser, 
10 April 1999. 
5 Michael McKinnon and David Eccles, "Boat People Face Close Detention," Advertiser, 22 
November 1999. 
6 Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. (2003). Immigration Detention 
Contract, schedule1, Detention Facilities. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the mandatory detention aspect of 
the refugee policies of the Howard government. By using Woomera as one 
example, I argue that the Howard government enhanced the existing legal 
framework that already supported the policy of mandatory detention of 
refugees, whilst at the same time criminalising their detention. It will be 
suggested in this chapter that the success of these developments depended on 
mandatory detention operating in secrecy, especially during the early stages of 
the Howard government’s changes to refugee policy. Such secrecy, it is 
suggested, consisted partly of secrecy surrounding conditions inside detention, 
and was partly due to an information process that made information almost 
inaccessible. It is argued that justifications by the Howard government, based 
on the ideology of legal rationalism, significantly contributed to this process. 
 
 
Public policy on detention 
 
This section outlines the policy of mandatory detention, and discusses the 
structural arrangements between the Department of Immigration and 
Multicultural Affairs and the private contractor. It was not until the release of a 
Performance Audit by the Auditor-General in 2004, after Woomera had 
closed, that information became known about this contract.7 The Howard 
government began the first few years of privatisation in relative secrecy away 
from public scrutiny. The available information sheds light on the overall 
pattern of legal rationalism, in the sense that the contract enabled the Howard 
government to maintain such secrecy.  
 
First, a few words about the history of privatisation of immigration detention 
services, and the nature of the services. Australasian Correctional Services 
                                            
7 Australian National Audit Office. (2005, 7 July). Management of the Detention Centre 
Contracts — Part B. Performance Audit (Audit Report No.1 2005–06). Department of 
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs. 
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(ACS) won the contract for the sole provision of immigration detention 
services in November 1997.8 In August 2003, Global Solutions Limited, then 
known as Group4 Falck, won the contract.9 These contracts were between the 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and private service 
providers. Australasian Correctional Services, after obtaining the first contract 
in 1997, contracted Australasian Correctional Management to provide the 
actual services.10 Under the terms of the 1997 contract, the new contractor 
would provide “a complete service” that consisted of “detention services, 
catering, health and education services, transport services, or whatever”.11 
Australasian Correctional Management had a duty of care to provide these 
services in accordance with the Immigration Detention Standards, but the 
overall responsibility for detention services rested with the Department of 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.12 Australasian Correctional Services won 
the contract from among seventeen tenders “to deliver services that meet 
Immigration Detention Standards”.13 
 
The government’s choice of successive contractors gave a clue that security, 
rather than humanitarian considerations, would continue to dominate the 
detention of refugees. Before privatisation, the contractor was Australian 
Protective Services.14 This national security organisation worked closely with 
the Australian Federal Police.15 The core business of Australasian Correctional 
Management and Global Solutions Limited was prisons. Had the government 
                                            
8 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade. (2002, 17 July). A Report 
on Visits to Immigration Detention Centres (Chapter 3: Administration of Detention Centres).  
9 Global Solutions Limited, GSL (Australia) Pty Ltd. Contracts & Services [Website].  
10 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade. (2002, 17 July). A 
Report on Visits to Immigration Detention Centres. (Chapter 3: Administration of Detention 
Centres).  
11 Commonwealth of Australia. (2001, 20 February). Official Committee Hansard. Legal and 
Constitutional Legislation Committee. Consideration of Additional Estimates. Senate, p. 189.  
12 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. (2000, September). Not 
the Hilton. Immigration Detention Centres: Inspection Report. Joint Standing Committee on 
Migration, paragraph 1.21, p. 4.   
13 Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. (1997, 14 November). Company 
Takes up Responsibility for Immigration Detention Centre (Media Release, number DPS 
19/97). 
14 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, A Report on Visits to 
Immigration Detention Centres. (Chapter 3: Administration of Detention Centres). 
15 Australian Protective Service Amendment Act 2003. 
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intended to focus mainly on humanitarian needs, it would instead have chosen 
companies experienced in delivering services to families, with a core staff of 
social workers and teachers. The requirements of the service provider were set 
out in the Immigration Detention Standards.16 Parts of these Standards were 
labelled “commercial in confidence”, and were not legally enforceable.17 The 
absence of clearly identified legal obligations in the Immigration Detention 
Standards, and the withholding of parts of the Standards, provided an early cue 
that the Howard government may place barriers to public scrutiny and holding 
the government accountable in a public forum.  
 
Government secrecy about its new policy was noted and criticised on different 
fronts. Justice Selway, when presiding over a case in the Federal Court, 
described this “absence of a statutory regime” about non-enforceable 
conditions of detention as “a legislative legal vacuum” that was “potentially 
unfair both to those involved in the conduct of detention centres and to the 
detainees”.18 The Auditor-General later criticised the performance points as 
stated in the contract between the Department of Immigration and 
Multicultural Affairs and Australasian Correctional Management, as “vague”.19 
The Human Rights Commissioner, when reporting on a visit to a detention 
centre, criticised the Detention Standards as an ineffective monitoring tool, 
and added: “they fall short of minimum human rights standards in some areas, 
including compliance measures”.20 This perception of secrecy affected a 
hearing conducted by the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation 
Committee.21 A committee member at that hearing asked for greater public 
                                            
16 Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. (2004, 6 October). Immigration 
Detention Standards 2003.  
17 Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. (1998, 20 July). Immigration 
Detention Agreement 1998. 
18 "Secretary, Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs V 
Mastipour [2004] FCAFC 93. 
19 Australian National Audit Office. (2004). Department of Immigration and Multicultural and 
Indigenous Affairs, "Management of the Detention Centre Contracts — Part A, paragraph 
22. 
20 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. (2001, 2 December). A Report on 
Visits to Immigration Detention Facilities by the Human Rights Commissioner.  
21 Commonwealth of Australia. (2001, 20 February). Official Committee Hansard. Senate. 
Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee. Estimates. Additional Estimates. 
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transparency. Deputy Secretary of the Department of Immigration and 
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs: 
 
You come here and say, ‘What about the contracts’, and, ‘This contract is going to do 
this’ but we never see the contract. This is a bit unfair because you have given me a 
pro forma and invited me to look at it, which I do not intend to do because this has 
all got to come out in public.22   
 
It is noted throughout the thesis that the Howard government’s “secrecy” did 
not remove the contract from existing accountability structures. Instead, it is 
be argued, such secrecy created practical inconveniences to investigators who 
had a statutory duty to investigate aspects of government accountability. This 
secrecy was systemic throughout the Howard government’s refugee policies, 
and continued under Senator Amanda Vanstone, who replaced Philip Ruddock 
as Immigration Minister in 2003. For instance, in September 2003 the 
magazine Business Review Weekly reported that “a serious contractual breach” 
over how Australasian Correctional Management’s (ACM), “handling of an 
escape” had resulted in a default notice being issued by the Department of 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA) to the company.23 The cited 
article criticised the government for withholding “secrecy surrounding the 
default notice” and suggested that that the lack of transparency may have 
DIMA and ACM “become complicit in hiding unpleasant truths under the 
guise of commercial-in-confidence”. Minister Vanstone later defended the 
withholding of information on the basis that the government would not release 
information that “may have the capacity to damage the reputation of a 
contractor in the market if details … are made available publicly” .24 
 
                                            
22 Ibid., p. 191. 
23 Stuart Washington, "Detention Centre Cover-Up," Business Review Weekly, 25 
September/1 October 2003. 
24 Amanda Vanstone. (Undated). Letter Written to Senator Marise Payne, Chair, Senate 
Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, in Response to Questions Taken on Notice 
at a Committee Hearing in November 2003. 
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It is reasonable to assume that information that damaged the reputation of 
Australasian Correctional Management in the context of providing immigration 
detention services would also damage the reputation of the Howard 
government, because the government bore overall responsibility for the 
delivery of the policy of mandatory detention. The next few paragraphs discuss 
the role of the delay in the auditing of detention centres, which spanned the 
Ruddock and Vanstone ministries from 1998 until 2005. Here, the Howard 
government did not avoid its statutory obligations to submit its policies to 
public auditing, but through the delay of several audits, also delayed the release 
of information into public discourse by about five years. The strategy resulted 
in building into the contract a level of secrecy between the government and the 
private operator. Whilst not removing the accountability structure, it 
nevertheless manipulated the rules within this structure. Rather than overt 
secrecy, the strategy was less direct in that it delayed release of information, as 
illustrated by the example of two performance audits.  
 
The two delayed reports were two parts of the Management of Detention Centre 
Contracts by the National Audit Office.25 The first audit of a policy that began in 
1998 was not released until 2003. It is expected practice that such reports are 
released annually. Paragraph 4.24 in chapter 4 of Part A gives the reasons for 
the delay. It states that between September 1998 and early 2000, the 
government and the contractor “contemplated refining and adjusting the 
performance measures”. The cited report continues that these performance 
adjustments did not occur but that instead, the Department of Immigration 
and Multicultural Affairs negotiated with Australasian Correctional 
Management any changes “outside the detention agreements”. Consequently, 
the auditor reports, that instead of annual reports, the first audit covered “a 
six-year period from 1998 to 2004”. Due to the delay, the auditing was a 
                                            
25 Australian National Audit Office. Management of the Detention Centre Contracts — Part 
A. Performance Audit (Audit Report No. 54 2003–04); Australian National Audit Office, 
Management of the Detention Centre Contracts — Part B. Department of Immigration and 
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs. Performance Audit (Audit Report No.1 2005–06). 
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massive task. With the release of the first report in 2004, the Australian 
National Audit Office announced “a second performance audit of the 
management of the detention centre contracts”.26 Chapter 8 of the audit report 
adds that the government changed section 37(2) of the Auditor-General General 
Act 1997 prior to the release of part A, with the consequence that sections of 
part A were excluded from public release.27  
 
The publicly available information in Part A contained a clue as to how 
information about detention services remained hidden not only from the 
public, but also from the Howard government. This clue was in the 
communication structure between the Department of Immigration and 
Multicultural Affairs (DIMA) and Australasian Correctional Management 
(ACM). There were two official routes of communication: monthly reports 
from the onsite DIMA business manager at each detention centre, and second, 
from incident reports from ACM to DIMA. The audit found that the monthly 
reports by the DIMA manager were so inefficient and inconsistent that they 
may be disregarded as an effective source of information: These reports often 
arrived late, and the content generally was about major incidents at a detention 
centre, instead of the required comprehensive assessment of the quality of 
contract delivery.28 Such omission of official information occurred 
systematically, because, as previously stated, each detention centre had its own 
on site government official.  
 
With the information from detention centres by managers of the Department 
of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs taken out of the information process, 
only one major channel of official communication remained: incident reports 
that the contractor Australasian Correctional Management sent to DIMA. 
According to the Flood Report (an investigation into detention services that 
                                            
26 Australian National Audit Office. Management of the Detention Centre Contracts — Part 
A. Performance Audit (Audit Report No. 54 2003–04), summary and recommendations, 
summary, paragraph 9. 
27 Ibid., paragraph 8. 
28 Ibid., chapter 5, paragraphs 5.24 and 5.25. 
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will be discussed in the next section) an “incident” was an “occurrence which 
threatens or disrupts security and good order, or the health, safety or welfare of 
the detainees”.29 Furthermore, “incidents” ranged from a death of a staff 
member or a detainee to medical emergencies, and included a staff member 
being approached by the media, theft within the detention centre, or even the 
“transfer of a detainee to another facility”.  
 
In addition to being a major reporting tool about events in detention centres, 
incident reports were also a tool by which the government issued financial 
penalties to the service provider. If adverse incidents occurred, the company 
was liable to incur financial penalties. If DIMA suspected a breach, it would 
appoint consultants to investigate the reported incidents, “in particular, 
escapes, riots and other serious disturbances, where it considered that ACM 
might have breached its duty of care”.30 But where the company failed to 
report incidents, and the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs 
found out “through other sources”, it considered the non-reporting as a 
breach, and hence a potential reason for imposing penalties .31 Despite the 
importance of the incident reports, there were considerable difficulties in 
retrieving information from these reports, as shown in the following example. 
In one court case, the significance of which will be discussed in Chapter 6 — 
Politicisation of the Law, the High Court was asked to issue a summons for 
documents from Woomera, in order to assess conditions of detention.32 The 
court heard:  
 
Between 1 December 1999 and 18 November 2001 … it would be necessary to 
examine more than 3,000 files, more than 1,500 electronic documents and about 
6,000 incident reports. About 745 hours had already been spent by at least 47 officers 
                                            
29 Philip Flood. (2001, February). Report of Inquiry into Immigration Detention Procedures. 
Commonwealth of Australia, pp. 18-19. 
30 Australian National Audit Office. (2004). Department of Immigration and Multicultural and 
Indigenous Affairs, "Management of the Detention Centre Contracts — Part A, chapter 5, 
paragraph 5.30. 
31 Ibid., chapter 5, paragraph 5.37. 
32 Behrooz v. Secretary of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous 
Affairs [2004] HCA 36. (6 August 2004). 
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in identifying and locating files and it was estimated that completion of the process 
would be likely to take more than a further 1,000 hours.33 
 
Justice Kirby conceded that the request for these summonses was 
“oppressively wide” and may possibly constitute an “abuse of process”.34 The 
court denied the request for the information. However, the cited comments 
highlighted the issue about the cumbersome process for retrieval of 
information from an ineffective retrieval system. Part A of the audit informs 
that Australasian Correctional Management did not start its electronic Incident 
Tracking Database until March 2001.35 This involved manually entering all data 
into the system, and summarising the data twice before they were incorporated 
into the database.36  
 
Although there were shortcomings in the official information process between 
1998 and 2003, the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs did 
access information about the delivery of the detention contract. However, the 
information sought by DIMA was highly selective. Chapter 5 of Part A of the 
national audit report describes an information system that did inform the 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs about negative 
information of the policy.37 Accordingly, DIMA was using electronic 
information “to mark incident reports that were not provided in the required 
timeframe”; to establish if the government could issue financial penalties 
against the company. DIMA’s selectivity of information also included other 
areas. The audit, previously cited, notes that the Department of Immigration 
and Multicultural Affairs was mainly interested in “exception reporting”: a 
management tool that gives enough flexibility to the service provider to focus 
                                            
33 Ibid., paragraph 178. 
34 Ibid., paragraph 179. 
35 Australian National Audit Office. (2004). Department of Immigration and Multicultural and 
Indigenous Affairs, "Management of the Detention Centre Contracts — Part A, chapter 5, 
paragraph 5.45. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., chapter 5, paragraph 5.46.  
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on the key performance areas.38 The cited report explains that exception 
reporting consists of the collecting of essentially negative information that 
narrowly focuses on the trouble spots, with an apparent disinterest in more 
“neutral” information that may have led to a broader system of assessing and 
monitoring the operator’s performance: 
 
Exception reporting carries certain risks; for example, that on-going substandard 
performance in a critical area of service delivery, such as health care, will not be 
recognised until it results in a specific trigger event.39 
 
This suggests that the information system ensured that the Howard 
government officially did not become aware of problems with the policy unless 
incidents reached crisis proportions. Other, less dramatic, information became 
“lost” in the system and thus did not feature in higher levels of decision-
making about the policy. Audit A for instance reports that there was “a system 
of case management [that] also complemented exception reporting, by 
focussing on individual detainees and their treatment within a centre”.40 
However, there was no formal requirement to review complaints lodged by 
detainees.41 Central to the information system between Australasian 
Correctional Management and the Department of Immigration and 
Multicultural Affairs was thus a systemic mechanism that prevented vital 
information on policy delivery from reaching the Howard government. This 
feature, established under the rules of legal-rational process, had the potential 
to manipulate information. 
 
From the discussion it becomes evident that there was a systemic flaw to the 
information process. That is, as long as information did not reach the section 
of the process that focussed on financial penalties, the Howard government 
could reasonably argue that the operator successfully delivered the policy of 
                                            
38 Ibid., chapter 5, paragraph 5.33. 
39 Ibid., chapter 5, paragraph 5.34. 
40 Ibid., chapter 5, paragraph 5.35. 
41 Ibid., chapter 5, paragraph 5.38. 
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mandatory detention in accordance with the contract. One can see how 
information that may have suggested otherwise was excluded from the routine 
workings of this process: not by overtly falsifying information, but by 
systemically excluding it. This ability to selectively use information and to 
control the release of information into the public domain, suggests that the 
Howard government had considerable scope to present the policy to the 
electorate in a good light. 
 
An Ombudsman’s report as early as 1999, the first after the privatisation of 
detention services began in 1998, suggested problems with the information 
process, and attributed these to dishonesty by the Department of Immigration 
Affairs (DIMA) and Australasian Correctional Management. For instance, the 
Ombudsman reported that, despite DIMA’s obligation to ensure “prompt 
investigation” of allegations of assault on detainees, the Department “had 
taken little action to investigate the complaint and subsequently provided 
incorrect information and unjustified assurances to my office”.42 A 2001 
Ombudsman’s report also identified systemic problems and ongoing 
dishonesty by Australasian Correctional Management, and recommended that 
DIMA should find another service provider.43 In 2003, the Ombudsman 
reported two further inconsistencies.44 The cited report mentions one incident 
at the Woomera detention centre that contained a “misleading account of the 
actual event”, and another report of a “violent incident” at a different 
detention centre revealed “inconsistent reporting”.  
 
From the discussion in this section emerges the picture of a systemically flawed 
information process, by which the Howard government obtained information 
on how Australasian Correctional Management delivered the policy of 
mandatory detention between 1998 and 2001. Two major problems were 
identified: the flow of information from the detention centres into the system, 
                                            
42 Commonwealth Ombudsman. (1999, 30 September). Annual Report 1998-1999. 
43 Commonwealth Ombudsman. (2001). Annual Report 2000-2001.  
44 Commonwealth Ombudsman. (2003, 30 October). Annual Report 2002-2003. 
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and the practical difficulties of retrieving information from that system. The 
next section discusses how this structured absence of information took an 
unanticipated twist when the Howard government had to justify the conditions 
of mandatory detention to the electorate: ironically, the system that focussed 
on carefully selected official information generated a flow of unofficial 
information that raised questions about government accountability.  
 
 
Managing the policy 
 
All information from inside the detention centres was controlled through the 
contract between the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs 
and Australasian Correctional Management. Neither company management 
nor its employees were authorised to “engage in any public comment or 
debate” without written permission from DIMA. This agreement was 
governed by the official secrets provision of Section 79 of the Crimes Act 
1914.45 In addition, the contract also stipulated that the contractor agreed “to 
indemnify the Commonwealth in respect of any loss, liability or expense” 
arising from this secrecy agreement.46 Despite such legislation, “thousands of 
official reports” that were written between 2001 and 2004 were published on 
the website of the current affairs program Four Corners.47 How did the Howard 
government deal with information about its policy of mandatory detention that 
came from unofficial channels? Did the government’s way of handling 
unofficial information contribute to legal rationalism? This section suggests 
that there was a reluctance to accept unofficial information, coupled with an 
unwillingness to act on it.  
 
                                            
45 Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. Immigration Detention Agreement 
1998, General Agreement, paragraph 9.1.  
46 Ibid.([cited). General Agreement, paragraph 9.1.3.1e. 
47 Four Corners [ABC Television Broadcast]. (2003, 3 December). ACM's Incident Reports.  
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Reporting and accountability 
 
On 13 November 2000, The Australian newspaper reported that child sex abuse 
was “rampant” at the Woomera detention centre, and that the manager of 
Australasian Correctional Management at that centre prevented an 
investigation into child rape allegations in April 2000.48 Two days later, the 
same newspaper reported that a child was raped by his father, sold to other 
detainees in exchange for cigarettes, and that this matter was not reported “to 
an external agency”.49 In the following week, there were more allegations. 
Some claimed interference with medical files at Woomera.50 Others spoke of 
child abuse at the Port Hedland and Villawood detention centres.51 
Immigration Minister Philip Ruddock initially dismissed these allegations as 
lacking evidence and as “hearsay”.52 Two days later, Philip Ruddock ordered 
another investigation and stated that the South Australian government child 
protection agency Family and Youth Services had re-opened a child abuse case 
at Woomera.53 The cited media release also stated that the government-initiated 
investigation would report on “the processes in place for dealing with and 
following up allegations and instances of child abuse and the manner in which 
these processes were followed in the past year”. After re-opening the case, the 
inquiry found the child abuse allegations were not substantiated.54 However, 
the government-initiated inquiry found that management of Australasian 
Correctional Management at the Woomera detention centre had covered up 
                                            
48 Mathew Spencer, "Child Sex Abuse Alleged at Woomera," Australian, 13 November 2000. 
49 Mathew Spencer, "Woomera Officer Tells of Boy Raped and Sold for Cigarettes," 
Australian, 15 November 2000.  
50 Mathew Spencer, "Nurse Tells of Boy Rape Cover-Up," Australian, 21 November 2000. 
51 Lateline [ABC Television Broadcast]. (2000, 21 November). Abuse Allegations. Reporter: 
Margo O'Neill. 
52 Terry Plane, "Ruddock Dismisses Sex Abuse 'Hearsay'," Australian, 22 November 2000. 
53 Philip Ruddock. (2000, 22 November). Minister Announces Inquiry into Child Abuse 
Allegations (Media Release, number MPS 118/2000).  
54 Philip Ruddock. (2000, 18 December). FAYS Finds Woomera Abuse Allegations 
Unfounded (Media Release, number MPS 137/2000).  
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the allegations of child abuse, and concluded that there should have been 
investigation eight months earlier, when these allegations were initially raised.55  
 
The information from the media reports cited in the last paragraph did not 
come from the official information channels that the Howard government 
controlled, but instead became available when former employees of 
Australasian Correctional Management spoke with the media. As will be seen 
shortly, the subsequent discussions pointed to shortcomings with the policy 
delivery, and a reluctance by the Howard government to address these issues. 
Public discourse about these matters will be discussed in detail, because the 
media interest allows for detailed examination of how the Howard government 
justified the detention policy to the electorate. These justifications also provide 
a practical example of how the setting up of the information structure from the 
detention centres to the Howard government, which was discussed in the 
previous section, impacted on government accountability. As will be argued in 
this section, the systemic problems with the policy delivery were not addressed, 
evidenced by an administrative structure that continued to allow other 
problems to emerge. This section also draws attention to a pattern of Legal 
Rationalism Form 1; an unusual pre-occupation with rules and procedures, that 
emerged when unfavourable and unofficial information emerged about 
government policy.  
 
The suppression of the investigation of the suspicion of child abuse at the 
Woomera detention centre arose when nursing staff formed the suspicion that 
a child had been sexually abused. Philip Flood, who was appointed by the 
Immigration Minister to lead the inquiry which became later known as the 
“Flood Inquiry”, found that neither police nor Family and Youth Services were 
called when the allegations were made.56 The cited report added that the 
manger of the Woomera detention centre personally suppressed an 
                                            
55 Flood. Report of Inquiry into Immigration Detention Procedures, pp. 23-24. 
56 Ibid. 
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investigation that should have occurred: “the processes set down in legislation 
and the administrative requirements of DIMA and of ACM instructions were 
not followed”. Whilst drawing attention to local management, Flood was less 
explicit in drawing attention to systemic flaws.  
 
It remained unclear initially when the child abuse allegations of April 2000 
were first reported to an outside agency, and when they were first investigated. 
It appears that, if the re-opening of the case in November 2000 is included, 
there were three separate investigations. Philip Ruddock told Parliament in 
November that an investigation had “commenced as early as April”.57 The 
Minister also said that he was personally notified by a letter in October, and 
that his staff advised him that the matter had already been dealt with.58 
However, it appears that the investigation that took place in April had not fully 
dealt with the matter. Flood later reported that that no forensic evidence was 
collected in April, that police investigated in April and again in July, and that 
Family and Youth Services (FAYS) investigated in September.59 The re-
opening of the case by FAYS in November 2000, according to the 
government, was prompted by an incident report that had previously been 
withheld from investigators. A serious flaw of the information process that 
relied almost entirely on incident reports from the private contractor, began to 
emerge when Philip Ruddock told Parliament: 
 
Departmental officers found it [the incident report] last Friday week on the file in 
Woomera, and it was on the Monday following that it was brought to the attention of 
the South Australian department … For that reason I initiated the inquiry in relation 
to procedures because, to my way of thinking, it is a serious matter if a document that 
might be relevant to an inquiry that had already been undertaken by Family and 
Youth Services was not available to them at the time. I do not know in whose hands 
                                            
57 Philip Ruddock. (2000, 27 November). Questions without Notice: Illegal Immigration: 
Woomera Detention Centre. Parliamentary Speech, House of Representatives. Official 
Hansard. Commonwealth of Australia, p. 22,717.  
58 Philip Ruddock. (2000, 28 November). Questions without Notice: Illegal Immigration: 
Woomera Detention Centre. Parliamentary Speech, House of Representatives. Official 
Hansard. Commonwealth of Australia, p. 22,835.   
59 Flood. Report of Inquiry into Immigration Detention Procedures. pp. 24-25. 
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it was. It may have been in the department’s, it may have been in the hands of the 
contractors. But they are the matters that I believe are appropriate for Mr Flood to 
examine in his investigation.60 
 
In the investigation into the flaw in the information process, Philip Flood 
identified two separate cover-ups by local management of Australasian 
Correctional Management at the Woomera detention centre.61 The first 
occurred when child abuse was first initially suspected on 13 April and the 
second, when “documentation relevant to these inquiries” was not made 
available to the investigators in September. Philip Ruddock’s framing of the 
information process that prevailed at both times, inferred here from the 
Minister’s comments on these matters in November and December 2000, 
revealed a rhetorical recourse to the law that was characteristic of legal 
rationalism. As will be seen shortly, such recourse consisted of rebuffing the 
allegations predominantly in terms of legal rationality. It will also be seen 
shortly that, whilst such rhetorical recourse to legal obligations about the policy 
was in progress, the Howard government rectified behind the scenes aspects of 
the policy that it was publicly defending.  
 
It would seem that, where the official information system had failed, 
“unofficial” information contributed to the process of government 
accountability, as the chronological developments suggest. The first media 
report of child abuse allegations was published on 13 November.62 Family and 
Youth Services re-opened the case on 16 November, and received on 20 
November an incident report “which described the alleged events on 13 March 
2000”.63 In the information citied in the previous sentence, Flood avoided 
mentioning if this document contained references to child sexual abuse. On 
both 21 and 22 November, Minister Ruddock implied that the abuse 
                                            
60 Ruddock. (2000, 28 November).Questions without Notice: Illegal Immigration: Woomera 
Detention Centre. Parliamentary Speech, House of Representatives. Official Hansard. 
Commonwealth of Australia, p. 22,836. 
61 Flood. Report of Inquiry into Immigration Detention Procedures, pp. 23-24. 
62 Spencer, "Child Sex Abuse Alleged at Woomera." 
63 Flood. Report of Inquiry into Immigration Detention Procedures, p. 24. 
  
  
- 117 - 
Chapter 3 
Detention in the Desert — Woomera 
allegations were fabricated, without mentioning the re-opening of the case.64 It 
seems that the information in the official records, which the Minister used to 
rebut the unofficial reports, was less than trustworthy. Philip Flood wrote later: 
“the files at Woomera left a lot to be desired and betrayed evidence of sloppy 
and careless procedures and of possible interference”.65 One may also infer 
from the discussion in this paragraph that the investigations that began in 
November 2000 occurred as the result of media allegations, because it is 
unlikely that the official files contained relevant information that would have 
prompted a re-opening of the case.  
 
Whilst the abuse case was under investigation, questions emerged about the 
information process itself. Suspicions arose that it was in the interests of 
Australasian Correctional Management not to report adverse events because 
this carried the risk of financial penalties.66 The publication of Part A of the 
audit report, which may have given credence to these suspicions, was almost 
three years away.67 Philip Ruddock justified the policy of mandatory detention 
by a mixture of moral-legal and humanitarian concerns. The Minister told 
Parliament that the child abuse allegations were damaging to detainees.68 In 
another response, the Minister questioned the integrity of the unofficial 
information sources: 
 
One or two specific instances relating to specific individuals ought not to be used as a 
basis for generalised charges and claims which reflect upon the generality of the 
people who have been detained. Nor do I think it is reasonable for people who have 
a view about detention policy and who are seeking to unwind it to unnecessarily and 
inappropriately reflect upon the integrity and professionalism of officers of the 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs or those people with whom we 
                                            
64 Lateline [ABC Television Broadcast]. (2000, 21 November). Abuse Allegations; Plane, 
"Ruddock Dismisses Sex Abuse 'Hearsay'." 
65 Flood. Report of Inquiry into Immigration Detention Procedures, p. 22. 
66 Mathew Spencer, "Clauses Gag Rape Report: Church," Australian, 17 November 2000. 
67 Australian National Audit Office. (2004). Department of Immigration and Multicultural and 
Indigenous Affairs, "Management of the Detention Centre Contracts — Part A. 
68 Ruddock. (2000, 28 November). Questions without Notice: Illegal Immigration: Woomera 
Detention Centre, p. 22,861 
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contract. There is clearly a good deal of innuendo and unsubstantiated allegations 
about the detention centres and this seems to have a wider purpose.69 
 
As the time of the Minister’s rebuttals, the media reported even more 
allegations. The media sources, who identified themselves as registered nurses 
who had previously worked at the Woomera detention centre, spoke of 
another instance of child abuse, of the disappearance of another incident 
report from a medical file, and claimed that illegal storage and dispensing of 
prescription drugs had occurred at Woomera.70 Philip Ruddock questioned the 
credibility of the nurses by pointing to the law. The Minister told Parliament he 
was “concerned that people who under state law have a moral and legal 
responsibility to report these matters seem to be pressing these buttons 
now”.71 This was another example of legal rationalism, where Ruddock quoted 
legislation, without mentioning the systemic hindrances to the transmission of 
information between the government and the contractor. One week later, 
another parliamentary speech suggested how one might infer some difficulties 
for information to pass through the official system, without at least some 
degree of political control: the Minister exempted detention staff from the 
confidentiality clause of their working contracts, for the purpose of giving 
evidence to the Flood Inquiry.72 In the speech cited in the previous sentence, 
the Minister said that some community organisations had orchestrated “quite a 
malicious campaign” against government policy. It is possible that Philip 
Ruddock’s offer further prevented, rather than encouraged, information from 
getting into the official communication system. Four days after the Minister 
announced the exemption to the confidentiality clause for detention staff, The 
                                            
69 Ruddock. (2000, 27 November). Questions without Notice: Illegal Immigration: Woomera 
Detention Centre, p. 22,719.  
70 ABC News at 7pm. [ABC Television Broadcast]. (2000, 29 November). Untitled. Reporter 
Margo O'Neill; Lateline [ABC Television Broadcast]. (2000, 24 November). Detention 
Danger. (Reporter: Tony Jones; Terry Plane, "Second Case of Woomera Child Abuse 
Revealed," Australian, 27 November 2000.  
71 Philip Ruddock. (2001, 30 November). Question without Notice: Illegal Immigration: 
Woomera Detention Centre. Parliamentary Speech, House of Representatives. Official 
Hansard. Commonwealth of Australia, p. 23,156.  
72 Philip Ruddock. (2001, 7 December). Question without Notice: Illegal Immigration: 
Woomera Detention Centre. Parliamentary Speech, House of Representatives. Official 
Hansard. Commonwealth of Australia, p. 23,658. 
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Australian newspaper reported that some nurses rejected the Flood Inquiry as a 
“whitewash” and said they would not give evidence, despite the government’s 
offer of assistance of $10,000 toward legal and travel expenses.73 
 
Despite publicly defending its policies, the Howard government made 
significant changes after the Flood Inquiry. The Immigration Detention 
Standards were re-written, and the revised information system incorporated 
information from a source that was previously excluded from the process.74 
According to Schedule 3 of the new regulations cited in the previous sentence, 
the government no longer relied solely on the contractor for information, but 
included information from detained refugee applicants in the official process. 
Schedule 3 also specified that the Immigration Detention Standards must be 
prominently displayed in detention centres, and that detainees have the right to 
directly “complain without hindrance or fear of reprisal” to official agencies 
about conditions inside detention centres: to the Department of Immigration 
and Multicultural Affairs, the Human Rights Commissioner, the Ombudsman, 
police, and to child protection agencies.  
 
Other significant changes occurred. When announcing the Flood Inquiry to 
Parliament, the Immigration Minister said that he would implement the major 
recommendations of the report, including a revision of child protection policy, 
a review of training procedures for detention staff, and a revision of the 
performance clauses in the detention contract with Australasian Correctional 
Management.75 In the cited speech, Philip Ruddock also announced the setting 
up of an independent Immigration Detention Advisory Group that would have 
“unfettered access to all detention centres”. In the speech cited above, the 
Minister rejected “claims that a ‘veil of secrecy’ surrounds immigration 
detention” as “simply not true”. This analysis does not support the Minister’s 
                                            
73 Terry Plane, "Nurses Reject 'Whitewash' Inquiry," Australian, 11 December 2000. 
74 Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. Immigration Detention Contract 2003, 
schedule 3; 8.1.1, paragraph 3-57. 
75 Philip Ruddock. (2001, 27 February). Ministerial Statements: Immigration Detention 
Procedures, p. 24,438. 
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claim about an absence of secrecy. As suggested in the previous section, the 
structure of the contract between the government and the service provider was 
conducive to secrecy. The analysis of the events that followed the publication 
of child abuse allegations at the Woomera detention centre suggested that 
overcoming official secrecy depended on individuals working outside the 
official information process. Even then, transparency came about only after 
considerable pressure on the government through the media. Whilst the 
structure of the information process by itself is not indicative of legal 
rationalism, the manner in which the Howard government utilised the structure 
to control official information may contribute to legal rationalism.  
 
 
Changes to what end? 
 
Did the Howard government effectively address the policy problems in its 
mandatory detention regime that were discussed in the last section? The 
answer is a hesitant and qualified “yes”. As will be argued in this section, the 
systemic changes that caused the problems remained largely unaddressed, 
hidden behind an approach that had the appearance of legal-rational process. 
After the Howard government committed itself to implement the key 
recommendations of the Flood Inquiry, problems remained with investigating 
criminal allegations inside detention centres.  
 
Although the Howard government had taken steps to restore the reporting 
mechanism, such measures were not necessarily effective. The Senate heard 
that on 20 January 2001, an officer of Australasian Correctional Management 
allegedly assaulted a detainee.76 Police were called after a delay of almost two 
weeks, and only after the detainee reported the allegation to the on site 
business manager of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. 
                                            
76 Commonwealth of Australia. Official Committee Hansard. Legal and Constitutional 
Legislation Committee. Consideration of Additional Estimates. 
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Charges were laid six days later.77 Within days of the Flood Inquiry being 
tabled in Parliament, a Senate Committee report connected the delay of an 
investigation into the assault allegations cited above with the suppression of 
the sexual abuse allegations at the Woomera detention centre less than one 
year earlier: 
 
… with the allegations about Woomera and the length of time that was taken to 
investigate those allegations and the amount of information that came through after 
the event. It bothers me that the lessons from the experiences at Woomera have not 
been put into practice as yet.78 
 
One may infer from the above quote that changes to the information system 
had not overcome the systemic barriers within the reporting process. Although 
the rules had been changed, such changes did not translate to appropriate 
policy practices, evidenced by a two week delay in calling police to investigate 
an alleged assault.  
 
Even when information found its way into the system, such information was 
not immune from the ideological slant toward legal rationalism. This can be 
seen in the following example from the work of lawyer and Jesuit priest Frank 
Brennan with detained refugee applicants. 79 Brennan wrote that he had seen an 
injured child with bruises at the Woomera detention centre, and that he knew 
of reports by Australasian Correctional Management that tear gas had been 
used on children at that centre. Brennan continues that he informed the 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs in April 2002, that the 
Department refuted Brennan’s report “within hours” on the basis that there 
was no record of this but subsequently investigated the matter after a delay of 
“more than three months”.80 Here was another example where DIMA publicly 
denied a problem in the delivery of the policy, but acted on information behind 
                                            
77 Ibid., p. 197.  
78 Ibid., p. 198. 
79 Frank Brennan, Tampering with Asylum. A Universal Human Problem (St. Lucia, Qsl: 
University of Queensland Press, 2003) pp. 101-02. 
80 Ibid., p. 102. 
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the scenes. This example also questions Philip Ruddock’s assurance to 
Parliament, discussed earlier, that the policy was not conducted in secrecy.81  
 
Brennan’s account cited above is a good example of Legal Rationalism Form 1, 
where cumbersome policy practices lead to a selective use of legal rationalism. 
Brennan wrote that he informed the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission of how the child’s mother described to Brennan a conversation 
with a senior officer of Australian Federal Police (AFP): 
 
it was not the responsibility of Federal Police because they would come only for 
damage to property. He said Child Service would not come because their 
responsibility is child abuse and relationships between children and parents … He 
told me that the doctor and ACM had not made any report of my son’s injuries to 
Children’s Services.82  
 
Implicit in the above quote is a suggestion that a systemic flaw remained within 
the reporting mechanism: if no report was forthcoming from the detention 
centre, it was as if the matter had not occurred. Brennan continued that the 
detention guard, who hit the woman’s son, wore a mask at the time of the 
alleged assault. Almost one year after the incident, in February 2003, 
Immigration Minister Philip Ruddock advised the woman that the matter had 
been referred to Australian Federal Police, who found “insufficient evidence” 
because the “alleged offender” could not be identified.83 Whilst it may be 
difficult for police investigations to occur without appropriate evidence, 
Brennan’s example cited above raises two points. First, there seems to be a 
unique relationship of policy practices with legal rationality; one where the 
rules created systematic barriers to identifying issues within detention centres. 
Second, a legal-rational approach would have addressed the mechanistic means 
                                            
81 Ruddock. (2001, 27 February). Ministerial Statements: Immigration Detention Procedures, 
p. 24,438. 
82 Cited in Brennan, Tampering with Asylum. A Universal Human Problem, p. 103. 
83 Ibid. 
  
  
- 123 - 
Chapter 3 
Detention in the Desert — Woomera 
of circumventing legal rationality and led to an investigation, even if the 
masked offender could not be identified by the victim or by eye-witnesses.  
 
Brennan’s work highlighted another problem where the rules and procedures 
prevented efficient policy practices, even when the reporting mechanism 
remained intact.84 Accordingly, two men allegedly sexually assaulted and 
injured a woman, who was detained at the Curtin detention centre in 2003. 
Federal and state police in Western Australia were notified. Australian Federal 
Police advised that it did not investigate because this was a matter for the state 
police, and state police advised that this was a matter for the Australian Federal 
Police because the detention centre “was maintained on Commonwealth land”. 
Brennan wrote that one year later, Immigration Minister Ruddock wrote to 
him that the government “continues to work actively to develop formal 
arrangements” between state and federal police in South Australia, Western 
Australia and New South Wales. However, the skewed approach to applying 
legal rules in the example cited above did not mean that changing the rules to 
encourage greater transparency led to concomitant policy practices.  
 
It is arguable from the discussion in this section that the existing protocols 
created barriers to some investigations, due to the location on Commonwealth 
land. An extension of this argument would be the statement that some crimes 
committed in international airport lounges could not be investigated, because 
the relevant law enforcement agency which usually investigates this type of 
crime does not have jurisdiction in this area. Yet, as will be seen especially in 
the next chapter, arguments pertaining to jurisdiction restricted the clinical 
practice of child protection personnel. In other areas, as will be seen in the 
section on the criminalisation of detention, the Howard government 
committed itself to change legislation to allow for effective prosecution by 
police within detention centres. Investigations, however, were not always 
performed uniformly. 
                                            
84 Ibid., pp. 104-05. 
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From these investigative practices emerged a pattern of selective use of legal 
rationality that had the potential to conceal negative aspects of the policy, but 
informed on negative aspects about detainees. This observation sits 
comfortably with the Habermasian suggestion that governments put their 
policies in a good light. The observation also suggests a dimension to legal 
rationalism that is neither Form 1 nor Form 2. That is, investigations into 
crimes allegedly committed by refugees inside immigration detention centres 
may be consistent with good legal-rational practice, were it not for the selective 
aspect of investigations being conducted, depending on who the suspect may 
be. The “selective” investigations are, strictly speaking, not an example of 
Legal Rationalism Form 1, because such selectivity precludes any fetishising of 
the rules per se. Neither is this an example of Legal Rationalism Form 2, 
because there is no pretence of recourse to legal rationality when employees 
are the most likely suspects. In such cases, legal rationality may not even be set 
in motion at all, unless “unofficial” information is powerful enough to generate 
legal-rational practices.  
 
 
Criminalisation of detention 
 
This section discusses the information about policy practices that the 
government did not treat secretly. It is argued that information about 
disturbances from within detention centres served to consolidate the legal 
rationality rhetoric of the Howard government in areas where administrative 
detention under immigration law interfaced with Australia’s criminal justice 
system. It is intuitive to suggest that reports of regularly occurring allegations 
of assaults on women and children in detention centres would not look good 
for the Howard government. But what if the government could turn the 
argument around and argue that the actions of the refugee applicants justified 
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the threat frame, and that it was necessary to counter this perceived threat with 
a strong law-and-order response? In addition, what if the Howard government 
framed the detention of refugee applicants in remote desert locations as 
necessary components of humanitarian and legal-rational polices? To answer 
these questions, it is necessary to investigate the government’s policy 
justifications during a phase of mandatory detention when the emphasis was 
not on the safety to the detained refugee applicants, but on the safety of the 
Australian community. 
 
As will be seen shortly, part of the Howard government’s justifications of the 
policy of mandatory detention were about a need for an orderly and legal 
processing of refugee claims. Without admitting that mandatory detention 
between 1999 and 2003 was part of refugee policy, the government frequently 
framed such detention as a humane screening process.85 Instead, the Minister 
dissociated mandatory detention from refugee policy and framed it as 
migration policy: 
 
All unauthorised arrivals, whether protection visa applicants or not, are required by 
law to be detained until they are either removed from Australia, or granted a visa …  
However, detainees are only released when they have satisfied all relevant criteria for 
the grant of a visa.86 
 
About one year later: 
Let me affirm that we do have a policy of detention for people who arrive in 
Australia unlawfully and clandestinely, to ensure that they are available for processing 
and for removal. It is a policy to achieve that public interest outcome. It is not 
                                            
85 Philip Ruddock. (2000, 28 November). Matters of Public Importance: Immigration 
Reception Processing Centres. Parliamentary Speech, House of Representatives. Official 
Hansard. Commonwealth of Australia, p. 22,861; Ruddock. (2001, 27 February). Ministerial 
Statements: Immigration Detention Procedures, p. 24,483; Philip Ruddock. (2001, 5 April). 
Migration Legislation Amendment (Immigration Detainees) Bill, 2001: Second Reading. 
Parliamentary Speech, House of Representatives. Official Hansard. Commonwealth of 
Australia, p. 26,592.  
86 Philip Ruddock. (2000, 17 August). Question on Notice: Illegal Immigration: Woomera 
Detention Centre. Parliamentary Speech, House of Representatives. Official Hansard. 
Commonwealth of Australia, p. 19,366. 
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punitive. It is humane. We do not detain refugees. We do, however, detain people, 
some of whom make asylum claims.87 
 
One may infer from the Immigration Minister’s statements above that the 
policy was humane, delivered in lawful and orderly manner, whilst at the same 
maintaining Australian sovereignty. Other information, however, suggests a 
mismatch between the Minister’s language claims and actual policy practices.  
 
In mid-March 2001, about two weeks after the Flood Inquiry and the 
Ombudsman’s report (both previously cited) were critical of conditions inside 
immigration detention centres, Immigration Minister Ruddock gave permission 
for a Defence and Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs “to visit and 
assess human rights conditions at Australia’s immigration detention centres”.88 
This committee recommended a time limit of no more than fourteen weeks for 
detention, and also reported “a number of concerns about the human rights 
conditions of detainees in the centres”.89 On the current affairs program 
Lateline, Philip Ruddock rejected this recommendation as “quite impractical” 
and not “substantially and properly researched”.90 During this interview, the 
Minister played down his earlier comments in Parliament that some committee 
members, who reported their findings as distressing, were “naïve, lacking in 
life’s experience”.91 However, Philip Ruddock said that “one loses a sense of 
proportion”, because the amenities in Australian detention centres were better 
than those that existed in refugee camps in other parts of the world.92 This 
suggests that a humanitarian outcome to mandatory detention was not a top 
priority for the Howard government.  
                                            
87 Philip Ruddock. (2001, 21 June). Questions without Notice: Illegal Immigrants: Detention 
Policy. Parliamentary Speech, House of Representatives. Official Hansard. Commonwealth 
of Australia, p. 28,333. 
88 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. Completed Inquiry: 
Visits to Immigration Detention Centres, chapter 1, paragraph 1.1. 
89 Ibid., list of recommendations, recommendation 14; chapter 8; conclusions, paragraph 
8.5. 
90 Lateline [ABC Television Broadcast]. (2001, 19 June). Real Refugees the Focus for 
Immigration Minister. Reporter: Tony Jones.  
91 Ibid.  
92 Ibid.  
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On the same day when Philip Ruddock made this comparison on Lateline, 
Prime Minister John Howard made another comparison, when he responded 
to the committee’s report on the ABC radio broadcast PM. In this interview, 
the Prime Minister gave a qualified assurance of a humanitarian policy. John 
Howard conceded that detention centres were “very confronting”, but added 
that detention was necessary to humanely prevent “would-be illegal 
immigrants” from coming to Australia.93 John Howard elaborated: 
 
It is a very difficult problem, and I admire enormously the work that Philip Ruddock 
is doing to balance compassion. I mean we’re not sort of sending people back to their 
deaths. That’s the reason why we detain them.94  
 
In the two media interviews on Lateline and on PM as cited above, the 
comments by the Prime Minister and by the Immigration Minister depict 
mandatory detention as a humane policy. One may infer that it was not the 
policy that was humane, but rather the contrasting framing options presented 
by the Howard government; options that compared detention in Australia with 
being sent to certain death, or a comparison of conditions in refugee camps 
overseas. However, the recommendation by the Defence and Joint Standing 
Committee on Foreign Affairs to limit immigration detention to fourteen 
weeks was based on its findings in detention centres in Australia. In this 
respect, John Howard’s and Philip Ruddock’s “humanitarian” justifications for 
a policy of mandatory detention are rhetorical.  
 
Still reflecting on Philip Ruddock’s two comments cited above, there is also 
something incongruous about the policy practice of detaining refugee 
applicants and the Minister’s language claim that detention occurs for 
humanely processing these applications. Whilst the government may have 
                                            
93 PM [ABC Radio Broadcast]. (2001, 19 June). PM Responds to Asylum Seekers, HIH, 
Advertising and Kyoto. Reporter: Catherine McGrath.  
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processed the applications in an orderly and humane manner, it did little that 
assisted refugees to engage with this process. Indeed, this legal-rational 
processing of applications, coupled with an unwillingness of government 
officials to assist people realise their refugee rights contributed to the 
criminalisation of the process. This may be inferred from a newspaper report 
on comments by Philip Ruddock, when the Minister spoke about a riot at the 
Curtin detention centre.95 Accordingly, the Sydney Morning Herald reported that 
the riot began when 57 people, who arrived in March, were told in June that 
they “would be sent home without being given a chance to apply to stay in the 
country”. The article reported that Philip Ruddock said that “they were 
screened out of the process on the basis that they made no claims”, and that 
officials “don’t tell people what they have got to tell us to get into the process”. 
 
The context of the newspaper article cited above makes it clear that Philip 
Ruddock justified the government decision not to advise refugee applicants of 
their legal rights or on how to maximise the success of their application. Such 
is government policy under the special provisions of “separation detention”, as 
outlined in the Flood Inquiry96 Accordingly, the policy specifies that new 
arrivals are initially prevented from having contact with other detained refugees 
and not allowed phone calls within Australia, until after they have lodged their 
application. Flood continues that they receive legal advice and contact with the 
Ombudsman, Human Rights Commissioner and the Red Cross, but only on 
request. Conversely, people who do not make such requests do not receive the 
assistance. It can be seen from the policy provisions of “separation detention” 
that, ironically, successful entry to the orderly refugee processing scheme is 
maximised by some deviousness and prior coaching by “unofficial” means, 
where persons who articulate their own interests and have some knowledge of 
                                            
95 Andrew Clennell, "Get Better Coaching: Ruddock to Boat People," Sydney Morning 
Herald, 4 June 2001. 
96 Flood. Report of Inquiry into Immigration Detention Procedures, paragraphs 2.8 to 2.10, p. 
4. 
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the Australian legal system would benefit most. The rioting 57 people at Curtin 
mentioned earlier did not come into this category.  
 
Riots and breakouts, regardless of what motivated them, prompted further 
law-and-order justifications from the Howard government. This will be seen 
shortly, when addressing the criminalisation of detention. As disturbances 
inside immigration detention centres became more frequent, the Howard 
government wrote new legislation to address issues that arose specifically from 
the detention of refugees. Almost concurrently, other legislation imposed 
penalties for members of the Australian community who assisted with riots 
and escapes.  
 
Unrest began within six months after the Woomera detention centre opened in 
November 1999, and lasted for most of the lifespan of the facility. In May 
2000, the Sydney Morning Herald reported unconfirmed rumours of hunger 
strikes, mental health concerns, and violent incidents.97 In the following 
month, about 500 detained refugee applicants pushed down the fences and 
walked five kilometres to the township of Woomera, where they remained for 
three days before returning to the detention centre. The first releases from 
Woomera occurred about one month later, in July 2000. Philip Ruddock told 
Parliament that the breakout occurred because people “were misinformed by 
people smugglers about the length of time they would spend in detention”.98  
 
The June breakout was relatively peaceful. Things changed during the August 
riots. Thirteen guards were injured, and a water cannon and tear gas were used 
to prevent escapes.99 Philip Ruddock told Parliament:  
 
On Saturday, … detainees stoned buildings and were throwing rocks and implements 
at the staff. One canister of tear gas was used to quell the crowd … This morning at 
                                            
97 Penelope Debelle, "Home on the Range," Sydney Morning Herald, 10 May 2000. 
98 Ruddock. (2000, 17 August). Question on Notice: Illegal Immigration: Woomera Detention 
Centre, p. 19,366.  
99 Catherine Hockley and Annabel Crabb, "Woomera Riots," Advertiser, 29 August 2000. 
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5.45 South Australian time this same group deliberately set fire to a number of 
buildings. They have caused very extensive damage. The internal security fence has 
been pushed over and a perimeter fence has been breached in a couple of places. The 
detainees have used the fence posts to construct weapons. As a result, tear gas and 
the on-site fire tender were used to push those people back from the fence to enable 
some repairs to be made on a temporary basis.100 
 
The venue designated for orderly processing of administrative matters had 
become a place of violence. The Minister’s denial that there were refugees 
inside, and the actions of detainees themselves, may have strengthened the 
government’s claim that mandatory detention was necessary to safeguard 
Australia’s borders and citizens. Philip Ruddock later characterised the ongoing 
riots as objections to lawful detention, expressed in ways “ranging from non-
compliance with a request to more serious incidents such as assaults, wilful 
damage and breakouts”.101 This framing of events held the key to the 
criminalisation of mandatory detention; not from the perspective of refugee 
policy, but from the perspective advanced by the Howard government. It was a 
perspective that legally separated the detention of onshore refugee applicants 
from refugee policy. Strictly speaking, applications were processed under the 
auspices of refugee policy. However, the emerging criminalisation of detention 
had a different function. It assisted the Howard government’s language claims 
that framed refugees as criminals and as people intent on breaking Australian 
law. Government policy, by contrast, was depicted as the bulwark that 
protected the civilian population at the borders, and again when the perceived 
intruders were inside the state. When Philip Ruddock defended the legality of 
mandatory detention in August 2000, he also announced special legal 
provisions for riots and violence within detention centres.  
 
                                            
100 Philip Ruddock. (2000, 28 August). Questions without Notice: Immigration: Woomera 
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The government will be looking at any further action that it can take to ensure that 
those people who have been involved in rioting, civil disorder and destruction of 
property are dealt with in accordance with the law and, if the law is inadequate, that 
the law is addressed.102 
 
The Minister also told Parliament that Australian Federal Police, Australian 
Protective Services and South Australian state police were involved.103 This 
suggested that Australian legal provisions already addressed violence within 
detention centres. Such seemed to be the case when the Minister announced 
on the following day that ten detainees had been taken into police custody, and 
that the use of the water canon and tear-gas as “entirely appropriate and 
necessary, given that some 30 officers received injuries”.104 However, existing 
legislation operated regardless of the venue of violence and the identity of the 
perpetrators. Philip Ruddock’s parliamentary speech cited above announced 
specific legislation based on the political framing of refugees as law-breakers 
inside immigration detention centres.  
 
Philip Ruddock’s statements cited previously do not indicate that there were 
barriers to police jurisdictions that may have influenced investigations and 
prosecutions in relation to the August riots at Woomera. This contrasts with 
the discussion earlier in this chapter, where the effects of police protocols 
created barriers to investigating alleged crimes in which detainees were the 
victims. Philip Ruddock did not announce that the pending legislation would 
address such issues, or that victims of violence inside detention centres were 
entitled to special compensation, as one may expect from a policy that 
endeavoured to detain refugees safely and humanely. However, Philip 
Ruddock’s comments did feed into a public perception of detained refugees as 
criminals.  
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p. 19,395. 
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104 Philip Ruddock. (2000, 29 August). Questions without Notice: Immigration: Woomera 
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In December 2000, as some former detention staff publicly denounced 
conditions inside Woomera, and as the Flood Inquiry and the re-opened child 
abuse case were still in progress, life inside detention centres was far from 
peaceful. Already, Woomera had witnessed the June breakout and the August 
riots. A new phase of immigration detention had begun, with intermittent 
media reports of escalating violent disturbances that continued for the next 
two years. In early December, the newspaper The Advertiser published a 
photograph of homemade weapons that detainees had used against detention 
staff.105 These developments were increasingly at odds with language claims 
that mandatory detention was necessary for the orderly processing of illegal 
entrants to Australia.  
 
As happened during the investigation of child abuse allegations discussed 
previously, the Howard government was the only official information source 
about events in detention centres. Pro-refugee advocate and Migration Agent 
Marion Le suggested this much when offering a perspective of events that 
differed markedly from that of the Howard government.106 The article reported 
that, according to information from the government, the riot at Curtin was 
sparked because 57 detainees were told they would be sent back. The same 
media source contained a statement by Marion Le which questioned why 100, 
who also participated in the riot, would risk their own refugee claims unless 
there were other issues that the government did not mention.  
 
In November 2001, during “the sixth major incident at the isolated detention 
centre in 17 months”, there were six escapes as detainees set buildings on fire, 
causing damage of $140,000.107 The Howard government continued to focus 
its information on the violent aspects of the disturbances, without given an 
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106 Clennell, "Get Better Coaching: Ruddock to Boat People." Sydney Morning Herald, 4 
June 2001. 
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equally detailed account of the causes of the ongoing disturbances. The 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, which on other 
occasions was reluctant to discuss events within detention centres, released 
photographs of fire damage sustained during a riot in December 2001.108 These 
photographs could be accessed from a link at the cited media release, and 
remained on the departmental website at the time of writing the final draft of 
this thesis; more than five years later.  
 
The public depiction of events in detention centres during the criminalisation 
of detention depended on the source of information. The government’s 
comments about linking refugee policy with mandatory detention were 
generally in the context of generating a negative refugee stereotype, as the 
following media report suggests. Philip Ruddock, when commenting about 
another riot at Woomera in March 2002, said that participating in the riot 
might jeopardise a “protection claim”, because “Australia is under no 
obligation to give protection to people who commit serious criminal 
offences”.109 Woomera increasingly resembled a prison, instead of a detention 
centre for the processing of refugee claims. More weapons were discovered at 
Woomera in July 2002 “during a routine search of detainee 
accommodation”.110 In the same media release, the Department of 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs refuted as “wildly inaccurate” media 
reports that detainees sustained injuries during an incident.  
 
In contrast to official information from the government, unofficial 
information, when it reached official channels, suggested that the government 
downplayed suggestions of heavy-handed practices by detention guards. 
Independent Member of Parliament Andrew Theophanous raised in 
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Sunday Mail, 31 March 2002. 
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Parliament “unofficial” information that was not passed through the “official” 
channels made available by the Howard government, but was relayed directly 
to Theophanous during a visit to the Port Hedland detention centre in June 
2001.111 In the cited speech, Theophanous told Parliament that detainees at 
Port Hedland had taken possession of a metal baton, which they considered 
“proof … of continuing ill treatment at the centre”. Andrew Theophanous 
continued that, when he previously told Immigration Minister Philip Ruddock 
of this, the Minister “dismissed the hidden baton story”. In his response during 
the parliamentary debate, Philip Ruddock implied that the object was not an 
aluminium baton, without actually denying that it was an aluminium baton:112 
Philip Ruddock said that the baton was “aluminium coated … by a form of 
plastic rubber”; a “standard issue” baton, the type that was “used from time to 
time”.  
 
When Philip Ruddock refrained from admitting that detention guards used 
aluminium batons on refugees, the Minister employed the circumstantial 
manipulation of words that was so characteristic of legal rationalism. 
Accordingly, the Minister in the speech cited in the previous paragraph left 
open the possibility that a baton made of aluminium was not an “aluminium 
baton” if it was coated by plastic. The Minister continued by stating that 
“substantive issues” should be referred to the Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission for “full and complete investigation”, and that the 
Ombudsman, Human Rights Commissioner and United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees “are able to visit if they have had an invitation 
from detainees”.113 This advice directed information to the official channels; a 
process where information is published long after the event, and after prior 
consultation with the government. The official process thus assisted the 
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Hedland Detention Centre. Parliamentary Speech, House of Representatives. Official 
Hansard. Commonwealth of Australia, p. 27,859. 
113 Ibid. 
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Howard government to favourably present unchallenged its own version of 
events to the electorate at a time when the issues were of political salience.  
 
Official information from the Ombudsman and the Human Rights 
Commissioner, whilst not directly corroborating the unofficial information 
published by media sources, suggested that some unofficial claims were not 
implausible. One woman at the Curtin detention centre told an investigator 
that she sustained several hits from a baton during a riot, and that her husband, 
who intervened, was subsequently gaoled.114 This is in addition to the baton 
incident at Port Hedland that Theophanous referred to, as previously 
discussed. Another report of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission cited a separate report, where the authors were informed that 
during 2003, some children reported that they “saw their parents being hit with 
batons by officers”.115 Similarly, the Ombudsman reported “tensions between 
different ethnic groups” inside detention centres which escalated to “fights, 
assaults and threats to kill”, as well as alleged assaults on children.116 The cited 
report continued that “women who do not have a partner” and “unattached 
children”, those without families, were at greater risk of “indecent assaults and 
threats” than any other group.117 Philip Flood wrote that “a small proportion 
of detention officers” intimidated and verbally abused detainees.118  
 
The criminalisation of detention within the timeframe of this case study 
(between 1999 and 2003) began when Philip Ruddock announced after the 
August 2000 riots that special legislation would be introduced, as discussed 
previously. Several months later, especially in April 2001, the Howard 
government renewed these announcements. The new legislative measures 
                                            
114 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. A Report on Visits to Immigration 
Detention Facilities by the Human Rights Commissioner 2001. Treatment with Respect, 
paragraph 3.7.  
115 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. (2004, April). A Last Resort? National 
Inquiry into Children in Immigration Detention, paragraph 8.3, p. 298. 
116 Commonwealth Ombudsman. Report of an Own Motion Investigation into the 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs' Immigration Detention Centres, p. 17. 
117 Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
118 Flood. Report of Inquiry into Immigration Detention Procedures, paragraph 7.4, p. 28. 
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consisted of strip-searching of detainees, “including children as young as ten”, 
and an increase in gaol terms for convicted escapees from immigration 
detention from two to five years.119 These announcements also provided a clue 
that the criminalisation of detention would somehow include Australians. The 
Australian newspaper reported that the new legislation would include powers to 
“screen or search the possessions of visitors” to detention centres.120 The cited 
article also mentioned “a series of riots and mass breakouts from detention 
centres across the country”, during the last 12 months. Another newspaper 
article reported one riot at Curtin, which resulted in injuries to detention 
guards and $250,000 property damage, and another riot at Port Hedland in the 
previous week. Fourteen people escaped from the Villawood detention centre 
in April 2000, after they obtained bolt cutters that were used for construction 
work at that centre.121 
 
One may conclude from this discussion on riots and breakouts that the 
government’s announced legislative changes constituted the criminalisation of 
mandatory detention. Harsher legislative measures, in response to disturbances, 
are not an example of legal rationalism. These measures, however, do help 
answer the question posed at the beginning of this thesis: How, and to what 
extent, did the Howard government engage in legal rationalism when justifying 
its refugee polices to the electorate? The announcements of the pending 
legislation formed part of a pattern where the Howard government justified its 
refugee policies to the electorate by making recourse to the law. Where the 
judiciary imposed sentences under the increased penalties of the new 
legislation, such sentencing may have led indirectly to an adverse outcome of 
the refugee application.122  
                                            
119 Darren Gray and Annabel Crabb, "Ruddock Unveils Law to Strip-Search Detainees," 
Age, 6 April 2001. 
120 Megan Saunders, "Ruddock Won't Back Down to Riot Pressure," Australian, 6 April 
2001. 
121 Andrew Clennell, "Asylum Seekers on Run after Villawood Escape," Age, 28 March 
2001. 
122 This point may be argued from the consideration that an increase of the maximum 
penalty from two to five years for participation of disturbances within detention centres may 
have led to the passing of increased prison terms by the judiciary. Article 33.2 of the 
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The criminalisation of mandatory detention came full circle when 
announcements by Philip Ruddock heralded a new category of criminal: those 
members of the Australian community who assisted with escapes from 
detention centres. The examples cited in this paragraph form another part of a 
pattern, where the government has justified the policy to the electorate by 
recourse to the law. Philip Ruddock announced that those Australians who 
assisted in a breakout from the Woomera detention centre, would be charged 
with "conspiracy to defeat Commonwealth law"; an offence that carried a 
maximum sentence of ten years imprisonment.123 The cited article also 
reported that, although the new legislation had been passed, police instead 
charged those who assisted with the escapes “with a lesser offence” that 
carried a maximum penalty of four years. This suggests a difference between 
government rhetoric and actual law enforcement practices. However, the 
justification of the policy in terms of maximum sentencing provisions 
continued. In response to another breakout of 35 people from Woomera with 
outside help, the Minister said people risked up to ten years jail, and the “failed 
asylum seekers face up to five years in jail for their escape”.124  
 
The suggestion that Philip Ruddock’s comments were not only about the 
legislation, but also about justifying the policy, comes from a comment about a 
breakout from Woomera at Easter 2002. Then, the Minister said that those 
who assisted with escapes were not sympathisers, but people with criminal 
intent.125 Acting Immigration Minister Daryl Williams continued this line of 
                                                                                                               
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees for instance specifies that a person, may be 
“a danger to the security of the country” if convicted of a serious crime. This, in turn may 
have serious consequences for the refugee determination process if a judge imposed a 
prison term for an offence committed during a disturbance in a detention centre. The 
possible relationship between sentencing and refugee determination, however, was not 
pursued in this thesis.  
123 Michael Millett, "Ten Years Jail for Aiding Escape," Sydney Morning Herald, 2 April 2002. 
124 Philip Ruddock. 2002, 28 June). Criminal Actions by Refugee Group Results in Woomera 
Escapes (Media Release, number MPS 58/2002). 
125 Philip Ruddock said that this was a “deliberate, organised breakout by people who have 
been in contact with detainees: Terry Plane et al., "Woomera Breakout Exposes Security," 
Australian, 29 June 2002; Philip Ruddock spoke of people who had taken “the law into their 
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argument, when, in January 2003, he called on refugee support groups to 
“condemn violence”, instead of “tacitly endorsing the actions of detainees”.126 
The acting Minister spoke of a “co-ordinated national campaign” of three days 
of rioting at Baxter, Villawood, Woomera and Port Hedland, that resulted in $3 
million property damage.127 One can see here a rudimentary attempt by the 
government to separate refugee support groups into “lawful” and “unlawful” 
categories. Despite wide publicity of potential legal repercussions for 
Australians, there was another breakout from Woomera in February 2003, with 
outside help.128 Philip Ruddock continued this separation of refugee support 
groups, when he accused “some organisation and their advocates” of “saying it 
was appropriate for detention officers to be beaten by unknown assailants who 
had deliberately camouflaged their identities”.129 In a general comment about 
the hunger strikes, riots and breakouts that occurred from Woomera, Philip 
Ruddock said that the government was “anxious” to close the facility.130 
Woomera was mothballed on 17 April 2003, and was replaced by the high-
security facility of Baxter, about two-hundred kilometres south of Woomera.  
 
In its defence of the policy of mandatory detention, the Howard government 
engaged with the public in many forums, including non-mainstream 
publications. The Sydney Morning Herald for instance reported an exchange of 
words with the Minister and the Australian Catholic Social Justice Council.131 
In the exchange, the Minister wrote to the editor of the magazine of the 
religious organisation in response to an article that people inside detention 
centres might have been abused. The cited Sydney Morning Herald article 
                                                                                                               
own hands and assisting people to escape”:  Michael Madigan, "Furious Libs  Want 
Breakout  Plotters Jailed," Hobart Mercury, 29 June 2002. 
126 Daryl Williams. (2003, 1 January). Support Groups Should Condemn Violence (Media 
Release, number MPS 1/2003).  
127 David Eccles and Daniel Clarke, "Mission to Destroy; Revealed: The Plot to Burn 
Woomera," Advertiser, 1 January 2003. 
128 Mark Phillips, "Seven Arrested over Woomera Breakout," Herald Sun, 6 February 2003. 
129 Sharon Mathieson, "Guards Bashed in Breakout," Daily Telegraph, 5 February 2003. 
130 Mark Phillips, "Activists Lead Daring Breakout of Detainees," Courier Mail, 4 February 
2003. 
131 Toni O'Loughlin, "Detention Centres Like Home: Ruddock," Sydney Morning Herald, 9 
April 2001. 
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continued that the Minister rebuffed concerns over “the use of sedatives, 
solitary confinement and threats of jail”, and concerns over “health, food and 
education conditions”. Philip Ruddock wrote that that “conditions in detention 
centres are better than in many Australian homes”, and that detainees had 
destroyed computers and the library at Woomera in the previous year. 
Similarly, Philip Ruddock wrote to the editor, after the industrial publication 
Australian Nursing Journal called for “a more humane approach” to immigration 
detention.132 In his response, the Minister stated that “detention should be 
humane”, and that the article contained “some factual errors and omissions”.133  
 
The Howard government criminalised mandatory detention in two ways; 
through criminal convictions that occurred under specific legislation and 
imperatives of the policy, which included Australians who assisted with riots 
and escapes. Both approaches consisted of policy justifications by making 
recourse to the law. However, the recourse to the law in this section was not as 
direct as in the justifications about the conditions of detention noted earlier in 
this chapter.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Whilst there was no sustained overbearing justification about legal rules, except 
for those instances that assisted the criminalisation process, such an approach 
did not remain uniform throughout other aspects of policy delivery that were 
discussed in this chapter. Instead, the pattern of legal rationalism manifested 
itself in the legal-rational contract between Australasian Correctional 
Management and the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. 
Then, legal rationalism was noted when the government did not address those 
                                            
132 Author Unknown, "Mandatory Detention: Protection or Punishment," Australian Nursing 
Journal 9, no. No. 8 (2002). 
133 Philip Ruddock, "Mandatory Detention: The Minister Replies," Australian Nursing Journal 
9, no. 10 (2002). 
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features of the law that permitted a skewed outcome of process when such 
outcome was not disadvantageous to the government. For instance, the 
investigations of occurrences that put refugee applicants in a bad light, rather 
than the policy, indicated a selective application of expected legal-rational 
practices. It has been argued that in those instances, the systemic arrangements 
of the flow and retrieval of information sustained these skewed outcomes 
under the auspice of legally rational and orderly process. This process put the 
publicly accessible information about government performance and 
accountability under greater government control. Whilst this did not lead to a 
suppression of information, there was a delay in the release of information - 
either directly because the government could influence the timing of release, or 
indirectly because some information was very cumbersome to retrieve. Such 
power to delay the release of information occurred at a time when refugee 
policy entered a new phase with the privatisation of mandatory detention.  
 
The findings of this analysis from the legal-rational arrangements of the policy 
practices and the detention contracts suggested that much of the Howard 
government’s recourse to legal rationality at times was rhetorical, instead of 
leading to sustained practices. However, the emerging pattern of legal 
rationalism is not displayed neatly and evenly throughout this analysis. 
Nevertheless, it is suggested here that the policy practices and detention 
contracts generated two layers of contradictions that made up the core parts of 
the two forms of legal rationalism. The most prevalent form of legal 
rationalism was its manifestation of Legal Rationalism Form 1; the selective use 
and abuse of legal rationality. This became notable in some instances where the 
policy practices suggested that allegations of abuse inside detention centres 
were carried out selectively. Investigations tended to occur more readily when 
detainees were the alleged perpetrators. The opposite occurred when detainees 
were alleged victims, with some investigations stalling over matters pertaining 
to jurisdiction of law enforcement agencies. In this respect, this analysis 
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supports the hypothesis that the Howard government resorted to legal 
rationalism.  
 
The picture was less clear with the manifestation of Legal Rationalism Form 2 
– the fetishism of legal rationality as an end in itself. Whilst this did occur 
when the government justified its policy at the time of the riots, this was less 
so with regard to adverse allegations about conditions within detention centres. 
With regard to justifying the policy of mandatory detention, the Howard 
government made a stronger appeal to the law-and-order stereotype than to a 
legal-rational approach. It may be argued, though not persuasively from the 
material analysed in this chapter, that the Howard government made recourse 
to the law when attempting to discredit people who raised these allegations. 
Such recourse to the law, however, was not the Howard government’s 
dominant recourse to justifying the policy, and occurred only after two 
separate investigations were already in progress.  
 
Any electoral approval that could be attributed to the policies would be in the 
sense that the electorate disapproved of onshore refugees, and also of 
disturbances within detention centres. This proposition, however, was not 
tested in this analysis. This suggestion could be tested, perhaps through an 
analysis of opinion polls or media content of responses by the public to the 
governments policy justifications. Future research could also analyse how, or if, 
the information from non-government sources affected public discourse and 
how this resonated with the electorate. Similarly, the role of non-government 
organisations and their networks could be analysed for generating electoral 
support, or otherwise, for the policy of mandatory detention.    
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Six-year old Shayan Badraie was detained at the Woomera, and later at the 
Villawood immigration detention centres. The world may have never known 
his fate, had it not been for the hidden camera that refugee supporters 
smuggled into Villawood. Inside immigration detention, Shayan was known as 
LEE 67, the sixty-seventh person to step off a refugee boat that immigration 
officials had codenamed LEE. Footage from the hidden camera at Villawood 
was shown on national television. The current affairs program Four Corners 
depicted a listless child who had stopped eating, drinking and speaking, 
slumped over his father’s shoulder.1 In the following year, the program7.30 
Report stated that during a cycle of nine admissions for “rehydration and drip 
feeding” to the Westmead Children’s Hospital in Sydney, Shayan recovered, 
but became ill again when he returned to the detention centre.2 On both 
television broadcasts cited above, Immigration Minister Philip Ruddock denied 
that Shayan’s exposure to life inside immigration detention had brought on his 
illness. However, in June 2006, after spending $1.5 million on legal costs 
during a compensation case for damages sustained during two years of 
                                            
1 Four Corners [ABC Television Broadcast]. (2001, 13 August). The inside Story: Continuing 
Turmoil in Migrant Detention Centres Is Projecting an Australia That Is Unsympathetic to the 
Needs of People Who Fled Their Homelands to Seek Shelter Here. Reporter: Debbie 
Whitmont.  
2 7.30 Report [ABC Television Broadcast]. (2002, 8 May). Alliance Speaks on Behalf of 
Detainees. Reporter: Rebecca Baillie.  
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immigration detention, the Howard government paid to Shayan an out-of-
court settlement of $400,000.3 
 
Although the official position of the Howard government was that 
immigration detention was for administrative reasons, evidence emerged that 
children suffered under this policy. The evidence suggested that the length of 
stay in detention contributed significantly to this damage: The Human Rights 
and Equal Opportunity Commission reported that the average length of stay in 
detention continued to increase from 1999.4 According to the cited report, the 
average stay per child was almost eighteen months by the end of 2003, with the 
longest stay of almost five-and-a-half years for one child. The report also 
mentioned that, in the first half of 2002, there were 760 major incidents across 
all detention centres.5 Of these, sixteen incidents consisted of allegations of 
assault that involved children, and there were 25 reports of incidents where 
children were involved in self-harm. 
 
The challenge for the Howard government was to reconcile its policy of 
mandatory detention with information that the detention environment was 
detrimental to the well-being of children. Moreover, such policy justifications 
to the electorate also needed to include language claims and policy practices 
that the detention of children was not only a legal requirement and imperative 
to Australia’s security interests, but also humane, as specified by the policy 
objectives. This case study concludes that, although legal rationalism was the 
dominant justification for the policy of the mandatory detention of children, 
legal rationalism manifested itself differently from how it presented itself in the 
previous two case studies, and was often less discernible. 
 
                                            
3 Jewel Topsfield, "Immigration Spent $1.5m Fighting Boy's Stress Suit," Age, 1 June 2006. 
4 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. A Last Resort? National Inquiry into 
Children in Immigration Detention, section 6.7.2, p. 179. 
5 Ibid., section 8.3.1, p. 299. 
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Policy framework 
 
This chapter analyses how the government justified the mandatory detention 
of refugee children between 1999 and 2003.  
 
First, a summary of the legislation. The law does not differentiate between 
adults and children. The Migration Act specifies that persons, who arrived 
without authority, are detained until the person goes to another country, or 
receives a visa to enter Australia.6 There is no minimum age for detention, with 
the consequence that newborn children are also detained if the mother is a 
detainee when she gives birth. Although children had been mandatorily 
detained since 1992, it was not until August 2001 that a child protection policy 
was formulated for all detention centres.7 Section 183 of the Migration Act 
states that the courts to not have the power to release people detained under 
immigration legislation; only the government can do this.8 However, the 
Migration Act gave several choices to the government about how and where 
children could be detained. As will be seen in the “Buffer” section, the Howard 
government did not pursue these choices until after questions were raised 
about the safety of detained children in late 2001 and early 2002.  
 
The Migration Act also stipulates that children who arrived alone, the 
“unaccompanied minors”, have a special protective status. In such events,  the 
Immigration Minister is the legal guardian of  “non-citizen children”.9  Section 
5 of the Migration Act defines such children as less than eighteen years old, who 
do not have a parent, or other relative over twenty-one years old, to care for 
                                            
6 Migration Act 1958 No 157 (2001 as Amended), Section 196. 
7 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. A Last Resort? National Inquiry into 
Children in Immigration Detention, p. 294. 
8 Migration Act 1958 No 157 (2001 as Amended), Section 183. 
9 Immigration (Guardianship of Children) Act 1946. Act No. 45 of 1946 as Amended, Section 
6. 
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them. Furthermore, the Minister may delegate this duty of care for the children 
“to any officer or authority of the Commonwealth or any State or Territory”.  
 
Although the Migration Act did not specify this, the policy required that the 
private contractor of detention services treated children differently from adults. 
The 1998 Immigration Detention Standards recognised “individual care needs” 
among sections of the detainee population, with an obligation to identify such 
individuals and provide programs “to enhance their quality of life and care”.10 
Section 9 of these Standards identified children as a group with special needs, 
and the contractor was obliged to “take account of the needs of [the] particular 
age and gender” of unaccompanied children.11 The contractor was also 
contracted to attend to the “special needs of babies and young children”.12 For 
older children and for children who had a parent or other adult to care for 
them, the contract did not stipulate special responsibilities. There was, 
however, a general requirement that obliged the contractor to provide “social 
and educational programs appropriate to the child's age and abilities”.13 The 
assumption was that parents had the overall responsibility “for the safety and 
care of their child(ren)”.14  
 
After the allegations were raised that children inside detention centres may 
become victims of abuse and neglect, which were discussed in Case Study 3 — 
Detention in the Desert: Woomera, the Howard government clarified the duties of 
the contractor in relation to the policy framework. The 2003 Immigration 
Detention Contract identified children of all age groups, where the “minors, in 
particular unaccompanied minors”, were individuals who required “special care 
needs”.15 The assumption of the 1998 Standards that parents retained 
                                            
10 Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Immigration Detention Agreement 
1998, Section 9.1. 
11 Ibid., section 9.21. 
12 Ibid., section 9.31. 
13 Ibid., section 9.4.1. 
14 Ibid., section 9.4.2. 
15 Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Immigration Detention Contract 2003, 
section 2.2.2.1. 
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responsibility “for the health and welfare of their children” were also found in 
the 2003 Standards.16 However, the 2003 agreement placed specific onus on the 
operator to provide for the “safety, care, welfare and well-being” of the 
children “effectively and appropriately in accordance with” their personal 
circumstances within the legal and policy provisions.17  
 
As discussed in Case Study 2 — A special case: Children in Detention, shortly after 
the arrival of the boats in late 1999, Immigration Minister Philip Ruddock 
described two policy outlines, depending on whether such arrival was “lawful” 
or “unlawful”.18 However, the Howard government did not use such 
justification for the detention of children, perhaps because children could not 
reasonably be held accountable for the circumstances of their arrival to 
Australia. Instead, the government justified the detention of children by 
arguing that it was better to detain the children than to split the family by 
releasing only the children. Before discussing this justification, first I wish to 
discuss how the government’s claim of maintaining family unity through 
mandatory detention sat with the policy decision to scrap family reunion for 
refugees on Temporary Protection Visas. In the paper cited at the beginning of 
the paragraph, Philip Ruddock based this decision on the logic of arithmetic.19 
Accordingly, there were 23 million refugees in the world, and Australia had 
committed itself to a “12,000 place annual humanitarian resettlement program 
to assist international efforts to address the plight of refugees and others in 
need”. The recent “unauthorised boat arrivals”, the Minister reasoned, 
threatened this intake goal. More that 1,600 people had already arrived between 
July and December 1999, and another 10,000 were on their way at that time. 
Most were “young males”, who on average, after being accepted as refugees, 
would bring three additional persons through the family reunion program, 
which was part of Australia’s refugee polices. By offering only temporary 
                                            
16 Ibid., Section 2.2.3.2.2. 
17 Ibid., section 2.2.3.2.1. 
18 Philip Ruddock. Recognising the Real Challenge in Refugee Protection. [e-Journal] Online 
Opinion (1999, 15 September). 
19 Ibid. 
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protection to refugees from the “unauthorised” source for the first thirty 
months and making permanent protection conditional upon re-application, the 
Minister argued that Australia would be a less attractive destination and would 
therefore be able to offer the designated 12,000 places to “those in most 
need”. The Minister wrote that refugees were not the problem, but their mode 
of arrival, and that his policies would respond to this in an orderly and 
humanitarian manner.  
 
Treating refugees differently depending on whether they arrive lawfully or unlawfully 
does not mean that we are penalising unauthorised arrivals. What it does mean is that 
we are being more generous in cases where people play by the rules of the 
international protection arrangements and where they comply with Australia’s laws.20 
 
It is now time to return to this case study and relate the Minister’s arguments, 
which were essentially about orderly processing and restricting access to 
resources, to the detention of children. To begin, the Minister maintained that 
the Howard government did not separate refugee families.  
 
Separation from family members in these circumstances results from the decision of 
individuals to travel across the world and enter Australia unlawfully. It is not a 
decision of the Australian Government.21  
 
Nevertheless, the government’s decision to treat these refugees less generously 
than other refugees did impact on children in three major ways. First, it 
changed the demographics of the refugee population from mainly single men 
to families. From this perspective, it was plausible that the detention of 
children was partly caused by the government’s policy decision, which 
provided an incentive for parents not to leave their children behind. Second, 
justifications based on the legal rationality of the detention of children 
suggested that the Howard government had a policy of vicarious liability, 
                                            
20 Ibid. 
21 Philip Ruddock. (2000, 1 November). Questions on Notice: Refugees: Privacy: (Question 
No. 1936). Parliamentary Speech, House of Representatives. Official Hansard. 
Commonwealth of Australia, p. 21,966. 
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which flowed on from the actions of the parents to the children. Third, the 
argument that detention served the interests of children because they ought to 
remain with their parents did not address or justify the detention of children 
who arrived without families. Nevertheless, the government maintained that 
detention was a parental choice, and offered financial incentives for people to 
forego their rights to appeal refugee decisions and to leave Australia: 
 
Parents and their children are free to leave immigration detention at any time by 
leaving Australia. The government continues to work with people in detention and 
the governments of their home countries to facilitate the return of all unlawful non-
citizens. Where a person does not have the funds to arrange travel to their homeland, 
the government will assist. Many people in detention who have been found not to 
satisfy the requirements for a Protection Visa choose to pursue several avenues of 
appeal. As a consequence, the period of immigration detention for them and their 
children may be extended. There are a number of other factors that can contribute to 
extended detention periods for children. These include difficulty in establishing 
identity, litigation, difficulty in obtaining travel documentation and non-cooperation 
by their parents.22 
 
The statement cited above may be seen as part of a humanitarian policy to 
release families. However, the government’s offer also contained a potentially 
coercive element, at least for those applicants who believed that their appeals 
would eventually confirm their refugee claims. For those families, the choices 
consisted of taking their chances with freedom and returning to a country 
where persecution may be a realistic possibility, or to remain detained for a 
long time. Although the Migration Act underpinned the policy of the mandatory 
detention of children, one can assume from the website of the Department of 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs there was intent by the Howard 
government to direct legal-rational process toward an assumption of illegal 
entry to Australia. Yet such assumption was premature, at least in cases where 
the legal-rational process of the refugee application was pending. In a skew to 
                                            
22 Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. (Undated). Women and Children in 
Immigration Detention [Website].  
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legal rationality, those parents who did not accept the government offer and 
continued to explore legal options for accessing their refugee rights for 
themselves and their children, were framed by the Howard government as 
responsible for the deprivation of liberty of their children.  
 
Such policy framework, whilst derived from legal statutes and their 
interpretations in refugee applications and a range of legal-rational appeals, 
predisposed the process toward an outcome that suited the political objectives 
of the Howard government. This process was fine-tuned through the 
stipulation of the 1998 and 2003 Immigration Detention Contracts, as previously 
cited, in that it gave scope to parental discretion in the legal-rational sense. It 
was also a process that was geared to take legal rationality in the direction of 
legal rationalism through the nature of its framing assumptions. 
 
 
Service delivery of the contract 
 
In its attempts to justify its refugee policies, the Howard government came 
under pressure from the electorate to justify especially the mandatory detention 
of children. The National Inquiry into Children in Immigration Detention23 of the 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission received “more than 300 
submissions” from community organisations and individuals that raised 
concerns about health, educational, social, psychological, and legal issues. 
Mental health clinicians reported that the uncertainties of detention, coupled 
with prolonged deprivation of liberty in an already traumatised population, 
provoked psychiatric disturbances that became worse as the length of 
immigration detention increased.24 There were allegations of involuntary 
                                            
23 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. A Last Resort? National Inquiry into 
Children in Immigration Detention. 
24 Amer Sultan and Kevin O'Sullivan, "Psychological Disturbances in Asylum Seekers Held 
in Long-Term Detention: A Participant-Observer Account," Medical Journal of Australia 175 
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chemical restraint within detention centres.25 A United Nations inquiry 
reported that conditions within detention centres were prison-like, where 
previous trauma suffered by children could easily be exacerbated.26 The cited 
report recommended that the Australian government review the “mandatory, 
automatic and indeterminate character of detention” and “the lack of sufficient 
judicial review of the detention”.27 These reports were published at the time of 
riots, hunger strikes and breakouts that were discussed in Chapter 3 — 
Detention in the Desert: Woomera. Moira Rainer’s 2001 Murdoch Lecture gave an 
insight into the effects of detention on children, as she called for the 
incorporation of a human rights based model into Australian legislation that 
legally protected detained child asylum applicants, instead of leaving child 
protection issues to political process:  
 
What is life like, for children in immigration detention? It means being under 
constant video surveillance, being addressed by your number, not your name … 
There may be no medical facilities for mentally ill children, no paediatricians, and 
interminable queues, boredom and regimentation. Child detainees live behind razor 
wire, surrounded by uniforms, identification badges, roll calls and searches. Their 
food is prepared by strangers, not by parents, queued for and eaten on schedule or 
not at all.28 
 
The Howard government did not deny that unhealthy and traumatised children 
lived inside immigration detention centres. One government website listed 
these observations as issues of concern and pointed out that a range of social, 
medical and education services were available for detained children.29 However, 
                                                                                                               
(2001); Derek Silove, Zachary Steel, and R Mollica, "Detention of Asylum Seekers: Assault 
on Health, Human Rights, and Social Development," Lancet 357 (2001). 
25 Simonne Reid and David Eccles, "We Drugged Detainees, Say Nurses," Advertiser, 21 
May 2003; Rohan Price, "Who Has Jurisdiction over the Mind? An Individual Rights 
Approach to Forced Medication in Australia," Australian Journal of Human Rights (2003). 
26 United Nations. (2002, 24 October). Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention 
(Report Number E/CN.4/2003/8/Add.2). Economic and Social Council. Commission on 
Human Rights.  
27 Ibid. 
28 Moira Rainer. (2001, 21 August). Political Pinballs: The Plight of Child Refugees in 
Australia. Walter Murdoch Memorial Lecture. Murdoch University. Perth.  
29 Janet Phillips, Catherine Lorimer. (2003, 15 October). Children in Detention. Parliament of 
Australia, Parliamentary Library.  
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Philip Ruddock disagreed with the conclusion that, as a consequence of these 
findings, the policy of mandatory detention required modification, or that the 
policy contributed to the children’s dilemma: 
 
The fact is that we know that there are children, for a variety of reasons, who have 
exhibited all sorts of problems but what we can’t say is that they’re associated with 
detention and not with prior experiences that they may have had in life.30 
 
A humane policy may have erred on the side of caution and released the 
children, regardless of whether they had become traumatised before or after 
their arrival in Australia. However, the Howard government’s strategy not to 
collect systematised information from detention centres made it difficult to 
identify a longitudinal link between health issues and detention, or whether 
children became traumatised after witnessing disturbances in detention centres. 
Steve Davis, First Assistant Secretary of the government’s Unauthorised 
Arrivals and Detention Division, told a Senate Estimates meeting in 2004 that 
there was “no system wide research to point to” that may have shed light on 
disturbances within detention centres, but that issues were assessed instead on 
a case-by-case basis.31 Despite the lack of systematic information, the Minister 
attributed at least some blame to parents for not dealing effectively with the 
immediacy of the situations posed by adverse events: 
 
… responsible parents removed their children away from that environment and away 
from witnessing those sorts of events when they occurred and I think even in a 
detention environment, parents have particular responsibilities in relation to what 
their children see and what they’re exposed to.32  
 
Some children actively participated in these disturbances. The Minster implied 
that some parents forced or encouraged their children to participate, and may 
                                            
30 Sunday [Channel 9 Television Broadcast]. (2002, 5 May). The Trauma of Refugee 
Children. 
31 Commonwealth of Australia. (2004). Official Committee Hansard. (Legal and 
Constitutional Legislation Committee). Estimates. Additional Estimates. Senate. 
32 Sunday [Channel 9 Television Broadcast]. (2002, 5 May). The Trauma of Refugee 
Children. 
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even have prevented the children from eating by stitching their lips together.33 
In the cited newspaper article, Philip Ruddock warned that children may be 
taken away from their parents, pending an investigation by the Department of 
Human Services. If parents neglected their children, the evidence did not 
suggest this: the Human Rights Commissioner reported that not one child was 
taken away from his or her parents between January and April 2002.34  
 
The Minister did, however, authorise that those children over whom he was 
the legal guardian be moved to safety. In January 2002, the Department of 
Human Services removed nine unaccompanied children from Woomera after 
they collectively announced their intention to suicide.35 Philip Ruddock said at 
the time: "I am determined to protect these children from further harm".36 By 
the end of April 2002, all seventeen unaccompanied children who resided at 
Woomera had been transferred to home-based-detention.37 However, the 
Minister appeared less willing to remove children for their protection, when 
the parents, and not the Minister, were the legal guardians. This may indicate a 
legal-rational approach by the Minister to fulfil his statutory duties as a 
guardian toward unaccompanied children. Such speculation seems not 
unreasonable when one contrasts the removal of unaccompanied children with 
an earlier event in January 2002. At that time, several children were hospitalised 
as the result of various forms of self-harm, such as participating in a hunger 
strike, or poisoning themselves with detergent.38 When justifying why the 
children were not released from Woomera, Philip Ruddock said that it was not 
government policy to release the children and split families, unless child 
                                            
33 Kerry Taylor and Penelope Debelle, "Ruddock Threat over Child Hunger Strikers," Age, 
22 January 2002. 
34 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. A Last Resort? National Inquiry into 
Children in Immigration Detention, p. 153. 
35 Michael Madigan, "Processing Starts as Hunger Strikes Ease," Daily Telegraph, 30 
January 2002. 
36 Michael Madigan, "Lip-Stitch Kids Taken Away from Woomera," Hobart Mercury, 24 
January 2002. 
37 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. A Last Resort? National Inquiry into 
Children in Immigration Detention, p. 153. 
38 Lateline [ABC Television Broadcast]. (2002, 28 January). Labor Rethinks Detention 
Stance. Reporter: Tony Jones. 
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experts advised him to do this.39 It may have been humanitarian under these 
circumstances to release the children with their parents. Such release, had it 
occurred for those reasons, still could have been legally rational, because the 
Minister retained the right to release individuals from detention in special 
circumstances. The Minister’s preferred option not to release the parents was 
also legal-rational, because the Minister was not obliged to release children. 
Such legal-rational approach, however, is indicative of the second 
manifestation of legal rationalism, which is characterised by an overbearing and 
technical approach to the law. 
 
The child protection authorities responsible for the care and protection of 
children at Woomera were from Family and Youth Services in the Department 
of Human Services (DHS) in South Australia. Their work inside the detention 
centre on Commonwealth land was guided by a Memorandum of Understanding 
between the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and the 
Department of Human Services.40 This cited Memorandum set out the “mutual 
obligations” between both parties “in relation to the notifications of possible 
child abuse or neglect and child welfare issues pertaining to children in 
immigration detention in South Australia”.41 However, the relevant department 
managers did not “actively” consult with state welfare authorities until January 
2002, when unaccompanied children threatened mass suicide.42 This suggests 
that consulting with child experts may have been a political, rather than 
humanitarian, response. 
 
                                            
39 Ibid. 
40 Author Unknown. (2001). ” Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA) and the South 
Australian Department of Human Services (DHS) Relating to Child Protection Notifications 
and Child Welfare Issues Pertaining to Children in Immigration Detention in South Australia.”  
41 Ibid., paragraph 1. 
42 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. A Last Resort? National Inquiry into 
Children in Immigration Detention, p. 743. 
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Although mandatory detention has been law since 1989, the agreement cited 
above came about only after the Flood Inquiry recommended it in 2001.43 
When making the recommendation, Flood anticipated a potential clash of the 
Memorandum with the Commonwealth legislation – that is, Flood anticipated a 
situation where a recommendation by “child welfare authorities” to remove a 
child from detention may be inconsistent with the Migration Act. However, 
Flood advised that such clash may be avoided if the child was moved to 
another detention centre, or to another venue “which DIMA can declare to be 
a place of detention”, or if the government issued a Bridging Visa and released 
the child.44 Thus, a legal framework was already in place that could be activated 
at the Minister’s discretion, whereby the Howard government could have 
released the children without a recommendation from child protection 
authorities. The Minister’s requirement for a recommendation from child 
protection authorities before ordering the release of a child might have 
indicated that, whilst a legalistic approach would be used to detain children, 
such approach could change for humanitarian reasons. Paradoxically, the 
requirement for a recommendation for the release of children was actually used 
as a legal-rational justification to detain them.  
 
I will shortly elaborate on the previous sentence. First, to the Memorandum of 
Understanding. In practice, the Memorandum made the child protection practices 
of Family and Youth Services dependent on government permission. Detained 
children and parents would only be offered skills and awareness training to 
parents and children upon request from the Department of Immigration and 
Multicultural Affairs.45 This stipulation sets the theme for the purpose of the 
Memorandum, an agreement that dealt with instances where parents, not 
                                            
43 Philip Flood. Report of Inquiry into Immigration Detention Procedures, paragraph 6.14, pp. 
24-25. 
44 Ibid., paragraph 6.15, p .25. 
45 Author Unknown. "Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Department of 
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA) and the South Australian 
Department of Human Services (DHS) Relating to Child Protection Notifications and Child 
Welfare Issues Pertaining to Children in Immigration Detention in South Australia," 
paragraph 12.2. 
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conditions of detention, were responsible for child abuse or neglect. 
Investigations of child protection issues occurred only on express invitation, 
and the manager of the child protection service was required to “liaise” with 
the Director of Detention Operations of the Department of Immigration and 
Multicultural Affairs.46 The investigating authorities were required to “confirm 
the investigation plan” before commencing an investigation, to notify DIMA 
in writing of the identity of the child, and to negotiate an appropriate time in 
advance.47 The investigation itself was conducted “according to DHS standard 
procedures”,48 but the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs 
had discretion on how to proceed afterward.49  
 
According to these terms cited above, the Memorandum did not compromise the 
independence of an investigation. The stipulations did, however, set up a 
process of political control that made other components of the investigative 
cycle, such as initiation, timing, follow-up and enforceability of 
recommendations, dependent on government permission. Contrary to his 
public statements, therefore, the Immigration Minister was less likely to act on 
recommendations by child experts than on the basis that officials from his 
Department became convinced of the merits of these recommendations. 
Viewed from this perspective, the Memorandum of Understanding assisted the 
government’s objectives to pursue its legal-rational approach for the 
mandatory detention of children, whilst also allowing for a humanitarian 
approach under strictly controlled conditions. 
 
One example, broadcast on Channel Nine’s television program Sunday, 
illustrated this mixture of a legalistic and qualified humanitarian policy practice. 
The Minister said that one particular child remained in detention, because “the 
                                            
46 Ibid., paragraph 7.7. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., paragraph 8.1. 
49 Ibid., paragraph 8.5. 
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report was not to release the child separately from the mother”.50 Philip 
Ruddock added: “if the relevant authority recommends the child be released 
into the community, that will happen”.51 When the reporter pointed out that 
the authorities recommended the release of the whole family, so that separating 
the family would not be an issue, the Minster admitted to not following expert 
advice, and justified his decision in terms of migration law. 
 
They will only be released if there is a lawful basis upon which that can happen … the 
law makes it very clear, Commonwealth law, the Migration Act, as to when people 
will be released into the community.52 
 
The lawful basis for release of the child in this instance would have been to 
release the child on the basis of the expert recommendation, as was current 
policy. The Minister’s assurances that the Howard government did not to 
detain children against expert advice thus emerged as political rhetoric, but 
with a twist: although the release of the child was recommended, the Minster 
would have recourse to other legislation that prevented such release. Here, the 
Minster interpreted the recommendation not to separate the child from the 
mother as justification to detain both, and to ignore the advice to release the 
whole family. The above example of a rhetorical skew to legal rationality was 
not restricted to an isolated incident, but pointed to a systemic process. 
Findings by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission cite other 
examples where the government did not release all families where Family and 
Youth Services recommended such removal.53 The care and protection of 
children inside immigration detention centres, therefore, depended on how the 
legal rules coincided with political expediency.  
 
                                            
50 Sunday [Channel 9 Television Broadcast]. (2002, 5 May). The Trauma of Refugee 
Children. 
51 Ibid.  
52 Ibid. 
53 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. A Last Resort? National Inquiry into 
Children in Immigration Detention, pp. 154-5. 
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At stake for the Howard government was the proposition that children 
suffered damage as the direct result of their detention, and that government 
policy caused this harm and neglect. Through the restricted terms of the 
Memorandum of Understanding, the Howard government created the impression in 
public that child experts tacitly approved of the detention of children. From 
the perspective of the child experts, things were different. However, these 
experts did not communicate their view publicly at the time when the safety of 
children was at stake. At that time, the relevant authorities asked for 
submissions from the community in relation to “recent events” in child 
protection matters, which included matters pertaining to the detention of 
children.54 This concern was contained in an official Department of Human 
Services report based of these submissions.55 By the time the report was 
released, the Memorandum of Understanding had been operating for about 
eighteen months.  
 
In the report cited above, the Department of Human Services reported that 
most of these submissions identified aspects of the policy of mandatory 
detention, rather than the actions of individuals inside detention centres, as the 
main contributing factor toward abuse and neglect of detained children.56 The 
key recommendation (to “release of all children and their families”, because 
detention was “so devastating to the wellbeing and development of children … 
[that] the State Government has a responsibility to take a strong position on 
this issue”) was published eighteen months after the intervention was 
recommended.57 The report also identified a conflict between the jurisdictions 
of state and federal law, and acknowledged that the Memorandum of Understanding  
curtailed the child protection mandate of the state based Department of 
Human Services.58 The report argued that children in immigration detention 
                                            
54 Government of South Australia. (2002, May). Child Protection Review. Discussion Paper, 
p. 4. 
55 Government of South Australia. (2003, March). Review of Child Protection in South 
Australia. Department of Human Services. 
56 Ibid., paragraph 22.7-11. 
57 Ibid., paragraph 22.11. 
58 Ibid., paragraph 22.14. 
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“should not be denied their rights to protection merely because their parents or 
family have brought them to Australia to seek asylum”, and that the state 
government, not the federal government, had “a specific legislative mandate 
and administrative structure” to “ensure the proper protection of children”.59  
 
The Department of Human Services reported that, within the legal constraints 
of this Memorandum of Understanding, child experts had to avoid a clash with 
migration law and to avoid recommending that a child be released, “even if 
such release were mandatory to the protection of the child”.60 Accordingly, this 
posed the child protection agency with a “limited choice between inappropriate 
options” and placed it at potential risk of litigation, because of the legal 
requirements to “accommodate the policy of the Federal Government” whilst 
at the same time having a statutory duty to protect children.61 This requirement 
created what child protection experts Chris Goddard and Max Liddell called a 
“double bind communication” that effectively silenced the child experts.62 
According to another comment, this political requirement generated practical 
difficulties for child experts, who were “unable to control the structures”, and 
either excluded themselves or were being excluded “from effective political 
and professional engagement with asylum issues”, constrained by a legal 
arrangement with the government that transcended their usual professional 
and statutory roles.63  
 
Unlike the Woomera child abuse allegations that were communicated through 
unofficial channels, as was discussed in Case Study 3 — Detention in the Desert: 
Woomera, the recommendations of the child experts discussed above remained 
within the official channels. As the only source of information, the Howard 
                                            
59 Ibid., paragraph 22.15. 
60 Ibid., paragraph 22.14. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Max Liddell and Chris Goddard, "Can We Trust Governments to Protect Children? 
Evidence from Woomera Seen through the Looking Glass." Paper presented at the Ninth 
Australasian Conference on Child Abuse and Neglect (ACCAN), Sydney, 25-27 Nov 2003) 
p. 4. 
63 Sarah Cernlyn and Linda Briskman, "Asylum, Children's Rights and Social Work," Child 
and Family Social Work 8 (2003): p. 174. 
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government used the official communication process between the Department 
of Human Services and the Department of Immigration and Multicultural 
Affairs to justify the mandatory detention of children in terms of legal and 
humanitarian necessities. Such justifications, however, relied on a requirement 
for immigration law to dominate professional-clinical practices. For now, I 
wish just to state that this is an example where migration law uncoupled the 
child protection work from its own legal-rational principles. This example of 
colonising will be visited again in Section 2 — Themes.  
 
The Howard government, however, framed the matter differently when 
justifying the policy. In a media release, Philip Ruddock hailed the Memorandum 
of Understanding as “the first of many such agreements” that demonstrated “the 
Government’s continuing commitment to providing a safe, supportive 
environment for children in detention” that “built on the cooperative and 
collaborative relationships” between the federal government and state welfare 
agencies.64 In practice, as Frank Brennan points out, this agreement took more 
than three years to finalise, and there was still no Memorandum of Understanding in 
Western Australia at the time of the media release cited above.65 It remains 
unclear whether, in time, the Department of Human Services adapted to its 
political requirements, or whether the Howard government had restored the 
clinical independence of child protection experts. A 2004 report by the South 
Australian child protection agency stopped short of the strong language of the 
report discussed previously, and instead, endeavoured to build strong 
partnerships with the federal government, and to “remove barriers to 
information exchange (such as misconceptions about legal constraints)”.66 The 
cited report did not address how the fundamental issues that were raised by the 
2003 report may have been resolved.  
 
                                            
64 Philip Ruddock. (2001, 6 December). Child Welfare and Protection Agreement Signed 
(Media Release, MPS 190/2001).  
65 Frank Brennan, Tampering with Asylum. A Universal Human Problem (St. Lucia, Qsl: 
University of Queensland Press, 2003) p. 101. 
66 Government of South Australia. Keeping Them Safe, pp. 15-16. 
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Buffers to the policy 
 
Over time, it became overwhelmingly clear that detention centres were not safe 
for children. During the first half of 2002, the Department of Human Services 
investigated 92 cases of child abuse at Woomera alone, and referred nine of 
these to police.67 The Howard government made special arrangements to move 
some children from detention centres and to detain these children in the 
community. These arrangements consisted, firstly, of community-based 
detention, where children lived with foster families, and secondly, of the 
Residential Housing Projects, which consisted of homes, where children lived 
with some members of their family. In this section, these detention 
arrangements are called “buffers”, because it will be argues that their purpose 
was to buffer the impact of the policy of mandatory detention on children. 
According to the law, “immigration detention” was not restricted to detention 
centres, but could take place almost anywhere, “in another place approved by 
the Minister in writing”.68 An Ombudsman’s report and the Flood Inquiry 
recommended in early 2001 that the government should exercise this legislative 
option.69 The Howard government first utilised this option during the riots in 
August 2001 by establishing a Residential Housing Project in Woomera, and 
began community-based detention in February 2002, when the Minister 
“declared several homes in Adelaide to be places of detention for 
unaccompanied children in foster care”.70 Another option, rarely used by the 
Howard government, for releasing children under migration law in the absence 
                                            
67 Russell Skelton, "Big Increase in Woomera Child Abuse Reports," Age, 23 December 
2002. 
68 Migration Act 1958 No 157 (2001 as Amended), Section 5, Interpretation (1) (b) (v), 
"immigration detention"; Flood. Report of Inquiry into Immigration Detention Procedures, 
paragraph 10.30.12, p. 43. 
69 Commonwealth Ombudsman. (2001, March). Report of an Own Motion Investigation into 
the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs' Immigration Detention Centres, p. 7. 
70 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. A Last Resort? National Inquiry into 
Children in Immigration Detention, paragraph 6.4, p. 143. 
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of confirmation of refugee status, was to issue a Bridging Visa. Between 1999 
and 2002, the government released only “one unaccompanied child, one 
mother and her two children (leaving the father in detention) and one whole 
family” under this legislative provision.71 Contrary to what government 
rhetoric implied, most children remained in some form of detention.  
 
 
Home-based detention 
 
At the time of escalating riots inside detention centres between 2000 and 2001, 
the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs announced 
“innovative approaches to provide appropriate alternatives to long term 
residence in an immigration detention centre”.72 These changes consisted of a 
Residential Housing Project, which will be discussed shortly, “foster care 
arrangements with child welfare authorities, and community-based placements 
for people with special needs”.73 In reality, these arrangements did not 
constitute release, but widened the definition of detention: it was an alternative 
form of detention74 Community-based detention invoked special provisions of 
the Migration Act, where anybody could detain an immigration detainee, 
provided the detainee was “held by, or on behalf of, an officer”.75 For this 
purpose, “several houses and schools in Adelaide were declared as alternative 
places of detention”.76 The cited report continues that under this program, 
“several foster carers and school principals were directed to accompany and 
restrain detainee children”, and had to ensure that the children “remained in 
declared places or in the presence of directed persons”. Home-based detention 
                                            
71 Ibid., paragraph 6.3, p. 142. 
72 Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Women and Children in Immigration 
Detention. 
73 Ibid.  
74 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. A Last Resort? National Inquiry into 
Children in Immigration Detention, paragraph 6.4, p. 143. 
75 Migration Act 1958 No 157 (2001 as Amended), Section 5, Interpretation (1) (b), 
"immigration detention". 
76 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. A Last Resort? National Inquiry into 
Children in Immigration Detention, p. 153. 
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occurred only in South Australia, and the government did not actively explore 
the release of whole families, although the Department of Human Services had 
recommended this.77  
 
Home-based detention occurred under narrowly defined and carefully 
monitored conditions in response to children suffering abuse during the 
disturbances. These interventions, however, were short-lived rhetoric 
expressed at a time when it was beneficial to the Howard government to 
convince the electorate that its policy to detain children was humane. The 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission observed that the Howard 
government excluded from this scheme relatives who were prepared to take 
their families into home-based detention.78 Instead, the government’s plan was 
to place children into the care of community agencies:  
 
I made the decision some time ago as Minister that if a state welfare authority 
recommended that for the best interests of a child in detention they should be 
released from detention and cared for by state welfare authorities, I would accede to 
that course of action. It has not been a course recommended to me by any state 
welfare authority in Australia where detention facilities are placed.79 
 
As was seen in the previous section, the Howard government did not 
necessarily release on the recommendation of child experts. It is held here that 
home-based detention also occurred in a context where the government 
justified its policies by making recourse to the law, with the effect that the 
legalities that underpinned these policies were presented in a highly politicised 
context. The politicisation of the home-based detention of two children, 
Alumdar and Muntazar Bakhtiyari, illustrates this. There were several court 
cases, and the institutional issues that these cases raised are discussed in 
Chapter 6 — Politicisation of the Law. Here, I wish to comment on the political 
                                            
77 Ibid., pp. 156-59. 
78 Ibid., p. 159. 
79 PM [ABC Radio Broadcast]. (2003, 24 June). Philip Ruddock Says States Have Power to 
Remove Children from Detention Centres. Reporter: Ben Knight.  
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furore surrounding the detention of these boys. The issue was that there were 
serious health concerns, and legal steps were taken to compel the Howard 
government to release the boys from the Woomera detention centre. After the 
Family Court had ordered in June 2003 that the children be released, the 
Howard government framed this court ruling in terms of national security: 
Philip Ruddock said that the judgement “undermines all of our border 
protection arrangements”, and that people were “using, in effect, the legal 
system to continue to remain here as long as they can”.80 For the Bakhtiyari 
family, the euphemism of “staying here as long as they can” amounted to 
about four years of immigration detention. Treasurer Peter Costello 
acknowledged the dilemma of detaining children, but attributed this to the 
choice of the boys’ parents to appeal refugee decisions. The Treasurer said: 
 
nobody likes to see a child in detention, nobody … If they didn’t appeal then the 
family could be reunited back in their homeland but these appeals can go on and on 
and on.81 
 
Implicit in the statement cited above was the humanitarian consideration of 
family unity, but also the dominance of the legislative framework over 
humanitarian justifications. The government’s decision to appeal the court 
ruling seemed incongruous with Philip Ruddock’s statement that “he would 
heed advice from any competent authority that said children in detention 
should be separated from their parents to live in the community”.82 However, 
the cited statement confirms the argument advanced in the previous section 
that the Howard government was willing to release children only in conditions 
over which it had full control. Another difference is that the recommendations 
by child experts were not enforceable, but the orders of the Family Court were 
definitive. There was also the unanswered question that, if two children could 
be released because they had become traumatised, how many others could be 
                                            
80 Author Unknown, "Ruddock to Appeal Detention Ruling," Age, 20 June 2003. 
81 Australian Associated Press [AAP Newswire]. (2003, 27 June). Children 'Better Off in 
Detention'.   
82 ABC Online [News]. (2003, 25 June). Advice 'Heeded' on Detainee Kids. 
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released? Similarly, given that the same legislation determined the detention of 
adults and of children, could adults be released under similar circumstances? 
These questions, whilst not answered here, give an insight that much was at 
stake for the Howard government.  
 
The Howard government, which, as previously noted, was critical of those 
refugees who appealed unfavourable refugee decisions, lodged two appeals 
aimed at reversing the decision to release the Bakhtiyari boys. First, an appeal 
had been lodged in the High Court that challenged the constitutionality of the 
decision by the Family Court. An appeal was also lodged against the decision 
of the Family Court. As it happened, the hearing in the Family Court came 
before the hearing in the High Court, and the full bench of the Family Court 
upheld the original decision to release the children. Philip Ruddock again 
politicised the issue when he described the court decision as “unfortunate” and 
“pre-emptive”, because the matter of jurisdiction was still awaiting 
determination by the High Court.83 Prime Minister John Howard even went 
one step further with his political rhetoric and censured the judges and the 
court process: 
 
One’s not supposed to impute the integrity of judges in relation to these matters, but 
they seem to have a desire to be involved in dealing with these matters, and dealing 
with them quickly because they say people are in detention. But you know, we have 
many people who are convicted of offences who are sent to jail who sometimes have 
to wait until the courts are ready to deal with appeals, and that can sometimes go for 
years. When you have them being heard within days... many Australians would like to 
think that they could get their matters dealt with by the Family Court in the time 
frame that these matters seem to be dealt with.84 
 
However, the individuals most affected by the court decisions were not 
convicted criminals, but refugee children. The selective applications of  the 
                                            
83 ABC Online [News]. (2003, 26 August). Released Baxter Detainees Reunited with Mother.  
84 Meaghan Shaw and Penelope Debelle, "Court Favouring Asylum Seekers, Says 
Ruddock," Age, 27 August 2003. 
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legal rules by Senator Amanda Vanstone, who had meanwhile replaced Philip 
Ruddock as Immigration Minister, brings out the political edge of the 
institutional tension between Parliament and the courts when Alumdar’s and 
Muntazar’s story took yet another twist. The boys lived in a house in Adelaide 
and were supported by the Catholic welfare agency Centacare. In April 2004, 
an injunction was in progress that aimed at preventing the Howard 
government from detaining the children once again. Before the Federal Court 
made a determination, Immigration Minister Amanda Vanstone declared the 
house in Adelaide, where the children lived at that time, “a place of 
detention”.85 This step legally put the children into community-based 
detention. The judge publicly criticised this move by the government, and 
Minister Vanstone apologised to the Federal Court.86 
 
At this point, home based detention, which began as a “buffer” between 
children and the harsh effects of refugee policy, ended in confrontation. 
Centacare withdrew from the agreement to provide community-based 
detention. Centacare rejected as “untenable” the Howard government’s plan: 
for practical purposes, this plan would have turned Centacare’s home-based 
services into quasi detention facilities, with carers effectively acting as 
detention guards who strictly observed and supervised the children for 24 
hours per day.87 In part, Centacare’s decision to withdraw from the plan was 
also related to the government’s refusal to allocate additional resources for 
housing the children in the community.88  
 
At almost the same time that Senator Vanstone apologised to the Federal 
Court, the court quashed the injunction and the Howard government was 
authorised to detain the children. The Minister then ordered that the boys 
                                            
85 ABC Online [News]. (2004, 1 May). Detention Order Sparks Child Asylum Seeker Fears.  
86 Penelope Debelle, "Minister Rebuked by Child Case Judge," Sydney Morning Herald, 1 
May 2004. 
87 Catholic News. (2004, 30 June). Centacare Director 'Devastated' by Govt Demands.  
88 Andrew Mc Garry, "Fears for Welfare of Bakhtiyari Children," Australian, 5 May 2004. 
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remain in community-based detention.89 The Prime Minister welcomed this 
decision, but also expressed reservations about deporting the children: 
 
Just because that decision has come down and it's a very good decision, it clearly 
validates the whole detention system that is operating in this county, that doesn't 
mean we have to send the children back to where they came from. We want to be 
compassionate.90 
 
However, the children were removed from Australia. Eight months later, a few 
days before Christmas in 2004, the Howard government exercised its legal 
right to detain the Bakhtiyari family in a detention centre.91 Within the 
fortnight, in the early morning hours of 30 December, the family was deported 
to Pakistan.92  
 
The discussion in this chapter so far suggests that, whilst the Howard 
government did release some children from detention, it may not have 
approved of such release, but did so when there were political merits in such 
decision. Despite the rhetoric of compassion and a humanitarian policy that 
was informed by expert recommendations, the practices suggested that the 
government pursued a legally rational agenda of sole discretion, with a 
preferred option of placing children into detention centres, the harshest of all 
legally available forms of immigration detention.  
 
The political rhetoric between the courts and the Howard government 
illustrates both forms of legal rationalism. The narrow scope for placing 
children in home-based detention is an example of Legal Rationalism Form 1, 
with a special skew of how legislation was translated into policy practices. This 
                                            
89 Ian Munro and Penelope Debelle, "Children May Go Back to Detention," Age, 30 April 
2004. 
90 Author Unknown, "Illegal Immigrant Children May Not Be Sent Home: Howard," Sydney 
Morning Herald, 30 April 2004. 
91 Penelope Debelle and Russell Skelton, "Refugee Family Goes Back into Detention," Age, 
19 December 2004. 
92 Cynthia Banham and Penelope Debelle, "Bakhtiyari Family Deported under Cover of 
Darkness," Sydney Morning Herald, 31 December 2004. 
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may be inferred from the documented process of the government’s resistance 
to releasing the children from the detention centres proper. Legal Rationalism 
Form 2, the deference to legal rules that hides an underlying ideology, also 
took a special twist. Senator Vanstone’s hasty decision to detain Alumdar and 
Muntazar before the ruling in the Federal Court, as noted above, and by John 
Howard’s and Philip Ruddock’s politicisation of the court determinations, are 
examples of Legal Rationalism Form 2.  
 
However, the above examples differ from other examples of Legal Rationalism 
Form 2 that are mentioned in this thesis, in that the deference was not to the 
legal system, but to how the legal system may assist in promoting an ideology 
that has nothing to do with legal rationality. If one accepts this argument, then 
it seems reasonable to look beyond a fetishism of legal rationality as an end in 
itself, and to take the more critical approach that was suggested in the 
Introduction to this thesis. The more critical approach left open the possibility of 
whether or not the law itself may serve as a conspicuous icon that justified the 
refugee policies of the Howard government in a way that was acceptable to the 
electorate.  
 
 
Residential Housing Projects 
 
Running concurrently with community based detention was the Residential 
Housing Project, where some people were detained in cluster homes, instead 
of detention centres. The project began in Woomera in August 2001, and was 
extended in the following year to accommodate more families.93 Later, similar 
Housing Projects began in Port Hedland, Port Augusta, Perth and Sydney.94 To 
the public, the Howard government presented Residential Housing Projects as 
                                            
93 Philip Ruddock. (2002, 20 August). Immigration Detention Housing Project a Success 
(Media Release, number 075/2002).  
94 Amanda Vanstone. (2005, 9 June). Construction Begins on the New Sydney Residential 
Housing Project (Media Release, number 67.05).  
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living in the community. Detention under this project was open to some 
women and children if a male family member remained in the detention centre, 
to diminish the possibility of escape. When Philip Flood recommended the 
Residential Housing Projects, he also conceded that some families may not 
embrace this option, because it meant “leaving male family members 
behind”.95 This prediction proved to be correct. Immigration Minister Philip 
Ruddock said there were not many volunteers because families did not want to 
be separated.96 In October 2002, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission gave the government a temporary exemption from complying 
with the Sex Discrimination Act 1984, and extended this exemption in September 
2003, to “protect the Department from complaints that there was 
discrimination against men by excluding them from participation".97 However, 
the cited report also communicated concerns about the separation of families. 
As has been noted throughout this chapter, one main justification for the 
Howard government’s justification to detain children was the argument that 
releasing the children amounted to the splitting of families. Philip Ruddock 
also maintained this stance as Attorney-General, when he said that the release 
of children would counter government policy: 
 
… if children were released, families had to be released with them, and thereby abort 
the mandatory detention arrangements.98 
 
This confirmed that the earlier references to the government’s willingness to 
release children on expert advice was rhetorical, and not readily followed in 
practice. Legal rationalism was the dominant process involved. The 
government was less willing to explore the possibility of removing the whole 
family from detention. During the period of the inquiry by the Human Rights 
and Equal Opportunity Commission, from its announcement at the end of 
                                            
95 Flood. Report of Inquiry into Immigration Detention Procedures, paragraphs 8.1-8.2, p. 30. 
96 Lateline [ABC Television Broadcast]. Labor Rethinks Detention Stance. 
97 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. A Last Resort? National Inquiry into 
Children in Immigration Detention, p. 149. 
98 AM [ABC Radio Broadcast]. (2004, 6 May). Ruddock Stands by Detention of Children 
Policy. Reporter: Tony Eastley.  
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2001 until the findings were collated in mid-2003, only one whole family was 
released under the provision of a Bridging Visa.99 “Only two whole families 
were transferred to home-based detention between 1999 and 2003”.100 This 
suggests that the Minister’s chief concern to move children from detention was 
not primarily humanitarian, because he was at any time able, if he chose, to 
exercise his personal discretion and release all individuals from detention. 
Instead, Philip Ruddock’s public statements suggested that he was mainly 
concerned with following the rules and the legislation which his policy had 
shaped, but was less willing to provide effective remedies to ease the effects of 
detention on children.  
 
When the Residential Housing Project was heralded as a “trial of alternative 
detention arrangements” in March 2002, those who were there the longest 
were not allowed out.101 In time, the restrictions of detention impacted 
adversely on detainees, prompted by the “deprivation of liberty and 
autonomy”.102 In time, the government dropped the pretence that the 
Residential Housing Project amounted to release from detention. Immigration 
Minister Amanda Vanstone identified the Port Augusta Project in a 2003 
media release as “family-style accommodation in a community setting”, but 
added: “detention for people who have entered this country illegally is an 
unfortunate but necessary part of our system”.103 Later, when opening the 
facility in Port Augusta, the Minister justified the detention of children by 
framing it as safeguarding against criminal activity. The Minister’s choice to 
speak of families, instead of “people who bring a couple of kids with them”, 
also identified as rhetoric the detention of children for purposes of maintaining 
family unity:   
 
                                            
99 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. A Last Resort? National Inquiry into 
Children in Immigration Detention, p. 184. 
100 Ibid., p. 153. 
101 Ibid., p. 145. 
102 Ibid., p. 161. 
103 Amanda Vanstone. (2003, 14 November). Port Augusta Residential Housing Project 
(Media Release, number 12.03i).  
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No one likes to see children in detention but equally no one wants to send a flag to 
these criminals that prey on vulnerable people that if they can just bring a couple of 
kids with them that the criminals would be more successful in their people smuggling 
ventures, to come in through the back door rather than through our organised 
program.104 
 
Statements by successive Immigration Ministers also revealed the rhetorical 
superficiality of the government’s arguments about legal rationality, because 
first, the detention of children for purposes of deterring people smugglers was 
outside what can be expected from legal rationality. Second, after the riots and 
disturbances in detention centres settled, such justifications replaced the earlier 
justifications that the government was willing to release children on expert 
advice. In April 2004, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission 
released the major findings of its National Inquiry into Children in Immigration 
Detention, including that children inside immigration detention centres were “at 
high risk of serious mental harm”.105 Therefore, one major recommendation 
was that children should be released within four weeks.106 Third, at about the 
time of the release of the cited report, the government launched its Australia 
says YES to refugees school education campaign to correct “a politically biased 
account of our refugee policy”.107 Immigration Minister Vanstone defended the 
mandatory detention of children by pointing to statute law, international law, 
and legal precedent, and that the release of children would send a “dangerous 
message to people smugglers”.108   
 
What I think we should be focussing on is the success of the Government’s strong 
border policies in deterring people smugglers, so that children aren’t put on these 
appalling boats and smuggled from country to country.109  
                                            
104 Author Unknown, "Women, Kids Get Separate Detention," Age, 4 November 2003. 
105 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. A Last Resort? National Inquiry into 
Children in Immigration Detention, major finding 2, p. 850. 
106 Ibid., recommendation 1, p. 856. 
107 Amanda Vanstone. (2004, 21 April). Kids Need to Know That Australia Does Say Yes to 
Refugees (Media Release, number VPS63.04.  
108 PM [ABC Radio Broadcast]. (2004, 13 May). Vanstone Critical of Human Rights 
Commission Report. Reporters: Mark Colvin, Louise Yaxley.  
109 Ibid. 
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In a way, the Minister blamed people smugglers for the legal-rational 
framework in Australia that led to mandatory detention. However, legal 
rationality provided other choices, but the government’s preferred choice was 
to release the children when it became politically difficult to justify their 
detention. It was also arguable that, as the Howard government fine-tuned the 
legal-rational arrangements, it could have changed these to favour the release 
of children, especially as evidence about the harmful effects of the policy kept 
mounting.  
 
However, the publication of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission’s 2004 report signified a more lenient form of detention. In July 
2004, Prime Minister John Howard announced that most children had been 
released from detention centres, and indicated his willingness to release even 
more children, as long as it was “consistent with the maintenance of a strong 
policy and consistent with deterring people from resuming the illegal boat 
trade”.110 Immigration Minister Vanstone said that there was “only one child 
… in a mainland detention centre”, and that eleven children were in the 
Christmas Island, and nineteen in the Nauru detention centres.111 About one 
year later, the Minister announced that all children had been released from 
detention and moved into Residential Housing Projects in the community, but 
did not indicate how many children were detained offshore at that time.112 
 
Less was known about the fate of children in detention centres abroad. In 
Nauru, which also housed detained children, there was no arrangement with 
child protection services comparable to that in Australia. However, some 
information was available from other experts. Dr Marten Dormaar, psychiatrist 
in charge at Nauru, resigned over his untenable position of providing services 
                                            
110 Author Unknown, "PM Hails Detention Success," Australian, 6 July 2004. 
111 Amanda Vanstone. (2004, 6 July). Unauthorised Boat Arrivals: One Child in a Detention 
Centre (Media Release, number VPS 096/2004).  
112 Amanda Vanstone. (2005, 29 July). All Families with Children out of Detention (Media 
Release, number 98.05).  
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in a situation where the government prevented effective remedies. He said that 
after the Howard government ignored his reports, he resigned from his 
position and subsequently made videotapes from Nauru available to the 
ABC.113 Dormaar claimed that there were “unprecedented rates of mental 
illness among young asylum seekers” in Nauru.114 The Immigration Minster 
dismissed the psychiatrist’s diagnosis, and said they “are disappointed that they 
have not achieved their original objective”, and “disappointed people may at 
times be depressed”.115 This further indicated that the Howard government 
was reluctant to accept professional advice, unless such advice was proffered 
under carefully controlled conditions.  
 
Detention under the Residential Housing Projects became the Howard 
government’s major buffer to community pressure, allowing the government 
to fine-tune its policy of child refugee applicants. It allowed the Howard 
government to logically argue that it adhered to the legal rationality of 
mandatory detention. However, there is also the suggestion that the Howard 
government was sensitive to community attitudes about the detention of 
children. Whilst this may have been politically advantageous, the Residential 
Housing Projects did not address the needs of children who were also detained 
under this policy in offshore detention centres.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this case study, the Howard government’s justifications emerged as a mixed 
pattern of legal rationality, humanitarian outcomes, and border protection 
policy goals. Recourse to the policy goal of border protection occurred to 
some extent, and orderly processing almost never featured as a justification in 
                                            
113 ABC Online [News]. (2003, 15 May). Nauru Report Response Condemned by Author.  
114 GoAsiaPacific [ABC Radio Broadcast]. (2003, 15 May). High Rates of Mental Illness 
among Detainees.  
115 ABC Online [News]. (2003, 16 May). Nauru Depression 'Not Surprising': Ruddock. 
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this case study. Variations to the observed justificatory patterns usually 
occurred in response to events that attracted media attention about the 
mandatory detention of children, including claims that some children had 
suffered mental health problems as the result of their detention. At those 
times, the government justified the detention of children on the basis that their 
parents had broken the law, that releasing the children may encourage 
criminals to break the law in future, and because the family unit needed to stay 
intact. Concurrently with these language claims there emerged a significant 
change in policy practices, where some children were detained in community 
settings.  
 
It was argued throughout this analysis that these changes could usually be 
explained by an obvious, though at times an underlying, recourse to legal 
rationality. This made legal rationality the dominant justification, along with 
projections of humanitarian outcomes. The inconsistency, and partial or 
selective application, of these principles suggests that legal rationalism, an 
ideology of legal rationality, dominated the other three policy ideal types. There 
was some mismatch between language claims and policy practices, when the 
Howard government did not move all children and families from detention, as 
advised by child experts. Here, legal rationalism manifested itself as an extreme 
form of legal rationality that dominated the work of child experts, and which 
the Howard government has built into the justificatory framework. The result 
was refusals by the government to release children where the experts 
recommended removing the whole family from a detention centre. The 
government justified the detention of families in such instances, because child 
experts did not specifically recommend that the children should be separated 
from their families and removed from detention centres. The legalistic 
agreements that subsumed the work of child experts clearly undermined the 
government’s justification that detention was in the best interests of the 
children because it kept the family together.  
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Buffers were politicised as release from detention, but effectively served as a 
legal-rational framework that avoided releasing the children. These buffers thus 
justified the detention of children, most likely because detention inside homes 
was more humanitarian than the detention centres. These policy practices 
could not however be entirely explained by a legal rationality or by a 
humanitarian ideal type, because the Howard government activated the legally 
rational framework and the humanitarian policy practices only when the policy 
came under public scrutiny. It should not be discounted that when media 
interest developed about the mandatory detention of children, especially from 
late 2000 onwards, the policy had been operating for more than ten years. 
Then, the legal-rational justifications dominated the humanitarian justifications. 
This suggestion was further supported by the fact that unaccompanied 
children, over whom the Immigration Minister was the legal guardian, 
benefited from these arrangements, but hardly any children who had families. 
It was a political move of limited humanitarian benefit at a time of human need 
and public scrutiny.  
 
It would be simplistic to conclude with this observation, because the Howard 
government continued with the Residential Housing Project after media 
attention had dissipated. The framing of this form of detention as living in the 
community with great amenities, as depicted on the Minister’s website, 
suggested a political motive, a superordinate goal that may transcend the stated 
policy goals of the four ideal types. The legal-rational arrangement also ensured 
the political control over the process, and may explain why the Howard 
government was critical when the courts ordered moving some children from a 
detention centre into community foster care. It may also explain the demise of 
community-based detention through Centacare, when the government was 
unable to exert the same control as over other forms of detention.  
 
These new policy practices could be turned on or off by political process, 
carefully controlled to maintain a system of mandatory detention of children 
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that was less likely to gain media scrutiny than the policy practices prior to 
2002. On the other hand, the changes may have reflected a commitment by the 
Howard government to deliver a policy that gave greater consideration to the 
humanitarian ideal type than was previously the case. The absence of similar 
arrangements for offshore detention centres leads to the conclusion that a 
political motive of putting the policy into a good light may have been the real 
justification that overlaid considerations of both legal rationality and 
humanitarian outcomes. Legal rationality (reduced to legal rationalism) may 
have been simply ‘useful’ instrumentality. Indirectly, these overlaying political 
motives may have contributed to political gain for the Howard government. 
This suggestion, however, was not tested in this analysis.  
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The Howard government justified its refugee policies along four parameters: 
sovereignty issues, legal-rational process, orderly process, and humanitarian 
outcomes. From the three case studies in this section emerged a pattern that 
identified the legal-rational justifications as unevenly dominant among all four 
justifications. The uneven elevation of legal rationality to dominate the other 
three policy justifications led to contradictions between the problems that 
presented themselves to the Howard government, and the way in which it 
endeavoured to solve them. Where legal rationality was not a sufficient 
solution to achieve political objectives, the Howard government filled the gaps 
between verbal policy justifications and on-the-ground practices with other 
rhetoric. The result was a skew of the rules and procedures of legal rationality, 
until politically desired goals were achieved. This skew was more consistent 
with how the Howard government had framed refugee issues, than with legal 
rationality. Here are some examples. 
 
Right from the beginning of the case studies in 1999, the dominance of legal-
rational policy justifications of the Howard government set up a rhetorical, 
rather than actual, relationship between refugee policy and legal rationality: 
Refugees were framed as law breakers, even though they had not committed a 
crime. Consistent with this framing, the international concept of ‘refugee 
protection’ within Australia’s national legislative framework was uncoupled 
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from uninvited refugee applicants. The latter was treated primarily as illegal 
arrivals. Where recourse to legal rationality no longer overcame the 
contradictions between the policy practices and justificatory language claims, 
the Howard government used justifications outside of legal rationality, or 
skewed the rules into another direction until they defied what could be 
expected from good legally rational practice. This amounted to complaints that 
invariably led to a conclusion that there should be no investigation. Child 
experts were hired for the purpose of advising on how to minimise child abuse 
and neglect, but any advice that was incongruent with the goal of detaining 
child-refugee applicants was largely ignored. Legal rules were tightly skewed or 
temporarily disbanded until the resulting practices were consistent with the 
political goal of keeping refugee boats away from Australia. Unofficial 
information that contradicted government-controlled information from official 
channels was disputed, regardless of its truth value. Legal rationality as 
government rhetoric was coercive some of the time, well practiced when it 
suited political expediency, and circumvented when it did not. This rhetoric did 
not bring about consistent and predicable policy practices consistent with any 
of the four policy goals, but at times generated arbitrariness.  
 
The rhetoric, however, was useful to the Howard government because it 
placed responsibility for adverse policy outcomes on to legal rationality, whilst 
legitimating the goals of an ideology that were driving the use of legal 
rationalism. The Howard government did not state what these other goals 
might have been – that is of course, other than keeping Australia free of the 
burden of too many refugees. From the postulates of critical theory, however, 
one may predict that these goals were related to electoral gain. References to 
electoral gain were discussed mainly in relation the Tampa and the pending 
2001 federal election. This issue will be taken up again in chapter 7, where the 
discussion suggests that it was primarily not a matter of electoral gain, but of 
framing refugees within a nationalist agenda.  
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In the case studies, Weber’s ideal type model was used to analyse the language 
claims and behaviours of the Howard government against government defined 
parameters of “good practice” in refugee policy. This section looks beyond 
language claims and practices, and investigates the institutional framework that 
conferred legitimacy and authority to these language claims and practices. The 
analysis of the three chapters in this section is about how legal rationalism is 
located within the three institutions of the state: the bureaucracy, law, and 
public discourse.  
 
How should such analysis be conducted, and is there a basis for extrapolating 
the legal rationalism argument of the case studies to a process of legal 
rationalism that informs institutional practices? To begin, it is useful to state 
why it is now time to depart from Max Weber’s methodology. Weber’s ideal type 
as a heuristic representation of reality was methodologically appropriate for the 
concrete analysis of the case studies. Much of Weber’s work is taken up with 
the rational construction of law and bureaucracy, and observation of the ideal 
type and the likelihood of obeying public directives, which may be viewed as an 
instrumental way of achieving the overall goal of policy legitimation.1 However, 
                                            
1 Leon Sheleff, Social Cohesion. A Critique of Weber, Dürkeim and Marx, The Vale Inquiry 
Book Series (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997) p. 14; Dirk Käsler, Max Weber. An Introduction to 
His Life and Work (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988) p. 152. 
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it has been suggested that Weber’s conceptualisation of the individual choices 
of actors has “a strong element of relativism” that relies on recourse to 
individual psychology.2 Such concern would be less suitable for an exploration 
of the structural complexities of legitimation. Moreover, the methodological 
depth of the ideal type for an institutional analysis of modern state bureaucracy 
has also been contested, and it may better fit a hierarchical rule based on 
military culture, instead of the more complex structure of modern societies.3  
 
Without agreeing or disagreeing with the arguments stated in the last 
paragraph, and whilst recognising that social action is inescapably tied to the 
behaviour of individuals, I am suggesting that legal rationalism manifested 
itself as a process that provided a background to these behaviours. It may be 
more useful therefore to turn to Anthony Giddens’s theory of structuration, 
which embeds practices within the broader context of social structure in a 
time-space matrix. One can infer from this that analysing legitimation practices 
within social structure takes into account the chronological developments and 
also the social space that these developments occupy. The “space” is made up 
of the rules and resources within law, bureaucracy and discourse. Giddens 
states that this time-space organisation constitutes the properties of the system, 
and that these systemic properties enhance the probability for similar social 
action to occur in future.4 The practices themselves are governed by rules and 
resources, and Giddens calls these rules and resources “institutions”. Giddens 
argues that the system, which contains these institutions, consists of 
“reproduced relations between actors or collectives, organized as regular social 
practices”.5 Institutional analysis is a matter of “treating rules and resources as 
chronologically reproduced features of social systems”.6  
                                            
2 Kieren Allen, Max Weber. A Critical Introduction (London: Pluto Press, 2004) p. 71-72. 
3 Stanislaw Andreski, Max Weber's Insights and Errors (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1984) p. 100. 
4 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of Structuration 
(Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984) p. 17. 
5 Ibid. pp. 24-25. 
6 Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory. Action, Structure and Contradiction 
in Social Analysis. (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1979) p. 81. 
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The question as to whether legal rationalism exists as an institutional process 
thus builds on the analysis in the previous section, and relies less on a 
descriptive analysis of individual rules, legislation, or procedures. Instead, the 
next three chapters explore the significance of the reflexive changes to the 
rules and resources that made up the changing framework for the institutions, 
as the Howard government mapped out the parameters of normativity through 
its policies. The relationship between this section and the case-studies may be 
thought of as an interaction between these different social layers, as depicted in 
the following table.  
 
 
Table 2: The interaction between institutional and policy practices, mediated by the 
process of legal rationalism. 
 
Legal Rationalism 
 
Bureaucracy Law Discourse 
Woomera    
Tampa    
Children    
 
 
The table conveys a potential for an interactive relationship every time there is 
activity in any one of these cells. For instance, an event on the Tampa may lead 
to structural modifications within the law or to restrictions of how the media 
informs the public. If such an event is framed in public discourse as an issue 
that exposes Australia’s vulnerabilities, instead of a refugee issue, such framing 
may also affect practices pertaining to child refugees and to detention practices. 
The question that arises from the conceptualisation of such relationships is the 
following: does legal rationalism still play a part in the many possible ways in 
which such interaction may, at least conceptually, occur between practices and 
discourses represented by the cells in Table 2? In other words, does the 
process of legal rationalism demonstrate an effect at institutional level that 
would not be observable, had the Howard government not resorted to legal 
rationalism?  
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The previous section began by asking if the Howard government used the law 
as rhetoric when justifying refugee policies to the electorate. This section asks 
if there is evidence that such ideological use of the law is observable within the 
institutions of the state. Should this be the case, as will be argued in this 
section, then one would expect evidence that legal rationalism is seen not only 
in policy practices that flow down from the institutions. One would also expect 
legal rationalism to flow upwards from the policy practices and become 
legitimated at institutional level. One would also expect the process of legal 
rationalism to mediate changes within the layers of practice and structure 
within the institutions. Anthony Giddens expresses this interactive relationship 
between the reciprocal layers of interaction and change, when he explains the 
essence of his structuration theory: 
 
The constitution of agents and structures are not two independently given sets of 
phenomena, a dualism, but represent a duality. According to the notion of the duality 
of structure, the structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome 
of the practices they recursively organise.7  
 
In practice, one may expect some ripples from a process that adapts 
institutional change to the ideology of legal rationalism as a by-product of this 
process. Anthony Giddens argues that framing leads to contradictions within 
social structure, contradictions that identify “an opposition or disjunction 
between structural principles of a social system” , and that these structural 
separations pinpoint  “mechanisms of domination”.8 In his structuration 
theory, Giddens assumes a structural contradiction because of the way the state 
is operating.9 Giddens argues that these contingencies hold the key to social 
                                            
7 Giddens, The Constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of Structuration, p. 25. 
8 Anthony Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism., Second Edition ed. 
(Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 2XS and London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1995) 
p. 29 and p. 35. 
9 Giddens, The Constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of Structuration, pp. 196-97. 
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change: actors, if they are “are both able and motivated to act”, then these 
contradictions may manifest themselves as tensions.10  
 
This has relevance for planning the analysis of this section. If contradiction is 
systematic and occurs as the result of framing practices, as Giddens argues, one 
may anticipate that legal rationalism creates a tension. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to ask: does legal rationalism provoke such tension? Should this be 
the case, how does this tension manifest itself and how is it resolved at 
institutional level? When answering this question, this section is as much about 
dominance and power as it is about legal and bureaucratic processes. In order 
to strengthen the argument that these ripples can be explained by legal 
rationalism, there will be many instances when the methodology of the case 
studies will be revisited. The purpose of examining the language claims and 
practices of the refugee policies of the Howard government in an institutional 
context is to arrive at a concrete example of an institutional process.  
 
 
 
 
                                            
10 Ibid., p. 199. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to investigate how practices of legal rationalism 
became routinised into the administrative structure of refugee policy under the 
Howard government. It is time to ask if the government’s legitimation 
practices were only surface phenomena, or whether there were also structural 
concomitants that occupy the bureaucratic space and endure over time. The 
Howard government frequently claimed that it did not change anything in 
principle, but only fulfilled its legal obligations in relation to a system that was 
set up by previous Labor governments. This discussion will show that, 
although the current structure for refugee policy was set up in the early 1990s, 
the Howard government significantly altered the practices within this structure 
by introducing small structural changes with regard to accountability, 
transparency, and outside scrutiny that gave rise to significant institutionalised 
practices within the established structure.  
 
Is there a connection between the social relations within the institutions of the 
state, where public policy is practiced, and with using the law as a rhetorical 
tool to conduct a public policy that serves the ideology of the government in 
power? The mere fact of asking this question suggests that such a relationship 
is anticipated, because it seems implausible that these changes to refugee policy 
would have occurred without changes at the level of the institutions. The 
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remainder of this chapter suggests that these changes, grounded in the solid 
bedrock of statute law, required significant shifts in the type of power that 
comes from holding a public office, and were implemented through the 
bureaucracy. 
 
What then is bureaucracy? “Bureaucracy” can be defined as “a diffuse 
organisation that comprises the public service, magistrates, heads of tribunals 
and departments.1 In this chapter, I shall extend this definition to include the 
outsourced private companies who conduct these public services on behalf of 
the government. This includes not only the company that runs detention 
centres and the companies who build the infrastructure, or the labour hire 
contract companies who provide staff for the service provider, but also the 
contractors who conduct migration advice services for the Department of 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. Also included in this definition are 
those bodies which have a statutory duty to oversee government policy, such 
as the Ombudsman, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 
and the Australian National Audit Office. Strictly speaking, they are not the 
bureaucracy but they are bureaucratic institutions that either enact government 
policy or act to ensure that the government and the bureaucracy act in an 
accountable and responsible manner. The reason for including these statutory 
bodies in this chapter is because their accountability functions are part of the 
full cycle of public policy, and their recommendations play a part in shaping 
public policy.  
 
Before beginning the analysis of the structural factors, it is important to 
understand the noted significance of the Public Service. Bridgeman and Davis 
provide an outline of the structure of the Public Service.2 Accordingly, the 
Public Service is an important part of the state apparatus that carries out public 
                                            
1 Robert Hughes and Geoff Leane, Australian Legal Institutions. Principles, Structure and 
Organisation. (South Melbourne: FT Law & Tax, 1996) p. 249. 
2 Peter Bridgman and Glyn Davis, Australian Policy Handbook, Second ed. (St Leonards, 
NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2000) pp. 17-18. 
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policy, largely by controlling the outsourcing process, as it receives policy 
instructions from government. At the top of Public Service structure is the 
Secretary, who liaises directly with the responsible Minister. The portfolio of 
Immigration Minister is a senior position, which is part of Cabinet. Cabinet 
oversees the structural changes of Public Service departments, allocates 
budgets through its Expenditure Review Committee, and is responsible for 
legislation that is outside direct ministerial control. Cabinet, through its 
Expenditure Review Committee, controls this structure of policy 
administration through budgetary resources according to policy priorities. 
Ultimately, the Prime Minster has overall responsibility for the public policy, 
and appoints Ministers who oversee the implementation of policy by the 
Public Service or the private sector.  
 
As was the case with previous chapters, this chapter will also focus on the role 
of government. However, consideration will be given to the power 
relationships of the bureaucratic departments that execute the administrative 
features of modern states under the control of an elected government, as 
identified by Gianfranco Poggi.3 
 
 
New practices in a slowly changing structure 
 
Changes to refugee assessments need to be seen in the larger context of 
changes to the Public Service that began in the 1970s. These changes 
developed as the result of ongoing deliberation by successive actors over two-
and-a half decades and only became legally enforceable with the enactment of 
the Public Service Act 1999.4 Sections 56 to 57 of the Act give insight into these 
changes. Accordingly, each department was subsequently headed by a Secretary 
                                            
3 Gianfranco Poggi, The State. Its Nature, Development and Prospects (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1990) p. 31. 
4 Public Service Act 1999 (Act No. 147 of 1999) as amended, 1999. 
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who directly advised and provided information to the Minister. Security of 
tenure disappeared and the Prime Minister appointed, or removed, the 
departmental Secretary. The outcome was greater control by government over 
the Public Service than had previously been the case.  
 
Before commenting on refugee policy, I wish to discuss the restructuring of 
the Public Service from the 1980s onwards, because these broader changes 
shaped the structure for the administration of refugee policy under the Howard 
government. The literature suggests that these changes began with economic 
and political changes, and led to greater control over the Public Service by 
Parliament. These changes translated into greater political control. Howlett and 
Ramesh, for instance, argue that in 1995, approximately twenty years after the 
beginning of these changes, the Public Service was still in a position to meet its 
own preferences by steering politicians into policy decisions, by either 
providing or withholding crucial information.5 However, Howlett and Ramesh 
suggest that although the federal Ministers have the statutory authority to 
appoint the heads of each Public Service department, the structure still 
preserves “a degree of autonomy from both the Executive and the 
legislature”.6  
 
Greater control of politicians over Public Service appointments was certainly 
the stated goal of the Hawke government.7 Michael Keating suggests that these 
changes in control and mergers of departments may be viewed as a positive 
development in that it removed some factional interests and overlap in 
responsibilities, made departments more cost effective, and allowed for direct 
                                            
5 Michael Howlett and Michael Ramesh, Studying Public Policy. Policy Cycles and Policy 
Subsystems. (Ontario: Oxford University Press, 1995) p. 54. 
6 Hughes and Leane, Australian Legal Institutions. Principles, Structure and Organisation, p. 
242. 
7 Cited in Jenny Stewart, "Public Sector Management," in Government, Politics, Power and 
Policy in Australia, ed. John Summers, Dennis Woodward, and Andrew Parkin (Frenchs 
Forest, NSW: Pearson Education Australia Pty Limited, 2002) p. 76. 
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departmental representation to Cabinet through the Minster.8 Other writers 
were concerned about the potential impact that these changes may have on 
individual autonomy and the potential abuse of power by bureaucrats.9 The 
new structure was set up in a way that allowed for further structural changes to 
occur more quickly and easily, and led to greater scrutiny of government 
departments by Parliament and by statutory investigators.10    
 
There is debate over when these structural changes to the Public Service were 
completed, or even if they have been completed. Scott Prasser for instance 
argues that by 2003, the wave of the structural changes from the 1980s had 
stopped, that reform was off the agenda, and that independence of advice had 
become subsumed by political control and reluctance by public servants to 
advise government of unfavourable matters.11 Other writers argued that these 
changes brought the Public Service under direct Prime Ministerial control, and 
constrained Public Servants from giving unbiased or politically neutral advice 
on policy matters.12 There was also argument that the removal of safeguards 
against potential personal repercussions brought the Public Service under 
greater government control and may lead to the suppression of policy advice 
that did not conform to the Minister’s intentions.13 However, this position is 
contested, for instance by Patrick Weller who argues that the replacement of 
the Secretary when a new Minister takes over a Department may be viewed in 
the light of more personal, rather than political factors - not in the sense of 
                                            
8 Michael Keating, "Mega-Departments: The Theory, Objectives and Outcomes of HE 1987 
Reforms," in Reforming the Public Service. Lessons from Recent Experience, ed. Patrick 
Weller, John Forster, and Glyn Davis (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1993) pp. 11-12. 
9 Lionel Orchard, "Managerialism, Economic Rationalism and Public Sector Reform in 
Australia: Connections, Divergences, Alternatives," Australian Journal of Public 
Administration 57, no. 1 (1998). 
10 Patrick Weller, "What Has Been Achieved and How Can It Be Evaluated?," in Mega-
Departments: The Theory, Objectives and Outcomes of He 1987 Reforms, ed. Patrick 
Weller, John Forster, and Glyn Davis (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1993) p. 229 and p. 35. 
11 Scott Prasser, "Poor Decisions, Compliant Management and Reactive Change: The 
Public Sector in 2003," Australian Journal of Public Administration March (2004). 
12 Stewart, "Public Sector Management." pp. 77-78 and p. 83. 
13 Robert Smith and David Corbett, "Responsiveness without Politicisation. Finding a 
Balance," Canberra Bulletin of Public Policy 89 (1998). 
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nepotism but in the sense of being able to work effectively with the person.14 
However, there seems to be a general agreement in the literature cited above 
that the Public Service changes resulted in greater control by government over 
the Public Service.  
 
These larger changes within the broader Public Service accompanied two 
broad changes in refugee policy: ministerial delegation of duties within the 
bureaucracy and concomitant limitations on independent review of this 
process. This became apparent as early as 1989, which marks the beginning of 
the statutory delegation of duties for the processing of refugee applications.15 
Germov and Motta describe the new three-tier system of decision-making that 
became operational in 1990.16 Accordingly, there was first, an initial 
(“primary”) decision that was, second, followed by a review of rejected 
applications. Third, there was a final review by the Immigration Minister to 
allow those individuals to stay in Australia who were not accepted as refugees, 
but who had compelling humanitarian reasons for leaving their country. This 
replaced the old system where the Minister personally decided on all refugee 
applications. Under the changes since 1990, the Minister retained the option of 
final discretion, including the discretion to overturn refugee decisions made 
within the system of delegated powers.  
 
The process for review and appeal of unsuccessful refugee applications was 
also delegated to the bureaucracy, with the Minister exercising final control 
over the decisions. Germov and Motta continue that the Refugee Review 
Tribunal (RRT) was established in 1993 to deal with rejections at the primary 
stage “according to the requirements of substantial justice and the merits of the 
individual case”.17 Under the current system, a delegate of the Minister, who is 
                                            
14 Patrick Weller, Australia's Mandarins. The Frank and the Fearless? (Crows Nest, NSW: 
Allen&Unwin, 2001) pp. 12-13. 
15 Roz Germov and Francesco Motta, Refugee Law in Australia (South Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 2003) pp. 38-39. 
16 Ibid., p. 72. 
17 Ibid., p. 74. 
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an officer of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, makes 
the primary decision, which can be reviewed by the RRT.18 The legal authority 
for ministerial intervention is in the Migration Act. According to the legislation, 
the Minister may exercise discretion and make a more favourable decision than 
that made by the Migration Review Tribunal.19 Similar provisions exist for 
decisions of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.20 This decision cannot be 
delegated must be exercised personally by the Minister, is not reviewable and 
the Minister is not compelled to exercise such discretion or even to intervene.21 
There are potential problems with ministerial veto powers over a process that 
is intended to be fair and independent. The non-compelling and non-
reviewable aspects, as Don McMaster points out, “could be used to adapt 
migration law to their own political ends”.22 McMaster’s comments also give 
insight into the close relationship between political process and legal, 
bureaucratic and policy practices; a relationship that is explored in this chapter.  
 
The second change to refugee policy curtailed the role of the courts in the 
decisions of the determination process, through the establishment of quasi-
legal tribunals. Germov and Motta summarise these changes:23 The passing of 
the Judicial Review Administrative Decisions) Act 1977, which began operation on 1 
October 1980, facilitated judicial review of refugee decisions in the newly 
established Federal Court. Accodingly, decisions could be reviewed in the 
Federal Court on the basis of error of law. In addition, as has been the case 
since Federation in 1901 and guaranteed by the Constitution, review on 
constitutional grounds was also possible in the High Court. The merits of the 
case could not be reviewed in the courts. In 1992, changes were introduces to 
limit the reasons for judicial review in the Federal Court, but did not affect 
review on constitutional grounds by the High Court. In 2001, changes to the 
                                            
18 Ibid., p. 83. 
19 Migration Act 1958 (No 157 (2001 as amended), 1958. Section 351 
20 Ibid., Section 391. 
21 Germov and Motta, Refugee Law in Australia pp. 83-84. 
22 Don McMaster, Asylum Seekers. Australia's Response to Refugees (Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 2001) p. 89. 
23 Germov and Motta, Refugee Law in Australia, pp. 84-85. 
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Migration Act further restricted review by the Federal Court and the High 
Court, prevented class or representative actions in the Federal Court and the 
High Court, and introduced the privative clause. The privative clause had such 
massive impact on the process that it will be discussed in the next section.  
 
It becomes apparent from the above overview of the structural changes to the 
refugee determination process, and to the limitations to judicial review of this 
process, that these changes were put in place by Labor and Coalition 
governments over one-and-a-half decades. The task of this chapter is to 
analyse how, or if, the power shift assisted the development of legal 
rationalism.  
 
 
Power within political structure 
 
With these policy and legal changes in mind, it is now time to look at the whole 
of human agency in the changed power relationships within the institution of 
bureaucracy. To Giddens, agency becomes evident by the capacity to effect 
choice.24 To put it in Giddens’ words: “An agent ceases to be such if he or she 
ceases to make a difference”. It seems from the discussion in this chapter so 
far that the central agent for defining refugee policy and the guidelines for 
making decisions under this policy are members of the Howard government. It 
should be remembered, however, that public policy always occurs in a climate 
where stakeholders push the legitimacy of their own agendas, and government 
may search for common ground, or stall until consensus emerges, but 
eventually exercise leadership in this process.25  
 
                                            
24 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of Structuration 
(Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984) p. 9 and p. 15. 
25 Quentin Beresford, Governments, Markets and Globalisation. Australian Public Policy in 
Context. (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2000) p. 12. 
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Here are a few words about the power of agency in state structure. Examples 
of human agency on the part of government officials have been discussed in 
the case studies, where power was exercised to achieve policy outcomes that 
operate at the level of policy practices. There were examples of how agency 
resulted in exercises of military power, in the power to control information, or 
in the power to influence the work of professionals practicing in detention 
centres. Power, when it affects outcomes, is not expressed in this thesis as 
hierarchical – but as a diffusive layer that influences other practices. This 
power is communicated from the state structure to policy practices in several 
ways: first, through though professional and technical expertise,26 second, on 
the interpretation of the details of delegated legislation, regulations, bylaws, or 
ordinances.27 According to John Uhr, political analysis does not lose sight of 
the political context of these variables and also distinguishes between formal 
government powers and actual practices.28 Uhr continues that practices may 
change without an accompanying change in formal power, and one must not 
overlook the influence that informal practices may have on institutional 
performance. 
 
However, there is also a more subtle form of power that assists the 
legitimation process identified by Habermas. It is a power that relies on 
legitimating public policy not by coercion, but by argumentation. This power 
links human agency with political process. Cerny views the political process in 
state structure as consisting of two key elements: inclusion and control.29 
According to Cerny, both are controlled by the political executive, who control 
the “apparatuses of the state”, and which includes control through the means 
of budget allocations and appointments. Giddens, on the other hand, defines 
power as a neutral concept; nothing more than “the capacity to achieve 
                                            
26 Hughes and Leane, Australian Legal Institutions. Principles, Structure and Organisation, 
p. 251. 
27 Bridgman and Davis, Australian Policy Handbook, p. 73. 
28 John Uhr, "How Democratic Is Parliament? A Case Study in Auditing the Performance of 
Parliaments," Democratic Audit of Australia June (2005). 
29 Philip Cerny, The Changing Architecture of Politics (London: Sage Publications, 1990) pp. 
43-44. 
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outcomes, “a force that changes as structures of domination keep changing.30 
Neutrality thus means that power is all pervasive, perhaps at times unseen and 
not noticed. Yet, as Giddens observes, power is there and is integral to the 
outcome of social action: “There is no concept more elemental than that of 
power … Power is the means of getting things done and, as such, directly 
implied in human action”.31 In this thesis, the concept of power is used in the 
non-coercive and all-pervasive form, as described by Giddens, where power is 
not imposed, but a necessary concomitant of all government action.  
 
Kerry Carrington’s discussion of ministerial interventions in refugee decisions 
is an example of the exercise of power within the structure of bureaucracy.32 
The figures quoted by Carrington also give insight into the humanitarian 
impact of the changes to refugee policy after 1999. In the cited paper, 
Carrington argues that ministerial interventions, where the Immigration 
Minister has offset the harsh impact that legislation would otherwise have had 
on refugee applicants, have increased considerably since the Howard 
government took office in 1996. Such conclusion, however, may be misleading 
when the raw data are taken into account.33 In the cited article, Carrington 
compares ministerial intervention decisions of Labor Immigration Ministers 
between 1992 and 1996 with those of the Coalition Minister between 1997 and 
2000. Figures quoted by Carrington reveal 303 positive decisions by a Labor 
minister after rejection by the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT), and 1,562 
positive decisions by a Coalition minister for the respective timeframes. 
However, a different picture emerges when one converts Carrington’s figures 
to percentages. Then, the rate of ministerial interventions remains similar: just 
under 3 per cent approval under a Labor, and about 3.1 percent under 
Coalition government. These percentages, however, are offset when one takes 
into account the sharp increase in negative RRT decisions under the Howard 
                                            
30 Giddens, The Constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of Structuration, p. 257. 
31 Ibid., p. 283. 
32 Kerry Carrington, Ministerial Discretion in Migration Matters: Contemporary Policy Issues 
in Historical Context (Current Issues Brief no. 3 2003-04, 2003).   
33 See Appendix C, Figure C1. 
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government, which Carrington also quotes. Then it becomes apparent that 
over 51,400 RRT applicants missed out under the Coalition government, 
compared with slightly less than 10,000 individuals under Labor.  
 
The institutional power of the Immigration Minister can be inferred from the 
size and influence of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs 
(DIMA). The DIMA website reveals that this government department is 
responsible for the processes and practices of refugee determination, and 
controls all aspects of this process.34 Accordingly, primary refugee decisions are 
made by DIMA, and this function necessarily has a structural relationship with 
the appeals process. DIMA was established in 1945. The website also reveals 
that in September 2003, when this information was downloaded, DIMA 
employed about 3,680 people in Australia and overseas. In practice, many 
more people are involved in the operations of the Department because some 
services are outsourced through contracts. Other responsibilities include the 
monitoring of legitimate entry to and departure from Australia, detention of 
individuals and their removal and deportation from Australia, as well as the 
overall management of refugee claims and appeals. The Department has its 
own Corporate Division, a division for Litigation and Legal Services, and its 
own media division.  
 
Through changing the structure of migration advice, the Howard government 
reduced the influence of the courts and enhanced its own influence over the 
process. One example is the establishment of the Migration Agents 
Registration Authority (MARA). In 1998, legislation prevented all people, 
including lawyers and barristers of the High Court, from giving migration 
advice unless they fulfilled MARA registration criteria. MARA is a statutory 
body that regulates the registration of Migration Agents and investigates 
                                            
34 Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. 2005, January 20. Fact Sheet 3. The 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs.  
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complaints against them.35 There are hefty registration fees (initially $1,760, and 
$1,595 annually thereafter) and education requirements to maintain this 
registration.36 Whilst Migration Agents act independently, and MARA is an 
independent statutory body, the process is not immune from government 
control. DIMA contracts Migration Agents to give independent migration 
advice, generally through subcontractors.37 In a competitive market of 
tendering, the dependence on DIMA for employment in a relatively limited 
area, and bearing in mind the time, money and effort required to achieve and 
retain registration with MARA, one gets a sense that such process of refugee 
determination is not entirely independent of the wishes of the Howard 
government. It is highly unlikely that such “requirements”, should they exist, 
are ever spelled out as a requirement for maintaining employment, but are 
more likely conveyed as tacit knowledge through working culture among 
migration agents.  
 
Whilst migration agents had the independence of their decision-making 
guaranteed by law, the scope for such decision-making became increasingly 
narrow. This occurred as the result of changes by the Howard government 
about how the decision-making rules were interpreted and implemented. Alex 
De Costa traces a process whereby after September 2001, the government took 
steps to decrease the number of positive outcomes in refugee determination 
decisions, and how these rejections led to an increasing number of court 
appeals.38 Da Costa cites the case of Mrs Sarrozola, which Immigration 
Minister Philip Ruddock used to convince Parliament of the merits of a 
narrowed interpretation of refugee claims. Accordingly, the Minister told 
Parliament that a drug dealer was assassinated in Columbia because he owed 
$40,000. The assassins subsequently alleged that the sister of the dead man, as 
                                            
35 Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. 2003, 19 August. Fact Sheet 100. 
Migration Agents Registration Authority.  
36 Migration Institute of Australia. 2005. Migration Agents Registration Authority. [Website]. 
37 Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Fact Sheet 3. 
38 Alex De Costa, "Assessing the Cause and Effect of Persecution in Australian Refugee 
Law: Sarrazola, Khawar and the Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No 6) 2001 (Cth)," 
Federal Law Review 30, no. 3 (2002). 
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the only surviving relative, was responsible for payment and threatened to 
harm her children if she did not pay the debt. Mrs Sarrozola feared that she 
and her family would encounter persecution if they returned to Columbia and 
based her claim to refugee protection on belonging to a particular social group, 
her family. Additional complication came from the fact that the persecution 
was conducted by private individuals, who were not government officials. Da 
Costa, in the cited article above, describes the story of Mrs Khwar, where 
police in her home country turned a blind eye to the domestic violence to 
which she was repeatedly subjected. Mrs Khwar claimed persecution as the 
result of belonging to a social group, which essentially related to her being 
female and being born in Pakistan.  
 
There was no doubt that both women were persecuted. Da Costa continues 
that in both cases, the High Court deliberated over whether such persecution 
satisfied the requirements of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and 
whether the Refugee Tribunal (RRT) had applied the correct legal test to assess 
refugee status. Da Costa considers the different decision-making criteria over 
refugee decisions as a source of the tension between judges and the Executive. 
Officials of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and the 
RRT make refugee decisions based on their delegated duties as limited by 
parliament, which is narrower than the interpretative power of judges within 
the institution of law.  
 
There is, however, another side to the debate, as presented by Justice 
Sackville.39  According to Justice Sackville, the tension between the judiciary 
and the Executive occurs for several reasons: first, from non-reviewable 
administrative decisions; second, from the highly publicised context about a 
large number of litigation cases over the last twenty years; third from the 
stipulation in the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees that refugees may 
                                            
39 Ronald Sackville, "Refugee Law: The Shifting Balance," Sydney Law Review 26, no. 37 
(2004): pp. 42-44. 
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arrive in a host country “by whatever means”; and fourth, from the frequent 
passing of statute law by Parliament in response to judicial decisions. Justice 
Sackville argues that this cat-and-mouse game between the judiciary and 
Parliament has ushered in “the constitutionalisation of refugee law in 
Australia” and moved judicial review into a legal area (that of constitutional 
law), with is outside the legislative authority of the Executive.40  
 
In the article cited in the previous paragraph, Justice Sackville referred to a 
process that increasingly restricted the jurisdiction of the courts to decisions 
over whether or not matters pertaining to the refugee determination process 
had breached the Constitution. The conflict between the courts and Parliament 
also became notable during the post-Tampa legislation, as was noted in Case 
Study 1 — Showdown at Sea: The Tampa. Then, refugee policy became 
increasingly framed as immigration policy, with a focus on immigration intake 
rather than refugee protection, and was increasingly open to ministerial 
discretion.41 For the government, the bureaucratic process was easier to control 
than legal processes and agency of the legal system. It translated into 
institutional practices where the Minister could determine the process, appoint 
key agents, override all decisions, and issue directives. Against this structural 
background, and with fewer lawyers in the process, questions were raised 
about the integrity of the process. Carrington concedes that this discretion of 
process has invited criticisms.42 James Jupp suggests that the review system 
would have more credibility if it were conducted independently from DIMA, 
and transferred to the Attorney-General’s department.43  
                                            
40 Ibid., p. 43-44. 
41 Don McMaster, "Asylum-Seekers and the Insecurity of a Nation," Australian Journal of 
International Affairs 56, no. 2 (2002). 
42 Carrington, Ministerial Discretion in Migration Matters: Contemporary Policy Issues in 
Historical Context. 
43 James Jupp, There Has to Be a Better Way: A Long-Term Refugee Strategy, Blue Book 
Number Five. Australian Fabian Society Pamphlet Number Fifty-Eight (Melbourne: 
Australian Fabian Society and Arena Printing and Publishing, 2003). 
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Excluding the judiciary 
 
The purpose of this section is to highlight the structural tension between the 
judiciary and Parliament, as refugee assessments were increasingly brought 
under the political control of the Howard government. It was noted in the 
introduction to this section that Giddens’ structuration theory predicts that 
tension occurs within state structure. According to Giddens, such tension 
occurs directly from the way the State is operating.44 Structuration theory 
assumes that contradictions are systematically built into the structure of the 
state and exist as “fault lines” that are not necessarily problematic, but that do 
manifest themselves as tensions.45  
 
However, how does one detect the faultlines? Bevir, Rhodes and Weller argue 
that tensions within bureaucratic structure can be traced through “nodal 
points”, and that tension manifests itself through a “dilemma”.46 They suggest 
that a dilemma may take the form of an event or a theoretical crisis that clashes 
with the belief system of political actors. Bevir, Rhodes, and Weller illustrate 
this nodal tension and its resolution through an example:  the then-accepted 
constitutional meaning of the role of British Parliament in relation to public 
law clashed with the separation of powers doctrine under the Westminster 
system. The dilemma was resolved when a new interpretation downplayed the 
previously dominant interpretation of ministerial accountability, and instead 
highlighted the “emphasis on executive power and the role of the Executive as 
the guardian of the national interest”. In this example, the newly established 
doctrines moved in a different direction, but without clashing with the 
traditional belief system. 
                                            
44 Giddens, The Constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of Structuration, pp. 196-97. 
45 Ibid., p. 199. 
46 Mark Bevir, R.A.W. Rhodes, and Patrick Weller, "Traditions of Governance: Interpreting 
the Changing Role of the Public Sector," Public Administration 81, no. 1 (2003) p. 10. 
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One clear node of tension consistently identified throughout this thesis is in 
the relationship between the Executive and the courts. The case studies gave 
concrete examples of the faultlines played out in policy practices. These 
faultlines, it is suggested here whilst drawing on the work cited in the previous 
paragraph, were overcome through framing practices that were consistent with 
the ideology of legal rationalism. It will be argued shortly that these dilemmas 
were resolved by changing to a structure that was dominated by a bureaucratic 
model of decision-making in the refugee determination process.  
 
 
Structuring to exclude 
 
First, we shall explore the transfer of decision-making from the courts to 
tribunals. The second step, the introduction of a legislative model that 
enhanced the process of preventing cases from getting to the courts, will be 
discussed in the next section. As the new system increasingly came under 
government control, basic legal principles that applied to citizens were 
removed from the refugee decision-making process that applied to refugee 
applicants.  
 
Susan Kneebone describes a process where refugee application decisions 
eventually became administrative decisions under the Migration Act, “where the 
satisfaction of the Minister became the overriding consideration”.47 To 
illustrate this, Kneebone cites two cases where the judges ruled not in favour 
of natural justice, but in favour of another legal principle, that of 
“administrative convenience”.48 According to Kneebone, this was achieved by 
taking into account the importance of “streamlining of administrative 
                                            
47 Susan Kneebone, "Natural Justice and Non-Citizens: A Matter of Integrity?," Melbourne 
University Law Review 26 (2002) p. 366, and footnote 67 on p. 66. 
48 Ibid., p. 367. 
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procedures” and the importance of “reducing economic costs to the 
government”. Kneebone comments on the significance of such changing 
principles:49 First, the courts applied a legal principle that “is based upon the 
concept of a closed community, which could be applied to exclude non-
citizens”. Second, Kneebone observes that decisions which rule in favour of 
administrative convenience, however, came at the cost of “excluding some 
categories of non-citizens” from “the universal principles of natural justice”.  
 
The cases that established the changing principles that Kneebone refers to, 
were heard in 1993 and 1994.50 The shift toward an administrative model with 
different rules thus was well in progress before the Howard government came 
to power in 1996. Mary Crock observes that by 1992, almost all migration 
decisions were removed from the courts, and access to the judicial overview of 
this administrative process became more and more limited.51 Mary Crock notes 
three major legislative changes to the Migration Act; in 1989, 1992, and 1994, 
followed by a gradual transfer of power from the courts to an administrative 
model.52 Crock suggests this administrative model became structurally narrow; 
resulting in the removal of the power of judges interpreting how the law 
applies and applying the law according to precedent. The bureaucratic 
decision-makers did not have these powers of interpretation. Their duty was 
instead to apply the law without resorting to precedent.  
 
                                            
49 Ibid., p. 379. 
50 Kneebone refers to the following cases: Zhang De Yong v. Minister of Immigration, Local 
Government and Ethnic Affairs. No. WG215 of 1992 FED No. 715 Administrative Law - 
Practice and Procedure - Res Judicata (1993) 118 ALR 165 (1993); Chen Zhen Zi and Ors 
v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs. No. WAG142 of 1993 FED No. 145/94 
Administrative Law - Practice and Procedure (1994) 121 ALR 83 (1994) 48 FCR 591 (1994) 
33 ALD 441 (1993). 
51 Mary Crock, "A Legal Perspective on the Evolution of Mandatory Detention," in Protection 
or Punishment? The Detention of Asylum Seekers in Australia, ed. Mary Crock (Allandale, 
NSW: The Federation Press, 1993) p. 33. 
52 Mary Crock, Immigration and Refugee Law in Australia (Sydney: The Federation Press, 
1998) p. 20. 
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Mary Crock argues that judicial oversight of administrative law matters strained 
the relationship with the parliaments “over the role of judicial review in the 
control of migration decision-making”. Crock wrote in 1993:  
 
It is difficult to underestimate the resentment that the courts appear to have 
engendered first in the bureaucracy, and then in parliament. Through their 
interpretation of the law, the courts were seen to be usurping the policy-making role 
of parliament, and threatening the very fabric of immigration control. Put in crude 
terms, the courts were seen to be letting in people that the government, acting 
through the bureaucracy, wanted to keep out.53  
 
If there were resentments, the structure was increasingly set up to resolve 
tension through a legal-bureaucratic approach by shifting the parameters for 
decision-making. Whilst the Howard government did not set up this structure, 
one gets a sense that this new structure was not antagonistic to the 
government’s framing practices of refugees that were observed in the case 
studies. Moreover, the structural changes from 1989 onwards gave greater 
control to the government. The question for this and for the next chapter is: 
did human agency under the Howard government utilise this structure to 
conduct institutional practices that were driven by the ideology of legal 
rationalism? If so, how did this occur? 
 
Amendments to the Migration Act in 1989 gave rise to “one of the most highly 
regulated systems of public administration ever seen in Australia”.54 The policy 
of mandatory detention became law with the passing of the Migration 
Amendment Act in 1992. This resulted in measures to place into custody all 
refugee applicants who arrived after 19 November 1989, if they were not 
detained already.55 Six years later, after the Howard government had been in 
power for two years, Mary Crock observed: 
                                            
53 Mary Crock, "The Evolution of Mandatory Detention," in Protection or Punishment?, ed. 
Mary Crock (Annandale, NSW: The Federation Press, 1993) p. 32. 
54 Crock, "A Legal Perspective on the Evolution of Mandatory Detention," p. 27. 
55 Ibid., pp. 33-34. 
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The most striking feature of the present system when compared with the earlier 
regime is the extent to which discretions are confined. The government’s policy is no 
longer exclusively in the form of guidelines, but has been reduced into law through 
the medium of subordinate legislation. The Act, together with the Regulations, set 
out exhaustively the steps that must be followed and the criteria that must be applied 
in order to make lawful migration decisions. Even the Minister’s power to decide a 
case outside the rules set by the legislation is strictly confined.56 
 
The citation above suggests the Howard government established control 
through micro-legislation that micro-managed the parameters for decision-
making. Another development, as was noted earlier, was structural changes 
that guaranteed the independence of the decision-makers by statute. However, 
the scope for such independence and for exercising discretion was limited by 
other statutes. Concurrent with these changes, other significant developments 
occurred. It became increasingly difficult for refugee applicants to access the 
court system, as will be discussed in Chapter 6 — Politicisation of the Law. Other 
structural changes discussed later in this chapter consisted of limiting the 
powers of two statutory advocacy bodies: the Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission and the Ombudsman.  
 
Within the changing structure of governance, the growth of tribunals reflected 
a growing trend to increase the power of administrative bodies and to bypass 
the courts system. This structural change reflects an international trend. 
Members of the Council of Australasian Tribunals include sixty-one tribunals from 
Australia and New Zealand, including the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, 
Migration Review Tribunal, and the Refugee Review Tribunal.57 On its website, 
the Council of Australasian Tribunals stated that tribunals have increasingly 
replaced courts in order to produce “a range of determinative functions” that 
“achieve justice in terms of individuals’ relationship with Government as well 
                                            
56 Crock, Immigration and Refugee Law in Australia, p. 42. 
57 Council of Australasian Tribunals. (2002-2005). Register of Member of Tribunals of COAT. 
[Website]. 
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as each other”.58 Its objectives are to establish a national network and register 
of tribunals and its members, with agreed standards of practice, performance 
and behaviour, the training and support of its members, education and 
publications, close links to the tertiary education sector, and advice to 
government “on tribunal requirements”.59 Within this structure, potentially all 
decisions by government departments can be made by tribunals.  
 
According to its website, the umbrella organisation for Australian tribunals is 
the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). It is a statutory body under the 
portfolio of the Attorney-General, and addresses refugee matters under 
Section 7 of the Migration Act. The AAT commenced operation in 1976 amid 
other changes to the Public Service structure that attempted to overcome the 
lengthy and costly way of arriving at decisions through the courts. Its role is 
“to provide independent merits review of administrative decisions”.60 Its 
members are public servants appointed by the Immigration Minster.61The AAT 
hears appeals to refugee decisions that are not resolved by two lower bodies: 
the Refugee Review Tribunal and the Migration Review Tribunal.  
 
Several tribunals were set up for the purpose of overseeing refugee 
determination decisions, with an emphasis on minimising government 
discretion.62 The Refugee Review Tribunal, formed in 1993, is the first avenue 
of appeal. “Its main function is to review decisions made by the Department of 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA) to refuse or cancel protection 
visas to non-citizens in Australia”.63 Included in this appeals structure is the 
Migration Review Tribunal, which deals with issuing and cancellation of visas. 
Although the Migration Review Tribunal and the Refugee Review Tribunal 
                                            
58 Ibid. 
59 Council of Australasian Tribunals. (2002-2005). The Objectives of the Council of 
Australasian Tribunals. [Website]. 
60 Administrative Appeals Tribunal. (2004-2005). About the AAT. [Website]. 
61 Refugee Review Tribunal. (Undated). About the Tribunal. [Website]. Australian 
Government.  
62 Howard Adelman et al., eds., Immigration and Refugee Policy. Australia and Canada 
Compared., vol. 1 (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1994) p. 109. 
63 Refugee Review Tribunal, About the Tribunal. [Website]. 
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operate independently, they are parts of DIMA “with staff employed under the 
Public Service Act 1999 which operate with some degree of independence ... but 
which are not separate APS agencies as defined in the Public Service Act”.64 
Thus, Australian tribunals that address questions of refugee determination 
retain a strong structural link with the government. 
 
Safeguards that initially guaranteed independence of the appeals bodies were 
gradually removed. In line with other Public Service changes, there was 
downgrading of status and salary, and the removal of tenure of AAT members. 
Since the Migration Reform Act 1992, courts could only arbitrate over errors of 
law, not on the merits of a case. Krause and Knott discuss some implications 
of these changes.65 They indicate that the Minister can override refugee 
decisions of the RRT and the MRT, and issue directives, and this has the 
potential to affect the independence of the process. Officials of the Refugee 
Review Tribunal are not required to hold a legal qualification. Krause and 
Knott argue in the citation above that this may “adversely affect the quality of 
the Tribunal’s decision-making”, complicated by the fact that legal error is not 
grounds for review. The authors claim that reviews are not independent of the 
Executive but form part of its structure. Moreover, this occurred in an 
environment where legislation led to an interpretation of statutes toward the 
removal of rights of asylum seekers, which moved the system toward 
government control.66 
 
Administrative structures that resolve disputes and determinations in a cost-
saving and time-efficient manner have their merits. However, when such 
structures are weighted against the likelihood of successful refugee applications 
through “relaxing” notions of fairness and process on the one hand, and 
greater government control on the other, a different picture emerges. The 
                                            
64 Commonwealth of  Australia. (2005). Australian Public Service Agencies [Website, 
Adelaide Skilled Processing Centre].  
65 Dana Krause and Isabell Knott, "The Refugee Determination Process. A View across the 
Tasman," Alternative Law Journal 27, no. 5 (2002): p. 225. 
66 Ibid. 
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emerging picture is one of structural concomitants that enable the pattern of 
legal rationalism that was arguably observed in the case studies. This structure 
may even explain the strategy of some refugee applicants to exhaust all avenues 
of appeal and explore legal loopholes; a strategy of which the government was 
critical.67  
 
As part of legislative changes that were designed to prevent cases from 
reaching the tribunals, the government put up barriers that made it more 
difficult for applicants to file an appeal. Since July 1997, applicants had to 
lodge a $1,000 fee for appealing to the Refugee Review Tribunal. Applicants 
recovered their costs only if the appeal was successful. Since 2001, the barriers 
to filing appeals have been enhanced. A time limit was imposed that required 
detained applicants who to lodge an appeal within seven days, and present all 
material in English, translated by an accredited translator. This presented 
difficulties for applicants, especially in remote detention centres, where it was 
difficult to access lawyers and interpreters in a timely manner.  
 
One can infer the potential for the development of nodes of tension, as 
described earlier by Bevier and Rhodes and Weller, not only within the 
structure of refugee decision-making, but also within the larger structure of the 
state. Some of this tension was observed in the case studies, where framing 
practices and policy practices were adapted to bring about policy goals that 
enhanced an exclusionary refugee policy. It is suggested here that such tension 
was partly overcome at the level of structure through changes toward a 
dominant administrative model, and through the potential for political control 
of decisions within this structure. This legal-bureaucratic structure allowed for 
power to flow through the statutes of the administrative model.  
 
                                            
67 Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. (Undated). Women and Children in 
Immigration Detention. [Website]; Philip Ruddock. (2001, 27 August). Question without 
Notice: Illegal Immigration: Unauthorised Arrivals. Parliamentary Speech, House of 
Representatives. Official Hansard. Commonwealth of Australia, p. 30,236.  
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Once government control over the structure became almost complete, it was a 
matter of resolving structural tension through changing legislation; not in the 
politicised manner that reflected the language of framing practices described in 
the case studies, but through incremental changes over approximately three 
decades. These changes established a process of colonisation at system level, 
where bureaucratic power under political control gradually dominated the 
independent model of judicial decision-making. It should be noted in passing 
that this interpretation goes against the classic Habermasian conception of the 
system colonising the lifeworld. Here I am suggesting that a particular systemic 
understanding of law and politics colonised the systems world. 
 
 
Exclusionary legislation 
 
It is now time to address the second part of the structural change that 
contributed to  creating an environment where institutional practices could 
occur that were not antagonistic to an ideology of legal rationalism. However, 
this discussion addresses the legislative changes that brought about the 
structural shift to an administrative model, and does not include the micro-
legislation that guided the refugee decision-making per se.  
 
Perhaps the most direct attempt by the Howard government to change the 
structure of oversight was through introducing the privative clause. The 
purpose of this legislation was designed to put actions of individuals, who 
carried out relevant government policies, beyond the reach of the courts, 
except with permission from Parliament. The application of this legislation 
went beyond the actions of officers in relation to refugee boats, as discussed in 
Case Study 1 — Showdown at Sea: The Tampa, but included the decision-makers 
who operated under the delegated powers of the Minister. The privative clause 
thus included the administrative decisions within the Department of 
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Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and the independent tribunals. Section 
474 of the Migration Act stipulated that issues related to the Constitution 
remained under the jurisdiction of the High Court.68 This allowed only the 
constitutional matters that may arise from such decisions to be decided in the 
court, but kept issues pertaining to the refugee decisions within the tribunals 
and out of the courts.  
 
The Migration Act specifies that only the Minister had the power to override the 
privative clause and authorise a case to get to court.69  Germov and Motta 
argue that this “means that the Minister has effectively reserved the right to 
declare which decisions will be judicially reviewable”.70 Legal commentators 
pointed out other anomalies. Although the privative clause was “final and 
conclusive”, the Migration Act identified areas of jurisdiction for the High Court 
and the Federal Court in relation to the privative clause.71 One may assume 
that the definitive wording of the privative clause and the conferring of a gate-
keeping authority to the Minister by statute heralded the end to most court 
cases. In fact, the opposite came to pass. In the year after introduction of the 
privative clause, in 2002-03, there were “2131 applications for constitutional 
writs” filed in the High Court, most of which were about migration matters.72 
The more restrictive and exclusive the rules became, the greater the incentive 
for refugee lawyers to challenge those areas that the rules had not specified as 
exclusion criteria.  
 
                                            
68 Migration Act 1958 No 157 (2001 as amended), 1958. Section 474 (1) states: “A privative 
clause decision is (a) final and conclusive, and (b) must not be challenged, appealed 
against, reviewed, quashed, or called into question in any court, and (c) is not subject to 
prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account”.  
69 Ibid.   
70 Germov and Motta, Refugee Law in Australia, p. 708. 
71 Ibid.; Robin Creyke and John McMillan, Control of Government Action. Text, Cases & 
Commentary (Chatswood, NSW: LexisNexis, Butterworth’s, 2005) paragraph 2.1.21, p.45. 
72 Creyke and McMillan, Control of Government Action. Text, Cases & Commentary, 
paragraph 2.2.20, p. 45. 
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Caron Beaton-Wells suggests that these challenges achieved the opposite of 
what the Howard government intended to achieve.73 According to Beaton-
Wells, the government transferred the jurisdiction of most migration cases 
from the High Court to the Federal Court and provided eight additional 
Federal Court magistrates. In the cited article, Beaton-Wells argues that this 
began in 1993 and therefore reflects changes implemented by several federal 
governments to stop “clogging” the court system - “an acknowledgement by 
the government of the limits on its capacity to place substantive restrictions on 
judicial review”.74  
 
One clear node of tension that has been consistently identified throughout this 
thesis is in the relationship between the Executive and the courts. It is possible 
that to the Howard government, the privative clause seemed a reasonable way 
to remove this tension by legislating for situations that would keep the courts 
out of the process. The post-Tampa legislation was the third attempt by the 
Howard government to introduce the privative clause. Mary Crock notes a first 
attempt, where Immigration Minister Ruddock proposed a privative clause as 
early as 1997.75 Germov and Motta note a second attempt in 1999, three years 
before the Tampa, to resolve the tension.76 They note that the Minister framed 
refugee determination as “a threat to Australia’s national sovereignty and their 
[the government’s] ability to decide who enters and remains in Australia” as a 
“domestic concern, rather than as a requirement under Australia’s international 
obligations”. However, it is arguable that the arrival of the Tampa in August 
2001 significantly contributed to the writing of statute law that resolved a 
structural tension - a tension in the legal-administrative system over the 
framing of refugees as a threat to sovereignty under domestic law that collided 
with the tension of framing refugees as bearers of rights to protection under 
international law. The Howard government’s third, and successful, attempt at 
                                            
73 Caron Beaton-Wells, "Judicial Review of Migration Decisions: Life after S157," Federal 
Law Review 33, no. 1 (2005). 
74 Ibid. 
75 Cited in Crock, Immigration and Refugee Law in Australia, p. 294. 
76 Germov and Motta, Refugee Law in Australia, p. 721. 
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introducing the privative clause resolved the tension, because the requirement 
for approval by government over when and how the judiciary would address 
disputes had become part of the legal apparatus.  
 
As Mary Crock observed in 1998, this tension, from a legal perspective, came 
from attempts to shut off curial inquiries into the legality of refugee decisions. 
Crock correctly predicted in 1998, three years before the passing of the 
privative clause, that such a clause would only be final on the factual nature of 
the inquiry, not on a matter of law.77 Administrators do not have the powers to 
interpret the law; only judges do. Making the privative clause part of domestic 
legislation, therefore, may be seen as an attempt by the Howard government to 
limit when instances of judicial interpretation may come about. Justice 
McHugh articulates some reasons for this tension.78 McHugh suggests that the 
Executive believes the courts often do not take into account a broad picture 
that confronts policymakers, and that courts are pedantic about procedures. 
However, Justice McHugh argues in the cited article for maintaining 
independence of decision-making, because members of an administrative 
tribunal “do not have the same security of tenure and independence of 
judges”. As Germov and Motta suggest, the prospect of judicial review leads to 
more careful decision-making at the level of the tribunals and thereby ensures a 
“consistency of approach concerning how the law is applied” that “cannot be 
achieved by administrative tribunals”.79  
 
Overcoming this tension by keeping cases out of the legal system and retaining 
them within the bureaucratic system of appeal tribunals illustrated a flow of 
power from one system to another. It also illustrated how one system displaced 
another system within state structure. Such displacement of one area, and 
replacement with another, may be conceptualised as colonisation, in the sense 
                                            
77 Crock, Immigration and Refugee Law in Australi,a p. 294. 
78 Michael McHugh, "Tensions between the Executive and the Judiciary" (paper presented 
at the Australian Bar Association Conference, Paris, 10 July 2002). 
79 Germov and Motta, Refugee Law in Australia, p. 723. 
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that Habermas uses the word. In his colonisation thesis, Habermas argues that the 
rationality of a social system can become so mechanised that it displaces the 
considerations that underpin normativity.80 According to the theory, there 
comes a point where the rationality of a specialised system gains “more and 
more independence from normative contexts” of society, until this rationality 
becomes replaced with rationalism.81 At this point, the rationality of “system 
imperatives” replaces these normative contexts with the logic of the system.82 
The problem arises, according to Habermas, when system logic overshadows 
the capacity for citizens to debate and contest what is normative in society, so 
that the “systemic mechanisms suppress forms of social integration”.83 The 
problem here is not rationality, but a “rationality” that, devoid of normativity, 
takes on an existence of its own and is valued for its own sake.  
 
According to Habermas, the direction of colonisation moves from the system 
to the lifeworld, where the mechanised system replaces the values of the 
lifeworld. However, the findings of this thesis suggest that colonisation may 
occur within the system itself, where the bureaucratic system colonises part of 
the legal system, under the driving force of political process. A similar 
suggestion will be made in the next chapter, where it is argued that part of the 
legal system has “colonised” itself. In both instances, colonisation arguably 
arises from attempts to exercise government power through the structure of 
the state, without resorting to coercion. Instead, it was a matter of building a 
structure, and then introducing into this structure legislation that achieved the 
ideological goals of the Howard government. In this sense, ideology was 
driving both the legislation and the institutional practices. Whilst the discussion 
can reflect only on the Howard government, it is likely that this mechanism of 
colonisation is systemic to democratically elected governments, at least under 
                                            
80 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action. Lifeworld and System: A 
Critique of Functionalist Reason, trans. Thomas McCarthy, vol. 2 (Cambridge, UK: Polity 
Press, 1987). Habermas actually uses the metaphor of the life-world and the system. 
81 Ibid., p. 155. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid., p. 196. 
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certain conditions. Suggestions for this assumption come from the bipartisan 
attempts by Labor and Coalition governments since 1989 to colonise the legal 
system. This may reflect a systemic tension between governments and the 
judiciary in all Westminster democracies consequent to the rise of neo-
Liberalism.  
 
Normativity necessarily includes the relationship between government and 
citizens, because government writes the statutes that set the parameters for 
normative practices. The limiting factor on how governments exercise their 
power over their citizens is in the Constitution of the state. Mary Crock 
describes how the Constitution gives every citizen the right “to seek judicial 
review of the decision of federal officials”, thus ensuring the scope for judicial 
review over the action of government officials in the High Court.84 This 
includes officers who deal with migration cases, and means that some 
migration cases will always be reviewable in the High Court. As discussed 
earlier, these cases deal with the legal, not with the substantive part of the 
decision. From this perspective, refugees may always be viewed as outsiders 
because they are not citizens. However, questions of citizenship are not 
paramount in this process, as suggested by Creyke and McMillan.85 They write 
that the Constitution stipulates, and there is also precedent in common law, 
that the actions of “an officer of the Commonwealth” can be reviewed in the 
High Court. Not surprisingly, some authors did not discount the possibility 
that the Howard government’s statutory restriction through the privative 
clause may result in a constitutional challenge – a challenge that was likely to 
cause further antagonism between Parliament and the judiciary; an undesirable 
situation in a system of separation of powers for reasons of accountability.86  
 
                                            
84 Crock, Immigration and Refugee Law in Australia, pp. 276-77. 
85 Creyke and McMillan, Control of Government Action. Text, Cases & Commentary, 
paragraph 2.2.3, p. 40. 
86 John McMillan, "Federal Court v Minister for Immigration," AIAL Forum 22 (1999): pp. 19-
20; Cheryl Saunders, "Courting Danger," Eureka Street (2002): p. 29; Helen Robertson, 
"Truth, Justice and the Australian Way: Plaintiff S157 of 2002 v Commonwealth," Federal 
Law Review 31, no. 2 (2003): p. 374. 
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However, the tension discussed in the previous paragraph dissipated before it 
escalated to a constitutional challenge. Instead, the privative clause was 
rendered ineffective in a landmark case that determined how the privative 
clause should be applied.87 One forerunner to this decision was the joint 
verdict on appeals in five court cases of the previous year, where the full bench 
of the Federal Court established that the privative case was not to be taken 
literally, but should be read in conjunction with the Hickman principle.88 The 
Hickman principle, on which the decision was based, stipulates that 
administrative decisions are valid, provided such decisions: 
 
constituted a bona fide attempt to exercise the power conferred on the decision-maker; 
related to the subject matter of the legislation; was within the power of the decision-
maker; and did not breach an inviolable statutory constraint.89 
 
The verdict of the case colloquially known as s157, the case that neutralised the 
privative clause, limited judicial review to violation of the Hickman principle.90 
However, the courts also left open the right of judges to determine whether 
government officials acted within the principles set out in the citation above. 
Although there was no constitutional challenge, other tension persisted. 
Solicitor-General David Bennett, who usually represents the Howard 
government in court cases, suggested at a conference that this decision relaxed 
requirements for procedural fairness, but left open the door to future litigation 
on the basis of arguing “bad faith” on the part of the decision-maker.91 The 
court ruled that jurisdictional errors could still be brought before the High 
Court.92 However, in the process of arriving at this decision, the court widened 
the definition of jurisdiction of the privative clause to the point where this 
                                            
87 Plaintiff S157/2002 v. Commonwealth of Australia HCA 2 (4 February 2003). (2003). See 
section on Questions and Answers 1 and 2. 
88 David Bennett, "Privative Clauses — Latest Developments" (paper presented at the Aial 
Forum, Canberra, 27 Aug 2002), Endnote 1. Bennett refers to the following case: NAAV v. 
MIMIA, NABE v. MIMIA, Raturnaivrai v. MIMIA, Turcan v. MIMIA and Wang v. MIMIA (2002) 
FCAFC 228. (2002). 
89 Germov and Motta, Refugee Law in Australia, p. 725. 
90 "Plaintiff S157/2002 v. Commonwealth of Australia HCA 2 (4 February 2003). 
91 Bennett, "Privative Clauses — Latest Developments," pp. 20-21. 
92 Beaton-Wells, "Judicial Review of Migration Decisions: Life after S157." 
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clause became irrelevant for practical purposes.93 This verdict of s157 
generated much anticipation. On the day before the finding, Parliament issued 
a press release that stated that “immigration litigation was at record levels”.94 
Nevertheless, the declaration that the privative clause was invalid where an 
absence of procedural fairness could be established, opened once again the 
door to litigation in future.95  
 
In the judgement of s157, one can clearly see the systemic tension, and 
systemic strategies to overcome such tension, when the judiciary limited 
parliamentary powers in legal matters. However, it is held that, whilst limiting 
the power of the Executive to control institutional practices, the judiciary did 
not limit institutional practices that could be linked with the political framing 
of refugees as outsiders. This is also suggested in the next chapter.  
 
Thus, the tension over control between the Executive and the judiciary is far 
from settled. In its quest to keep refugee decisions from the ambit of the 
courts, the government explored a new angle. Since the end of 2001, lawyers 
may be personally responsible for the legal costs in cases that have little 
likelihood to succeed. The Tampa-case, which will be discussed in Chapter 6 — 
Politicisation of the Law, challenged the authority of the Howard government to 
refuse permission to let the Tampa passengers into Australia. Lawyer Eric 
Vadarlis lost this case, and the Howard government applied to the court for a 
determination that Vadarlis personally be liable for all legal costs.96 The case 
about the legal costs received far less media publicity than the Tampa case. Yet 
the following discussion suggests institutional practices that illustrate the 
central argument of this thesis – the argument that the Howard government 
made recourse to the law when it suited the government’s ideological purposes. 
                                            
93 Ibid., 
94 Robertson, "Truth, Justice and the Australian Way: Plaintiff S157 of 2002 V 
Commonwealth," p. 378. 
95 John Basten, "Revival of Procedural Fairness for Asylum Seekers. The Case of S157 and 
Protection of Human Rights," Alternative Law Journal, no. 3 (2003). 
96 Ruddock v. Vadarlis  (Includes Corrigenda Dated 2 January 2002 & 4 January 2002) 
[2001] FCA 1865 (21 December 2001). (2001).  
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Germov and Motta describe the legal reasoning in the case Ruddock v Vadarlis, 
cited above.97 According to Germov and Motta, the lawsuits that challenged 
the detention of the Tampa passengers were brought by lawyer Eric Vadarlis, 
and by the Victorian Council for Civil Liberties (VCCL). Both cases were so 
similar that the judges treated them as a single case. After Vadarlis lost his case, 
the VCCL withdrew its case. After the judgement of the Tampa case, the 
government sued lawyer Eric Vadarlis and the Victorian Council for Civil 
Liberties for costs.   
 
Germov and Motta state that the government argued in court that the Tampa 
case should not have occurred.98 Accordingly, the government argued: “the 
proceedings were an interference with the executive power of the 
Commonwealth”. The government argued in court that the legal proceedings 
interfered with the government “exercising an aspect of executive power 
central to Australia’s sovereignty as a nation that was non-justiciable”.99 Most 
judges rejected this view, and “held that section 75(v) of the Constitution 
expressly provided for judicial review of executive power”: 
 
The litigation raised important and novel legal issues concerning the alleged 
deprivation of the liberty of the individual, the executive power of the 
Commonwealth, the operation of the Migration Act and Australia’s obligation under 
national law.100   
 
Despite such acknowledgement, the court ordered Vadarlis and the Victorian 
Council for Civil Liberties to pay costs. Germov and Motta write that the court 
held that such payment was “to compensate the successful party rather than to 
                                            
97 Germov and Motta, Refugee Law in Australia, pp. 601-4. 
98 Ibid., p. 604. 
99 Ruddock v.  Vadarlis  (Includes Corrigenda Dated 2 January 2002 & 4 January 2002) 
[2001] FCA 1865 (21 December 2001). Joint judgement by Chief Justice Black and Justice 
French, paragraph 30. 
100 Ibid., pp. 604-05. 
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punish the losing party”.101 Germov and Motta continue that the court order 
effectively meant that Vadarlis did not pay, for two reasons: first, the court 
ordered that each party should pay their own costs, and second, the court 
allowed Vadarlis to apply for a certificate that waived any fees arising from the 
case.102  
 
It is interesting to note that, whilst determining whether or not legal costs 
should be awarded against Vadarlis personally, similar considerations did not 
arise with regard to Immigration Minister Philip Ruddock. Whilst this 
undoubtedly caused personal discomfort to Eric Vadarlis, something else was 
at stake. This case was not only about recovery of costs. There was also the 
principle about making lawyers think carefully about filing for cases, given the 
potentially devastating personal consequences. Court cases that examined the 
actions of government officials in the delivery of policies did not match the 
political objectives of the Howard government. The Prime Minister and the 
Immigration Minister told Parliament on several occasions that the point of the 
post-Tampa legislation was to clear up any legal doubt, and to bring 
government decisions about unauthorised boats beyond the reach of the courts 
in future.103 Since winning in Ruddock v Vadarlis, the Howard government has 
passed legislation that disallows individuals or legal bodies in the community 
“from pursuing the litigation further”.104 However, existing legislation already 
allows for the awarding of costs, at judicial discretion.105 
 
Such discretion has been replaced by mandatory consideration. As part of 
“new reforms”, the government legislated away that discretion, so that lawyers 
                                            
101 Ibid., p. 604. 
102 Ibid., 
103 John Howard. (29 August 2001). Border Protection Bill 2001: Second Reading. 
Parliamentary Speech, House of Representatives. Official Hansard. Commonwealth of 
Australia, p. 30,569; Philip Ruddock. (2001, 30 August). Matters of Public Importance: Illegal 
Immigration: MV Tampa. Parliamentary Speech, House of Representatives. Official 
Hansard. Commonwealth of Australia, p. 30,682; Philip Ruddock. (2001, 18 September). 
Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Bill: Second Reading. Parliamentary 
Speech, House of Representatives. Official Hansard. Commonwealth of Australia, p. 30,682. 
104 Germov and Motta, Refugee Law in Australia, p. 604. 
105 Ibid., p. 601. 
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must provide a document that the case has a reasonable chance of succeeding, 
and the courts must mandatorily consider whether to award costs against the 
lawyers.106 This is an example of a particular approach to the system colonising 
the system in general, where the access to the judiciary for purposes of arguing 
government accountability has been curtailed. It is also an example of the 
“needs” of the systemic use of legal rationalism colonising the “needs” of the 
system of legal rationality to ensure access to the courts.  
 
The Howard government continues to pursue this avenue to dissuade lawyers 
from taking on refugee cases. In May 2004, then Attorney-General Philip 
Ruddock called again for lawyers to personally bear costs for “unmeritorious” 
cases.107 Philip Ruddock justified this as an initiative to prevent what he framed 
as “court shopping” and to prevent all refugee cases from getting to court. The 
move was based on the “Penfold Report”, a document that the Attorney-
General refused to release.108 
 
This change in institutional practices must be seen against the systemic tension 
over ensuring government accountability, and the government’s powers to 
determine the direction of its own accountability. Bringing the bureaucracy 
under control of the Executive became an effective tool for the Howard 
government to influence how and in what circumstances Parliament is 
accountable for using its powers. The main benefit of the new institutionalised 
practices—cheap and timely access to justice—often seemed a euphemism for 
injustice, backed up by the government’s power to utilise the law for its 
ideological purposes and to manipulate the institutional structure to achieve 
this. The privative clause brought out a contradiction between the legal-rational 
imperative to deliver an acceptable level of government accountability, and the 
government’s strategy to curtail such process. In these developments, the 
                                            
106 Beaton-Wells, "Judicial Review of Migration Decisions: Life after S157." 
107 PM [ABC Radio Broadcast]. (2004, 6 May). Lawyers May Be Liable for 'Unmeritorious' 
Asylum Cases. Reporter: Tanya Nolan. 
108 Ibid.  
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Howard government maintained the structure for review and accountability, 
but raised the hurdles to accessing the process.  
 
 
Taming the watchdogs 
 
Government accountability forms part of the policy process. There are three 
statutory bodies for this purpose: the Ombudsman, the Human Rights and 
Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC), and the Australian National Audit 
Office. All three bodies have statutory powers and obligations to check on the 
delivery of public policy and to investigate how government officials execute 
their duties. Investigators of all three statutory agencies are employed under the 
provisions of the Public Service Act 1999.109 These offices allow for inexpensive 
high-level investigations that result in decisions that are sound and reasonable, 
and which makes their findings authoritative.110 This section discusses 
examples of how legal rationalism was practiced until the legislation limited the 
effectiveness of the accountability that these statutory bodies were set up to 
deliver. 
 
As a background to this discussion, each agency will be introduced. The 
Australian National Audit Office describes itself as “a specialist public sector 
practice providing a full range of audit services to the Parliament and 
Commonwealth public sector agencies and statutory bodies”.111 The 
Ombudsman investigates complaints about government policy and the actions 
of government officials.112 The cited legislation states that the actions of a 
Minister, or of a politician acting under Parliamentary privilege, are exempt 
from the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. The Human Rights and Equal 
                                            
109 Commonwealth of  Australia, Australian Public Service Agencies. [Website]. 
110 David Corbett, Australian Public Sector Management (St. Leonard's, NSW: Allen & 
Unwin, 1996) p. 208. 
111 Australian National Audit Office. (2002). History of the ANAO. [Website]. Commonwealth 
of  Australia.   
112 Commonwealth Ombudsman Act 1976 (Act No. 181 of 1976 as amended). 
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Opportunity Commission investigates and reports to the Minister on human 
rights concerns.113  
 
These three agencies do not release their reports directly to the public. The 
Auditor-General’s report is first tabled in both houses of Parliament.114 
Similarly, the findings of HREOC and of the Ombudsman only become public 
when being tabled in Parliament.115 The Human Rights Commissioner, who 
conducts regular visits to all immigration detention centres, conducts the 
investigations without  making public statements about these visits, “but will 
advise DIMIA [sic] in writing of any human rights’ issues, should that be 
necessary”.116 Similar arrangements exist for reports issued by the 
Ombudsman. During the investigations by the three bodies, there is a 
consultative process with the government, which allows the government to 
take remedial action before the final report is released. As a consequence, the 
reports by these agencies often state that the government has already acted on 
recommendations to improve policy delivery. These investigators tend to work 
quietly behind the scenes and focus on better outcomes, rather than 
confronting the government.  
 
One may assume from the discussion in this section so far that the roles of the 
HREOC and the Ombudsman are relatively apolitical, due to requirement for a 
consultative process with government before the release of finings. However, 
there is some evidence that the interaction of the Howard government with the 
Ombudsman and the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission 
show how the government resorted to legal rationalism in order to curtail the 
investigative force of both statutory bodies. The first clue comes from the 
language of the website of both agencies. Key words on the Human Rights and 
                                            
113 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act. Commonwealth Consolidated 
Acts (1986). Section 11 (f). 
114 Auditor-General Act. Commonwealth Consolidated Acts (1997). Section 18. 
115 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986. Section 46. 
116 Human Rights and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (2005, 18 October). 
Human Rights Commissioner Visits Baxter Immigration Detention Facility (Media Release).  
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Equal Opportunity Commission and Ombudsman sites are “investigate”, 
“advise”, “administer”, “educate”, “negotiate”, “persuade”, “resolve”. 
Information on the Ombudsman website stipulates that the Ombudsman 
neither issues directives nor makes legally binding decisions.117 The 
Ombudsman endeavours, according to the Website, to improve administrative 
practices by way of “negotiation and persuasion”, but may make formal 
recommendations to government. This reporting practice makes it all the more 
remarkable when open confrontations occur between the investigators.  
 
Despite the need for diplomatic language and a consultative process, 
Ombudsman reports are not immune from criticism by the Howard 
government. For instance, although conceding that the Ombudsman’s Own 
Motion Investigation investigated seventy cases, Philip Ruddock said the report 
was “unbalanced” because the Ombudsman did not follow an appropriate 
consultation process.118 Not only does such comment ignore the substantive 
issues raised by the cited Ombudsman report. The Minister’s comment also 
ignores that legislation requires that the Ombudsman first, informs the relevant 
government department that an investigation is being conducted, and second, 
that the Minister receives a copy of the report.119 With such extensive process, 
it is difficult to follow Minister Ruddock’s comment on Lateline that the 
Ombudsman did not appropriately consult with Parliament. Similarly, in 2004, 
the Immigration Minister refused to accept the findings of the HREOC 
inquiry, A Last Resort?.120 Instead, the Howard government alleged unreliable 
methodology and historical irrelevance of the report to dispute the validity of 
                                            
117, Commonwealth Ombudsman. (2001). What We Do. [Website]. Commonwealth of  
Australia.   
118 References for the Ombudsman report and Philip Ruddock’s criticism: Commonwealth 
Ombudsman. (2001). Report of an Own Motion Investigation into the Department of 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs' Immigration Detention Centres; Lateline [ABC 
Television Broadcast]. (2001, 2 March). Ruddock Disappointed with 'Unbalanced' 
Ombudsman’s Report. Reporter: Tony Jones.  
119 Commonwealth of  Australia, Ombudsman Act 1976. Sections 15(2) and 15(6)  
120 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. A Last Resort? National Inquiry into 
Children in Immigration Detention.  
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the findings.121 As discussed in the case studies, both reports identified 
systemic and ongoing problems with the mandatory detention regime.  
 
Such confrontations, however, occurred before the politicisation of refugee 
issues that were discussed in the case studies. Already, the Ombudsman has 
been restricted from giving “unsolicited advice” to people who were detained 
inside immigration detention centres.122 In August 1999, the Howard 
government curtailed the activities of the Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission. Fred Argy suggests that at that time, the 
government passed legislation that redefined and downgraded HREOC’s role 
to an advisory role with greater emphasis on educating individuals about 
human rights, rather than having a more forceful investigatory role.123 After 
these events that limited the power of official investigators, the Law Society 
warned that these changes removed the independence of HREOC.124 In the 
cited article, there was also the prediction that political interference may arise 
in cases where the government itself was party to the litigation, and may 
therefore be in a position to influence the outcome of such litigation. 
 
Despite these structural cutbacks, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission had retained its powers to “make an order” over a human rights 
issue.125 In 2004, three months before the release of A last Resort?, HREOC 
invoked these powers to intervene in court matters. The report, it will be 
recalled from the case studies, made compelling findings about the suffering of 
                                            
121 For criticism by government of the report cited in the previous footnote, see: Cynthia 
Banham, "Detention Policy Damned as Cruel to Children," Sydney Morning Herald, 14 May 
2004; Meaghan Shaw, "Release Children, Report Says," Age, 14 May 2004; PM [ABC 
Radio Broadcast]. (2004, 13 May). Vanstone Critical of Human Rights Commission Report. 
Reporters: Mark Colvin, Louise Yaxley;  Amanda Vanstone and Philip Ruddock. (2004, 13 
May). HREOC Inquiry into Children in Immigration Report Tabled (Media Release, number 
VPS 068/04. 
122 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report 1998-1999. 
123 Fred Argy, "Arm's Length Policy-Making: The Privatisation of Economic Policy.," in 
Institutions on the Edge? Capacity for Governance., ed. Michael Keating, John Wanner, and 
Patrick Weller (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2000) pp. 109-10. 
124 Ronnit Redman and George Williams, "Weaker Protections Rejected," Law Society 
Journal 41, no. 6 2003 : (2003): p. 64. 
125 Under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1997. 
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children in immigration detention. Although the Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission was compelled by legislation “to settle the matter by 
way of conciliation”, HREOC took the view that a conciliatory approach was 
“inappropriate” in this investigation, and formally reported the matter to the 
Attorney-General.126 Former Immigration Minister Philip Ruddock, who had 
ministerial responsibility when most of the findings of alleged human rights 
breaches occurred, had become federal Attorney-General. To his credit, 
Ruddock gave permission for HREOC to intervene.   
 
HREOC lodged its request to the High Court to intervene in a case that was 
already before the court, in an attempt to secure the release of four children 
from immigration detention.127 HREOC submitted that the immigration 
detention of the four children under consideration in this case was punitive 
and therefore unconstitutional.128 HREOC also submitted that the impact of 
such detention on the children went beyond what was “reasonably necessary” 
and argued that the High Court should take into account the severely adverse 
effects of detention on these children.129 Therefore, HREOC argued in the 
submission cited above that the government should release these children. In 
the following week, HREOC announced that it had been granted permission 
to challenge the detention of children in the High Court.130 
 
But when the case was heard eight months later, all seven High Court judges 
unanimously dismissed the appeal by HREOC. Justice McHugh pointed out 
that Parliament had the authority to pass special laws for “aliens” and that the 
legislators did not intend immigration detention to be “punitive” and to punish 
                                            
126 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. A Last Resort? National Inquiry into 
Children in Immigration Detention, p. 28. 
127 Applicants M276/2003, Ex Parte - Re Woolley & ANOR [2003] HCATRANS 445 (31 
October 2003). (2003). 
128 Human Rights and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (2004, 28 January). 
Submission of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Seeking Leave to 
Intervene. High Court of Australia, Melbourne Office of the Registry, M 276 of 2003.  
129 Ibid., paragraphs 7a, c, d. 
130 Human Rights and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (2004, 3 February). 
HREOC Intervenes in Challenge to Immigration Detention of Children (Media Release).  
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the children.131 Had the court accepted the submission by  the Human Rights 
and Equal Opportunity Commission that the detention of the four children 
went beyond what was “reasonably necessary” for administrative purposes, the 
courts may have had to consider the legality of detaining the children under 
such circumstances. However, the judges disagreed with this assertion and 
found that the legislative intention of immigration detention was “protective” 
of Australia, in that it was designed “to prevent unlawful non-citizens, 
including children, from entering the Australian community”, and not to 
punish them.132 The court also ruled that the effects of detention on these four 
children did not constrain Parliament from exercising this “alien power”.133  
 
Effectively, the ruling meant that the High Court disagreed with HREOC’s 
submission that the court should take into account the damaging effect of 
detention on the mental health of the children, when considering an order to 
effect their release. The example discussed in the previous paragraph gives a 
unique twist to the influence of legal rationalism in institutional practices. On 
the one hand, permission from the Attorney-General to the Human Rights and 
Equal Opportunity Commission set up a forum for the HREOC to argue its 
case directly in court without political interference in the High Court. The 
unanimous decision of the seven judges to reject the HREOC submission 
indicates that, no matter what the human rights issues pertaining to detention, 
such issues would be irrelevant because the stated purposes of the legislators 
did not convey such intent. The case is discussed again in the next chapter, in 
the context of an argument that this is an example of the dominance of 
migration law over other basis law. Here, I wish to highlight that the court 
decision is one example of the convergence of institutional practices with the 
political framing of legal rationalism.  
 
                                            
131 Re Woolley; Ex Parte Applicants M276/2003 by Their Next Friend Gs [2004] HCA 49. 
(High Court of Australia, 2004), Justice McHugh,  paragraphs 43 and 44. 
132 Ibid., Justice McHugh, paragraph 115. 
133 Ibid., Justice Gummow, paragraph 165. 
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These institutional practices also corroborate Poggi’s work of how 
governments achieve not only legal, but also public legitimation by working 
through a structure in Coalition democratic states.134 Poggi identifies that 
governments (the “ruling party”) exert control by prioritising and allocating 
resources, and set directives through the administrative and bureaucratic 
apparatuses charged with implementation. In the end, it is the structure that 
confirms policy and institutional practices, and this confers legitimation to the 
workings of governments. Poggi argues that the legitimating aspect of state 
structure is an expectation “made manifest through the institutionalisation of 
opposition that policy formation does not express the higher wisdom of an 
unchallengeable power”.135 Accordingly, there is considerable structural 
capacity to accommodate other views, which further confers strength and 
legitimacy to the formation of public policy. This suggests a large potential for 
human agency to achieve structural change and, once such has been achieved, 
the resulting practices become a powerful tool of legal and public legitimation.  
 
Another example, which occurred after the timeframe of the case studies, 
needs to be included because the watered-down structure of accountability 
protected the Howard government from the political impact of adverse 
findings. As was the case with allegations of child abuse and neglect that were 
discussed in the case studies pertaining to Woomera and children in detention, 
two incidents of incorrect detention under migration legislation also were first 
aired by “non-official” sources. Another similarity was that the government 
continued to deny the allegations, until the “non-official” evidence and the 
accompanying media pressure persuaded the government to order a 
parliamentary investigation.  
 
As 2004 drew to a close and the Howard government prepared to deport the 
Bakhtiyari family, the media reported allegations that an Australian woman was 
                                            
134 Poggi, The State. Its Nature, Development and Prospects, pp. 31-32. 
135 Ibid., p. 56. 
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inappropriately detained under immigration law. Within weeks, there were 
reports that the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs had 
deported another woman, who was an Australian citizen. When the 
government called the Palmer Inquiry, it commissioned a non-public 
investigation and specified that the findings should not be made public, but 
later gave permission for publication. As has happened in the Flood Inquiry and 
the Ombudsman’s Own Motion Investigation in 2001, the political impact was 
offset by improvements that had already taken place before the findings were 
released.  
 
The Palmer Report investigated the detention of Cornelia Rau, and also released 
initial findings into the deportation of Vivian Alvarez.136  Ms Rau had 
Permanent Resident Status, and Ms Alvarez was an Australian citizen. 
Therefore, visa requirements under immigration law did not apply to them. 
Mick Palmer identified a Kafkaesque Department of Immigration and 
Multicultural Affairs as the main culprit in both cases. Palmer found that “a 
clear ‘disconnect’ between policy development … and operational 
requirements” have “created an environment in which people are unwilling to 
accept ownership of matters beyond their immediate responsibility, regardless 
of the importance of the matter and the obvious need for continuity”.137 
Furthermore, the report identified “a culture preoccupied with process and 
rule-driven operational practice”, “a strongly hierarchical, process-motivated, 
bureaucratic organisational structure” with “a high degree of vertical control”, 
consisting of “arrangements that constrain, rather than enable, effective 
management action”.138 After the blunder, the Howard government increased 
the investigative powers of the Ombudsman, but not those of the Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. However, Ombudsman 
investigations are slow, and results often come to light after the concern for an 
                                            
136 Mick Palmer. (2005, July). Inquiry into the Circumstances of the Immigration Detention of 
Cornelia Rau. Commonwealth of Australia.  
137 Ibid., p. 165. 
138 Ibid., p. 166-67. 
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issue has dissipated. Eighteen months after the Rau issue emerged, the 
completion of 248 cases of wrongful detention under immigration law was still 
awaiting completion.139 
 
Ongoing complaints about the policy to mandatorily detain refugees are not 
unique to the Howard government, and also go back to the time before 
privatisation. The adverse effects of the policy on the mental and physical 
health of detainees, which has been discussed in Case Study 2 — A special case: 
Children in Detention and in Case Study 3 — Detention in the Desert: Woomera, also 
occurred in earlier times.140 Neither was violence in detention centres limited to 
one particular timeframe or administrative system.141 Privatisation in some 
areas actually brought about improved services and better levels of detainee 
satisfaction.142 This improvement, however, was only a temporary phase. 
Under the Howard government, the spate of reports from the Human Rights 
and Equal Opportunity Commission about human rights concerns occurred in 
1997, 2002, and 2004.143 An increasing number of complaints from detainees in 
part motivated an earlier HREOC inquiry, that pre-dates privatisation, and also 
prompted a later inquiry by the Ombudsman under the new system.144 The 
2000-2001 Ombudsman Annual Report also raised concerns about the 
treatment of detainees.145 The recurrence of similar allegations over time, under 
different commercial contractors, suggests that the problems are systemic to 
the detention system.  
                                            
139 Andra Jackson, "List of Wrongful Detention Cases Grows," Age, 18 August 2006. 
140 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. (1998, 11 May). Those Who've Come 
across the Seas. Detention of Unauthorized Arrivals. p. 218 
141 Ibid., p. 222. 
142 Commonwealth Ombudsman.(1999, September). Commonwealth Ombudsman Annual 
Report, 1998-1999.  
143 For the respective years, see: Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. (1998). 
Immigration Detention: Human Right's Commissioner's 1998-1999 Review; Human Rights 
and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (2002). A Report on Visits to Immigration 
Detention Facilities by the Human Rights Commissioner 2001; Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission. (2004, April). A Last Resort? National Inquiry into Children in 
Immigration Detention. 
144 Human Rights and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Those Who've Come 
across the Seas. Detention of Unauthorized Arrivals; Commonwealth Ombudsman. Report 
of an Own Motion Investigation into the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs' 
Immigration Detention Centres, p. 2. 
145 Commonwealth Ombudsman. Commonwealth Ombudsman Annual Report 2000-2001.  
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A “much better” colonisation? 
 
This chapter would not be complete without discussing how the Howard 
government responded to some adverse findings that came from “official” 
channels. The Ombudsman identified ongoing problems with record-keeping 
and reporting to outside agencies in the 1998-1999 Annual Report, and the 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs agreed with the 
recommendations and promised to implement them.146 Later, the Ombudsman 
reported that DIMA had improved “both the general administration of 
programs and the handling of complaints”.147 In 2004, however, the 
Ombudsman Annual Report once again made recommendations for 
“appropriate record keeping” and “further training of detention officers”.148  
 
Emerging problems are often framed as indicators of a need for further 
training. A 1998 audit report stated that DIMA staff who worked in remote 
locations needed training, and DIMA agreed to provide this.149 Amid 
complaints that emerged from the detention centres during the timeframe of 
the case studies, recommendations were made that “all ACM staff working in 
detention centres should undergo cultural awareness training”.150 The cited 
report also recommended “comprehensive training in cultural awareness and 
guidance to deal with issues of racism, sexism and religious intolerance”.151 
                                            
146 Commonwealth Ombudsman. Commonwealth Ombudsman Annual Report, 1998-1999, 
p. 54. 
147 Commonwealth Ombudsman. Commonwealth Ombudsman Annual Report 2002-2003, 
p. 53. 
148 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Commonwealth Ombudsman Annual Report 2003-2004, 
p. 52. 
149 Australian National Audit Office. (1998). The Management of Boat People, paragraphs 
3.30 and 3.31, pp. 27-28. 
150 Commonwealth Ombudsman. Report of an Own Motion Investigation into the 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs' Immigration Detention Centres, 
recommendation 9, p. 8. 
151 Philip Flood. 2001, February. Report of Inquiry into Immigration Detention Procedures. 
Commonwealth of Australia, paragraph 10.30.2, p. 42. 
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There were also “delays in establishing and training staff in ACM policies”.152 
Whilst there is a need for initial and ongoing training in working situations, 
there also seems to be a pattern of pointing to “training” as a remedy that does 
not solve problems in the long-term. Recommendations for “training”, whilst 
not disputed here, may also reflect a “diplomatic” way of masking other issues. 
 
There could be a difference within different areas of DIMA. The Australian 
National Audit Office analysed a stratified random sample of 209 completed 
applications for protection visas from a pool of 3,077 cases lodged between 
July 2002 and June 2003.153 The sampling, which was conducted to assess the 
efficacy of the decision-making process, found an overall “high” standard, with 
99 and 92 per cent efficacy for some assessment parameters.154 Although there 
were “administrative shortcomings”, the report found that training needs of 
decision-makers for Protection Visas were met and well structured.155 Audit 
reports thus produced different findings in those areas of the Department of 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs that deal with the detention of refugees. 
This finding contrasts with the training deficits repeatedly identified for staff of 
DIMA’s Compliance branch and those employed by the providers of detention 
services identified in the reports already discussed. Similarly, the finding that 
DIMA’s Refugee and Humanitarian (Onshore) Program has clearly identifiable 
targets to achieve, and a quality control program suggests a competent and 
efficient government department.156 The findings for the onshore 
“humanitarian” assessments contrasts with findings for the onshore refugee 
assessment process. For onshore refugee processing, the Ombudsman 
recommended that “DIMA ensure that the number and use of trained staff for 
processing detainee applications is adequate”.157  
                                            
152 Ibid., paragraph 6.25, p. 27. 
153 Australian National Audit Office. (2004). Management of the Processing of Asylum 
Seekers, paragraph 2.6, p. 30. 
154 Ibid., paragraph 6, p. 12. 
155 Ibid., paragraphs 9 and 10, p. 13. 
156 Ibid., paragraphs 13 and 14, p. 40. 
157 Commonwealth Ombudsman. Report of an Own Motion Investigation into the 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs' Immigration Detention Centres, 
recommendation 2, p. 5. 
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However, it was a different matter when the Department of Immigration and 
Multicultural Affairs dealt with people, not their refugee applications. These 
events were repeatedly documented as involving less than efficient ways of 
handling refugees, as evidenced by findings of several Ombudsman reports, 
the Flood Inquiry and more recently, the Palmer Inquiry. All these reports 
have been discussed in this thesis. Rather than training needs, the findings may 
suggests a less than ideal working culture. This may be due to the repeated 
framing of refugees as illegals and threats to Australian sovereignty, an 
attribution directly encouraged by the dominance of a rule-driven culture of 
legal rationalism.  
 
Under the rules of legal rationalism, policy shortcomings are framed as a 
requirement for training in policies, procedures, or multicultural matters. One 
consequence of this however, is that people responsible for the policy avoid 
taking full responsibility, and identification of systemic problems are also 
avoided by changing areas of jurisdiction or by identifying faults at the lower 
levels of the hierarchy. Under these rules, ministerial accountability can be 
avoided as long as no government minister or legislator states in public that the 
policies are specifically designed to harm people, and instead pays lip-service to 
a humanitarian policy. For example, during a media interview after the release 
of the Ombudsman report into the removal of Vivian Alvarez from Australia, 
Senator Vanstone did not accept that she was to blame. Nor did her 
predecessor Philip Ruddock, who was the Minister at the time of the detention 
of Ms Rau and Ms Alvarez. The Prime Minister said that Minister Vanstone 
should not take responsibility, because she was not in office at the time. He 
added: 
 
 if somebody in a remote part of a department makes a mistake, to automatically say 
that because of that mistake the minister has to resign would mean that, to be quite 
frank, ministers would be resigning all the time through no personal failing of their 
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own. If the minister is personally responsible for a failing or clearly has directed a 
course of conduct which brings about the failing then that’s another matter.158 
 
Yet the findings of official investigators suggest ongoing and systematic policy 
blunders. This thesis claims that these blunders were in part encouraged by the 
rule-driven ideology and circumstantial reasoning that manipulated the legal 
rules. This occurred in conjunction with an ongoing unwillingness to accept 
information about the policy that the rules, presented in neutral language, were 
concealing. The systemic way of preventing negative information from 
entering official records through the selective reporting of “incidents” and 
“exception-reporting” discussed in Case Study 3 — Detention in the Desert: 
Woomera are but two examples. Under the policy practices of legal rationalism, 
good legal-rational reporting and processing of information was being 
colonised by the practices of delay and clandestine policy delivery.  
 
Whilst the government did not accept that it was to blame, it did accept the 
findings of the Palmer Report. Immigration Minister Vanstone proposed to 
address the deficiencies in training and departmental culture by appointing 
several managers, and by replaced the secretary of the Department of 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. Many of the deficiencies would be 
addressed by training under the new leadership. Minister Vanstone’s media 
release announced in the light of poor training establishment of a College of 
Immigration Border Security and Compliance “for the training of DIMIA 
officers” that would generate several “much better” initiatives.159 The cited 
media release promised  “much better training of DIMIA staff”, “much better 
health and well being for detainees”, “much better information management”, 
“much better quality assurance and decision-making”, and a “much better 
focus on clients” in future. In August 2006, the Howard government 
announced the appointment of former Police Commissioner Mick Palmer, 
                                            
158 PM [ABC Radio Broadcast]. (2005, 7 October). Vanstone Not to Blame: Howard. 
Reporter: Alexandra Kirk.  
159 Amanda Vanstone. (2005, 6 October). Palmer Implementation Plan and Comrie Report 
(Media Release, number v 05119).   
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who also headed the investigation into the wrongful detention of Cornelia Rau, 
as the chair of the newly established College of Immigration.160 The 
professional background in law enforcement of the head of the new 
educational institution, together with the awarding of the detention contract to 
a company that is renowned for its world-wide expertise in managing prisons, 
suggests that the real focus may remain on the incarceration of people who 
have been framed as intruders. Detention as a primary commitment, however, 
is at odds with the images that come to mind when contemplating the “much 
better” focus on clients and detainee well-being that Immigration Minister 
Amanda Vanstone committed herself to during the adverse political publicity 
when the findings of the Palmer Report became known in July 2005.  
 
DIMA indicated resistance to the findings of Part B of an audit that was 
discussed in Case Study 3 — Detention in the Desert: Woomera and implied that its 
services were so unique that outsiders may not fully understand the processes 
involved: there was the claim “that it is not possible to define these 
requirements in simplified ways, and that it was a misconception that services, 
standards and reporting can be simply and inflexibly stated”.161 However, 
assessments and reports by professionals who are not part of DIMA are crucial 
to maintaining accountability, and this includes accountability in a court of law. 
If outsiders are kept at bay, there is no challenge to prevailing ideas; only full 
exposure to the ideology of legal rationalism. So far, the cumbersome rules 
within a closed system have kept it that way. The audit report cited above 
reports that DIMA acknowledged that reports were needed about the 
efficiency of detention services.162 Yet when the efficacy of the contract was 
assessed, DIMA indicated difficulties in how to quantify some measurable 
                                            
160 Author Unknown, "Palmer Heads Training Body," Sydney Morning Herald, 31 Aug 2006. 
161 Australian National Audit Office. (2004). Management of the Detention Centre Contracts 
— Part A. Performance Audit (Audit Report No. 54 2003–04). Department of Immigration 
and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs. Commonwealth of  Australia, paragraph 44. 
162 Ibid., paragraph 47. 
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indicators to the auditor.163 It would seem that not the rules, but their 
manipulation toward political goals, was the culprit. 
 
Based on the argument of this thesis that many of the problems arose from the 
skew of legal-rational rules for ideological and highly politicised purposes, it is 
unlikely that training will solve the problem. More training may be effective if it 
is accompanied by the appropriate use of legal rationality. Otherwise, the 
establishment of government-controlled training facilities is likely to build a 
bureaucracy that is more massive; one where a government minister has the 
power to override every decision. A more likely outcome is that, once the use 
of rules and regulations has been designated its proper place in the political 
process of exercising institutional power, training may be less of a problem 
than has been suggested. Training of personnel should be a matter of routine, 
not a standard recommendation of investigations that identify problems with 
the delivery of public policy.  
 
Under the statutory requirements for investigators to use diplomatic language 
and to negotiate with government before releasing their findings, coupled with 
a requirement to make non-enforceable recommendations and a potential 
threat of budget cuts after releasing unfavourable findings, “training needs” 
remains a euphemism for a void that becomes evident when legal rationalism 
has colonised other areas of legal rationality. There is no suggestion here that 
ongoing investigations by the Auditor-General, the Human Rights 
Commissioner and the Ombudsman should be removed from the process. 
There is, however, a suggestion that such process should be free of political 
manipulation. 
 
                                            
163 Ibid., paragraph 57. 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter enhances the findings of the case studies by bringing out the 
institutional factors that operated behind the façade of conducting refugee 
policy in a legal-rational manner. The structural changes, however, enhanced 
the practice of legal rationalism and therefore support the argument that the 
Howard government used the law as an instrumental tool. The government 
achieved these changes by utilising changes to the larger structure of the Public 
Service, and then adapting the institutions to drive the political process that 
was behind refugee policy. The legislative changes and changed allocation of 
resources led to greater government control, which further enhanced this 
process.  
 
Through the manipulation of legislation and the structure, the effectiveness of 
institutions for government accountability was weakened progressively, until 
almost all aspects of accountability for refugee policy were placed under 
effective control of one person: the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural 
Affairs. This retained the structure of clear accountability lines, but with 
restrictions on what could be reported and how and when this was to occur. It 
put the Howard government in a position to resist all inquiries, except those it 
approved of. This undermines meaningful participation in the public sphere, 
and thus further enhances legal rationalism, which, as argued in the case 
studies, relied on secrecy. Governments are expected to act politically and seek 
electoral approval to retain office at the next election. However, the danger of 
controlling legal rationality in a way that controls information about 
institutional practices according to their political saliency has set a dangerous 
precedent for democracy. There have been indications that this exercise of 
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legal rationalism was not absolute, but could be controlled by other legally 
rational processes. 
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This chapter explores how the institution of the law addressed tensions over 
the Howard government’s control of the policy process that, arguably, could 
be linked to the government’s framing practices of refugee issues. The delivery 
of public policy and the implementation of social change may be perceived as a 
process where public officials’ exercise of power has been conferred upon 
them. To Poggi, power within state structure is expressed as legislation; a view 
borne out throughout this thesis. If one accepts this statement, then one may 
perceive of elected politicians as agents of change, who exercise power in a 
space where politics and the law cannot be separated. Moreover, government 
officials also write the law that govern their policies. For Poggi, since 
politicians write the law, the law is therefore politicised and has an ideological 
charge.1 The relationship between government and the law is thus never 
neutral, but is an exercise of power that achieves political outcomes. In Poggi’s 
words, 
 
increasingly the state comes to employ juridical instruments (from the constitutional 
charter to the statute to the administrative warning to the judicial sentence) in order 
to perform the most diverse political tasks. It is by means of law that the state 
                                            
1 Gianfranco Poggi, The State. Its Nature, Development and Prospects (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1990) p. 29. 
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articulates its own organisation into organs, agencies, authorities … The state thus 
‘speaks the law’ in almost all aspects of its functioning.2 
 
If one extends Poggi’s view for a moment, then it is plausible that the rules and 
procedures that accompany changes to refugee policy in Australia also contain 
political bias. The exercise of power to achieve political goals by changing the 
law is therefore systemic to the structure of the state and does not constitute 
legal rationalism. Instead, it was argued that legal rationalism consists of a 
rhetorical recourse to legal rationality that masks an ideology behind these 
changes in two ways: First, legal rationalism consisted of a fetishised obedience 
to legal rules; an ideological representation that reduced the legal-rational 
constructs of the law to blind obedience to the rules. Second, it was argued 
that legal rationalism masked the exercise of political expediency, without 
necessarily revealing other, often unstated, purposes behind these rules. In this 
way, legal rationalism emerged as an ideology that drives the use and direction 
of legitimately conferred power, rather than the government’s use of such 
power per se.  
 
This chapter addresses the political dimensions of the exercise of power 
through the law, and the scope of political process to manipulate such power. 
Based on the findings of a divergence of judicial practices with the ideology of 
legal rationalism, it will be argued that legal rationalism has become part of the 
institutional practices of legal system, and that legal rationality has become 
colonised by legal rationalism. The analytical descriptions of legal rationalism in 
this chapter are much more subtle than the clear connection between practices 
and legal rationalism that was argued in the case studies. Nevertheless, the 
analysis in this chapter points to an intrusion of legal rationalism from political 
framing practices into institutional practices.  
 
                                            
2 Ibid. 
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The law, judiciary and parliament 
 
This section introduces the relationship between the judiciary and parliament 
under the Westminster system: a type of government that originated in 
England and was subsequently incorporated into the Australian Constitution. 
Under the separation of powers doctrine of the Westminster system, 
institutional power is split between an elected parliament and a judiciary that is 
not elected and operates independently of parliament. As will be seen shortly, 
this structural relationship between the law and parliament has the potential to 
create a tension between both institutions. Such tension is distinct from any 
structural tension that may be generated by the framing practices of legal 
rationalism, should they exist. Nevertheless, the separation of powers doctrine 
is relevant to this analysis, because this doctrine shapes and defines the 
structure where public policy is practiced and where power is exercised.  
 
Under the Westminster system, the separation of powers doctrine is designed 
to ensure that parliament works in accountable manner. This doctrine guards 
against a concentration of power in the hands of parliament, and against both 
parliament and the judiciary “working in tandem”.3 What, then, are the powers 
that this doctrine endeavours to separate? Political analyst Haigh Patapan 
identifies two locations of power that are in constant tension within the 
structure of the state: first, the judiciary guards against the possibility of 
parliament acting illegally. 4 Tension comes about, according to Patapan, from 
the expectation that an elected parliament implements the will of the people 
without hindrance from the judiciary.5 Second, Patapan identifies a paradox in 
                                            
3 Robert Hughes and Geoff Leane, Australian Legal Institutions. Principles, Structure and 
Organisation. (South Melbourne: FT Law & Tax, 1996) p. 167. 
4 Haigh Patapan, Judging Democracy. The New Politics of the High Court of Australia. 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000) p. 152. 
5 Ibid., p. 190. 
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this structural relationship between both institutions: only when power is 
exercised, can it be separated. Patapan writes: “each independent branch needs 
to be powerful enough to protect itself from a takeover by other branches”, 
and that “independence is secured only by means of mutual checks”.6  
 
In this system, parliament is known as the legislature, the bureaucracy as the 
Executive, and the legal system as the judicial powers. Spencer Zifcak explains 
that under Australia’s Constitution, there is no strict separation between the 
legislature and the executive, but there must be clear separation between the 
legislature and the judiciary.7 Thus, ministers are part of the legislature and of 
the executive. Zifcak concedes that, whilst the power of parliamentarians as 
law-makers does not extend to exercising judicial functions that may result in 
imprisonment, such functions are not clearly separated when it comes to non-
citizens and asylum seekers. Here is a brief outline of the difference between 
these three powers: 
 
Executive power is the power to administer the law. It may include, for instance, the 
initiation of law, the maintenance of order, and the promotion of social and 
economic welfare. It is characterised by the development of policy and the 
management of public organisations. Judicial power is the power to determine 
disputed questions of fact or law, in accordance with the law laid down by the 
parliament.8 
 
Within this separate, rather than hierarchically superior, power structure the 
courts exercise their role of the judicial oversight of parliament: first, through 
judicial review in court cases. Second, the High Court has the authority to 
strike out parliamentary statutes that are constitutionally invalid.9 The overall 
responsibility for judicial oversight rests with the High Court; a court that 
ensures that governments act within the powers conferred upon them by the 
                                            
6 Ibid. p., 153. 
7 Spencer Zifcak, "Separation of Powers," Legaldate 17, no. 1 (2005): p. 6. 
8 Ibid., p. 5. 
9 Hughes and Leane, Australian Legal Institutions. Principles, Structure and Organisation, p. 
41. 
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Australian Constitution and thereby guards against arbitrary use of powers by 
governments.10 Judicial review gives to courts the power to determine if 
government officials have acted within the limits of the legal authority of their 
office.11 For this purpose, section 75 of the Constitution specifies that courts 
can issue writs and declarations.12 These constitutional powers of the legal 
system thus give certainty to social practices that occur within the context of 
public policy, safeguarded by judicial review under the doctrine of the 
separation of powers.  
 
Power is not static and the rules that determine its use change over time. One 
may, incorrectly, infer from the discussion on the separation of powers so far 
that a polemic, rather than a reciprocal, relationship exists between the law and 
parliament. The structural requirement to separate power does not necessarily 
imply a struggle for power. One can, however, anticipate that legal rationalism 
may provoke tensions when legislators barely disguise that the laws were 
written for political purposes, and will be implemented on a variable basis.   
 
Examples in Australia, where legislators have written statute law for political 
purposes, are as old as the Australian legal system. Mary Crock illustrates this 
in a discussion on the white Australia policy.13 Crock’s work just cited gives an 
example of how the political decision to keep non-white migrants out of 
Australia became part of the statutes and institutional practices that were 
operational for the first fifty years of the Australian legal Federation. 
Accordingly, about five years prior to Federation, the English Privy Council 
denied royal assent on the Coloured Racial Immigration Restriction Bill 1896, 
because the proposed legislation was couched in overtly racist exclusionary 
language. Crock continues that, although the Immigration Restriction Act 1901 
                                            
10 Robin Creyke and John McMillan, Control of Government Action. Text, Cases & 
Commentary (Chatswood, NSW: LexisNexis, Butterworths, 2005) p. 39. 
11 Ibid., Paragraph 2.2.1, p. 39. 
12 Mary Crock, Immigration and Refugee Law in Australia (Sydney: The Federation Press, 
1998) p. 277. 
13 Ibid., pp. 13-20. 
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was also written for the purpose of preventing entry to Australia on the basis 
of race, this Act did not contain racist language. Legal exclusion from entering 
Australia was much more subtle: The Immigration Restriction Act 1901 introduced 
the dictation test; a test that appeared objective, but was set up so that 
uneducated non-white people would fail. Failure to pass this test not only 
meant refusal to enter Australia. People who failed could also be deported; 
even if they had lived in Australia for several years. The dictation test was part 
of the legislation until the passing of the Migration Act 1958. Crock concludes 
this story with the observation that the High Court upheld the constitutionality 
of parliamentary legislation by interpreting the law in a way that allowed 
parliament to detain under the aliens power and the head of foreign affairs 
power conferred by the Constitution, which “ensured that the migration cases 
have been firmly isolated from debates about implied rights in the 
Constitution”.14  
 
When applied to this thesis, the examples cited in the previous paragraph give 
insight into the legally conferred power that the Howard government had at its 
disposal to implement its framing practices with the assistance of the law. The 
above example also shows how non-racist language established the legal rules 
for institutional practices on the basis of race for almost six decades. This, I 
argue, is an example of legal rationalism: The neutral wording of the dictation 
test legitimated government practices that were firmly grounded in statute law, 
whilst masking the political ideology of racial exclusion that was driving the 
legislation. Leaving aside inferences about racism, one can see a similarity 
between the Immigration Restriction Act 1901 and the contemporary refugee law 
of the Migration Act 1958 with its amendments by the Howard government: 
both Acts, whilst purporting to regulate the rules for migration to Australia, 
were actually instruments of exclusion. The commonality of both statutes lies 
in masking exclusionary policies by raising the legal barriers to enter Australia.  
 
                                            
14 Ibid., p. 20. 
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The Migration Act that excluded onshore refugees between 1999 and 2003 did 
not nullify the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The case studies 
discussed a tension between the benefits of the refugee protection that flowed 
from the Convention and the barriers that the Migration Act posed to reaching 
those benefits. In his book, The Postnational Constellation, Jürgen Habermas 
identifies similar issues. Habermas identifies a tension “between the universal 
meaning of human rights and the local conditions of their realisation”.15 
Habermas explains this tension through the close relationship of human rights 
with morality. Accordingly, human rights have a basis in law and in morality, 
but they only protect the individual if the person belongs to the legal 
community of the nation state.  
 
Ari Brand’s discussion on the law adds another complexity to the debate:16 
Brand writes that, although the law expresses a moral order, it operates in 
instrumental fashion, as a “morally neutral” construct that becomes oriented 
toward its own goals, so that there is a difference between law and morality. 
One may infer from Brand’s work just cited that the law itself has “agency”, 
rather than the law-makers. This complexity, when applied to the discussion in 
this chapter that parliamentarians write the law, suggests that members of the 
Howard government are themselves drawn into a process that has an 
autonomous logic. In this process, the law, though it does not operate 
autonomously of the law-makers, nevertheless has its own logic that is distinct 
from the logic and autonomy of the law-makers. 
 
Without further exploring the relationship between law, morality and logic, one 
may infer from the previous two paragraphs that the law represents a codified 
expression of normative behaviour in society, and that normativity is 
channelled through the legal code. Hughes and Leane, in their discussion on 
                                            
15 Jürgen Habermas, "Remarks on Legitimation through Human Rights," in The Postnational 
Constellation and the Future of Democracy (Polity Press, Cambridge, in association with 
Blackwell Publications, Oxford., 2001) pp. 117-8. 
16 Arie Brand, The Force of Reason: An Introduction to Habermas' Theory of Communicative 
Action (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1990) p. 43. 
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Australian legal institutions, discuss how this close relationship between 
normativity and the law is expressed in determinations in court cases:17 Court 
cases are essentially arguments where two parties argue (“plead”) their 
opposing claims and judges adjudicate over these disputes by applying existing 
law to the arguments. In this sense, Hughes and Leane continue, the judges 
interpret, or “determine”, the will of parliament; a will that parliament has 
already expressed through the writing of the legal statutes. The power that is 
being separated in a Westminster democracy thus consists firstly, of writing the 
statutes, and secondly, of the power to definitively interpret what these statutes 
mean in practice.  
 
From the preceding discussion of the legal system within the structure of the 
state, and from Giddens’ prediction that framing practices create tensions 
within social structure, as noted in the introduction to this section, arises a 
consideration: if the framing practices of refugees by the Howard government 
generate structural tension, then evidence of such tension may be expected to 
surface in court cases where the delivery of refugee policy is contested. Legal 
rationalism, if it modifies institutional practices of the legal system, would be 
within this dividing line that separates the two powers that face each other in 
the court room: the framing practices that are evident in parliamentary 
legislation, and the interpretation of this legislation.  
 
 
The frame becomes legal precedent 
 
The Immigration Restriction Act 1901 was repealed half a century ago. Racist 
policy practices have since become illegal and court practices and legislation 
have changed considerably since the Federation of Australia. Nevertheless, the 
way in which the judiciary has interpreted this racist legislation established 
                                            
17 Hughes and Leane, Australian Legal Institutions. Principles, Structure and Organisation  
pp. 38-41. 
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about one hundred years of legal precedent within the Australian legal code. It 
will be noted in this section that the way in which judges have interpreted 
immigration legislation has varied considerably. It will be argued that the legal 
rationalist framing of refugees by the Howard government has found its way 
into court decisions pertaining to refugee matters that occurred between 1999 
and 2003. This is not to suggest that some judges have become legal 
rationalists themselves, but rather that their decisions have been swayed by the 
legal rationalism of the government.  
 
There are broad indicators that a change has occurred in judicial thought. Mary 
Crock observed a trend in the 1970s, where the High Court interpreted 
immigration law along the principles of international instruments.18 By 2001, 
however, this trend had changed. When confirming the legal right of the 
Howard government to deny entry of the Tampa into Australian waters, the 
High Court upheld the “principle of strict territoriality”, rather than 
interpreting the matter of entry of the rescued people on the principles of a 
humanitarian instrument.19 In 2004, the High Court ruled in the Behrooz case 
that mandatory detention was for administrative purposes and that such 
detention was voluntary.20 In another decision, the High Court ruled that 
immigration detention was not indefinite but prolonged, because the duration 
of detention depended on how well individuals co-operated with authorities to 
leave Australia.21 Let us briefly return to Chapter 2 — Showdown at Sea: The 
Tampa, to the time when the Tampa was inside Australian waters and the 
destination of the rescued refugees on board the ship was still unclear. The 
reason for repeating material that was already quoted in this thesis is that the 
same material gives rise to different arguments that each chapter addresses. 
The current chapter broadens the discussion and analyses the tension itself, 
                                            
18 Crock, Immigration and Refugee Law in Australia, p. 28. 
19 Mary Crock and Ben Saul, Future Seekers, Refugees and the Law in Australia 
(Annandale, NSW: Federation Press, 2002) p. 61. 
20 Tania Penovic, "The Separation of Powers. Lim and the 'Voluntary' Immigration Detention 
of Children," Alternative Law Journal 29, No 5 (2004): p. 226. 
21 Adiva Sifris and Tania Penovic, "Children in Immigration Detention. The Bakhtiyari Family 
in the High Court and Beyond," Alternative Law Journal 29, No. 5 (2004): p. 219. 
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and discusses some of the institutional mechanisms that have absorbed this 
tension. However, such broad consideration has one narrow purpose: to ask if 
this legal rationalism thesis still has merit when the hypothesis that the Howard 
government justified its refugee policies by making rhetorical recourse to the 
law is placed in another context. This context, as alluded to at the beginning of 
this chapter, is the space where the Judiciary and Parliament contest the 
boundaries of legitimate state power.  
 
When both the Prime Minister and the Immigration Minister argued for 
passing of the Border Protection Bill, they indicated that the proposed legislation 
would transform institutional practices beyond the Tampa: John Howard said 
that, whilst the legality of the government’s actions with regard to the Tampa 
was not in doubt, the new legislation was necessary, because “the law is often 
an unpredictable thing”.22 One day later, Philip Ruddock added that the 
legislation would not only clear up matters of legality, but also remove “the 
possibility to argue that there may be a case for doubt”.23 It is now time to 
discuss the uncertainty of the institutional practices to which the Prime 
Minister and the Immigration Minister referred. This uncertainty was about 
how the judiciary may apply the new legislation.  
 
Academic lawyers Tania Penovic and Adiva Sifris discuss this changing trend 
in judicial decision-making in three articles that were published in a special 
edition of the Alternative Law Journal.24 Penovic’s and Sifris’ description of the 
chronology of this change is not inconsistent with the argument of this chapter 
that legal rationalism has directly contributed to changing institutional 
                                            
22 John Howard. (2001, 29 August). Border Protection Bill 2001: Second Reading. 
Parliamentary Speech, House of Representatives. Official Hansard. Commonwealth of 
Australia, p. 30,569. 
23 Philip Ruddock. (2001, 30 August). Matters of Public Importance: Illegal Immigration: MV 
Tampa. Parliamentary Speech, House of Representatives. Official Hansard. Commonwealth 
of Australia, p. 30,682. 
24 Penovic, "The Separation of Powers. Lim and the 'Voluntary' Immigration Detention of 
Children."; Adiva Sifris, "Children in Immigration Detention. The Bakhtiyari Family in the 
Family Court," Alternative Law Journal 29, no. 5 (2004); Sifris and Penovic, "Children in 
Immigration Detention. The Bakhtiyari Family in the High Court and Beyond." 
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practices: the argument that the institution of law, in the politicised context of 
refugee policy, increasingly resembled the framing of refugees by the Howard 
government as illegal intruders and as a threat to Australian sovereignty.  
 
Two cases discussed by Penovic and Sifris, known as Lam and Teoh, are not 
refugee cases. However, the cases give insight into the reasoning by the 
judiciary only five years before the Howard government introduced major 
changes to its refugee policies from 1999 onwards. Mr Teoh had committed an 
offence that  incurred the penalty of removal from Australia. In April 1995, the 
High Court ruled that Mr Teoh was allowed to remain in Australia because his 
removal would not be in the best interest of his children. 25  Sifris comments 
that the decision to allow Mr Teoh to remain in Australia came from 
Australia’s ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1989, and that 
this ratification created “a ‘legitimate expectation’ that the convention would 
be taken into account in the decision-making process”.26 Eight years later, Sifris 
continues, “the High Court was critical of the ‘legitimate expectation’ approach 
in Teoh”.  
 
Sifris cites the second case, the Lam case, where the court judgement differed 
markedly. Not unlike Mr Teoh, Mr Lam had also committed an offence that 
resulted in the cancellation of his Australian visa. Sifris writes that in 2003, 
eight years after Teoh, several judges were critical of  Mr Lam’s application to 
the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs that his children 
would be disadvantaged if Mr Lam were ordered to leave Australia.27 Justices 
Gleeson, McHugh and Gummow stated that although Mr Lam did not claim 
that the Teoh case had set a precedent for his (Lam’s) claim, Mr Lam’s 
                                            
25 Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Ah Hin Teoh F. C. No. 95/013 [1995] 
HCA 20; (1995) 128 ALR 353, (1995) 69 ALJR 423, (1995) EOC 92-696 (Extract), (1995) 
183 CLR 273  International Law - Immigration (7 April 1995). (1995). 
26 Sifris, "Children in Immigration Detention. The Bakhtiyari Family in the Family Court," p. 
216. 
27 Ibid., p. 219. 
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submission may imply such claim.28 Some judges were critical of Mr Lam’s 
submission, because the legislation that applied to the Lam and Teoh cases had 
changed. The joint judgement by Justices McHugh and Gummow indicate how 
legislation sets the boundaries of judicial power: 
 
One consideration is that, under the Constitution (s 61), the task of the Executive is 
to execute and maintain statute law which confers discretionary powers upon the 
Executive. It is not for the judicial branch to add to or vary the content of those 
powers by taking a particular view of the conduct by the Executive of external affairs 
… Rather, it is for the judicial branch to declare and enforce the limits of the power 
conferred by statute upon administrative decision-makers, but not, by reference to 
the conduct of external affairs, to supplement the criteria for the exercise of that 
power.29 
 
Such is the status of legislation within state structure, even if legislation was 
written for narrow politicised purposes, as has been argued in the case studies. 
Creyke and McMillan describe how judges pronounce judgement on points of 
law: judges decide if and how legislation applies to a particular case, and also 
interpret what the legislation means in a particular case.30 Accordingly, 
parliament writes the law and the courts receive the authority of what they can 
decide from such legislation. For the discussion in this thesis, these legal 
matters raise the question of how judges determine on points of law where the 
law has been written for narrow political purposes. This takes the discussion 
into the area of judicial interpretation that, combined with the power to make 
definitive determinations, gives to judges considerable power to influence the 
workings of parliament through the institution of law.  
 
As noted in the case studies, Australian statute law does not give a special 
status to uninvited refugees. This has always been the position of the Howard 
                                            
28 Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex Parte Lam [2003] HCA 6 (12 
February 2003). (High Court of Australia, 2003), paragraph 7; Ibid., Justice Gleeson, 
paragraph 28;  Justices McHugh and Gummow, paragraph 65.  
29 Ibid., Justices McHugh and Gummow, paragraph 102. 
30 Creyke and McMillan, Control of Government Action. Text, Cases & Commentary, 
paragraph 2.3.2, p. 56. 
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government, as indicated in this speech by Immigration Minister Philip 
Ruddock to Parliament:  
 
Let me affirm that we do have a policy of detention for people who arrive in 
Australia unlawfully and clandestinely, to ensure that they are available for processing 
and for removal. It is a policy to achieve that public interest outcome. It is not 
punitive. It is humane. We do not detain refugees. We do, however, detain people, 
some of whom make asylum claims.31 
 
The legislation the Minster refers to is the Migration Act. This legislation 
established a visa system, and refugees were increasingly viewed in relation to 
valid travel documents.32 The gradual change of institutional practices, where 
the power of oversight moved from the judiciary to the Immigration Minister, 
was discussed in Chapter 5 — Bureaucratic Process and Ministerial Power. Nick 
Poynder argues that this process depended on a ruling by the High Court that 
the Executive had powers to bring about this change.33 Accordingly, this 
occurred when the High Court ruled in the Lim case in 1992 that Parliament 
was authorised under the Constitution to detain people. Mary Crock notes the 
impact on refugees during this change, where the Migration Act prevailed over 
earlier UN treaties:34 the courts considered asylum seekers “a mere subset of 
unlawful non-citizens”, so that the lawfulness of administrative detention 
under a system of bureaucratic decision-making “neatly removes from 
consideration anything personal to a litigant”. Crock concludes her discussion 
by arguing for “a much more contextual approach to both the interpretation 
                                            
31 Philip Ruddock. (2001, 21 June).  Questions without Notice: Illegal Immigrants: Detention 
Policy. Parliamentary Speech, House of Representatives. Official Hansard. Commonwealth 
of Australia, p. 28,333.  
32 Jim Mc Kiernan, "The Political Imperative: Defend, Deter, Detain," in Protection or 
Punishment? The Detention of Asylum Seekers in Australia, ed. Mary Crock (The 
Federation Press, Armadale, NSW, 1993) p. 4.  
33 Nick Poynder, "Human Rights Law and the Detention of Asylum Seekers." In Protection or 
Punishment. The Detention of Asylum Seekers in Australia., ed. Mary Crock (Armadale, 
NSW: The Federation Press, 1993) p. 61. 
34 Mary Crock, ""You Have to Be Stronger Than Razor Wire": Legal Issues Relating to the 
Detention of Refugees and Asylum Seekers," Australian Journal of Administrative Law 10, 
no. 1 (2002): pp. 55-57. 
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and application of the law in cases involving the detention of asylum 
seekers”.35  
 
Tania Penovic perceives a double layer of tension that was generated by the 
new institutional practices, and resolved in the Lim case:36 first, only the courts 
have the power to detain people. Penovic continues that in Lim, the High 
Court decided that mandatory detention did not infringe on the separation of 
powers, provided that Parliament did not “exercise judicial power”. Judicial 
power is exercised when judges impose a custodial sentence. Second, Penovic 
continues, detention under orders from Parliament may infringe on the 
separation of powers doctrine. This tension was resolved when the High Court 
ruled that Parliament could detain non-citizens under the “aliens power” under 
section 51 of the Constitution: 
 
The detention must be reasonably capable of being seen as necessary for the 
purposes of removal or to enable a visa application to be made and considered. If 
detention was not limited to one of these alien power purposes, it would be punitive 
in character and violate the separation of powers.37  
 
One may infer from the above discussion of the papers by Poynder, Crock, 
and Penovic that the judiciary created a space in the legal system where 
Parliament conducted new institutional practices that refined the policy of 
mandatory detention. It is my assertion that legal rationalism later entered this 
space when the Howard government stretched the application of these rulings 
through legislative changes. First, these legislative changes directly affected 
refugees, as was discussed in the case studies. Second, and less publicised than 
the legislative changes to refugee policy, other changes limited government 
accountability, as was discussed in Chapter 5 — Bureaucratic Process and 
Ministerial Power. Through both sets of legislation there resulted, on the one 
                                            
35 Ibid., p. 62. 
36 Penovic, "The Separation of Powers. Lim and the 'Voluntary' Immigration Detention of 
Children," p. 222. 
37 Ibid. 
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hand, in greater powers for the Howard government to define the scope of its 
accountability, and second, through increasing parliamentary powers over 
people defined as “aliens”, a space was created within legal rationality for the 
ideology of legal rationalism to inform institutional practices.  
 
For example, Penovic writes that when the Lim case was heard, there was a 
time limit of 273 days on detention and that the High Court accepted that this 
time limit would “result in expeditious removal from Australia”.38 Penovic 
writes that later, this time limit was removed. I do not suggest that the 
continuation of mandatory detention after the removal of the time limit was a 
misuse of legal rationality in the technical-legal sense. However, the court 
ruling that Parliament had the power to detain people without sentencing by 
the judiciary occurred in a specific context. When this context changed after 
removal of the time limit, there remained within the legal system a broader 
authority for Parliament to exercise its powers of mandatory detention. Within 
this broader authority created by the Lim case in 1992, the Howard 
government subsequently delivered a policy of mandatory detention that 
carried over to the case studies. At this point, I wish to allude to the possibility 
that within this space of increased government power, there was the potential 
for legal rationalism to dominate other institutional practices. Such would be 
an example of Legal Rationalism Form 2, where the exercise of government 
power through the law may mask other ideologies behind its refugee policies.  
 
Such development, as seen in the following example, does not preclude the 
manifestation of Legal Rationalism Form 1: the idea of observing rules for 
their own sake, as long as such practice is consistent with other goals. Penovic 
comments on the different legal arguments that lawyers presented in the 
Woolley case about the power of Parliament to detain children:39 Counsel for 
                                            
38 Ibid., p. 223. 
39 Ibid., p. 225. Another aspect of the Woolley case, how legal rationalism has stifled the 
powers of the Human Rights Commissioner, was already discussed in the Bureaucracy 
chapter.  
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the children argued that the detention of children was “unconstitutional in 
their indiscriminate application to children without accounting for their 
developmental needs and vulnerabilities”. Penovic contrasted this argument 
with an argument advanced by counsel for the government: “constitutionality 
must be determined by the legal structure of the detention regime and not by 
its consequence and effect on detainees”. The second argument is what 
Habermas would call the uncoupling of legal rules from the purposes they 
were intended to serve, a fetishised system of rules exercising for its own sake. 
I will return to this point in the next section, when elaborating on the fate of 
the Bakhtiyari family.  
 
The argument presented so far suggests how a changing trend in court 
judgments allowed for legal rationalism to influence institutional practices. 
Court judgements, however, are informed by a legal code, and not by political 
rhetoric of the elected government. What then, are the legal factors that may 
account for this changed interpretation of the law by the judiciary? First, there 
was the framing of refugees as aliens under Australian law since Federation, as 
already discussed. However, these factors existed long before the Howard 
government came to office, and therefore do not fully explain a change in 
judicial reasoning when the Howard government, as is argued here, pursued an 
ideology of legal rationalism. Without implying a causal relationship, two 
changes to the broader principles of judicial reasoning may explain this new 
trend: the changing interpretation of the Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees as expressed by the “consular” and the “surrogate” views. 
 
Germov and Motta describe two variations within the accepted view that 
protection of refugees under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees is a 
matter of agreements between states, rather than a statement of individual 
rights:40 On the one hand, there is the concept of “surrogacy” where, when 
                                            
40 Roz Germov and Francesco Motta, Refugee Law in Australia (South Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 2003) pp. 27-28. 
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states fail to protect their citizens from persecution, there is “a duty on the 
international community to offer surrogate protection to individuals who have 
been identified as fitting the definition of refugee on criteria set by the 
receiving state”. In the citation above, Germov and Motta explain that the 
second interpretation of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the 
“consular” view, is less generous than the surrogate view: “consular” 
protection, in contrast to “surrogate” protection, focuses on the rights of the 
state to exclude aliens, rather than on the obligation of the state to offer 
protection. “Consular” protection thus has a special focus on how persecution 
fits into the narrow definition in Australian law. One implication is that if an 
applicant has not met the Australian protection criteria, then “this could result 
in the expulsion, or refoulement of that individual to a territory where they may 
well face such persecution”.41 Germov and Motta add that such view has been 
accepted “by at least three judges of the High Court”.42 
 
One can see from the previous paragraph that in these new institutional 
practices, refugee determination was conceptualised as a right of the state to 
refuse permission of entry to foreigners. Also significant is that these new 
practices, which resulted in a dominance of immigration law over refugee 
rights, occurred at the height of refugee arrivals in Australia, and the Howard 
government’s politicisation of such events. It was the time when the Howard 
government pursued the language claims and framing practices of its legal 
rationalist agenda, as was argued in the case studies. The developments, cited in 
the next paragraph, support such claim. 
 
Susan Kneebone argues that the state approach focuses “on the sovereign 
rights of states to enter into treaties and exclude aliens”.43 Elsewhere, 
Kneebone notes that this change among judges to view “the [Refugee] 
                                            
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., footnote 123, p. 28. 
43 Susan Kneebone, "Moving Beyond the State: Refugees, Accountability and Protection," in 
The Refugee Convention 50 Years On, ed. Susan Kneebone (Aldershot,  England: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2003) p. 310. 
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Convention from the perspective of the rights of the receiving state, rather 
than from the need of individuals seeking protection or asylum”, whilst not 
held by all judges, marks a shift in judicial interpretations.44 As recently as 1998, 
“the claims of the applicants were accepted on the basis of an individual 
investigation into their claims of persecution”.45 Two years later, in the Khawar 
case, the judges accepted a persecution claim not primarily because the 
applicant demonstrated an acceptable claim to persecution, but because the 
state of the refugee applicant did not enforce existing legislation.46 Such judicial 
reasoning, Kneebone continues, conferred “a limitation upon the absolute 
right of member states to admit whom they choose”. Nevertheless, the goal 
posts had changed from accepting refugees because they were persecuted, 
toward an interpretation that the applicant needed to demonstrate a case where 
the home state had not taken appropriate measures to protect the applicant 
from persecution.  
 
This change in judicial reasoning, and the judgement of the Khawar case, give 
credence to an observation stated earlier in this chapter: that the legal code has 
its own logic, which may differ from that of the law-makers. Whilst the 
Howard government may have welcomed the interpretation of the Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees from the perspective of the rights of the 
Australian state, the judicial interpretations of the legal code also generated an 
outcome less favoured by the government. Such reasoning may be inferred 
when Mrs Khwar won her refugee case on appeal. Thus, the institution of law 
absorbed some tension created by legal rationalism, when the court judgements 
became less incongruous with the rhetoric of the Howard government, as the 
legal code increasingly framed refugees as a threat to Australian sovereignty 
and as illegal border-crossers. Some tension between the judiciary and 
Parliament, however, remained. The Khawar case is but one example of how 
this tension remained in constant flux. Other examples will follow in this 
                                            
44 Ibid., p. 302. 
45 Ibid., p. 303. 
46 Ibid., p. 308. 
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chapter: Although the influence of legal rationalism could be observed in some 
judicial reasoning, such association was weak because the judges applied the 
logic of the legal code.  
 
Whilst there may be the scope to appeal, governments eventually have to 
accept court determinations. Haigh Patapan writes that, because the 
judgements of the High Court affect the formation of public policy by 
governments, the High Court automatically assumes a political role.47 
However, the court decisions that affected the formation of refugee policy had 
a special political flavour. Mary Crock and Ben Saul observe a unique feature in 
the emerging trend of decisions in migration cases.48 Crock and Saul argue that 
this trend was brought on by an increasingly restrictive legislation by the 
Howard government that left less and less room for interpretation by the 
judiciary. Accordingly, some judges, given the political climate, risk vilification 
or “retaliative legislation”.49 In what may appear as a competition between 
claim and counter-claim, the Howard government referred to some judges, 
who pronounced court judgements that the government disapproved of, as 
“activist judges”. Such derogatory comment, however, misses one point. 
Judges, whose determinations did not clash with the ideology of the Howard 
government, were not called derogatory names. Yet it is arguable that the judge 
who stretches the interpretation of statute law into the direction of an outcome 
desired by Parliament, may be just as “activist” as the judge whose 
interpretation pulls in the opposite direction. The reality was that, due to the 
politicised nature of the refugee issue, it became increasingly impossible for 
judges to pronounce “neutral” decisions, without some political reaction. 
 
 
                                            
47 Haigh Patapan, "The High Court," in Government, Politics, Power and Policy in Australia, 
ed. John Summers, Dennis Woodward, and Andrew Parkin (Frenchs Forest, NSW: Pearson 
Education Australia Pty Limited, 2002), p. 129. 
48 Crock and Saul, Future Seekers, Refugees and the Law in Australia, p. 62. 
49 Ibid. 
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The system colonises itself 
 
 
In their discussion on the changing trend in judicial decision-making, Sifris and 
Penovic allude to an ambivalence that accompanied this development:50 in one 
case, the Family Court ruled that the children of the Bakhtiyari family had 
suffered damage as the result of their immigration detention and that, 
therefore, the government should release these children from immigration 
detention. The Howard government appealed against the order to release the 
children, but the full bench of the Family Court upheld the previous decision. 
One year later, in April 2004, the High Court ruled that, as “unlawful non-
citizens”, children could lawfully be detained under the Migration Act. Justice 
Callinan declared that the Migration Act “was designed to deal with all matters, 
without exception, relating to unlawful non-citizens”.51  
 
The judgement by the High Court meant that the provisions of the Migration 
Act operated in immigration detention centres and, therefore, the Family Court 
did not have the jurisdiction to release the Bakhtiyari children. This judgement 
also raises two points when contemplating the argument in this chapter: the 
assertion that legal rationalism has modified institutional practices. First, is the 
judgement of the High Court, which stipulated that the legislation of the 
Migration Act applied to detained children, an example of legal rationalism? 
Perhaps, because the High Court ruling, which favoured an interpretation of 
immigration law over child protection law, was not incongruent with the 
government’s framing practices that identified refugees as outsiders. However, 
in the language of the legal code, an interpretation of the law to treat refugee 
                                            
50 Sifris and Penovic, "Children in Immigration Detention. The Bakhtiyari Family in the High 
Court and Beyond," pp. 217-19. 
51 Ibid., p. 219. 
   
  
- 258 - 
Chapter 6 
Politicisation of the Law 
children differently from other children may express itself as a matter of 
jurisdiction.  
 
Second, does legal rationality necessarily imply that the wordings of legal 
statutes are followed to the letter? Justice Richard Chisholm sat on the full 
bench when the Family Court ordered the release of the children. After retiring 
from the bench, Justice Chisholm wrote that if he could have released the 
children from detention, he would have done so.52 According to Justice 
Chisholm, evidence from health professionals in the court case showed that 
“the children demonstrated the effects of abuse and neglect”, and that the 
evidence also “identified the immigration centre environment as prima facie 
the source of the children’s abuse and neglect”. Therefore, Justice Chisholm 
reasoned, the Family Court assumed it had jurisdiction to release the children. 
When the High Court later overturned this decision, it meant that there were 
no legal provisions to release the children, except by discretion of Parliament.53  
 
Justice Chisholm’s paper cited above brings out the tension between judicial 
interpretation in accordance with rules and with principles. The legislation was 
clear, from section 196 of the Migration Act: courts do not have the authority to 
release anybody who has been detained under this law. On the other hand, 
there was also a principle that brought out a tension within the legal system: 
Children ought to be protected from harm, even if such harm occurs in the 
context of lawful delivery of public policy. The legal system accommodated the 
tension, firstly through implementing a rule-driven approach that was so 
characteristic of legal rationalism, and secondly through colonising, or 
displacing, one part of legal statute with another. With regard to the first point, 
one can see how the strict application of legal rules is an example of Legal 
Rationalism Form 2, the fetishising of rules without addressing the 
                                            
52 Richard Chisholm, "Children in Immigration Detention: The Exclusion of the Family Court 
and Implications for the Future." (Paper presented at the 11th Biennial National Family Law 
Conference, Gold Coast, September 2004) p. 38. 
53 Ibid., p. 42. 
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consequences or the principles behind these rules. In the strictly legal sense, 
one may argue that the High Court determined that Parliament is the relevant 
authority to deal with the welfare of children detained under immigration law. 
Such reasoning, however, starkly departs from the principle that children are 
protected by other jurisdictions.  
 
I will return to the second point shortly. First, a few words about the role of 
legislation and principle in legal rationality to support the argument advanced 
at the end of the previous paragraph. One may infer from Abraham Kaplan’s 
exposition on the philosophy of law that legal rationality is greater than 
codification and resolution of disputes through the legal code:54 Although 
judgements are based on the rationality of the law, rationality goes beyond 
“acting so as to secure the values pursued” and “is not limited to a choice 
among means”.55 Instead, Kaplan argues, decisions should not be guided by 
means–ends relationships as the determining reason for the decision. Instead, 
Kaplan continues, the “rationality of a person or an institution lies in the whole 
of its working, in the style of its performance”.56 Viewed from this perspective, 
rational-legal decisions are not made entirely on the basis of the wording of 
statute law, but are also informed by the principles of precedent and 
interpretation. When combining these components, there may be scope for 
judicial decisions to depart from the concrete wording of legislation, yet remain 
consistent with the legal code. However, the issue is more complicated: Kaplan 
concludes the discussion cited at the beginning of this paragraph by adding 
that, unless legislators have written unambiguously worded legislation for a 
specific purpose, judges may exercise personal discretion and preferences when 
interpreting the legislation. Applied to this thesis, one can see how through the 
politicisation of refugee issues that were driving the increasingly concrete 
                                            
54 Abraham Kaplan, "Some Limitations on Rationality," in Rational Decision, ed. Carl J. 
Friedrich (New York: Atherton Press, 1964) pp. 57-62. 
55 Ibid., p. 60. 
56 Ibid., p. 62. 
   
  
- 260 - 
Chapter 6 
Politicisation of the Law 
wording of immigration law, legal rationalism projected another ideology, one 
that was driving the political process as well as the legislation. 
 
Putting legal statutes into the wider context of legal rationality does not remove 
the tension that exists within the institution of law — a tension that arises from 
the requirement that on the one hand, legal rules must be obeyed, while on the 
other, that legal rules may be applied with discretion. It is a tension that has 
been observed throughout this thesis. Sebstián Urbina addresses this tension as 
a central concern, almost as a dichotomy, that exists in jurisprudence.57 
Accordingly, one view proposes that if laws are viewed as norms, one should 
not focus on “neutral procedures … but on both legal procedures and subjects 
who interpret and apply them to specific cases, in certain contexts, at a certain 
time”. Urbina outlines the other side to the debate: legal positivists reject the 
view that legal orders are more than “instruments”, but argue that strict 
adherence to these “legal orders” achieve the goals of predictably giving 
“intentionality, purpose, morality and self-interest” to social life.58 In arguing 
for a rights-based approach to the law, Urbina writes that judges should 
pronounce their court judgements beyond normative expectations and the 
wishes of the majority, because “individuals ought to be treated with equal 
concern”.59 Urbina concedes that the practical application of the philosophical 
principle proposed in the above citation has the potential to generate tension 
when judges, in exercising their discretion to interpret law, arrive at a decision 
that is contrary to the will of the legislators.  
 
It is suggested here that legal rationalism absorbed some of the tension that 
arose from this ambiguity: through micro-legislation that achieved politically 
desired outcomes and influenced judicial interpretation, the Howard 
government removed some of this ambiguity and gave more certainty to 
                                            
57 Sebastian Urbina, Legal Method and the Rule of Law, Law and Philosophy Library (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002) p. 63. 
58 Ibid., p. 104. 
59 Ibid., p. 233. 
   
  
- 261 - 
Chapter 6 
Politicisation of the Law 
institutional practices. Such certainty, however, also points to a fundamental 
flaw within the legal system that the Howard government exploited when, 
under the auspice of the apparently “neutral” language of legal statutes, the 
government advanced the strong ideological intent of its framing practices – an 
intent that was not obvious from the wording of the statutes. Just as the courts 
in the early days of Federation assisted Parliament with the exclusion of non-
white immigrants to Australia, so the court determinations based on the 
statutes of the post-Tampa legislation legitimated an exclusionary ideology 
behind the framing practices through the legal system. The framing of refugees 
as intruders, their deprivation of liberty under the auspice of immigration law, 
and the removal of legally enforceable measures designed to guarantee the 
safety of children inside immigration detention centres make this point. There 
comes to mind a not dissimilar development in the legitimate exercise of state 
power that was already discussed, one where the “neutral” language of 
legislation pertaining to the dictation test disguised a racist ideology until 
racism was no longer the preferred practice.  
 
It is now time to return to the second point that emerged from the discussion 
on the tension between court determinations based on wording of statutes and 
principles behind these statutes. Such point relates to the High Court ruling 
that the Family Court did not have jurisdiction to release children from 
immigration detention to the Habermasian colonisation thesis. However, the 
fate of Alumdar and Muntazar Bakhtiyari as the result of the High Court 
determination adds a qualification on the colonisation thesis.60 To recap from 
Chapter 1 — Theoretical and Political Background, and drawing on the above 
citation: Habermas predicts that the system colonises, or displaces, the 
functional ability of the lifeworld as a normative construct, and thereby 
rationalises the lifeworld to extremes. However, the court ruling that the 
Migration Act prevails over other law in matters pertaining to immigration 
                                            
60 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action. Lifeworld and System: A 
Critique of Functionalist Reason, trans. Thomas McCarthy, vol. 2 (Cambridge, UK: Polity 
Press, 1987) pp. 154-55. 
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detention centres, generates an observation that the Habermasian colonisation 
thesis does not predict: here, one part of the legal system dominates another 
and displaces, or colonises, part of itself. This observation adds another 
dimension to the colonisation thesis: Habermas may well have underestimated the 
power of politics to resolve tensions within the system, and the ability of 
political process to resolve a struggle for dominance and institutional power 
within the structure of the state, instead of spilling over to the lifeworld.  
 
This insight warrants a closer look at the potential for colonisation of legal 
rationality by legal rationalism. Three articles by Spencer Zifcak, published 
three months apart in the e-journal NewMatilda.com, take us into this space 
where colonisation has occurred.61 In these cited articles, Zifcak does not use 
the word “colonisation” or mention Habermas. However, Zifcak’s discussion 
on the principles of judicial interpretation is not inconsistent with the claim 
that is advanced here. Zifcak discusses four cases that have already been 
mentioned in this thesis: the cases about the teenage children Alumdar and 
Muntazar Bakhtiyari, four children of a family from Afghanistan in the 
Woolley case, Mr Ahmed Al Kateb, and Mr Mahmed Behrooz.62 The reason 
for mentioning these cases again is to focus on one aspect that has not yet 
been discussed: how legal rationalism assisted in resolving the institutional 
tension about the separation of powers doctrine.  
 
Zifcak’s three articles cited at the beginning of the previous paragraph have 
one common thread: in the four court cases that Zifcak discusses, the courts 
accepted that Parliament was authorised to detain people under section 196 of 
                                            
61 Spencer Zifcak, "The Forgetting of Wisdom: The High Court and Mr Ahmed Al-Kateb." [e-
Journal] NewMatilda (2004, 10 November). 
Spencer Zifcak, "The Forgetting of Wisdom: Mr Behrooz Jumps the Razor Wire but the High 
Court Catches Him." [e-Journal] NewMatilda (2004, 10 November). 
Spencer Zifcak, "No Way Out: The High Court and Children in Detention." [e-Journal] 
NewMatilda (2005, 12 January). 
62 Behrooz v. Secretary of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous 
Affairs [2004] HCA 36 (6 August 2004). (2004); Al-Kateb v. Godwin [2004] HCA 37. (2004); 
Re Woolley; Ex Parte Applicants M276/2003 by Their Next Friend GS [2004] HCA 49. 
(2004).  
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the Migration Act. Zifcak notes another commonality: the judiciary, when 
interpreting the law in this way, did not interpret the law to determine whether 
or not the detention itself was punitive. As noted earlier, and Zifcak also makes 
this point, Parliament is authorised to detain non-citizens for administrative, 
but not for punitive, reasons. Zifcak’s point is that the courts had scope to 
interpret whether detention was punitive, but instead avoided this option and 
interpreted the cases on the technical aspects of the rules of migration law.  
 
It is now time to elaborate how Zifcak arrives at the conclusions set out in the 
previous paragraph. In relation to the detention of children, Zifcak identifies a 
dilemma: whilst technically correct on points of law, their detention also was “a 
grave assault on their human rights [and] a significant infringement of 
Australia’s obligations under several international human rights conventions”.63 
In the case of Mahmed Behrooz, the High Court disallowed documents from 
Woomera, which may have shown that Behrooz’ detention was punitive.64 
Zifcak argues in the previous citation that the courts ruled on technicalities of 
law and separated detention from the conditions under which it occurred, so 
that “once inside, the conditions to which this person is subjected, no matter 
how harsh or degrading, are irrelevant to the inquiry”. Zifcak continues that 
the assumption that Behrooz was detained “because he came to or remained in 
this country without permission” may have been punitive. Zifcak’s conclusion 
closely approximates the description of Legal Rationalism Form 2; an ideology 
where legal rules are fetishised and obeyed for their own sake: 
 
The majority perspective is informed by and infused with an adherence to technique. 
Being technical, it is also narrow and prone to abstraction. This abstraction, 
regrettably, can lead to the adoption of propositions that not only defy common 
sense but also, more perilously, deny our common humanity.65 
 
                                            
63 Zifcak, "No Way Out: The High Court and Children in Detention." 
64 Zifcak, "The Forgetting of Wisdom: Mr Behrooz Jumps the Razor Wire but the High Court 
Catches Him." 
65 Ibid. 
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When ruling that Ahmed Al Kateb’s potentially lifelong detention was not 
punitive, the High Court also interpreted section 196 of the Migration Act 
literally, and did not make an interpretation “on the presumption of liberty”.66 
Zifcak explains that this principle comes from a precedent that is based on 
“numerous prior judicial decisions that, in case of doubt, laws should not be 
interpreted in a way that is prejudicial to individual liberty”. Behind this 
principle is the assumption that the courts assume that the legislature does not 
“overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights, or depart from the general 
system of law without expressing its intention with irresistible clarity”.67 
Zifcak’s concern that the emerging principle behind judicial interpretation as a 
pre-occupation with rules is not inconsistent with the key argument of this 
chapter that the political framing of legal rationalism has become of part of 
institutional practices: 
 
The principal implications of the case, however, lie far deeper than this. The court 
has adopted a very literal, semantically founded interpretation of both statute and 
Constitution. This suggests a measure of deference to the will of the Executive that is 
likely to narrow significantly its role as guardian of individual rights and liberties and 
expand governmental power correspondingly.68 
 
What Zifcak calls in the above quote “deference to the will of the executive” 
also suggests resolution of the structural tension between the Howard 
government and the judiciary; a resolution where the judicial framing of 
refugees increasingly reflected the government’s political framing. The trend of 
the judiciary to interpret in favour of the concrete wording of the legislation 
that authorises parliament to mandatorily detain people, instead of exercising 
its discretionary powers to interpret in each case whether detention is punitive, 
takes us back to a type of judicial activism not acknowledged by the Howard 
government. This is an example of judicial activism alluded to earlier in this 
                                            
66 Zifcak, "The Forgetting of Wisdom: The High Court and Mr Ahmed Al-Kateb." 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
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chapter, where judges, whilst appearing to have limited discretion of 
interpretation due to the wording of legislation, actually stretch and 
accommodate the interpretation until the outcome barely disguises the 
ideology of  legal rationalism.  
 
 
Pacific Solution on trial 
 
This section discusses two cases that may be seen as an additional example of 
colonisation within the legal system, and how the legal rationalist agenda of the 
Howard government resolved the tension that occurred in this process. The 
Tampa case and the Nauru case, as they became colloquially known, show how 
the legal system resolved the tension created by the micro-legislation that 
reflected the framing practices of refugees by the Howard government. Both 
cases take us back to the case studies. However, the cases are discussed here 
because of the institutional issues they raised. These institutional issues revolve 
around how the judiciary responded to the Howard government’s political 
exploitation of tensions that occurred as the result of the changes to refugee 
policy between 1999 and 2003.  
 
At that time, the quandary for the Howard government was how to move the 
Tampa from Australian waters without taking the refugees. The Australian 
published a story that drew similarities between the Tampa and a historical 
event that later became known as The Voyage of the Damned.69 In 1939, the ocean 
liner St Louis carried 930 Jewish refugees, who had left Nazi Germany. The 
Cuban government refused permission for the ship to enter the port of 
Havana, and the Cuban president said that “the shipping line … should be 
taught a lesson about respect for Cuban law and sovereignty”. The cited 
                                            
69 Leon Gettler, "Voyage of the Damned: A Disturbing Lesson from History," Australian, 5 
September 2001. 
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newspaper article reported that the ship returned to Europe, and that most 
refugees later died in the Holocaust.  
 
Unlike the St Louis, the Tampa did not turn around. Foreign Minister Downer 
indicated that the Tampa may be towed to international waters, but the 
Norwegians prepared a court injunction to prevent this, on the basis that the 
Tampa was unseaworthy.70 The Australian government did not follow through 
with this option of towing the Tampa, but instead send the navy in and moved 
the refugees to military ships. It was argued in the Tampa case study that the 
Howard government resolved the political pressures created by the arrival of 
the Tampa by resorting to framing refugees as intruders. Political framing, 
however, did not sway the attitudes of the judiciary, which decided arguments 
on the rule of law. Or did it?  
 
On 31 August 2001, two cases were lodged in the Federal Court that “sought 
restraining orders preventing the Commonwealth and the MIMIA [Minister for 
Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs] from removing the asylum 
seekers to the territorial sea”.71 A group of lawyers who acted pro bono for the 
refugees challenged the detention on board the Tampa and argued that these 
people should not be detained on the Tampa, but instead be detained on the 
mainland under section 196 of the Migration Act. Any other form of detention, 
they reasoned, would be illegal. In court, the government did not argue the 
legality of detention, but argued instead that the passengers were not detained 
at all: the Federal Court accepted the view “that the rescuees were not held in 
detention on the MV Tampa but that they were free to go wherever they 
wished other than to Australia”.72 The full bench agreed with this proposition 
                                            
70 David Marr and Marian Wilkinson, Dark Victory (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2003) p. 85. 
71 Germov and Motta, Refugee Law in Australia, footnote 46, p. 46. 
72 Victorian Council for Civil Liberties Incorporated v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural 
Affairs (& Summary) [2001] FCA 1297 (11 September 2001). (2001). Summary, Statements 
13, 14, 15. 
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and ruled that “the rescuees were not detained by the Commonwealth or their 
freedom restricted by anything that the Commonwealth did”.73  
 
Realistically, with the Tampa being unseaworthy and with the Indonesian 
government refusing permission for the refugees to enter, their ability to move 
elsewhere was severely curtailed. Although some of the Tampa refugees later 
went to New Zealand, several newspaper reports at the time indicated that no 
country had given permission to allow the Tampa to dock and leave its refugees 
there.74 Philip Lynch and Paula O’Brien argue that the Tampa judgment in its 
practical and political context indicates a narrow interpretation of what 
constituted lawfulness:75 the finding that the passengers were not detained on 
the Tampa was based on judicial reasoning of “abstracting each individual act 
of the Commonwealth from its context and consequences”. Such narrow 
interpretation, Lynch and O’Brien continue, was based on two key 
assumptions. First, the judges reasoned that the closure of the Christmas 
Island port to prevent the Tampa from docking there, occurred on the basis of 
lawful authority. Second, the judges accepted that “the presence of SAS troops 
on board the MV Tampa did not … constitute detention” and the negotiations 
with Nauru and New Zealand “provided the only practical exit from the 
situation”.  
 
Lynch and O’Brien’s conclusion in the article cited previously is not 
inconsistent with the argument of this chapter that the legal system resolved 
the tension generated by legal rationalism through a process where the legal 
system colonised parts of itself. Lynch and O’Brien conclude that the Howard 
government created a context where it ensured “that none of the fundamental 
rights accorded to non-citizens under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) accrue to the 
                                            
73 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs & ORS v. Eric Vadarlis, V1007/01 
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs & Ors V Victorian Council for Civil Liberties 
Incorporated & Ors V1008 of 2001," (2001). Summary, Statement 5. 
74 Brendan Nicholson et al., "Refugee Deal a Shambles," Age, 2 September 2001. 
75 Philip Lynch and Paula O'Brien, "From Dehumanisation to Demonisation. The MV Tampa 
and the Denial of Humanity," Alternative Law Journal 26, no. 5 (2001): pp. 215-16. 
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asylum seekers”.76 One can see in the previous comment how immigration law 
colonised a more basic principle that was expressed in other legislation that 
conferred certain rights on individuals. From an institutional perspective, the 
Tampa judgement reflected to points significant to this chapter: first, the law 
kept out those who were framed in the political language of the Howard 
government as intruders. Second, the legal system replaced, or colonised, one 
set of judicial principles with another: the judiciary favoured an interpretation 
of the rights of the state, as was discussed in the previous section.  
 
The following case came about from the way in which the Nauruan legal 
system rationalised the detention of refugees who were prevented by the 
Australian military from reaching Australia.77 The case in the High Court did 
not occur until 2005, but the background events take us back to September 
2001. Then, the Howard government was in the process of establishing the 
Pacific Solution, which included the transfer of refugees to a detention camp in 
Nauru. It will become apparent from this example that institutional framing 
practices are much more enduring and powerful than political framing 
practices.  
 
To reflect on the background, I will draw on the work of Marr and 
Wilkinson.78  Whilst the legality of the policy of mandatory detention in 
Australia was part of Australian legislation since 1989, such laws did not exist 
in Nauru. Moreover, the Nauruan Constitution stipulated that “no person shall 
be deprived of his liberty unless authorised by law”. Neither were there 
provisions in the Nauruan legislation that authorised detention under 
Australian law. Marr and Wilkinson argued that Australian lawyers resolved 
this legal dilemma for Nauru’s constitution through “brute force and tricky 
interpretation”.79 According to this interpretation, the refugee applicants were 
                                            
76 Ibid., p. 215. 
77 Ruhani v. Director of Police [2005] HCA 42 (31 August 2005). (2005). 
78 Cited in Marr and Wilkinson, Dark Victory, p. 163. 
79 Ibid. 
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not detained at all. Instead, Nauruan authorities issued a “visitor’s visa”. This 
visa was issued “on condition that each person remained within the confines of 
the camp”. But if people left the detention camp without authorisation, they 
would breach their visa conditions and hence be in breach of Nauruan law.  
 
On the Australian side, there was no doubt that transporting the Tampa 
passengers to Nauru was all about detention. Frank Brennan notes that the 
Australian Protective Services, a branch of the Australian Federal Police, co-
operated with Nauruan police to keep “the asylum seekers inside these 
facilities”.80 Brennan also cites a document where the International 
Organisation of Migration, the agency that processed the refugee applications 
in Nauru for the Tampa passengers, saw its role to manage these places as 
detention centres “in coordination with the relevant agencies of the Australian 
government”.81 Although the refugees were sent by Australia’s defence forces 
to Nauru for the purpose of detention, their framing as visitors under Nauruan 
legislation suggested otherwise. In October 2006, five years after 
implementation of the Pacific Solution, a newspaper cynically reported a 
projected cost of $1.2 million per year for “a world record visa charge” to keep 
one refugee on Nauru.82 The cited article reported that the Nauruan Foreign 
Minister said that Nauru charged high fees “for humanitarian reasons”, in an 
attempt to put pressure on the Australian government to move this refugee 
from Nauru.  
 
The foregoing example of the legality of detention in Nauru shows how the 
power of political rhetoric becomes magnified when such rhetoric is barely 
distinguishable from legal reasoning: Technically, there is a difference between 
the framing of refugees by the Howard government as outsiders and their 
framing by the Nauruan government as “visitors”. These semantics, however, 
                                            
80 Frank Brennan, Tampering with Asylum. A Universal Human Problem (St. Lucia, Qsl: 
University of Queensland Press, 2003) pp. 108-09. 
81 Migration Legislation Amendment (Transitional Movement) Act 2002. Section 198D (3) (c); 
Cited in Ibid., p. 108. 
82 Michael Gordon, "Nauru Sets Record Refugee Visa Fee," Age, 4 October 2006. 
   
  
- 270 - 
Chapter 6 
Politicisation of the Law 
do not obscure the reality of detention. Marr and Wilkinson predicted that this 
“curious message about law and lawfulness” worked, provided there was no 
legal challenge in an Australian court, and provided that Australian lawyers 
were denied entry to Nauru.83 Subsequent developments proved this prediction 
incorrect.  
 
On 28 April 2004, a refugee claimed that his detention in Nauru as a condition 
of the visitor’s visa, was illegal. On the previous day, a newspaper reported that 
the Australian government paid for a Queens Counsel and for a barrister to 
defend Nauru against these charges.84 The cited report continues that the 
lawyers who were paid by the Australian government flew to Nauru. Other 
lawyers who intended to defend the refugee, were prevented from boarding the 
plane, because the Nauruan government had cancelled their visas at the last 
minute. In response, the lawyers who were left behind claimed “political 
interference” by the Australian government. On the following day, the online 
news service Nine MSN reported a twist to the proceedings:85 The Nauruan 
Justice Minister “ordered all Australian lawyers to leave”, including those 
financed by the Australian government, and ordered that Nauruan paralegal 
teams instead argue the case in court. Queens Counsel Julian Burnside, who 
intended to defend the refugee applicant in Nauru, told reporters: 
 
The visas contain a condition requiring those people to remain locked up as long as 
they are on Nauru… They didn’t want to be in Nauru, they didn’t ask for visas and it 
is a very strange thing to have a visa foisted on you that requires you to go to jail.86 
 
Another newspaper report gives insight into further developments.87 The 
report indicated that the significance of the case was that if one refugee 
                                            
83 Marr and Wilkinson, Dark Victory, p. 163. Marr and Wilkinson explain that Nauru did not 
have lawyers, and its legal relationship with Australia stemmed from a post independence 
treaty that recognised Australian courts as the highest seat of appeal.  
84 Andra Jackson, "Nauru Bars Boat People's Lawyers," Age, 27 April 2004. 
85 Ninemsn [News]. (2004, 28 April). Aussie Lawyers Sent Home from Nauru.  
86 Ibid.  
87 Andra Jackson, "Nauru Judge Complains," Age, 28 April 2004. 
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applicant was detained on Nauru illegally, so was everybody else. The Supreme 
Court of Nauru found that the asylum seekers were not held there illegally. 
Normally, this would have been the end of the matter. However, the Chief 
Justice of Nauru lodged a complaint to his government “over the cancellation 
of visas for four Melbourne refugee lawyers”. This complaint paved the way 
for the Australian lawyers who intended to represent the refugee in Nauru, to 
appeal the judgement of the Nauruan court in the High Court of Australia. 
One can infer, from the events just cited and from the events in the next 
paragraph, the power of rhetoric when rhetoric has become part of 
institutional practices.  
 
In the case before the Australian High Court, Mr Ruhani claimed that his 
detention in Nauru under a visitor’s visa was illegal.88 In a majority decision, 
the High Court rejected Mr Ruhani’s appeal, which effectively meant that both 
the Nauruan and the Australian legal system had confirmed the legality of his 
detention. Chief Justice Gleeson acknowledged that Mr Ruhani had the right 
that this matter be heard in the High Court of Australia.89  However, Chief 
Justice Gleeson ruled that the High Court needed “to apply the law of Nauru 
in determining this controversy”, and added that “Nauruan law was given the 
force of federal [Australian] law”. 90 The power of politics in legal rationality is 
further demonstrated by the outwardly passive conduct of the Howard 
government during Mr Ruhani’s case. Justice Kirby was critical of the Howard 
government’s conduct and said that in a case that had the potential to unwind 
the legal basis of the Pacific Solution, the government did not “seek to appear, to 
intervene or otherwise to provide oral or written submissions” to the High 
Court. Justice Kirby found this omission most irregular: 
 
neither the Commonwealth nor the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth appeared, as 
would have been their right under federal law and normal practice. This left the defence of 
                                            
88 Ruhani v. Director of Police [2005] HCA 42 (31 August 2005). Chief Justice Gleeson, 
paragraph 18.  
89 Ibid., Chief Justice Gleeson, paragraph 58. 
90 Ibid., Chief Justice Gleeson, paragraphs 65-66. 
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the validity of the Australian legislation to the appellant alone, acting through his lawyers. 
In my view … this presented a most unsatisfactory state of affairs… To leave the defence 
of that law, when under attack by a public officer of a foreign country having treaty 
arrangements with Australia, to another foreigner, detained in that country under 
arrangements with Australia … is unique.91 
 
It is possible that the Howard government refrained from arguing its position 
in the High Court because it relied on the power of its political framing that 
had found a way into Nauruan law. However, the controversy of the 
government’s conduct in the Ruhani case does not end there. Justice Kirby was 
critical that the government did not disclose to the High Court that it financed 
Nauru’s legal defence, and of the fact that “the circumstances of the costs and 
indemnity” were unknown “before press reports appeared”.92 Justice Kirby’s 
criticism about the government’s non-disclosure of financing the lawyers was 
two-fold. First, it was up to the High Court to decide on costs, and the court 
would not award costs against the Commonwealth, which was a “non-party” in 
these proceedings.93 Therefore, payment by the Australian government to the 
Australian lawyers begs the question of why the court case in Nauru was so 
important: the assumption that an Australian Court would be guided by the 
judgement by the Nauruan court seemed inevitable. Justice Kirby’s cited 
comment supports the speculation cited at the beginning of this paragraph 
that, once political framing becomes law, it has become part of normative 
assumptions that no longer require debate. Second, Justice Kirby stated that 
the government’s non-disclosure changed the perception of the High Court 
that “the Commonwealth and the respondent were at arm’s length”.94 The 
second comment cited in the previous sentence takes us back to a lawyer’s 
comment about political interference stated earlier.  
 
                                            
91 Ibid., Justice Kirby, paragraphs 222-23. 
92 Ibid., Justice Kirby, paragraphs 228-29. 
93 Ibid., Justice Kirby, paragraph 238. 
94 Ibid., Justice Kirby, paragraph 228. 
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With the benefit of knowing the outcome of the court case, and taking Justice 
Kirby’s criticisms into account, one gets a sense of how a political process 
between the Australian and Nauruan governments almost pre-empted the 
determination in the case discussed above. All attest to the power of an 
exclusionary ideology that cannot be inferred from the statutes nor the judicial 
determinations. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Constitution formally 
separates the powers of Parliament and the judiciary. Despite such formal 
separation, the practical boundaries between both remain in constant flux and 
are subject to manipulation by political process.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter explored structural power and dominance within the institution of 
law. It was argued that, when the system became stressed as a consequence of 
the political framing practices that informed the refugee policies of the 
Howard government between 1999 and 2003, legal rationalism influenced 
practices within the institution of law. An attempt was made to analyse 
whether or not the new institutional practices within the legal system 
resembled the government’s political framing practices that were in the case 
studies attributed to legal rationalism.  
 
The analysis showed that the judiciary has modified the way in which it 
exercised its powers of interpretation, and that these changes were not 
incongruent with legal rationalism. These changes in turn informed judicial 
thinking in three main ways. First, though not necessarily in this order, there 
was a shift in judicial thinking from the rights of the refugee to the rights of the 
state. Second, as a flow-on from the first point, court judgements increasingly 
framed refugee issues as matters of unwelcome intruders, favoured a focus on 
the rights of the state. Both points suggest strongly that the ideological 
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projections behind legal rationalism have become part of institutional practices. 
In the introduction to this thesis, such development was called legal 
rationalism form one. Third, there was a shift from interpreting from principles 
behind legislation to narrow interpretation of statutes. All three markers 
indicate an insidious proliferation of politics as the emerging dominant pattern 
among institutional practices within state structure.  
 
This does not mean the influence of legal rationalism on institutional practices 
came easy. Changing judicial practices were accompanied by legislative changes 
from Parliament in the form of micro-legislation, which almost predetermined 
judicial rulings and limited the discretion of judges to interpret these statutes in 
future court cases. Here, the system reinforces itself, as these changes, over 
time, become established precedent in the institution of law. One’s mind drifts 
to Anthony Giddens’ structuration theory, which predicts a reciprocal 
interaction between structure and actors, as the power of political framing 
practices shapes institutional practices. 
 
Tracing legal rationalism from the Howard government’s political statements 
and policy practices from the case studies to the domain of institutional power 
within the legal system suggests a fundamental problem with the law. This 
problem derives directly from the structural tension between Parliament and 
the judiciary under the Westminster system of government in Australia. Whilst 
it may be necessary for this tension to exist in order to accommodate new 
social practices, this analysis has shown great potential for this space to 
become dominated by self-serving political interests. The requirement for the 
courts to interpret the rules in a pre-determined fashion led to some instances 
where, arguably, the political process that propelled legal rationalism influenced 
the outcome of court judgements in a system that required full court 
autonomy. In those instances, the statutes became isolated from the full 
autonomy of judicial interpretation, and promoted the semantics of legal rules 
to become the main consideration in judicial decision-making. If such 
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reasoning is accepted, then another point may be equally acceptable: if key 
practices of the legal system are susceptible to domination by legal rationalism, 
then the system needs activist judges who create a scope for human agency to 
contest the boundaries of power in the courtroom. Such contest, however, 
needs to be more transparent than it has been under the Howard government 
and come closer to the practice of public discourse that Habermas suggests. 
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In the three case studies, the analysis was about rules and the manipulation of 
the rules for political purposes. The previous two chapters extended the 
analysis and explored how in the institutions of law and bureaucracy these new 
rules legitimated such manipulation and gave authority to this ideological skew 
of legal rationalism. These two chapters discussed legitimacy in the legally 
rational sense, where legislation and public policy go hand in hand, and the 
legislation and policy practices are confirmed, or modified, under the influence 
of case law when disputes are settled in court. This chapter explores a different 
type of legitimation: legitimation of government policy that is derived from the 
electorate, the source of authority for governments within state structure.  
 
To Habermas, the legitimation that this chapter explores is achieved through 
public deliberation and is an integral component to democracy. Habermas 
argues that at the base of legitimation is a cultural identity that forms the basis 
for the unity of a “collective identity” that exists at national level.1 Accordingly, 
this combination of state structure and the political activity of citizens are 
characteristic of the state. Habermas writes: “Only the symbolic construction 
of ‘a people’ makes the modern state into a nation-state”. Within Habermas’s 
                                            
1 Jürgen Habermas, "The Postnational Constellation and the Future of Democracy," In The 
Postnational Constellation. Essays. (Polity Press, Cambridge, in association with Blackwell 
Publications, Oxford., 2001) pp. 64-65. 
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theory, democracy becomes the “legitimation of political authority” not as 
citizens being ruled by government from above, but into citizens as bearers of 
“liberal and political civil rights” who confer such authority to the state. Public 
discourse thus becomes the space where citizens can influence their 
government, and it is logical that governments direct lots of energy toward that 
space.  
 
Chronologically, the public legitimation discussed in this chapter occurred 
between 1999 and 2003, when the Howard government justified the policy 
changes that were discussed in the case studies. The significant direction for 
these policy changes, and public discourse about these changes, was thus 
distinct from the legitimation through the legal system: legislative changes 
occurred after key events prompted such legislation and the cases that 
interpreted the new legislation occurred even later. Public discourse about the 
events that the Howard government politicised to shape its refugee policies 
also occurred before official investigations were conducted; indeed such 
investigations often were prompted by such events. However, some 
information about how the Howard government delivered its refugee policies 
was released into the public domain between 1999 and 2003, such as the 
ongoing media publicity about the events themselves and reports by official 
investigators. It will be argued in this chapter that the public discussion 
approved of the Howard government’s changes to refugee policy. It may also 
be concluded that, because there was public knowledge of how the Howard 
government conducted its refugee policies, the public legitimated the new 
refugee policies and that the Howard government had no option but to 
represent the will of the people. Such conclusion, however would be too 
simplistic, because a recurring thread through the case studies and Chapter 5 
— Bureaucratic Process and Ministerial Power was a systemic process that resulted 
in a delay of the release of information until after public discussion of the topic 
had subsided.  
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A thesis that argues that the Howard government resorted to legal rationalism 
to convince the public of its refugee policies would not be complete without 
asking if legal rationalism swayed public opinion, and what part the Howard 
government played in shaping public opinion through its legal rationalist 
agenda. This chapter, however, is not about how public opinion is generated or 
expressed, but about how the intensity of public opinion became a legitimating 
force for refugee policies between 1999 and 2003. Here, the question is: how 
did the Howard government frame its dialogue with the public to get public 
support for its refugee policies? From this chapter emerges a perception that 
public legitimacy was achieved by creating a perception of difference at cultural 
and psychological levels, and by creating a fear based response to this 
difference. It is argued that legal rationalism, whilst it did not specifically 
change public opinion, nevertheless provided an ideology that legitimated these 
changes that resulted in public approval of policies designed to dispel these 
perceived threats.  
 
 
Thoughts of the public 
 
It is difficult to know what “the public” is thinking. Jürgen Habermas 
conceptualises of public opinion as that which transpires in public discourse. 
Habermas writes that governments (“the state”) secure their external borders 
and exercise legitimate power within these borders.2 Such legitimacy comes 
partly from the law, and partly from the electorate. Habermas argues that, as 
long as people agree with the overall framework of the legal order, the public 
tends to legitimate actions that arise from the framework of the legal code. 
                                            
2 Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Beacon Press, Boston, 
1975) p. 21. It should be noted that when Habermas uses the word “truth” in relation to 
public discourse, “truth” is about public agreement in establishing normativity.  
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Provided there is such support, Habermas argues, “the belief in legitimacy thus 
shrinks to a belief in legality”.3  
 
Habermas’ proposition, when applied to this thesis, suggests that if there was 
electoral support for the general direction of the Howard government’s refugee 
policies between 1999 and 2003, the public would also support legislation to 
accompany this new direction. From this perspective, it is arguable that legal 
rationalism has a dual role in relation to public legitimacy and legality through 
the law. First, there is the potential to influence public discourse through 
framing social life through the lens of legal rationalism. Such influence may be 
inferred from the argument of the case studies that legal rationalism was the 
main justification for the refugee polices of the Howard government. Second, 
as was argued in the previous two chapters, legal rationalism also influenced 
institutional practices through the legislation that accompanies these policy 
changes. However, whilst public acceptance of the government’s policy 
justifications may have arguably contributed to the writing of legally binding 
rules, it does not follow  that the public approves of the rules themselves. 
More is needed before statute law reflects the will of the electorate. Thomas 
McCarthy’s comment points to how Habermas addresses this difference: 
 
In the case of the truth-dependency of belief in legitimacy, however, the appeal to the 
state’s monopoly on the creation and application of laws obviously does not suffice. 
The procedure itself is under pressure for legitimation. At least one further condition 
must therefore be fulfilled: grounds for this procedure of the legitimating force of 
this formal procedure must be given.4 
 
In other words, legitimacy through public discourse is not about the laws, but 
about governments seeking approval for passing the laws. In contrast with the 
previous two chapters, this chapter does not explore how the Howard 
government exercised legal control, but how it engaged the electorate through 
                                            
3 Ibid., p. 98. 
4 Ibid. 
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persuasion and argument. This difference is illustrated by following example, 
where legitimacy was equally about statutes and court decisions as about public 
debate. The Tampa was framed as a legal issue, where the Prime Minister, along 
with the Ministers for Immigration and for Foreign Affairs stated that their 
course of action had its authority in firmly established legal code, and that they 
had no choice but to act according to law.5 However, such statements seem 
unconvincing when one takes into account the modifications in this period. 
Roz Germov and Francesco Motta wrote at the beginning of their 900 page 
book on refugee law:  
 
The text has been re-written three times since we began working on it four years ago. 
We often felt like giving up because of the frequency of legislative change and the 
sheer volume of case law that was developing on a weekly basis.6  
 
Approval through public discourse, however, was a different matter. Such 
approval depended on how the electorate accepted that the political framing of 
refugees was consistent with the four language claims that the Howard 
government made about its refugee policies. These claims were that refugee 
policies were about sovereignty issues, legal rationality, orderly process, and 
humanitarian outcomes. Rather than revisiting the case studies, it is now time 
to abstract from language claims and practices and ask if political framing 
translated to public approval, and if legal rationalism influenced this debate.  
 
How then, does the public declare its views to its elected political leaders, and 
how do governments respond to such views? It seems unlikely that the public 
dictates, and politicians follow the results of opinion polls. Murray Goot 
                                            
5 John Howard. (2001, 29 August). Border Protection Bill 2001: Second Reading. 
Parliamentary Speech, House of Representatives. Official Hansard. Commonwealth of 
Australia, p. 30,569; Philip Ruddock. (2001, 30 August). Matters of Public Importance: Illegal 
Immigration: MV Tampa. Parliamentary Speech, House of Representatives. Official 
Hansard. Commonwealth of Australia, p. 30,682; Alexander Downer. (2001, 28 August). 
Question without Notice: Illegal Immigration: MV Tampa. Parliamentary Speech, House of 
Representatives. Official Hansard. Commonwealth of Australia, p. 30,360.  
6 Roz Germov and Francesco Motta, Refugee Law in Australia (South Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 2003) Foreword, p. viii. 
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suggests that the question of whether politicians follow public opinion does 
not address the complexity of the relationship that exists between opinion and 
the active part that governments play in shaping public opinion.7 Goot argues 
that there is a two-way street between opinion and policy: politicians frame an 
issue, which then sets the context for the answers. Goot thus suggests a two-
way street of information between governments and the electorate that goes 
beyond governments passively taking survey data into account, and actively 
construct such opinions.  
 
Goot gives the example where the framing of the refugee issue by the 
government during the 2001 election campaign in terms of national 
sovereignty “primed” the public debate and responses in terms of border 
protection, which achieved “just what the government wanted to hear” when 
refugees themselves accepted the government’s queue-jumping frame and 
distanced themselves from refugees on the boats.8 According to Goot, the 
relationship between framing and priming begins with framing an issue in 
terms that builds on publicly accepted values or opinions. Rhetoric is then 
introduced to put the issue in a favourable light, whilst controlling information 
so that the public’s assessment of the issue is limited by the information that 
has been released by politicians. By this process, “politicians don't reshape their 
policies; rather, they attempt to bring the public on side by reshaping the 
arguments”.9 Goot continues that in the ensuing debate, the public accepts the 
arguments about the policy, rather than the policy itself.  
 
Viewed from Goot’s perspective, this difference may explain fluctuations in 
approval or disapproval of public policies, where survey respondents approve 
of the justifications for the policy, rather than to the goals or practices of the 
policy. If one accepts Goot’s argument, then it seems that public discourse was 
                                            
7 Murray Goot, "Politicians, Public Policy and Poll Following: Conceptual Difficulties and 
Empirical Realities," Australian Journal of Political Science 40, no. 2 (2005). 
8 Ibid., p. 197. 
9 Ibid., pp. 197-98. 
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not about refugee policy. Instead, public discourse debated what the Howard 
government had framed as an assault on Australia’s borders. Not only were 
refugee and migration issues on the agenda. The Howard government also 
channelled public discourse increasingly into debating whether the refugees 
were deserving of Australia’s generosity, and added   rhetoric that seriously 
questioned that refugees had the social attributes that compel the Australian 
public to reach out.  
 
Public opinion about refugee issues between 1999 and 2003 was a matter of 
rhetoric and persuasion that, if persuasive enough, was reflected in opinion 
polls. Indeed, some longitudinal data exists that indicates that migration was a 
matter of public interest.10 The graph in Figure 2 was plotted from Newspoll 
data that was collected between 1989 and 2004. The raw data in Table B2 in 
Appendix B — Defence and Immigration show that voters were annually (except 
in 1996) given twenty topics, and asked to indicate what issues they considered 
voting on at federal elections. Figure 2 below shows a trend of the percentage 
of voters who indicated in these polls that “Immigration” was a voting issue 
for them. The graph shows that for about ten years, between 1989 and 1999, 
about 30 to 45 percent of voters indicated that they would vote on 
immigration issues. The sharp increase from 1999 to mid-2002 follows this 
general trend. However, between 2004 and 2005, voters’ interest plummets to 
less than 15 per cent; the lowest in 25 years.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
10 Katherine Betts’s analysis of longitudinal data drew my attention to the Newspoll data, 
from which I constructed Figures 2 and 3 to illustrate the relevant discussions in this chapter. 
The reference to the data was cited in Katharine Betts, "Boatpeople and Public Opinion in 
Australia," People and Place 9, no. 4 (2001). 
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Figure 2: Voters’ attitudes about importance of immigration as an election issue.  
Answer to the question, “Thinking about federal politics. Would you say each of the 
following issues is very important, fairly important or not important on how you 
personally would vote in a federal election?”  
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Although the Newspoll reflects an interest in immigration instead of refugee 
issues, the data in Figure 2 between 1999 and 2005 correlate with the Howard 
government’s politicisation of refugee issues during this period. The increased 
interests among voters between 1999 and 2003 correlates with the publicised 
and politicised changes to refugee policy during this time. The increasing trend 
until well into 2002 suggests that the electorate remained interested, well after 
the 2001 federal election and after the Howard government had scaled down 
Operation Relex. Such interest indicates that the refugee issue had gained 
momentum in public discourse, and was maintained for the first months of 
2004. The following sharp decline correlates with the publication of major 
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reports that revealed serious shortcomings with the delivery of the policy of 
mandatory detention: the report on children in immigration detention and by 
the Human Rights Commissioner, and two reports by the Auditor-General.11 
This declining trend gives tentative support to a recurring argument in most 
chapters of this thesis; the suggestion that it was in the Howard government’s 
interests to delay the release of information until the political saliency of an 
issue had faded. When the three reports with unfavourable information that 
were just cited were released, public interest was at a record low.  
 
Whilst the percentages depicted in Figure 2 above do not differ markedly from 
other percentage values in 25 years, noteworthy is the length of time during 
which the public maintained an interest in immigration as a voting issue. This 
five-year period between 1999 and 2004 coincides with the period of major 
changes to policy practices and institutional practices to the bureaucracy and 
the legal system. So the sudden decline in mid-2004 seems all the more 
remarkable. Such decline could indicate that the electorate had resolved the 
issues raised in public discourse and the changes over the preceding five years, 
and the ideology which underpinned these changes had become an accepted 
part of public life. If this interpretation is correct, then it is also correct to state 
that this thesis has provided some insight into the institutional power that 
flowed on from political framing of refugees by the Howard government.  
 
Discussion of opinion polls in this chapter, however, should be seen in a 
broader framework of structuring public debate, and not as direct indicators of 
what the public is thinking, because there are methodological issues. As Liz 
Young of the Statistics Group at the Parliamentary Library points out, public 
opinion polls are usually conducted by media outlets, and are therefore driven 
                                            
11 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. (2004, April). A Last Resort? National 
Inquiry into Children in Immigration Detention; Australian National Audit Office. Management 
of the Detention Centre Contracts — Part A. Performance Audit (Audit Report Number. 54 
2003–04). Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Australian 
National Audit Office. (2005). Management of the Detention Centre Contracts — Part B. 
Performance Audit (Audit Report No.1 2005–06). Department of Immigration and 
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs.  
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by what is considered newsworthy.12 Young notes that this tends to influence 
the topic, and that there is additional bias that comes from the wording of the 
questions, which in turn may influence the results. Despite these limitations, 
Young argues that these tests should not be discounted, because impartial 
analysts whose business and reputation depend on producing reliable data 
conduct the polls. 
 
When commenting on public opinion, it is good practice to rely on trends and 
not on single instances, as the following example from a report by the ABC 
Radio National current affairs program PM shows.13 At the height of the 
Tampa issue, on 1 August 2001, the Norwegian newspaper Norway Post received 
a high volume of emails about this issue. The editor of Norway Post told PM 
that, according to the number of emails and phone numbers his newspaper 
received, “about 95 per cent are extremely critical of the Australian 
Government’s handling of the situation and about 5 per cent support the 
Government”. As will be discussed in the next section, such conclusion, whilst 
indicating the attitude of individuals who emailed the Norway Post, was at odds 
with public opinion at that time.  
 
Other information corroborates an interest in immigration issues. Peter Mares 
views the child abuse allegations by staff at the Woomera detention centre as 
the catalyst for generating public debate about detention issues.14 Mares writes 
that there was no public debate on detention in early 2000, before these issues 
attracted media attention from November 2000 onwards. After the publicity, 
The Australian newspaper set up a special Woomera website, and maintained 
the site for approximately six months.15 This site contained almost sixty 
                                            
12 Liz Young, The Political Significance of Opinion Polls. Parliament of Australia, 
Parliamentary Library. [Website]. 2001  
13 PM [ABC Radio Broadcast]. 2001, 1 August) Australians Email Norwegian Newspapers. 
Reporter: Edmond Roy.  
14 Peter Mares, Borderline: Australia's Response to Refugees and Asylum Seekers in the 
Wake of the Tampa, Second ed. (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2002) p. 
15. 
15 Australian. (2000). Woomera in Crisis [Website]. 
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articles, editorials, and letters to the editor that the newspaper published during 
that time.   
 
The purpose of writing this section was to demonstrate public interest in 
immigration issues during the timeframe that is relevant to all chapters of this 
thesis. From the timeframe of this thesis, one may assume that such interest 
also indicates an interest in refugee issues. The remainder of this chapter asks: 
how did the Howard government manage public legitimation, as it sought to 
bridge the gap between public acceptance and political framing? As in other 
chapters, this chapter will also ask the extent, if any, that legal rationalism 
played in this fast-moving and intense political debate.  
 
 
Rhetorical threats 
 
This section explores initially explores how the Howard government framed 
refugees as a threat, and then explores the public debate about such perceived 
threat in the light of an upcoming federal election. Political scientist Katherine 
Betts disagrees with suggestions that the framing of the Howard government 
of the Tampa as a defence issue contributed to a public perception that refugee 
boats are a threat to Australia’s national security.16 By showing trends in public 
opinion from several sources, Betts argues convincingly that such link existed 
in public discourse eight months before the Tampa arrived. On this basis, Betts 
concludes that the “desire to close the door to boatpeople” did not just emerge 
from the Tampa, but was as a “slow and growing trend over the last quarter of 
a century”.17  
 
I considered myself informed about refugee issues, yet was surprised to read 
Bett’s finding that public attitudes about defence and immigration issues were 
                                            
16 Betts, "Boatpeople and Public Opinion in Australia," p. 41. 
17 Ibid., p. 45. 
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linked before the arrival of the Tampa. Therefore, I checked on the source that 
Betts quoted in the article cited in the previous paragraph. The result is Figure 
3, which clearly supports Betts’ analysis. The histogram of Figure 3 was 
constructed in a similar way to the graph in Figure 2 in the last section: by 
tracing the primary source that Betts had quoted and then plotting selected 
figures from Table B1 in Appendix B — Defence and Immigration.  
 
 
Figure 3: Voters attitudes about importance of immigration and defence as an 
election issues.  
Answer to the question, “Thinking about federal politics. Would you say each of the 
following issues is very important, fairly important or not important on how you 
personally would vote in a federal election?”  
Constructed from Newspoll data. For raw data, see Appendix B, Tables 1 and 2. 
 
 
 
Significant about Figure 3 is that for the first time in January 2001, in 25 years 
since the polls commenced in 1989, voters stated that “Defence” was an issue 
that would influence their voting behaviour. This correlation between Defence 
and Immigration occurred before the Tampa. It peaked in October 2002 and 
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February 2003, but remained relatively constant since at around 50 percent. 
One cannot conclude from Figure 3 that to voters, immigration issues had 
become defence issues, because Newspoll voters were not asked if they 
perceived such link.18 The following paragraph, therefore, should be read with 
caution. 
 
Although the data in Figure 3 do not specifically state this, it is highly probable 
that throughout 2001, voters had linked refugee and defence issues. To begin, 
the Howard government had politicised refugee issues as an assault on 
Australia’s borders and as a threat to sovereignty since the refugee boats 
arrived in November 1999. The Woomera breakout in June 2000 and the riots 
inside detention centres that began in August 2000 and continued throughout 
2001, may also have generated such perception. The terror attacks in America 
in September 2001 may have added fuel to an already existing perception. It 
becomes difficult to speculate on a link between immigration and defence 
issues beyond 2001, because the Afghan war in 2002 and the Iraq war in the 
following year may have also influenced voters’ perceptions. 
 
Moving on from Figure 3, the Howard government linked defence and refugee 
issues with the Tampa. Images of soldiers preventing refugee boats from 
arriving in Australia on the Tampa and through Operation Relex, and the 
comments by the Howard government within weeks of the pending election in 
November 2001, all enhanced such perception. Between September and 
November 2001, the military increasingly became a metaphor for defending 
nationalist sentiment. John Howard told Neil Mitchell on Radio 3AW in 
Melbourne that asylum seekers “sometimes try to intimidate us with our own 
decency”, and indicated that giving in meant to “surrender our right as a 
sovereign country (and) our right to control our borders”.19 The Prime 
                                            
18 The wording of the question for Table B2 in Appendix B is: “Thinking about federal politics, 
would you say each of the following issues is very important, fairly important or not important 
on how you personally would vote in a federal election?” (Italics added). 
19 Cited in Marr and Wilkinson, Dark Victory, p. 63. 
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Minister linked Australia’s “decency” with the right to maintain national 
sovereignty. John Howard’s statement also had another message: decency was 
maintained through the law, and they were using such decency as a weapon 
against Australia.  
 
Not only was the link between the Tampa and a physical threat strengthened 
with the sight of soldiers. The Prime Minister, whilst technically not refusing to 
authorise medical personnel or supplies to the Tampa from Christmas Island, 
instructed the Australian Maritime Safety Authority to suspend with the usual 
procedure of sending civilian doctors and nurses to the Tampa.20 Instead, the 
Howard government, whilst monitoring the situation on the ship, delayed 
medical aid and authorised a medical team only as part of the military.21 In 
addition, a lawyer acting for the shipping company stipulated, among other 
conditions, that the Tampa would only depart if Australia made available 
“armed security for the crew”.22 The events of these few days enhanced the 
threat frame of the refugee issue, which the government had pursued all along. 
 
Whilst the terrorist attacks on American soil in September 2001 did not 
precede the link of refugees with security issues, the Howard government 
utilised the event to construct such link. Peter Mares suggests that the media 
became a platform for linking refugee boats with terrorists.23 Mares quotes 
Alan Jones asking on the following day, on 12 September 2001, how many 
asylum seekers were terrorist sleepers, and Defence Minister Peter Reith linked 
both matters “within forty-eight hours” of the attacks on New York. Mares 
writes that John Howard held back initially, but “revived” the terrorist link just 
days before the November 2001 election, and the electorate rewarded him for 
“the tough line on the boat people”. When the Prime Minister entered the 
debate about refugees and defence, he said enough to generate media reports 
                                            
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., p. 69. 
23 Mares, Borderline: Australia's Response to Refugees and Asylum Seekers in the Wake of 
the Tampa p. 134. 
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that it could be a terrorist link, but then distanced himself from these reports. 
Just before the election, on 7 November 2001, the Prime Minister told the 
Courier Mail: “illegal entrants on the boats may or may not be linked with 
terrorist organisations”.24 On the same day, John Howard’s website clarified 
the Prime Minister’s position.25  The website stated that John Howard did not 
wish to “force or over force the link”, or to state that there were terrorists on 
the boats, but that he “could give no guarantee that there weren’t”. John 
Howard’s statement was enough to keep alive refugees as a defence issue just 
days before the election.  
 
It may appear, incorrectly, from the discussion in this section so far that legal 
rationalism did not contribute to the formation of public opinion. The opinion 
polls between 1999 and 2003 were conducted whilst the Howard government 
justified its refugee policies in terms of legal necessities. The law is not only 
about rules, regulations and judicial interpretation, but as an institution, defines 
Australia as a society. With refugees politically framed as a threat to law-and-
order, it is not surprising that refugees were viewed negatively in public 
discourse. Thus concludes Mary Crock in an exploration of how cultural and 
social factors contributed to the public perception of refugees over the 
preceding 25 years: 
 
The extraordinary side of the refugee story in Australia has … everything to do with 
the law or, rather, with the intersection of Australia’s legal institutions in their 
dealings with refugees. There is a sense in which refugees have threatened to bring 
Australia’s judicial system to its knees, both literally and juridically.26 
 
If the Howard government resorted to legal rationalism to justify its refugee 
policies to the electorate, as has been argued throughout this thesis, then the 
                                            
24 John Howard. (2005, 7 November). Transcript of the Prime Minister the Hon John Howard 
MP Joint Press Conference with Senator the Hon Amanda Vanstone, Minister for 
Immigration, Parliament House, Canberra. [Prime Ministerial Website]. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Mary Crock, "Judging Refugees: The Clash of Power and Institutions in the Development 
of Australian Refugee Law," Sydney Law Review 26, no. 1 (2004). 
   
  
- 292 - 
Chapter 7 
Formation of the Public Voice 
question arises: how did public discourse legitimate these policies? One day 
after the SAS troops took control of the Tampa and also sent medical aid, on 
30 August 2001, ABC television’s 7.30 Report reported that “90 per cent of calls 
– that’s over 110,000 callers” answered “yes”, when the “Channel 10 ‘Boat 
People Crisis Poll’” asked “should Australia turn away the boat people?”.27 The 
Nielsen poll found that 77 per cent did not want to let the Tampa passengers 
into Australia, and 74 per cent approved of how the Prime Minister handled 
the matter.28 In the following month, after the High Court confirmed that the 
government had acted lawfully in keeping the Tampa out, the Howard 
government prepared the Border Protection Act; legislation that would deny entry 
to refugee boats in future. When the Opposition defeated passage of the first 
draft of the bill in the Senate on the basis of the privative clause, which, 
according to Opposition Leader Kim Beazley, contained legislation that 
“overrides all law”, the fervour of public opinion turned against him and his 
Labor colleagues.29 Beazley recalls: 
 
The calls were terrible… The emotions were raw … People were sobbing and 
screaming down the line … The phones were feral from this point right to the end of 
the election campaign. Labor members would go home to the electorates at the end 
of this first week and be spat on in the streets. Beazley said, 'it was unprecedented in 
my experience. Never had it in my career.30 
 
Such emotive response, whilst it indicated public support for the Howard 
government, also suggested that the Labor Party had violated the taken-for-
granted assumption. It is possible that at that time, the electorate had accepted 
the defence-frame and also the exclusion-frame, which I will discuss in the 
next section. The response was all the more remarkable because public opinion 
was not fixed, and poll results changed within days. The ABC radio program 
                                            
27 7.30 Report [ABC Television Broadcast]. (2001, 30 August). Tampa Asylum Seekers 
Caught in Political Deadlock. Reporter: Fran Kelly. 
28 Cited in: Betts, "Boatpeople and Public Opinion in Australia," pp. 41-42. 
29 Kim Beazley. (2001, 29 August). Border Protection Bill 2001: Second Reading. 
Parliamentary Speech, House of Representatives. Official Hansard. Commonwealth of 
Australia, p. 30570.  
30 Cited in Marr and Wilkinson, Dark Victory p. 99. 
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PM estimated that on 31 August, based on “an analysis of talkback radio over 
the last week”, 78 percent of callers supported the government’s handling of 
Tampa, but that support dropped to 47 percent after the government sent the 
troops on the ship.31 Though there seemed support for the broader issues. 
PM’s managing director said in the broadcast just cited that support was “a 
level that we've not seen for any other government initiative since they’ve been 
in power”.  
 
With regard to broader issues, Birrell and Betts argue that public sentiment was 
not only directed at refugees, but against any increase of “newcomers” to 
Australia.32 The opinion polls quoted in the article just cited show that, with 
only a few exceptions in the 1960s and between 1996 and 2000, people 
thought since 1954 that there were “too many” people in Australia. Birrell and 
Betts note that in 1996, almost 70 per cent of the poll sample thought there 
were “too many” inhabitants, and this rate steadily dropped to 43 per cent by 
the year 2000. As much as the data cited by Birrell and Betts lead to the 
conclusion that public sentiment was not directed against refugees, the data do 
not indicate that the public had become accepting of refugees. Just how to 
assess public opinion about refugees was far from clear. Katharine Betts 
observed that political analysts did not predict such a high level of support for 
the government’s policies from the content of letters to the editors in 
“mainstream forums at the time of the Tampa.33  
 
It seems from the discussion so far that indicators of public opinion did not 
consistently indicate support for the refugee policies of the Howard 
government, and that the public may not have supported every aspect of the 
policies. This may be due to a failure of the polls to reflect a difference in 
opinion about the broad and the specific aspects of refugee policies. Two 
                                            
31 PM [ABC Radio Broadcast] (2001, 31 August). Talkback Radio Reveals Anti-Muslim 
Sentiment. Reporter: Leigh Sales.  
32 Robert Birrell and Katharine Betts, "Australians' Attitudes to Migration," Review - Institute 
of Public Affairs 53, no. 4 (2001): p. 3. 
33 Betts, "Boatpeople and Public Opinion in Australia," p. 43. 
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examples illustrate this difference. In the first example, public concerns were 
raised when the Howard government consulted with local residents about 
opening the detention centre at Woomera.34 Woomera residents expressed 
concerns “about the level of security, the possible spread of disease and the 
level of comfort offered to the illegal immigrants”.35 Similar issues emerged in 
the second example from an opinion poll on building the Baxter detention 
centre near Port Augusta in South Australia.36 In a random sample of over four 
hundred Port Augusta residents, over 75 per cent indicated that they 
disapproved (“disagree” or “strongly disagree”) of asylum seekers being 
housed at the Baxter detention centre near Port Augusta. It appears from the 
article just cited that, whilst most approved of the government policies, they 
did not want refugees in their local area, citing “security and safety” as main 
concerns.  
 
It appears from the previous two examples that in Woomera and later in 
Baxter, the issue to the electorate was not the policy of mandatory detention, 
but receiving assurances about perceived safety concerns. The remainder of 
this section moves from percentages obtained in opinion polls and discusses 
the broader, non-numerical aspects of public legitimation of refugee policies. 
Two months before the 2001 federal election, it was suggested on the PM 
radio program that keeping the Tampa out would translate into considerable 
electoral advantage to the Liberal Party. John Howard denied a connection 
between the Tampa and the polls: 
 
No, it’s not. That is absolutely absurd. It’s not. This has got nothing to do with the 
upcoming election. I wish that this problem were not ours. I don’t find it easy. It's a 
very difficult issue. We’re trying to balance our legitimate right to preserve our border 
                                            
34 Amanda Vanstone. (1999, 9 November). Woomera to Accommodate Illegal Arrivals 
(Media Release, MPS 161/99).  
35 Paul Starrick, "Refugees Welcome; Woomera Popular Choice for Detention Centre," 
Advertiser, 11 November 1999. 
36 Natascha Klocker, "Community Antagonism Towards Asylum Seekers in Port Augusta, 
South Australia," Australian Geographical Studies 42, no. 1 (2004): pp. 7- 9. 
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integrity with our very legitimate concern as a nation that for generations has taken 
refugees from all around the world and has a wonderful humanitarian record.37 
 
Some commentators disagreed, and suggested that a strong link existed. Paul 
Williams argued that the Howard government not only improved its electoral 
standing from an approval rating that had fallen to 40 percent, but also 
“legitimately claimed a mandate to introduce a raft of ‘border protection’ 
legislation”.38 Gary Johns expressed a similar view when he wrote: “The 
electorate chose a Prime Minister to reflect its concern about who comes to 
Australia, and who gets to stay”.39 Keith Suter recognised the Tampa issue “at 
the heart of the election campaign” and argued that this led to an unexpected 
win for the Liberal coalition government.40 Guy Rundle argued in his Quarterly 
Essay that the Tampa assisted John Howard to generate an expression of unity 
through the perception that the Tampa constituted an external attack on 
Australia.41 Marr and Wilkinson suggested that the perception of unity was 
consolidated through “the rhetoric of scapegoats, of enemies, and aliens”.42 
Journalist Peter Mares wrote of “a khaki election” after “the September 11 
terror attacks on New York and Washington [that] pushed defence concerns to 
the top of the political agenda”.43  
 
James Jupp related John Howard’s response to the Tampa to gaining votes.44 In 
the article, Jupp argues that the government’s new refugee policies recaptured 
the one million voters, who in the 1998 federal election turned from the 
Liberal Party and voted for Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party. Jupp built his 
                                            
37 PM [ABC Radio Broadcast]. (2001, 31 August). Howard Defends Australian Stand on 
Tampa.  
38 Paul Williams, "Tampa, Terrorism & Temptation: The Howard Government and the 
Misuse of 'Mandate'," Social Alternatives 21, no. 3 (2002): pp. 30-32. 
39 Gary Johns, "Electorate Wins Battle, Elites Winning War," Institute of Public Affairs 53, no. 
4 (2001). 
40 Keith Suter, "Tampa to the Rescue," World Today 57, no. 10 (2001). 
41 Guy Rundle, "The Opportunist. John Howard and the Triumph of Reaction," Black Inc 
Quarterly Essay, no. 3 (2001): p. 17. 
42 Marr and Wilkinson, Dark Victory, p. 131. 
43 Mares, Borderline: Australia's Response to Refugees and Asylum Seekers in the Wake of 
the Tampa, p. 134. 
44 James Jupp, From White Australia to Woomera. The Story of Australian Immigration. 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002) pp. 197-99. 
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argument by pointing out similarities between Hanson’s proposed, and 
Howard’s actual refugee policies. These key elements consisted of the forcible 
removal of asylum seekers from Australia, the processing of asylum claims in 
camps abroad at Australia’s expense, the denial of family reunion to bona-fide 
refugees, and the redefinition of borders that resulted in the excision legislation 
of the Border Protection Act. Jupp also notes that presenting the rationales for 
these policies occurred through the use of different language. Accordingly, the 
Howard government framed the rationales for these policies as a need to 
maintain “the integrity of the system” in an attempt to prevent opening “the 
floodgates to huge numbers of new arrivals”, and to prevent “people 
smuggling [as] a growing criminal threat to national borders” and to retain 
control over the process.45  
 
Robert Manne went as far as arguing that the Howard government was re-
elected in 2001 on the Tampa issue alone.46 George Megalogenis disagreed with 
Manne’s view just cited and, whilst concurring that “the Tampa flipped the 
tables”, nevertheless concludes that “Howard didn’t need the Tampa … he 
would have won without it”.47 Without agreeing or disagreeing with either 
argument, I wish to pursue the broader context in which Megalogenis discusses 
the public legitimation of the Howard government’s refugee policies.48 
Megalogenis counters Manne’s proposition by writing that all of Howard’s 
elections “were reduced to a single issue … Keating in 1996, tax reform in 
1998, border protection in 2001, and interest rates in 2004”. To focus on the 
single issue of the election campaign, however, would be detracting from John 
Howard as a “brilliant politician” who “took the pulse of the nation” and, “the 
longer he ruled, the more comfortable he was with the electorate’s 
contradictions”.49  
                                            
45 Ibid., p. 197. 
46 Robert Manne, "How a Single-Issue Party Held on to Power.," Sydney Morning Herald, 12 
November 2001. 
47 George Megalogenis, The Longest Decade (Carlton North, Vic: Scribe Publications, 2006) 
p. 262. 
48 Ibid., p. 298. 
49 Ibid. 
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The reference to “contradictions” in the previous sentence suggests that public 
legitimation of government policies was more than reading the wishes of the 
electorate, but to unite the electorate behind a new purpose. Such purpose that 
overcomes contradictions within the electorate, should it indeed exist, would 
most likely transcend pre-occupations with approval ratings at opinion or 
questions about which political party one prefers. Such purpose would also 
address a broader platform of unity than the ideology of legal rationalism that 
was postulated in this thesis: the fetishising of rules and procedures of legal 
rationality, and the misuse of legal rationality for other ends. Public 
legitimation would instead incorporate what Megalogenis in the previous 
paragraph calls “the pulse of the nation”. Could refugee policy be part of a 
politically managed nationalism that had exclusion of non-nationals as a basic, 
though unstated, assumption? This question will be addressed in the next 
section. 
 
 
Of contest and agreement 
 
This section discusses the contributing factors of how refugees were framed as 
outsiders. The Howard government framed refugees as rich and undeserving 
“economic migrants” who preferred to engage the services of people 
smugglers and defied the law-and-order stereotype by jumping the queue. It is 
suggested that this exclusionary stereotype was promoted in public discourse 
especially at the time before the 2001 federal election, when another stereotype 
was briefly added: one that promoted the framing of refugees as 
psychologically incompatible with Australians. The arrival of the Tampa three 
months before the election took public discourse to a new level, according to 
Peter Mares: 
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The Tampa affair polarised public opinion like few issues before it, and it worked to 
the government’s advantage. There was little doubt that the knee-jerk response of 
most voters was to support John Howard’s decision to refuse to allow the rescued 
asylum seekers to land at Christmas Island … On 10 November John Howard was 
swept back into office for a third term – a victory that had seemed unlikely just a few 
months earlier.50  
 
Rather than asking what was so powerful about the Tampa, it may be more 
useful to ask: what factors featured most prominently in public discourse at 
that time? Don McMaster’s research, published about six months before the 
arrival of the Tampa, identified a trend in modern immigration policies that he 
explained in terms of creating an Australian national identity.51 More 
specifically, McMaster observed exclusionary practices that couched refugee 
issues around notions of citizenship.52 Mary Crock observes that in Justice 
Beaumont’s judgement on the Tampa case, the word alien “appears no less than 
27 times in the 30 paragraphs of his judgement”.53  
 
One can see how legal rationalism, through its emphasis on couching refugee 
debate in terms of legal rules and procedures, may have masked an underlying 
ideology of nationalism. Yet there is an argument that that the framing of 
refugees by the Howard government as a threat to sovereignty even had legal 
substance: Dauvergne argues that the commitment of governments to the 
Convention on the Status of Refugees is a sovereign decision by itself.54 Furthermore, 
governments have control over how the Convention is realised within their 
borders. Dauvergne argues that what is framed as arguments about 
sovereignty, illegality and border control, is actually political argumentation 
designed to show the strength of a nation.  
                                            
50 Mares, Borderline: Australia's Response to Refugees and Asylum Seekers in the Wake of 
the Tampa, p. 134. 
51 Don McMaster, Asylum Seekers. Australia's Response to Refugees (Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 2001) p. 158. 
52 Ibid., pp. 169-70. 
53 Crock, "Judging Refugees: The Clash of Power and Institutions in the Development of 
Australian Refugee Law," p. 68. 
54 Catherine Dauvergne, "Sovereignty, Migration and the Rule of Law in Globalt|Mes," The 
Modern Law Review 64, no. 4 (2004): pp. 597-601. 
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The question arises: how does the electorate decide whom to exclude? Jürgen 
Habermas seeks to answer this question by exploring how the public 
legitimates what is acceptable in society. It will be recalled that, according to 
Habermas, rules are established through public discourse, where members of 
society decide what governs their behaviour. Validity is achieved by agreement, 
when argumentation is rational and without coercion.55 The Habermas model 
works on evaluation of rational argumentation against democratic principles, 
which sets the “ethical dimensions of everyday life”.56 If such evaluation occurs 
through the law, where the rules determine whom to include and exclude, then 
the legal system would also play a part in how the public debates nationalism. 
From this perspective, it is possible that legal rationalism masked occurred as 
an ideological projection of nationalism, with nationalism as the ideology that 
was driving the inconsistent applications of legal rationality that were observed 
in the case studies.  
 
Nationalism, in this sense, is an ideology that consists of a patriotism that goes 
beyond nationality and citizenship. Rather than asking  why the Howard 
government resorted to legal rationalism, it is more consistent with the tenet of 
this thesis to ask if the government introduced into public discourse 
exclusionary stereotypes that may be consistent with nationalism. It is 
suggested that some of the exclusion criteria that the Howard government 
advanced in public discourse not only assisted with legitimation of refugee 
policies by the electorate. It is also suggested that such exclusion criteria went 
beyond the exclusion criteria set by a legal-rational approach derived from 
legislation and policy practices. As will be seen shortly, the Howard 
government introduced into public discourse refugee stereotypes that were 
broader than questions of refugee determination and travel documentation.  
 
                                            
55 George Snedeker, The Politics of Critical Theory (Lanham Maryland: University Press of 
America, 2004) p. 73. 
56 Ibid., p. 75. 
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Marian Maddox observes how the government tolerated the debate that 
stereotyped Muslim as the symbolic Other. In a radio interview with John 
Laws on radio 2UE on 21 November 2001, John Howard did not actively 
promote exclusionary stereoypes, yet did little to discourage them. Maddox 
cites the example from the radio broadcast, where John Howard commented 
on “the Reverend Fred Nile’s suggestion that Muslim women should not be 
allowed to wear full body and head coverings in public”.57 Maddox continues 
that in this interview, “John Howard gave his customary reassurances of 
Australian decency, tolerance and commitment to equality”. Then, Maddox 
goes on, the Prime Minister also acknowledged that Fred Nile represented “the 
views of a lot of people”, and acknowledged the validity of such views by 
saying: “I understand what he’s getting at”. It was obvious from Maddox’ 
discussion that the radio interview was not about fashion, but about cultural 
and religious differences that had implications about whether Muslims had a 
place in Australian society.   
 
During one event, the children overboard affair, the Howard government 
actively promoted an exclusionary stereotype, going further than the example 
cited in the previous paragraph. Senior members of the Howard government 
presented the stereotype to the public almost exclusively as a moral issue and 
claimed an incompatibility with Australian values. These were the facts, as 
presented by Commander Norman Banks of the Australian Navy to a 
subsequent Senate Inquiry:58 on 6 October 2001, an air force surveillance plane 
spotted the Oblong, or Siev 4 in the language of the Department of Immigration 
and Multicultural Affairs, with 223 people on board. The soldiers were ordered 
to “deter the Siev and its passengers from seeking access to Christmas Island”. 
HMAS Adelaide approached, but the continued to move toward Christmas 
Island, despite warning shots and messages over the loudspeaker.  
                                            
57 Marion Maddox, God under Howard. The Rise of the Religious Right in Australian Politics 
(Crows Nest, NSW: Allen&Unwin, 2005) p. 177. 
58 Commonwealth of Australia. (2002, 25 March – 30 July). Senate Select Committee on a 
Certain Maritime Incident (Official Committee Hansard). Statement by Norman Banks, 
Commander, Royal Australian Navy, p. 158. 
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Over the following days, the press reported that passengers from the Oblong 
had thrown their children into the water when HMAS Adelaide approached. 
The Age newspaper reported that the government claimed that this was “a 
premeditated way to force themselves into the country”.59 The same newspaper 
article added that Immigration Minister Ruddock said that boat passengers had 
thrown “a number of children” into the sea, in a “clearly planned and 
premeditated” attempt to force their way into Australia. When questioned 
three days later by a reporter on the veracity of such claim, Defence Minister 
Peter Reith produced two photographs of children and adults in the water, and 
said: “the fact is the children were thrown into the water”, and added there also 
was video evidence of this.60 
 
It was revealed later that the facts did not support the story that the Howard 
government promoted about one month before the November 2001 federal 
election: Commander Banks told a Senate Inquiry in March 2002 that the 
published photograph was cropped from a larger photograph that was taken as 
the Oblong was sinking “nose down”, and that the video, released on 8 
November 2001, contained no evidence that children were thrown into the 
water.61 Yet even when doubts arose about the children overboard allegations, 
the Howard government continued its unprecedented anti-refugee campaign. 
Prime Minister Howard declared on three consecutive days “that he didn't 
want ‘people like that in Australia’”.62 Foreign Minister Downer said that no 
civilised person would ever “dream of treating their own children in that 
way”.63  
 
                                            
59 Sophie Douez and Mark Forbes, "Boat People 'Threw Children Overboard'," Age, 8 
October 2001. 
60 Andrew Clennell, Craig Skehan, and Michelle Grattan, "Pictures Tell the Story, Says 
Reith," Sydney Morning Herald, 11 October 2001. 
61 Commonwealth of Australia. (2002, 25 March – 30 July). Senate Select Committee on a 
Certain Maritime Incident (Official Committee Hansard). 
62 Michael Gordon, "Do the Pictures Really Tell the Story?," Age, 11 October 2001. 
63 Ibid. 
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The previous two paragraphs indicate how the Howard government 
introduced into public discourse information that went beyond legal 
rationalism and justifications of refugee policy: it was a matter of turning public 
sentiments against refugees and to legitimate their exclusion from Australia. 
Four years later, when delivering the 2005 Earle Page Memorial Oration, 
historian Keith Windschuttle re-visited the children overboard story.64 
Windschuttle points to a section in David Marr and Marian Wilkinson’s book 
Dark Victory, where the authors state that their research has revealed several 
precedents to the government’s claims of children overboard: 
 
Marr and Wilkinson reveal one case of a three-year-old child thrown overboard, four 
cases of boat people threatening to try to throw children overboard, and one case 
where they deliberately set fire to the boat, putting 100 people who could not swim 
into the sea, including several children, a twelve-month old and two-week-old baby. 
The children overboard business was a scandal alright, but the culprits were not John 
Howard or Philip Ruddock.65 
 
In children overboard, the government recast previous facts as if they had 
occurred at that time, and presented them in the context of the upcoming 
election. So it is difficult to concur with Windschuttle’s conclusion in the 
above citation “that the oft repeated claim that the government lied about the 
children being thrown overboard, is itself a lie”. Had the children overboard 
allegations been correct, as Marion Maddox observes, it would have been one 
case among those of several thousand people who approached Australia’s 
shores.66 Instead, Maddox writes, “they all had become ‘people like that’”, so 
that children overboard “seemed tailor-made” to build an exclusionary 
stereotype.  
 
                                            
64 Keith Windschuttle, "Vilifying Australia. The Perverse Ideology of Our Adversary Culture”, 
Quadrant (2005). 
65 Ibid., p. 22. 
66 Maddox, God under Howard. The Rise of the Religious Right in Australian Politics, p. 171. 
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One can see from the above example how the power of rhetoric in public 
discourse depends on control over the timing and release of carefully selected 
information. In previous chapters, it was argued that the Howard government 
controlled public discourse through controlling the timing of the release of 
independent reports about government performance and accountability. These 
were reports released by the National Audit Office, the Ombudsman and the 
Human Rights Commissioner. In this section, there emerges another type of 
information controlled by the government: the selective presentation of 
information on refugee issues that the media can report as news.  
 
Crucial to the formation of public opinion is an unrestricted media. The 
government says it objects to reporters having access of detention centres, to 
respect the privacy of those detained. Such objection would be plausible, were 
it not for the release of information by the government in a way that sought to 
justify government policy. Although Operation Relex was conducted out of 
public view, the government later released “dozens of hours” of “video tapes 
of asylum seekers – in close up, clearly identifying them” when it suited the 
government.67 This also became evident when the Tampa was off the coast of 
Christmas Island. All media comments were strictly controlled, and at that time 
were handled directly by the Defence Minister.68  The following example, taken 
from the Courier Mail newspaper, shows how easy it is to take selective 
information out of context.69 The example is about video footage that was 
played during a court case: “Authorities gave Tampa asylum seekers a pot of 
jam and filmed them diving for it to portray them as wild people during a 
hunger strike aboard HMAS Manoora”. The article continues that an eyewitness 
also told the court that people shown in this video had not eaten for ten days.  
 
                                            
67 Marr and Wilkinson, Dark Victory p. 136. 
68 Commonwealth of Australia. (2002, 25 March – 30 July). Senate Select Committee on a 
Certain Maritime Incident (Official Committee Hansard). Statement by Tim Bloomfield, 
Director, Media Liaison, Department of Defence, 17 April. p. 1,173. 
69 Liza Kapelle, "Starving Boat People Given Jam," Courier Mail, 19 September 2002. 
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The ability to selectively direct media attention, especially when combined with 
the power to exclude other information at that time, makes political rhetoric a 
powerful tool in achieving public legitimation for government policies. It has 
to do with how governments “prime” public opinion at the time, as noted 
from Murray Goot’s work quoted earlier in this chapter.70  For instance, one 
government report primed the debate by framing refugees as “illegals” even 
before they arrived in 1999.71 Viewed in this context, the findings of another 
government report may not come as a surprise: although the number of 
unauthorised air arrivals was far higher than the number of unauthorised boat 
arrivals, most of the media attention concentrated on boat arrivals as a people 
smuggling issue.72 Such media attention was consistent with the language 
claims by the Howard government that framed as “illegals” those uninvited 
refugees who arrived by boat, but ignored those who arrived by plane. This 
trend was especially notable between 1999 and 2002, where the government’s 
language claims discussed in the case studies were about boat arrivals.  
 
For the reminder of this chapter, I wish to reflect on the reciprocal nature of 
priming public debate between the Howard government and the public during 
the timeframe of the case studies. In the first example, longitudinal data 
published by Newspoll indicates a powerful relationship between public 
opinion and the importance of the debate at that time. 73  The data show that at 
least 50 per cent of the sample indicated during a telephone survey just after 
the Tampa arrived at the end of August 2001 that all boats should be sent back. 
                                            
70 Goot, "Politicians, Public Policy and Poll Following: Conceptual Difficulties and Empirical 
Realities," p. 197. 
71 Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. (1999). DIMA - Illegal Migration 
Issues Protecting the Border: Immigration Compliance. [Departmental Website]. 
72 Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. (Unknown). Unauthorised Arrivals. 
[Departmental Website]. 
73 Newspoll Data. (2004, 15 August). [Newspoll Website]. Question 1. “Thinking now about 
asylum seekers or refugees trying to enter Australia illegally. Which one of the following are 
you personally most in favour of with regards to boats carrying asylum-seekers entering 
Australia? Do you think Australia should [a] turn back all boats carrying asylum-seekers, [b] 
allow some boats to enter Australia depending on the circumstances [c] allow all boats 
carrying asylum-seekers to enter Australia? (a, b, c in brackets added).” Question 2. “Now 
about the Howard Coalition Government's actions in 2001 surrounding the Tampa issue and 
how you currently feel about this. Do you personally agree or disagree with the actions of 
the Howard Coalition Government in 2001 on the Tampa issue?” 
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This increased to 56 per cent in October 2001. The poll results just cited 
occurred in a specific context when the Howard government primed the 
refugee debate: Newspoll collected the second sample with even higher 
approval ratings for the government’s policies than in the first sample shortly 
after the attacks on America in September 2001, around the time of the 
children overboard affair, and a few weeks before the Federal election.  
 
One year later, when the debate and the politicising of the refugee events as a 
“crisis” had subsided, and the government had ordered an Ombudsman’s 
investigation into allegations that approximately 200 Australian citizens or 
residents had been detained under immigration law, the poll results changed 
considerably. Then, Newspoll results cited at the beginning of the previous 
paragraph showed that only 35 percent of the sample approved of sending all 
boats back, and 48 percent indicated that some boats should be allowed “to 
enter Australia, depending on the circumstances”. It appears from these data 
that in September and October 2001, when the Howard government primed 
public debate about refugee policy in terms of national security and an assault 
on Australia’s legal system, public legitimation for the government’s policies 
was at its highest. However, the cited Newspoll source also indicated that the 
vast majority (90 per cent in 2001 and 86 per cent in 2002) remained opposed 
to allowing “all boats carrying asylum seekers to enter Australia”, and approved 
of a screening process for all entrants to Australia. One may infer from the 
Newspoll results that similar public legitimation of government policy may 
occur as occurred in 2001, if another event occurred that was also framed by a 
government as an assault on Australia.  
 
Public legitimation of refugee policies between 1999 and 2003, in contrast with 
the relatively more permanent legitimation through the institutions of law and 
bureaucracy, thus depended on the intensity of public debate. Yet there must 
also be some congruence between institutional and public legitimation. An 
article by Adrienne Millbank suggests that the Howard government may have 
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breached this gap between public and institutional legitimation.74 Millbank 
argues that the government’s response to the Tampa may have been so 
successful that it may even become the world’s best-practice model because 
other European countries have attempted to implement part of that model; 
most significantly the concept of detention abroad without ever allowing 
asylum seekers into the country. Millbank partly attributes the political success 
of the model to the government’s rhetoric of “calling asylum seekers queue 
jumpers, without denying that they may be refugees”. Such rhetoric is not 
inconsistent with the legal-institutional aspects of policy legitimation: Millbank 
continues that Australia has shown that a “sizable inflow of asylum seekers ... 
can be stopped, while the country (at least technically) remains within 
international treaty obligations”. 
 
A few examples illustrate this interplay between the intensity of public debate 
and institutional legitimation. It is suggested from the outset that the Howard 
government was not “fixed” in one or the other form of legitimation, but 
consistent with the legitimation sought through legal rationalism, responded 
selectively to the timing and context of the debate. On 19 October 2001, the 
refugee boat Siev X sank on its way to Christmas Island. Among the 46 
survivors was Sundous, but her three children were among the 353 people who 
did not make it. Her intention was to follow her husband, Mr Al-Zalimi, who 
already lived in Sydney on a Temporary Protection Visa. Under the terms of 
the visa, Al-Zalimi was free to leave Australia and be with his wife after these 
tragic events. But would be denied permission to come back, and would need 
to re-apply for his refugee protection. Al-Zalimi asked the government for 
special permission to vary his visa condition, so he could comfort his wife in 
Indonesia after their tragic loss. The government refused. Tony Jones of 
Lateline asked the Prime Minister if “the images of him going back would have 
somehow mitigated against the tenor of your campaign”. John Howard denied 
                                            
74 Adrienne Millbank, "World's Worst or World's Best Practice? European Reactions to 
Australia's Refugee Policy," People and Place 12, no. 4 (2004): pp. 33-35. 
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that he took “advice on the political impact on something like that”, and said 
that the question was “close to offensive”.75  
 
One year later, a similar story unfolded, but there was no pending election. In 
this example, a refugee applicant was detained at the Baxter detention centre. 
His wife and children were on their way to Australia, but only got as far as Bali. 
The wife died during the Bali bombing in October 2002, but the two children 
survived. Despite the compelling circumstances, the Immigration Minster 
refused a visiting visa for the children, in case refugee supporters would 
“campaign for them to be able to be permanently with their father here in 
Australia”.76 However, coincidence favoured the family in “a victory for public 
pressure aided by a fortuitous twist”.77 According to the newspaper report just 
cited, the Prime Minster was photographed in Bali, unaware he was holding 
hands with both children. This photograph was circulated as the symbol of the 
heartless refugee policies of the Howard government. Immigration Minister 
Amanda Vanstone subsequently exercised ministerial discretion and gave 
permanent residency to the family.78 
 
Significant about the examples in the previous two paragraphs is that when 
these events occurred, there were no significant differences between the 
relevant legislation or the polices that applied to these events. The political 
contexts and the government’s policy practices, however, differed markedly. As 
late as six months before the arrival of the first refugee boats of the case 
studies in November 1999, the Howard government framed its refugee policies 
differently. For about one year after announcing the arrival of Kosovar 
refugees in April 1999, the Howard government continued to frame the 
                                            
75 Lateline [ABC Television Broadcast]. (2001, 8 November). Cited in Marr and Wilkinson, 
Dark Victory pp. 241-42. 
76 7.30 Report [ABC Television Broadcast]. (2003, 14 April). Bali Bombing Victims Still in 
Limbo. Reporter: Mary Gearin.  
77 Penelope Debelle, "At the Stroke of a Pen, Freedom and Love Restored," The Age, 30 
November 2003. 
78 7.30 Report [ABC Television Broadcast]. (2003, 6 November). Sammaki Children Granted 
Permanent Residency. Reporter: Mary Gearin.  
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Kosovars as people in need. It seemed that public opinion was on side then, as 
it was throughout the timeframe of the case studies, despite a marked 
differences in policies. It is even possible that, after initially framing refugees as 
welcome visitors, the public would react differently to refugees who were 
framed as a threat to national sovereignty and to law-and-order.  
 
As the Kosovars arrived, Immigration Minister Ruddock announced that he 
would not lock up the Kosovars, and also said “he would welcome people 
befriending the visitors and taking them on outings”.79 The Kosovars did not 
need health and security checks, and were therefore not framed as diseased and 
criminal stereotypes.80 The Courier Mail even called them “temporary 
Aussies”.81 They were greeted with “inflatable jumping castles for the children, 
access to the Internet, money to make telephone calls and the welcoming 
presence of the Prime Minister and Mrs Howard”, as well as generous 
donations.82 Even when the government later removed the Kosovars from 
Australia and detained those who resisted such removal, the government did 
not portray them as dangerous escapees, as was the case after the Woomera 
escapes in June 2000. The Courier Mail reported that in response to three 
Kosovars who had escaped from immigration detention, a government 
representative said this was “no big drama and that the refugees would be 
found”.83 
 
Public legitimation of government policies, it seemed, was congruent with how 
the Howard government has framed the Kosovar refugees. However, the long-
held public resentment against newcomers that was reflected in ongoing 
opinion polls over almost half a century returned quickly. The Kosovars were 
                                            
79 Miles Kemp, "Woomera and Hampstead Bases to Take 750 in Refugee Airlift," Advertiser, 
10 April 1999. 
80 Ian McPhedran, "Plans Begin for Nation's Biggest Airlift," Courier Mail, 8 April 1999. 
81 Peter Charlton, "Rousing Welcome for Our Temporary Aussies," Courier Mail, 8 May 
1999. 
82 Tony Stephens and Andrew Darby, "Clothes, Castles, Cash and PM Await Kosovars," 
Sydney Morning Herald, 7 May 1999. 
83 Greg Rule and Carmel Egan, "Kosovars Hide as Deadline Runs Out," Courier Mail, 12 
April 2000. 
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welcome, but only temporarily. The Howard government did not invite them 
to become part of Australia. Those Kosovar refugees who resisted being 
returned home were no longer framed as welcome visitors, but as ungrateful. 
Philip Ruddock’s comments about an incident at a refugee camp indicate this 
change: 
 
How dare ‘those people’ … complain about Singleton when ‘they came from tents 
where running water is not available, where toilet facilities were built for an 
emergency situation ... and there was significant overcrowding and risk of disease’.84  
 
The Kosovars’ story concluded when Immigration Minister Amanda Vanstone 
granted permanent protection to the remaining 36 of an initial number of 
4,000 refugees more than two years after the above incident.85 The refugees 
from Kosovo were invited to come to Australia, but the refugees from the 
Middle East who arrived between 1999 and 2003 were not. However, as the 
following example of East Timorese refugees shows, mode of arrival was not 
the only determinant of how the Howard government framed refugee issues in 
public discourse. Moreover, the Howard government’s framing of the East 
Timorese in early to mid-2003 cannot be explained by the lessening of political 
salience. At that time, the Howard government pursued the “involuntary 
repatriation of 227 Iranian detainees in Australian detention centres”.86 Afghan 
refugees had been offered a similar package at that time. This package 
consisted of a cash incentive between $2,000 and $10,000.87 
 
Against this political backdrop, the Australian government approached the 
East Timorese refugees. Peter Mares explains that the East Timorese presented 
to the Howard government an ongoing legacy from the previous Hawke and 
                                            
84 Frank Devine, "Bungling Leaves Behind a Busload of Rancour," The Australian, 7 March 
2002. 
85 Andra Jackson, "Visa Reprieve for Kosovo Refugees," Age, 7 August 2004. 
86 Julie Macken, "Ruddock's Iran Deal Shrouded in Doubt," Australian Financial Review, 2 
May 2003. 
87 SBS Television News. (2003, 4 May). Iranian Asylum Seekers Refuse Repatriation Offer 
Reporter: Madeleine Byrne.  
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Keating Labor governments:88 some had arrived by boat after they survived the 
Santa Cruz massacre of 1991, or prior to that in 1989. Most came between 
1994 and 1995 on tourist visas, and had lived in Australia since. But the 
government stopped processing their refugee applications when East Timor 
became independent in 2002. 
 
Unlike the Kosovars, the East Timorese had become part of Australia. In 
contrast to refugees from the Middle East, the East Timorese were not faceless 
people locked up in immigration detention centres but had lived in the 
Australian community for approximately ten years. Their children attended 
Australian schools and had never been to East Timor. In a massive show of 
community support, “the government had come under pressure for refusing 
permanent residency to the 1,600 East Timorese” and Philip Ruddock 
“announced he had granted “reprieves to 379 East Timorese”.89 However, the 
future of the remaining 1,200 people was uncertain.90 As the Howard 
government intensified the pressure to deport East Timorese refugees, 
community support grew. Staff of the Richmond West Primary School publicly 
argued that they should stay and mayors of eight city councils signed a joint 
letter at a public function and asked the government for a quick 
determination.91 The matter was fully resolved one year later, when the 
remaining sixty East Timorese received a permanent residency visa, after 
Immigration Minster Amanda Vanstone exercised her discretion to intervene.92 
 
As can be seen from the examples in this section, the public refined and at 
times challenged the exclusionary stereotype that the Howard government 
constructed about refugees. The public accepted the construction of refugees 
                                            
88 Mares, Borderline: Australia's Response to Refugees and Asylum Seekers in the Wake of 
the Tampa, p. 210. 
89 Cynthia Banham, Craig Skehan, and John Garnaut, "Ruddock's $10,000 Man Faces 
Extradition," Sydney Morning Herald, 4 June 2003. 
90 Author Unknown, "More East Timorese Likely to Stay: Ruddock," Age, 5 June 2003. 
91 Andra Jackson, "Wait on Appeals Taking Toll on East Timorese Children," Age, 25 June 
2003. 
92 SBS Radio News. (2004, 20 Aug). East Timorese Granted Asylum.  
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as outsiders when refugees were literally outside the public domain. However, 
the exclusion was challenged when the public met the people, saw their 
photographs or had detailed information about their hardship. In the examples 
discussed in this section, the Howard government was prepared to make 
temporary exceptions, whilst persisting with the general direction of policy. A 
similar strategy of exception was observed in the case studies, when the public 
challenged the Howard government’s policy justifications that were in this 
thesis explained by a pattern of legal rationalism.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The goal of this chapter was to analyse the engagement of the Howard 
government with public discourse. The analysis showed that the exclusionary 
frame was an important component of that argument, together with the 
defence frame. The rhetorical recourse to legal rationality in this process 
consisted of appearing as a “neutral” requirement to abide by the requirements 
of law-and-order. Yet a less obvious component was the ideological use of 
legal rationality where political framing implied that the value system of 
refugees was incongruent with the value of Australians to observe law-and-
order processes. This deferred legal rationalism came especially to the fore 
during those moments in public discourse, when the Howard government used 
not a legal rationality argument, but an exclusion argument. It was observed in 
this chapter that the Howard government promoted the exclusion argument 
especially during the children overboard, and the Tampa episodes. Through the 
framing process, an implicit argument was projected that refugees were 
incompatible with the symbolism that legal rationality represents in Australian 
society.  
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Legal rationalism, masquerading as legal rationality, transcended the 
construction of self and other, of caring for those in need, legitimated the use 
of state power that resulted in deprivation of liberty and exclusion of refugees. 
However, there were times when public discourse limited the use of 
government power in this process, as much as there were times when the 
Howard government limited the power of public discourse by restricting the 
media. Restricting media access meant that the government had the power to 
set the parameters of the debate and to control the information that could be 
discussed at those crucial times when public discourse defined the limitations 
of the extent to which refugees should be excluded.  
 
There emerges a suggestion that the exclusionary stereotypes of refugees that 
the Howard government promoted in public discourse occurred in a larger 
context of nationalism, which also defines and excludes some social groups as 
outsiders. This suggestion was not fully explored in this thesis, but may prove 
fertile ground for future research. Future research could address what could 
not be explained in this chapter by legal rationalism: the public display of 
patriotism in the refugee debate and the fervent desire to prevent those framed 
as outsiders from becoming part of Australia’s national identity.  
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The analysis of Section 2 — Themes built on the argument of the case studies 
that the Howard government justified its refugee policies to the electorate by 
using a process called legal rationalism. Embedded in this discussion was the 
question as to whether legal rationalism also holds together the different layers 
of institutional practices, in addition to the day-to-day political justifications by 
which members of the Howard government justified their refugee policies 
between 1999 and 2003. It was argued in Section 2 — Themes that there was 
evidence for the conceptual presentation of an interaction effect that was 
predicted in Table 2 at the introduction to this section, for three main reasons: 
framing practices, structural changes, and control of public discourse.  
 
First, the Howard government attained a political goal. The framing of 
practices within the institutions of law and bureaucracy increasingly mirrored 
the political arguments by which the Howard government had framed its 
policy responses to refugee issues. For instance, the influence of legal 
rationalism can be seen within the Nauruan legal system, where incarcerated 
refugees are technically not detained, but were forcibly placed there on a 
visitor’s visa. The High Court of Australia accepts this position, and has used 
this framing as a principle when delivering its own determination, which also 
serves as precedent for future court rulings. In Australian courts, there was 
already acceptance by the judiciary that immigration detention is not indefinite 
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but open-ended, although in practice, some people have spent more than five 
years in detention. This came about by the judiciary accepting the conceptual 
framing that immigration detention is an administrative necessity for efficient 
processing of refugee claims.   
 
A second reason for arguing that legal rationalism has found its way from 
policy justifications to institutional framing practices comes from the structural 
changes within the institutions, to accommodate these practices. Some of these 
changes were part of broader changes to the Public Service. However, the 
changes to the accountability process, by which the Ombudsman, Human 
Rights Commissioner and Auditor-General investigate government practices, 
have aided the ideology of legal rationalism in institutional practices. This was 
done partly through structural changes that affected the investigative powers of 
these bodies, and partly due to legal constraints on how the investigative 
bodies release their information to the public. This was aided by a shift in the 
accountability of the refugee assessment process from a judicial to a 
bureaucratic model where the Minister for Immigration has ultimate control 
over the process through special discretionary powers.  
 
In the politically charged climate that was directed at keeping refugees out of 
Australia, there emerged a legal and administrative structure that was least 
accommodating to the interests of refugees, whilst maximally protecting the 
interests of the state. Perhaps most damaging to refugees in the systemic 
process where the electorate is the ultimate arbiter on the acceptability of 
public policy, was the third mechanism by which legal rationalism influenced 
institutional practices. This was the Howard government’s exploitation of anti-
refugee sentiment within the electorate, where the ultimate message was that 
porosity of state borders meant opening the borders to unacceptable outsiders, 
and that the refugee policies of the Howard government were the only 
acceptable means to prevent this. This was done through exploiting anti-
refugee sentiments in the electorate that has been well documented: through 
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longitudinal research over five decades, and through openly racist institutional 
practices in the five decades before that. Public discourse thus was a powerful 
tool in electioneering when framing the wishes of the electorate to coincide 
with the Howard government’s political framing of refugee policies.  
 
In public discourse, the influence of legal rationalism was less readily seen than 
in the law and bureaucracy. One could argue, though not very persuasively, 
that the influence of legal rationalism in public discourse was more indirect, 
perhaps because the policy justifications had established their own credibility 
by becoming corroborated by the institutions of the state. Such credibility, 
however, does not necessarily translate into electoral favour. The persuasion 
came from convincing the electorate that preventing refugees from crossing 
Australia’s borders meant to protect Australians from the ‘other’.  
 
This analysis did not establish a strong basis for arguing a direct connection 
with refugee policy and electoral favour. The strongest argument for such 
connection came from the policy justifications in response the Tampa, which 
preceded the 2001 federal election by just over two months and resulted in a 
landslide win for the Howard government. Yet there is evidence that the 
refugee policies resonated with public opinion, even if it becomes difficult to 
translate such resonance into votes. Such convincing public display of 
agreement with public policy as was the case during the formulation of refugee 
policies between 1999 and 2003, however, readily translates into a popularity 
that was advantageous to the Howard government.  
 
If the process of legal rationalism assisted the Howard government to 
successfully justify its refugee policies, then what are the implications if such 
approach were to become extended to other areas of political framing? To 
begin, the challenge that confronts the utilisation of political power through a 
process of legal rationalism is that this came at a price. One consistent 
observation that has emerged in this thesis is that placing legal rationalism into 
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the centre of justifications for refugee policies assisted the Howard 
government to control when and how information was released to the public. 
This was information about the delivery of the policy, about the institutional 
processes that shape public policy, and information about the outcomes of 
accountability measures that feed back into public discourse.  
 
The challenge that comes to widening the successful use of legal rationalism 
lies in the effects that legal rationalism has already exerted on the institutions 
that control government power. In this systemic tension between the judiciary 
and parliament, there is a danger that, if political process overpowers judicial 
process, such a power shift may affect not only outsiders, but also Australian 
citizens. To some extent, this has already happened, through the detention of 
Australian citizens under immigration law. The government’s almost exclusive 
control over refugee policies, with a concomitant detraction from legal 
principle to a focus on the mechanics of the law that has widened the powers 
of non-judicial forums, may be more cost-effective than the court system. Yet 
non-financial costs are likely to express themselves in diminishing the rights of 
the individual and asserting the rights of the state. How and to what extent this 
affects citizens depends on the extent to which the electorate is willing to 
control state power. It is problematic when the ideological use of legal 
rationality blurs the distinctions between persuasive rhetoric and becomes 
enmeshed with institutional power that sets the foundation for manipulating 
public discourse, so that legal rationalism, rather than the electorate, has the 
potential to set the parameters of democratic process.  
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The central concern of this thesis is to understand a political process of 
identifying and modifying social norms, and how these normative changes 
became justified and fed through the institutions where normativity was 
contested. This thesis claims that this change was driven in large part by legal 
rationalism, an ideological process that reflected the political framing of 
refugees rather than legal rationality in relation to refugee policy. Much time 
was devoted to testing the proposition by the Howard government that these 
changes were a combination of four factors, of which legal rationality was only 
one part.  
 
The thesis in relation to legal rationalism was derived from a combination of 
observing the government’s justificatory claims and from the theoretical 
insights derived from the colonisation thesis of Jürgen Habermas. Three case 
studies analysed how the Howard government justified its refugee policies to 
the electorate. In order to strengthen the argument about legal rationalism in 
this thesis and to argue that legal rationalism dominated the language clams and 
practices of refugee policy, additional material was included that went beyond 
the boundaries of the three case studies. Such material will also be included in 
this chapter.  
 
  
  
  
  
- 320 - 
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis was to give breadth and depth to answering the 
question: how, and to what extent, did the Howard government resort to legal 
rationalism when justifying its refugee policies to the electorate, if at all? The 
case studies concluded that the Howard government’s recourse to legal 
rationality actually constituted legal rationalism. This conclusion was based on 
two features of legal rationalism that emerged throughout the case studies. 
First, there was an at times overbearing appeal to the rules and procedures of 
the law, as if these rules and procedures were an end in themselves and 
therefore the reason for conducting the refugee policies. Second, an analysis of 
the justificatory language claims revealed that some practices were inconsistent 
with these dominant language claims. Both parts of the findings became the 
reason for arguing that the Howard government resorted to legal rationalism, 
and suggested that this may have been consistent with how the government 
had framed the refugees. From the evidence of the case studies, it was argued 
that the Howard government presented a series of apparently legally rational 
arguments that were located outside conventional understandings of legal 
rationality. This argument led to the suggestion that the Howard government 
may have resorted to legal rationalism for reasons of electoral gain, or perhaps 
utilised an opportunity to feed an ideological goal into the practice of legal 
rationality.  
 
If legal rationalism was more consistent with political framing practices than 
legal rationality, how then were these framing practices incorporated into 
institutional practices? The Themes section explored the institutional frame 
that constrained and enabled normative practices to occur within these 
institutional boundaries and through human agency. The question was: were 
there institutional factors that contributed to the practice of legal rationalism? 
This question was discussed in Section 2 — Themes.  
 
The pattern of these factors emerging in Part 2 suggested that there were 
institutional factors that aided the Howard government in legitimating its 
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refugee policies to the electorate. These factors were about the process of 
driving change through the structure of those institutions of the state where 
refugee policy is delivered and contested. The discussion identified a political 
process, exercised through the authority of public office, which brought key 
aspects of refugee policy increasingly under control of the Howard 
government. This was done partly through new legislation and partly through 
the government legitimating its legal rationalist agenda on the basis of these 
institutional changes. Political process, it was argued, was behind the altering of 
jurisdictions and accountability structures, overregulation and micro-
management by the Executive, until the institutional process was brought 
under government control. The resulting changes, it was argued, subsequently 
set the institutional parameters for enabling legal rationalist practices in refugee 
policy.  
 
The remaining question is to ask: how does the political process within the 
institutions, as an enabling factor of legal rationalism, relate to the Habermas 
colonisation thesis? This question will be answered in the two parts of this 
chapter. The discussion of the first section on the significance of legal 
rationalism suggests that colonisation did occur. However, the discussion from 
the previous two sections suggest that colonisation occurred within the legal 
and political systems, where one system of dominance replaced another. This 
conclusion differs from the colonisation thesis, where Habermas predicts that 
the system will colonise the lifeworld. Further exploration of the extent of legal 
rationalism links this discussion with concurrent developments in other areas 
of political analysis. The outcome is a final illustration of how the legal 
rationalist ideology has informed refugee policy, propelled by a political 
process in an ongoing quest where governments seek public legitimation for 
the way in which they frame their public policies. This chapter concludes with 
a suggestion for a solution to resolve the tension created by the functional 
requirements of institutions and the requirement for governments to push 
their ideology of a better world through the institutions of the state. 
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Legal rationalism revisited 
 
Ultimate authority for the institutions of law and parliament comes from the 
people, through the participation in public discourse. The Habermasian model 
of public opinion, according to William Outhwaite, keeps state power in 
check.1 Accordingly, Habermas recognises “two forms of publicity which today 
characterises the political sphere … as the gauge of a process of 
democratisation”. This model of “the exercise of social power and 
domination” is governed by “the mandate of democratic publicity”. This 
model recognises two communication inputs: “the system of informal, 
personal, non-public opinions” and “that of formal, institutionally authorised 
opinions”. Evidence in Chapter 7 — Formation of the Public Voice brought out 
how, through favouring information from the formal channels and discounting 
information from the informal channels, and also through influencing the 
content and the release of official information, the Howard government 
established control over a political process that included the practice of legal 
rationalism.  
 
The discussion in this thesis has ignored the debate of how normativity was 
negotiated within the Howard government. This was largely due to the fact 
that such debate was not evident from the official statements of members of 
the Howard government and from the official records discussed in this thesis. 
The case studies sought to establish a plausible argument that, by constructing 
from ideal types a heuristic referent point for normativity, legal rationalism could 
be inferred, or refuted. This method narrowed the scope of the argument to an 
analysis of justificatory language claims and practices by members of the 
Howard government during four years of refugee policy from 1999 to 2003. 
                                            
1 William Outhwaite, The Habermas Reader, First published in association with Blackwell 
Publishers, Oxford. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996) pp. 35-36. 
  
  
  
  
- 323 - 
 
Conclusion 
From the pattern of justifications, the case studies section concluded that legal 
rationalism emerged as the uneven but dominant pattern in policy practices, 
with the institutions contributing to and enabling legal rationalism through 
institutional practices.  
 
Table 3 depicts an interaction effect between two layers of refugee policy: the 
policy practices where legal rationalism emerged as the dominant pattern, and 
the institutional factors that enabled the practice of legal rationalism. This 
interaction effect emerged from the framing practices. On the one hand, 
refugees were depicted as invaders, inept parents, as an antithesis to human 
values. On the other hand, institutions of the state that addressed the legal-
rational aspects of these framing practices were unable to address the 
ideological framing that skewed institutional practices toward a shifting and 
selective practice of legal rationality.  
 
 
Table 3. Schematic presentation of legal rationalism in the case studies and 
Themes, corresponding to subheadings within each chapter.  
 
 
 
At first glance, Table 3 incorrectly suggests that legal rationalism, as it became 
expressed though public policy at ground level, shaped the institutional factors 
that operated within the larger domain of public policy. Whilst there may be 
some truth in this statement, it was argued at the beginning that the direction 
of the hypothesis was not specified, and that, therefore, the analysis of the 
three case studies did not imply causality. Legal rationalism did not cause these 
institutional factors, but constituted a complex layer that added a new 
dimension to the policy practices in the case studies and the institutional 
Bureaucracy Law Discourse Public Policy 
Institutional factors enabling legal rationalism 
Tampa    
Woomera     
Children  
Dominance of 
Legal 
Rationalism    
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practices in Section 2 — Themes. The case study design follows the logic of 
pattern matching, that “compares an empirically based pattern with a predicted 
one (or with several alternative predictions)”2. This type of case study design is 
analytical, and does not imply causality. Having established that Table 3 
represents a reciprocal, rather than a causal relationship among patterns in the 
dimensions of institutional and policy delivery, it now seems in order to digress 
for a moment and to explore how this two-way process may influence future 
research designs in a three dimensional layering.  
 
It is now time to stretch the analysis to take into account the influence of the 
framing of an issue at the micro-level and of the political process that 
permeates every level of this presentation. To get a more comprehensive view 
of legal rationalism, one can imagine how in its three dimensions, the frame 
can stretch, accommodate and give as it experiences various stresses. The 
Table also suggests that it requires tremendous stress or the removal of several 
supporting blocks for the frame to collapse. Rather than the flat image 
presented in Table 3, there emerges a three-dimensional matrix, of multiple 
determinations. 
 
The analysis showed that political process influenced every layer at the ground 
level and the institutions within this complex matrix of interaction, including 
the development of legal rationalism itself. Had there not been the clear thread 
of political process, then the effects of legal rationalism would have remained 
confined to the events of the case studies and the listing of institutional factors. 
If one accepts the two-way effect of structuration, then the supporting frame 
in the background that combined justifications and events at micro-level with a 
generalised institutional framework has the potential to enhance the reach of 
legal rationalism beyond the issues discussed. Such enhancement of legal 
rationalism is logically possible, because of the potential to disperse the 
                                            
2 Robert Yin, Case Study Research. Design and Methods, ed. Leonard Bickman and Debra 
Rog, third ed., vol. 5, Applied Social Research Methods Series. (Thousand Oaks, California: 
Sage Publications, 2003) p. 116. 
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influence of legal rationalism into almost any area of public policy. The model 
of analysis used in this thesis could then be extended, especially to other areas 
where the delivery of public policy is conducted by government officials, or 
those who act as quasi-government officials on contract to governments.  
 
If legal rationalism fed into the different layers of practices, and aided the 
development of the supporting frame, is there a way for analysts to predict a 
direction that influences the progression of legal rationalism? The evidence of 
the case studies pointed to political process, which mentored legal rationalism 
through the various mazes of the development of refugee policy. There were 
instances where the Howard government changed what would be expected 
with legal rationality. Framing refugees as law-breakers and a threat to national 
sovereignty and to law-and-order did not initiate a response that led the 
government to deal with asylum seeking as a criminal matter. Instead, political 
process directed the interpretation of this framing toward deterring refugees. 
Common to these events is that neither legal rationality nor orderly process 
accorded with these documented practices. Political process emerges as a 
diffuse layer that drove most of the events discussed in the case studies. 
Political process then was the driving force that not only influenced the 
practices at institutional level, but also fine-tuned the way in which legal 
rationalism expressed itself in language claims and policy practices at ground 
level. Whilst the framing was designed to achieve the stated goals, the political 
process behind the frame was designed to achieve an orderly process as long as 
it meant keeping out uninvited refugees. 
 
This political process, as was observed throughout this thesis, relied on the 
Howard government tightly controlling the processes of accountability, micro-
managing information from detention centres - changing jurisdictions and 
passing legislation in response to court judgements, until this political process 
became increasingly under government control throughout the three 
institutions that determined the direction of refugee policy. Such power to 
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isolate the different layers of practice within these different areas resulted in a 
tight control over the discourse, so that the way in which the government 
framed an issue could not easily be disputed at the time. Achieving the goal of 
these political purposes by members of the Howard government relied on the 
ability of the government to fine-tune this process in any direction, including 
the direction of exceptions.  
 
Legal rationalism may threaten the acceptance of its own legitimacy if it is 
removed far enough from the norms and processes of legal rationality. This is 
especially so if legal rationalism moves from refugee policy and colonises other 
areas of public policy. If it were to drive political process through policies that 
affect Australian citizens in the way that it has affected refugee policy, then 
legal rationalism has the potential to undermine public confidence in the legal 
process. The emerging picture would be one of the law becoming separated 
from public decision-making, where framing practices have become a matter of 
sensationalist confrontation. Such practices, however, divorce legal rationality 
from normativity and from the principles behind legal-rational decision-
making, and replaces these with political process that feeds a legal rationalist 
agenda consistent with the ideology of the governing political party. The 
significance of such extension of legal rationalism would impede the ability of 
the legal system to judge on principles, and instead manipulate the institutions 
of the state through arbitrariness of legal and political processes. Such 
precedent already exists, as has been the argument of this thesis. Were future 
governments to extend a similar model of legal rationalism into legislation over 
Australian citizens, then marginalised people are likely to suffer the most 
adverse effects, because they are least likely to argue their case through the 
legal and political structures.  
 
The potential for such extension of legal rationalism, as emerged during 
Chapter 7 — Formation of the Public Voice, would need to rely on more than the 
fundamental weakness of the legal system to judge according to ideologically 
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manipulated rules than the principles behind legal process. As the discussions 
of the Tampa, children overboard and children in detention have shown, the 
extension of legal rationalism would rely on governments making extensive use 
of appealing to universal values, and then arguing that targeted groups do not 
have these values. The ultimate arbiters in this process are members of the 
electorate and their tolerance of a political process that drives such ideology.  
 
 
Political process as a colonising agent 
 
One claim of this thesis was that legal rationality could become colonised by 
legal rationalism. As set out in Chapter 1 — Theoretical and Political Background, 
Habermas postulates two steps for colonisation to occur: uncoupling and 
displacement. First, system logic becomes uncoupled from its normative 
content, and second, the dominant logic then displaces normativity. This can 
be seen where policy and institutional practices mutually enforce each other, as 
shown in the interaction effect, where political process was driving both layers 
of practices. Perhaps the greatest advantage in using political process was the 
ability of the Howard government to control information - information from 
the policy practices and back through the institution of public discourse. At 
times, there was suppression of or delay in, the release of information, or 
information was presented in such a way that it was too cumbersome to access 
and hence irretrievable. With political process controlling these variables, the 
skewed information was then translated into practices that uncoupled the law 
from its underlying purpose.  
 
There were several instances of uncoupling. Child protection issues for 
instance became defined in such a way that there was no clash with migration 
law. State sovereignty became a matter of legally moving borders for the sole 
purpose of closing these borders to refugees with the military, rather than 
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police, acting as the law-enforcement agency. Activating the law through 
political process removed this tension between sovereignty requirements and 
child legislation and refugee protection. This was the second step to 
colonisation, where one part of the law colonised the other. Legal rationalism 
then expressed itself not in the value of its ability to uphold law-and-order, but 
in its ability to make use of the legal apparatus for political and ideological 
ends, whilst utilising military deployment in a civilian matter to achieve law-
and-order in peacetime. Utilising the military for civilian purposes, it should be 
remembered, was not the result of a more security conscious world since 11 
September 2001, but occurred six weeks before this event.  
 
When adapting Habermas to the methodology of this thesis, the first step to 
colonisation was the uncoupling of legal rationality from its normative base. As 
will be seen shortly from several examples, uncoupling was achieved by 
utilising some legal-rational aspects of the legal system itself - through court 
decisions and statutes. Political process could not directly influence how judges 
interpreted the law. This would have compromised the independence of the 
judiciary and contravened the separation of powers doctrine and placed the 
Howard government in breach of the Constitution. Instead, the influence of 
political process was notable where, as was discussed in Chapter 6 — 
Politicisation of the Law, the Howard government responded to a court 
judgement that it disapproved of by passing new legislation that would prevent 
judges from interpreting the law in a similar way in future.  
 
Perhaps the best example of the power of political process to steer legal-
rational process into a direction desired by politicians came from one of the 
cases of the Bakhtiyari children.3 In the cited case, the High Court overturned a 
decision by the Family Court to release children from immigration detention. 
When the Howard government had the authority to detain the children, it then 
                                            
3 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v. B [2004] HCA 20 (29 
April 2004). (2004). 
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released them from the detention centre back into detention in the community. 
The issue was no longer the care and protection of children, which was the 
normative base for legislation. With the legal safeguard of the normative base 
uncoupled from the legislation, the normativity of protecting the children 
became a matter of political process and the legal authority to exercise 
discretion over activating such process. In this case, the decision of the High 
Court that the Family Court had no jurisdiction over children in immigration 
detention centres resolved an institutional conflict between Parliament and the 
judiciary. However, the ruling also uncoupled from the legal system an 
important principle of legal rationality - the normative requirement that 
legislation ensures the protection of children. For practical purposes, the High 
Court ruling in the Bakhtiyari case meant that there was no legally enforceable 
remedy to ensure the care and safety of children in immigration detention 
centres, nor a legal requirement to provide such remedy. The government’s 
decision to move the children from the Woomera detention centre into 
detention in the community was discretionary, activated by political process 
rather than legal requirement. The ideology of legal rationalism had colonised 
legal rationality.  
 
Just four months after the case discussed in the previous paragraph, a similar 
development occurred where legislation was uncoupled from the normative 
requirement to protect adults from harsh effects that occur from the exercise 
of enforcing legislative requirements.4 In this case, legal counsel for Mr 
Behrooz argued that he was not legally detained under immigration law, 
because the conditions of detention were so intolerable that this did not 
amount to lawful detention. The High Court rejected this argument. Justice 
Kirby, the only dissenting judge, stated that “to deny the appellant the 
argument that he now propounds would, in practice, involve the Australian 
judiciary washing its hands of his case and any lawfulness … in the conditions 
                                            
4 Behrooz v. Secretary of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous 
Affairs [2004] HCA 36 (6 August 2004). (2004). 
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of his detention…”.5 Again, there is a tension between interpreting the statute 
or the principles behind it. In the Behrooz case, the tension between legal-
rational interpretations of legal statutes and principles behind legislation was 
overcome through a dominance of migration law over legislation that may 
otherwise have protected Mr Behrooz from the harsh effects of detention on 
his mental health. Here, the rights of the state dominate over the rights of the 
individual.  
 
Stanley Cohen’s work on denial shows how political framing practices may 
overcome this tension.6 According to Cohen, governments use two main 
strategies that create a systematic framework that denies information they 
prefer to keep hidden from public view: denial of the events, and denial 
through the law. In “blank denial”, governments deny that an event did occur, 
or that it occurred in the way it was claimed to have occurred .7  This strategy 
leads to a “legitimate controversy” over “claims and counter-claims”.8 Cohen’s 
second strategy consists of an “interpretive denial [that] comes from the 
language of legality itself”.9 When the “interpretative” strategy is used, 
governments may argue that something was necessary for security reasons.10  
 
Especially throughout the case studies, it became evident that the Howard 
government resorted to these denial strategies, which helped push refugee 
policy in the direction of the legal rationalist ideology. There was for instance 
the claim that the passengers of the boat that landed on Melville Island in 
December 2003 did not lodge a valid refugee claim, because their words did 
not match the legalistic requirements to initiate such claim. Or there was the 
government’s spin that detained children were not subjected to abuse, at least 
not at the hands of government, despite an out-of-court settlement in the 
                                            
5 Ibid., paragraph 139. 
6 Stanley Cohen, States of Denial. Knowing About Atrocities and Suffering. (Cambridge, UK: 
Polity Press, 2001) pp. 104-16. 
7 Ibid., p. 104. 
8 Ibid., p. 106. 
9 Ibid., p. 107. 
10 Ibid., p. 110. 
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Badraie case, after the Immigration Minister Ruddock initially blamed the 
child’s stepmother for Shayan’s recurring illness. Cohen puts into a different 
framework how governments circumvent accountability structures by 
uncoupling their justifications from the norms of government and social and 
institutional practices through suppression of information or putting slants on 
this information. With a political process of systematic “denial” and political 
framing that informed institutional practices in the legal system, legal 
rationalism colonised legal rationality. The legislative requirements of migration 
law took precedence over other legal requirements. 
 
In this practice of colonising, migration legislation also dominated legislation 
for making available medical requirements. The normative base for meeting 
medical requirements became dominated by the principle of meeting 
immigration requirements. A court case illustrates how, once legal rationalism 
practices become mainstreamed, medical practices also become uncoupled 
from their normative base.11 Especially paragraphs 257 to 258 of the transcript 
of the case illustrate uncoupling. Accordingly, detention authorities did not 
comply with medical advice to move two persons from an immigration 
detention centre to a psychiatric hospital for treatment. The court held that “S 
and M … did not have to settle for a lesser standard of mental health care 
because they were in immigration detention”. Yet the evidence indicated that 
health care “to S and M was, and remained, clearly inadequate”. The court 
attributed this to “a complex outsourcing arrangement” without “regular and 
systematic auditing” of the provision of medical services that essentially 
consisted of “monitoring and working procedures to deal essentially with the 
intermediate and the ad hoc”.  
 
Under the logic of legal rationalism, medical treatment of refugee applicants as 
detainees is under order of Parliament, rather than legal and professional 
                                            
11 S v. Secretary, Department of Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 
549 (5 May 2005). (2005).  
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norms of medical charters. The acceptance by the courts that the health of the 
two men identified as “S” and “M” became adversely affected as the result of 
their detention brings out a normative value about the relationship of social 
and legal status of the patient with the delivery of health care. This value is 
derived directly from the practice of framing refugees as law-breakers and as a 
threat to sovereignty, so that individual health requirements of persons so 
framed are not a primary consideration. The dominance of migration law then 
overcomes a tension that the legal system may otherwise address in 
circumstances where the health of persons becomes damaged as the direct 
consequence of government legislation and discretion.  
 
Michael Ignatieff raises the question of how far governments are able to meet 
human needs, including the needs of strangers.12 To this debate must be added 
the human need for freedom from indefinite immigration detention for the 
purpose of meeting administrative requirements of refugee applications. 
Ignatieff questions the value of an approach that is entirely rights-based, unless 
there is recognition that a rights-based approach also expresses collective 
values.13 Through forging a relationship with strangers, refugees depicted by 
the Howard government as the antithesis to Australian values overcomes the 
disparity between the justification for refugee policy and institutional practices.  
 
Ignatieff proposes an approach of responsibility for the Other as human being, 
not just technical accountability derived from a rule-driven approach. In this 
recognition of human beings resides the normative purpose of legal rationality. 
When applied to this thesis, Ignatieff’s approach thus differs from a 
relationship of Australia with refugees in terms of sovereignty, law-and-order, 
humanitarian considerations and orderly process. This was the normative 
relationship in which the Howard government framed refugees – a relationship 
that became the cornerstone for refugee policy and the ideal type in the case 
                                            
12 Michael Ignatieff, The Needs of Strangers (London: The Hogarth Press, 1990) pp. 29-36. 
13 Michael Ignatieff, The Rights Revolution (Toronto: House of Anansi Press Limited, 2000). 
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studies. By contrast with Ignatieff’s model, humanitarian considerations were 
least likely to translate into on-the-ground practices in a policy approach that 
served as thinly disguised rhetoric for legal rationalism. 
 
An argument that normativity, as identified by the Howard government and 
summarised here as ideal types, cannot function without the narrow framing of 
sovereignty, visa requirements, border-crossing and persecution claims within a 
tight set of legal rationality, pales into insignificance when one considers the 
exceptions that the Howard government has made to legal rationality, and 
overlaid it with the government’s legal rationalist ideology. However, the 
restoration of a strictly rule-driven policy would not restore legal rationality to 
its normative base, to the extent that these rules in and of themselves would 
operate legalistically for their own sake, rather than for the normative purpose 
that underlies any system of legal rationality in the first place. Furthermore, the 
manner in which the refugee rules are written at present were designed from 
the perspective of an ideology that seeks to exclude strangers, rather than 
arrive at any form of mutual recognition.  
 
Mutual recognition would enhance the notion of trust, not only between 
government and citizens with regard to placing information into public 
discourse. It would also engender trust between government and those who 
are seeking to engage Australia’s protection, as individuals worthy of 
recognition. Such an approach would not require abandoning legal rules or 
orderly process. It would, however, require a conceptually different 
interpretation of legal rationality; one that abandons assumptions of a threat 
response that requires military intervention at the borders or open-ended 
detention without seeking to invoke any notion of proportionality between 
threat and response, in accordance with legally rationalised rules and 
procedures within a framework of legal institutions.  
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Habermas argues that citizens lobby their government for political and legal 
change, and thereby achieve a society that translates the values of that society 
into legally binding rules. But how may the more diffuse system of values be 
reconciled with the notion of predictable and non-arbitrary legal rationality? 
Legal commentator Martin Krygier argues that “the rule of law is incomplete”, 
unless the values and traditions that the law represents consist of “equality 
before the law, procedural fairness or due process”, and are exercised in a 
system where these legal traditions are honoured.14 Accordingly, the 
significance of the law lies in its interaction with extra-legal components; its 
“sociological and political, rather than purely legal, consequence”, where the 
rule of law exists as “a frame in the exercise of social power” that is informed 
by “social and political questions” in any given society15. This analysis has 
shown that the opposite occurred in refugee policy, where the law was used to 
remove these principles that Krygier considers essential to the legal system.  
 
This thesis has shown several tensions between free debate and the political-
institutional framework that operate at the levels of political ideology, legal 
rationality and public debate. Whilst it may be argued that these changes came 
about as the result of informed debate, such debate was also thwarted — by 
direct government control over most aspects of the legal and communication 
processes until a unique version of legal rationality was achieved, with 
exceptions and rhetorical slants that created an excluded and undesirable 
Other. How far can legal rationalism go? This was a rhetorical question, 
because legal rationalism, as any other social phenomenon, will go as far as 
citizens allow it to.  
 
 
                                            
14 Martin Krygier, "The Grammar of Colonial Legality," in Australia Reshaped. 200 Years of 
Institutional Transformation, ed. Geoffrey Brennan and Francis Castles (Port Melbourne, 
Vic: Cambridge University Press, 2002) p. 230. 
15 Ibid., p. 232. 
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Postscript: the ongoing consequences of legal 
rationalism 
 
If the ideology of legal rationalism has colonised legal rationality through 
manipulating public discourse, as has been argued, it is worthwhile to look at 
how the Howard government conducted its discourse after it achieved 
institutional change. This thesis was about how politicians set the norms, 
which are then debated. As Habermas puts it: 
 
Practical discourse is not a procedure for generating justified norms but a procedure 
for testing the validity of norms that are being proposed and hypothetically 
considered for adoption … Practical discourses are always related to the concrete 
point of departure of a disturbed normative agreement. These antecedent disruptions 
determine the topics that are up for discussion16.  
 
Work on the period following the timeframe of the thesis suggests that legal 
rationalism is still practiced, but that it also has its limitations from within the 
system. As will be seen shortly, discussions were no longer about justifying the 
ideology of legal rationalism or the practices that derived from this ideology. 
Instead, it was a matter of fine-tuning the practices and limiting their effects on 
some individuals. Parliament debated these limitations in early 2004, after the 
Howard government had been re-elected for another term. 2004 was also the 
year when, as was noted in Chapter 7 — Formation of the Public Voice, public 
interest in refugee matters was at an all-time low.  
 
In August 2004, Immigration Minister Vanstone announced a new visa 
category for those refugee applicants who were unable to renew their refugee 
protection after their Temporary Protection Visa had expired. The 
                                            
16 Outhwaite, The Habermas Reader, p. 187. 
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beneficiaries of this visa were bona-fide refugees who had failed to convince 
the Howard government that they needed ongoing protection after the three 
years of the Temporary Protection Visa had expired. On the surface, the visa 
appeared to be a humanitarian gesture, aimed at those refugees who, since their 
release from immigration detention centres, demonstrated a willingness to 
integrate with Australian society. The visa stipulated that applicants would be 
allowed to remain in Australia for an additional eighteen months and would be 
eligible to apply for a permanent visa, provided either they had worked in a 
rural area for one year, or they contemplated marriage to an Australian 
citizen.17 As Immigration Minister Vanstone put it, this was an opportunity for 
“a second bite at the cherry”.18 Listeners to the ABCs radio program The World 
Today heard that this visa was not a policy change, but an indication of the 
government’s generosity to erstwhile applicants that “Australia opens their 
arms to people like that”19.  
 
However, the claim to generosity masked the issue that applicants would also 
relinquish any appeals rights about their refugee status when they applied for 
the visa. Neither did the visa benefit those who have been unable to secure 
work, neglected to learn English, or did not intend to marry an Australian 
citizen. There was no government indication from the Howard government 
that its refugee policies would markedly depart from the exclusionary practices 
that were set up between 1999 and 2003. Six months before announcing the 
new visa, Immigration Minister Vanstone indicated a conflict between personal 
preferences and the higher goal of her duties: 
 
“Individually, you might want to open your heart, but my job is not to be, in a sense, 
Mother Teresa,” says Vanstone. “My job is to have an ordered migration program 
that will maintain acceptance in the Australian community and be in Australia’s best 
interest. And you can’t make policy by meeting people individually and deciding 
                                            
17 Meaghan Shaw, "Vanstone Eases Refugee Restrictions," Age, 25 August 2004. 
18 Ibid. 
19 World Today [ABC Radio Broadcast]. (2004, 24 August). Govt Fleshes out Refugee Visa 
Changes. Reporter: Louise Yaxley.  
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whether you like them or not because there’s heaps of people who want to come and 
we can’t have them all”.20 
 
Here, the Minister announced her intention to work within the law-and-order 
frame that was largely constructed by her predecessor Philip Ruddock. 
However, Amanda Vanstone omitted to mention her personal powers of 
intervention, which have always been part of the rules of this orderly program. 
Personal intervention is the exercise of ministerial discretion that “balances 
what is now an otherwise inflexible set of regulations to allow the minister a 
public interest power to grant a visa in individual circumstances”21. Although 
the Minister cannot delegate decision-making powers to other people, the 
process is not as cumbersome as Minister Vanstone implied in her statement 
to the press cited above. In 2003, the “ministerial intervention unit” employed 
fifty staff members22. Indeed, Minister Vanstone had exercised her personal 
discretion frequently within a short time of taking over the ministerial 
portfolio. Yet for some refugees, the prospect of indefinite detention was 
ongoing.  
 
The new visa was preceded by ongoing dissent over migration policies from 
within the coalition parties. Two Coalition parliamentarians publicly stated that 
the government “should show more compassion”.23 Another asked for a 
general amnesty for refugees on Temporary Protection Visas.24 Other 
parliamentarians also called for an amnesty and for a policy change, so that all 
refugee applicants would be released from detention after meeting initial health 
and security checks.25 Amanda Vanstone reaffirmed that the camps needed to 
stay open to deter people smugglers.26 At the time these discussions were 
                                            
20 Michael Gordon and Russell Skelton, "Changing Views on High," Age, 21 February 2004. 
21 Kerry Carrington, Ministerial Discretion in Migration Matters: Contemporary Policy Issues 
in Historical Context (Current Issues Brief no. 3 2003-04, 2003). 
22 Ibid.  
23 Brendan Nicholson, "Lib MPs Urge Refugee Policy Change," Age, 11 February 2004. 
24 Michelle Grattan, "National MP Calls for Refugee Amnesty," Age, 6 February 2004. 
25 Michelle Grattan, "Liberal Urges Asylum Seekers to Be Freed," Age, 9 February 2004. 
26 Andra Jackson and Meaghan Shaw, "We Need Camp as Deterrent: Vanstone," Age, 12 
February 2004. 
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taking place, the release of a report by the Human Rights Commissioner on the 
effects of detention on children was around the corner, and public discourse 
was marred by “unauthorised” information about the detention and 
deportation of an Australian citizen, which led to the Palmer Inquiry.27  
 
Dissent among parliamentarians of the Coalition Party entered public discourse 
again in early 2005, and the Howard government resolved the tension by 
making small concession to the dissenters. In response to its critics, the 
Howard government announced another visa category; the Removal Pending 
Visa. The new visa meant that applicants could only apply if they renounced all 
claims to refugee rights and were released from detention if they agreed to 
leave Australia as soon as practical.28 Two months later, ten people were 
released under these provisions, and Immigration Minister Vanstone 
announced that another seven would be released.29 Within one week of this 
announcement by Vanstone, Philip Ruddock, now Attorney-General, heralded 
the passage of new legislation to further restrict appeals rights in immigration 
cases.30 Two weeks later, the debate about how to implement the conditions of 
Removal Pending Visas resulted in the government doing away with the 
stipulation that applicant’s waiver their appeal rights.31 However, release under 
this visa under this legislation depended on sole discretion of the government. 
 
One newspaper article expressed the human and political dimensions of this 
conflict.32 Accordingly, 31-year-old Peter Qasim had spent seven years in 
detention. Mr Qasim was stateless, and his repeated requests over the previous 
18 months to return to India went unanswered. During his time in detention, 
Qasim became depressed and suicidal to the extent that he needed admission 
                                            
27 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. (2004, April). A Last Resort? National 
Inquiry into Children in Immigration Detention; Mick Palmer. (2005). Inquiry into the 
Circumstances of the Immigration Detention of Cornelia Rau. Commonwealth of Australia.  
28 Meaghan Shaw and Michelle Grattan, "Freedom for Some — Then Deportation," Age, 24 
March 2005. 
29 Michelle Grattan, "Freedom for 10 Long-Term Detainees," Age, 31 May 2005. 
30 Michelle Grattan, "Ruddock to Get Tough on Migrant Appeals," Age, 5 June 2005. 
31 Michelle Grattan, "Freedom near for Qasim," Age, 21 June 2005. 
32 Penelope Debelle, "Suicidal and without Hope," Age, 12 June 2005. 
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to a psychiatric hospital. The article cited at the beginning of the paragraph 
described the efforts that eventually secured Mr Qasim’s release, after Minister 
Vanstone had already ruled out his eligibility for release under the terms of the 
Removal Pending Visa: The Minister changed her determination after Qasim’s 
lawyer and psychiatrist joined the public campaign that was started by 
Coalition parliamentarian Petro Georgiou and prominent businessman Dick 
Smith.  
 
The discussions at parliamentary level really were about bargaining. Whilst the 
lobbying for Mr Qasim’s release was in progress, the parliamentarians 
challenged the arbitrariness of ministerial discretion. Georgiou prepared two 
private members bills, aimed at judicial review after ninety days of detention 
and the review of all child detainees.33 Significant about the private members 
bill was that the dissident parliamentarians sought to depart from the 
conventional practice of the Minister presenting the bill and initiating relevant 
discussion. If successful, the resulting new legislation would have 
fundamentally changed not only the potentially indefinite timeframe for 
detention, but also returned major aspects of the oversight over policy delivery 
to the judiciary. “Up to twenty” parliamentarians indicated to the Prime 
Minster that they supported the proposed policy changes.34 Some were 
prepared to cross the floor and vote with the Opposition on this matter.35 On 
the day before Georgiou was to present his bill to parliament, the Prime 
Minister opted for a compromise and arrived at agreement with the dissident 
parliamentarians that avoided the introduction the private members bill. John 
Howard subsequently announced that the policy of mandatory detention 
remained intact, but that families with children would be placed into an 
alternative form of detention in the community.36 In the cited interview, the 
                                            
33 Elizabeth Colman, "Backbench Revolt on Detention," Australian, 25 March 2005. 
34 Samantha Maiden, "PM Open to Detention Overhaul," Australian, 1 June 2005. 
35 Louise Dodson, "Call for Hard Heads, Soft Heart," Sydney Morning Herald, 1 June 2005. 
36 7.30 Report [ABC Television Broadcast]. (2005, 20 June). PM Admits Immigration 
Changes Long Overdue. Reporter: Kerry O'Brien.  
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Prime Minister spoke of “very good changes” that retained the “balance 
between sensitivity and the national interest”.37  
 
The Prime Minster’s willingness to negotiate at this point may indicate an 
intention to have the Coalition Party appear united before the electorate. 
However, the “changes” agreed to during the compromise were only cosmetic 
changes. There was no more talk of judicial review over the timeframe of 
mandatory detention. The removal of families with children from detention 
centres to alternative detention in the community was already practiced during  
2001 and 2002, when the Howard government faced criticism over the 
detention of children. The fact that this issue was raised again in mid-2005 
suggests that any changes to that effect were a short-lived, yet effective 
bargaining tool to appease the government’s critics.  
 
Moreover, it would seem that the only initiative that was not arbitrary was the 
willingness of the Howard government to minimise disapproval over its 
refugee policies. The policy to exclude refugees continued relentlessly. In 
February 2004, Immigration Minister Vanstone announced an extension of the 
excision legislation of the Border Protection Act and excised even the waterways 
around the coast: 
 
That would simply mean that instead of coming into our waters people actually have 
to get their feet on Australian soil — I think that’s a sensible practical solution. It 
would mean that people simply couldn’t come into an Australian port and therefore 
access our immigration laws38. 
 
In mid-January 2006, one refugee boat achieved what the legislation was 
designed to prevent. Refugees from West Papua arrived on the mainland in 
Queensland. The purpose of the voyage was clearly displayed. There was no 
mistake that this was a refugee boat: a banner on the boat clearly stated that the 
                                            
37 Ibid.  
38 ABC Online [News]. (2004, 21 February). Changing Migration Zone Will Curb Illegal 
Immigrants: Vanstone.  
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passengers were seeking refugee protection from Australia.39 Despite such clear 
statement of intention by the passengers, the Department of Immigration and 
Multicultural Affairs declared that “no application has yet been lodged” and 
“the purpose of the voyage” was not clear40. This comment raises the 
speculation about whether or not the government intended to send them back, 
just as it turned around a boat with Kurdish people in December 2003 at 
Melville Island. However, on the following day, The Age reported that 
Indonesian soldiers had killed five school children who came from the area of 
West Papua where the asylum seekers came from.41 One of the dead children 
was a close relative of the men, who had been sent to the Christmas Island 
detention centre.42 Another newspaper reported that two men died in reprisal 
killings in the region and that there were beatings by the Indonesian military.43 
Australian authorities subsequently gave refugee status to 42 of the 43 
passengers.44 The fate of the remaining person remained doubtful for another 
four months, until he also had his refugee status confirmed on appeal.45 
 
The decision to accept the West Papuan refugees caused a diplomatic incident, 
and Indonesia temporarily recalled its ambassador from Australia for eleven 
weeks.46 During this time of tensions with Indonesia, Prime Minster Howard 
announced significant changes to assessment criteria in refugee decisions. John 
Howard indicated that future refugee assessment decisions would take into 
account “what’s in this country’s best interests and in the best interests of a 
longer-term relationship” between both countries.47 The newspaper article just 
cited spelt out that such changes could mean that Australia may in future “take 
                                            
39 Ian Mapoon, "Save Our Souls, Plead West Papuans," Australian, 19 January 2006. 
40 ABC Online [News]. (2006, 20 January). Papuans Have Not Filed for Asylum: DIMIA.  
41 Andra Jackson and Mark Forbes, "Two Papua Children 'Shot Dead'," Age, 21 January 
2006. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Tom Allard, "Military Kills Papuan Man," Sydney Morning Herald, 21 Jan 2006. 
44 Andra Jackson, "Free at Last, West Papuan Refugees Rejoice in New Dawn," Age, 4 April 
2006. 
45 Craig Skehan, "Tribunal Allows Papuan to Stay," Sydney Morning Herald, 1 August 2006. 
46 ABC Online [News]. (2006, 12 June).Most Oppose Offshore Asylum Seeker Processing: 
Poll . 
47 Louise Dodson, Mark Forbes, and Craig Skehan, "In the National Interest: PM Takes 
Tougher Line on Asylum," Sydney Morning Herald, 8 April 2006. 
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into account the view of the countries applicants are fleeing”. The Federal 
government announced plans that in future, all boat arrivals would be sent to 
offshore detention centres.48 The reasons for this change remained unclear. 
The Prime Minister denied that these plans occurred as the result of pressure 
from Indonesia, whilst Immigration Minister Vanstone linked this decision 
with retaining Indonesia’s cooperation “in relation to border protection”.49 
 
This intention was blocked, when the Howard government negotiated another 
softening of its policies with the dissenting parliamentarians. These changes 
included shorter processing times of refugee claims, the placement of children 
in community detention instead of immigration detention centres, and greater 
powers for the Ombudsman.50 However, the manner in which the government 
compromised its intention deserves mention. The lower house had already 
passed the Migration Amendment (Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 2006. It was 
doubtful that the Bill would pass the next hurdle and be approved in the 
Senate. An increasing number of senators declared they would vote against the 
proposed legislation and businessman Ian Melrose supported a massive media 
advertising campaign that opposed the proposed legislation.51 Some 
commentators predicted that the Prime Minister faced “the biggest and most 
embarrassing Senate defeat of his 10 years in power”.52 However, “just hours 
before” the bill was to be debated in the Senate, John Howard withdrew the 
intended legislation, to avoid a “humiliating defeat”.53 
 
This compromise resulted in the policy changes summarised at the beginning 
of the previous paragraph. Although the Howard government withdrew the 
                                            
48 Sasha Shtargot, "Nauru Detention Fear for Afghan Asylum Seekers," Age, 2 June 2006. 
49 Michael Gordon, "Vanstone Admits Indonesian Influence," Age, 15 June 2006. 
50 Cath Hart and Steve Lewis, "Rebels to Force Howard's Hand," Australian, 10 August 
2006. 
51 Mark Metherell and Mark Forbes, "Howard Faces Humiliating Defeat on Asylum 
Legislation," Sydney Morning Herald, 14 August 2006. 
52 Louise Dodson, "All in a Day's Work for the Master Fixer," Sydney Morning Herald, 15 
August 2006. 
53 Phillip Coorey and Mark Forbes, "Danger in PM's Retreat: Jakarta," Sydney Morning 
Herald, 15 August 2006. 
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legislation, it is worthwhile to reflect on how far the government was prepared 
to take its new refugee policies. Journalist Michael Gordon discussed the case 
for and against debating the legislation:54 the purpose of this legislation was to 
send all uninvited refugees to detention centres outside of Australia for the 
processing of their asylum claims, including those who arrive on the Australian 
mainland. Georgiou claimed that the negotiated changes to the policy were not 
enforceable in Nauru, and this could mean that some successful refugee 
applicants would remain there, detained indefinitely. According to Immigration 
Minister Vanstone, the proposed legislation would ensure the appropriate 
allocation of scarce resources to refugees most in need. The Minister also 
claimed that the new system would be fairer to all onshore refugees: 
 
There is no reason to treat someone who, by dint of good winds and tides, manages 
to make it to the Australian mainland differently from a person who strikes bad 
weather and arrives at an island a stone’s throw off the coast. It is fair to treat all 
unauthorised boat arrivals in the same way.55  
 
What Minister Vanstone in the above quote heralded as fairness, effectively 
meant closing Australia even to those few refugees whose boats occasionally 
slipped past the military surveillance of Australia’s coast. The thwarted plan 
also meant that uninvited refugees would never again have access to the 
Australian legal system, and would be subject to the outcome of the refugee 
polices that the Howard government pursued since the time period of the case 
studies. Rather than treating refugees more fairly, it appears that the 
government’s motive was to introduce even harsher policies. Just as Philip 
Ruddock in 1999 claimed that his new policies were about resources for 
refugees, the newspaper article cited in the previous paragraph with Amanda 
Vanstone’s comments begs the question of how the need for refugee 
protection can be assessed by their mode of travel to Australia.56 
                                            
54 Michael Gordon, "Risking Political Death but Undeterred," Age, 10 August 2006. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Philip Ruddock, “Recognising the Real Challenge in Refugee Protection.” [e-Journal] 
Online Opinion (1999, 15 September). 
  
  
  
  
- 344 - 
 
Conclusion 
 
The few examples from the Howard government’s response to refugee boats 
since the end of the case studies are not inconsistent with the claim of this 
thesis that refugee policy has become increasingly uncoupled from its 
normative purpose to protect refugees. The trend has been toward policies that 
exclude, rather than regulate, the entry of refugees to Australia. Some signs 
suggest that future refugee protection could become a bargaining tool for 
Australian governments with the governments of the persecuting state from 
which refugees have fled. This would put a new meaning to the concept of 
rights of the state where the rights of individuals pale into insignificance.  
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Appendix A — Onshore Refugees 
 
Of approximately 10,000 people who arrived by boat, about 70 per cent were 
accepted by Australian authorities as refugees. When the figures were released, 
about 20 per cent remained in detention and the outcome of their refugee 
applications were unknown. Not shown are numbers of arrivals who either did 
not enter Australia, or who did not remain in Australia. 
 
 
Table A1: Number of boat arrivals between 4 January 1999 and 2 July 2003, of 
onshore refugees and people remaining in detention by 12 September 2003. 
 
Outcome 
Arrivals 10,289  
Refugees  7,339 71.32 % 
Detention  2,085  20.26 % 
 
Figures calculated from Fact Sheet 74a. Produced by the Public Affairs Section 
of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs. 
Revised 12 September 2003. Last update: 15 September 2003 at 08:36 AEST. 
 
 
Source: Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Fact Sheet 74a. 
Boat Arrival Details (12 September 2003) (Last updated 15 September 2003 
[cited 24 September 2003); available from 
http://www.dima.gov.au/facts/74a_boatarrivals.htm 
 
Raw data for calculating numbers in Table A1, copied from Fact Sheet 74a, 
cited above.  
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Symbols used: 
Baby* = born after boat's arrival; 
children = under 18, at boat's arrival; 
ref = entry through refugee status (protection visa); 
humanit = entry on humanitarian grounds; 
entry = entry on other grounds; 
bridging visas = visas giving temporary lawful status; 
TPV = temporary protection visa 
release = release into community pending appeal; 
departs = departures from Australia; 
det. = in detention/custody (ie under investigation/awaiting repatriation to 
safe third country/having been refused refugee status/with application, appeal 
or litigation pending; 
Unknown = yet to be determined. 
 
Note: the italicised boat name used is the code name used by DIMIA to 
identify each boat. It is not the real name of the boat. 
 
1989 
1. 28 November 1989, Broome (Pender Bay) 26-20 adults, 6 children - plus 1 
baby* (8 Chinese, 10 Vietnamese, 8 Cambodian). 9 ref, 2 entry, 6 departs.  
1990 
2. 31 March 1990, Broome (Beagle) 119 - 95 adults, 24 children - plus 16 
babies* (34 Chinese, 8 Vietnamese, 77 Cambodians). 37 ref, 18 entry, 80 
departs.  
3. 1 June 1990, north of Darwin (Collie) 79 - 49 adults, 30 children - plus 2 
babies* (15 Chinese, 64 Cambodian) 22 humanit, 12 entry, 47 departs.  
1991 
4. 4 March 1991, Darwin (Dalmatian) 33 - 21 adults, 12 children - plus 3 
babies* (11 Chinese, 8 Sino-Vietnamese, 13 Macau citizens, 1 Hong Kong 
citizen). 18 ref, 2 entry, 16 departs.  
5. 6 March 1991, Darwin (Echo) 34 - 20 adults, 14 children - plus 2 babies* (1 
Vietnamese, 34 Cambodians). 26 ref, 1 humanit, 2 entry, 7 departs.  
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6. 24 March 1991, Darwin (Foxtrot) 3 adults (2 Indonesians, 1 Bangladeshi). 
3 departs.  
7. 26 April 1991, Darwin (George) 77 - 48 adults, 29 children - plus 4 babies* 
(2 Chinese, 11 Vietnamese, 64 Cambodian) 35 ref, 6 humanit, 9 entry, 1 
bridging visas, 34 departs.  
8. 9 May 1991, Darwin (Harry) 10 - 9 adults, 1 child - plus 1 baby* (10 
Vietnamese). 11 ref.  
9. 31 December 1991, Montague Sound, WA (Isabella) 56 - 55 adults, 1 child 
- plus 2 babies* (Chinese). 34 ref, 23 humanit, 1 depart.'  
1992 
10. 10 May 1992, Darwin (Jeremiah) 10 - 8 adults, 2 children (Chinese). 2 ref, 
8 departs.  
11. 21 May 1992, Saibai Island/Torres Strait, Torres Strait (Kelpie) 11 - 8 
adults, 3 children-plus 1 baby* (Polish). 12 departs.  
12. 23 August 1992, Christmas Island (Labrador) 68 - 65 adults, 3 children - 
plus 3 babies* (Chinese). 22 ref, 3 humanit, 2 entry, 1 escapees, 43 
departs.  
13. 28 October 1992, Dauan, Dauan Island/Torres Strait (Mastiff) 11 - 9 adults, 
2 children - plus 1 baby* (Romanian). 2 ref, 10 departs.  
14. 30 October 1992, Christmas Island (Norwich) 113 - 102 adults, 11 children 
(Chinese). 113 departs.  
15. 3 November 1992, Saibai Island/Torres Strait (Otter) 2 adults (1 Somali, 1 
Nigerian). 2 departs.  
1993 
16. 24 November 1993, Darwin (Pluto) 53 - 30 adults, 23 children - plus 2 
babies* (52 Sino-Vietnamese, 1 Chinese). 47 ref, 7 humanit, 1 entry.  
17. 5 December 1993, Broome (Quokka) 24 - 20 adults, 4 children - plus 3 
babies* (Chinese). 9 ref, 6 humanit, 12 departs.  
18. 20 December 1993, Troughton Is, WA (Roger) 4 adults (Turkish nationals). 
4 ref.  
1994 
19. 1 February 1994, Cape Talbot, WA (Sting) 4 adults (Bangladeshi). 2 refs, 2 
departs.  
20. 28 May 1994, Christmas Island (Toto) 58 - 49 adults, 9 children - plus 1 
baby* (35 Chinese, 23 Sino-Vietnamese). 22 ref, 1 bridging visa, 2 
escapee, 34 departs.  
21. 4 June 1994, Darwin (Unicorn) 51 - 29 adults, 22 children (Sino-
Vietnamese). 51 ref.  
22. 7 July 1994, Broome (Vagabond) 17 adults (Vietnamese ex-Galang), 5 ref, 
2 entry, 10 humanit.  
23. 13 July 1994, Darwin (Wombat) 25 - 17 adults, 8 children - plus 3 babies* 
(Chinese). 13 ref, 1 entry, 14 departs.  
24. 9 September 1994, Cape Leveque, WA (Xenon) 31 - 27 adults, 4 children 
(Vietnamese, ex-Galang). 30 departs, 1 escapee.  
25. 29 September 1994, Darwin (Yabbie) 10 adults (Vietnamese, ex-Galang). 
10 departs.  
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26. 26 October 1994, Broome (Zebra) 22 adults (Vietnamese, ex-Galang). 22 
departs.  
27. 13 November 1994, Darwin (Albatross) 118 - 65 adults, 53 children - plus 6 
babies* (Sino-Vietnamese). 124 departs.  
28. 18 November 1994, Darwin (Brolga) 89 - 50 adults, 39 children - plus 4 
babies* (Sino-Vietnamese). 93 departs.  
29. 22 November 1994, Darwin (Cockatoo) 84 - 61 adults, 23 children - plus 4 
babies* (73 Chinese, 11 Sino-Vietnamese). 33 ref, 6 humanit, 1 entry, 2 
escapees, 46 departs.  
30. 22 November 1994, Darwin (Duck) 13 - 12 adults, 1 child (Vietnamese, ex-
Galang). 13 departs.  
31. 11 December 1994, Darwin (Eagle) 89 - 51 adults, 38 children (Sino-
Vietnamese). 89 departs.  
32. 12 December 1994, Broome (Falcon) 27 - 24 adults, 3 children 
(Vietnamese, ex-Galang). 27 departs.  
33. 22 December 1994, Darwin (Galah) 71-54 adults, 17 children - plus 3 
babies* (Sino-Vietnamese). 74 departs.  
34. 23 December 1994, Darwin (Heron) 90 - 51 adults, 39 children (Sino-
Vietnamese). 90 departs.  
35. 25 December 1994, Darwin (Jabiru) 82 - 46 adults, 36 children - plus 3 
babies* (Sino-Vietnamese). 85 departs.  
36. 28 December 1994, Darwin (Kookaburra) 72 - 46 adults, 26 children (Sino-
Vietnamese). 72 departs.  
1995 
37. 18 January 1995, Christmas Island (Lorikeet) 65 - 46 adults, 19 children - 
plus 4 babies* (Sino-Vietnamese). 68 departs, 1 ref.  
38. 9 March 1995, Darwin (Mudlark) 52 - 34 adults, 18 children - plus 1 baby* 
(Sino-Vietnamese). 53 departs.  
39. 13 March 1995, Darwin (Nightingale) 54 - 31 adults, 23 children (49 Sino-
Vietnamese 5 Vietnamese). 54 departs.  
40. 17 March 1995, Ashmore Islands (Oriole) 5 adults (Afghan). 5 ref.  
41. 11 May 1995, Darwin (Pheasant) 37 - 32 adults, 5 children (2 Chinese, 35 
Sino-Vietnamese). 35 departs, 2 refs.  
42. 29 May 1995, Darwin (Quail) 18 - 16 adults, 2 children (East Timorese). 18 
bridging visas.  
43. 25 August 1995, Ashmore Islands (Rosella) 6 adults (Turkish). 6 ref.  
1996 
44. 17 January 1996, Ashmore Islands (Sandpiper) 4 adults (Iraqi). 4 ref.  
45. 6 February 1996, Christmas Island (Teal) 46 - 34 adults, 12 children 
(Chinese). 46 departs.  
46. 14 March 1996, Christmas Island (Wattle Bird) 37 - 25 adults, 12 children 
(Chinese). 37 departs.  
47. 6 May 1996, Christmas Island (Yellow Bird) 61 - 48 adults, 13 children 
(Chinese). 61 departs.  
48. 7 May 1996, Christmas Island (Zebra Finch) 62 - 36 adults, 26 children 
(Chinese). 62 departs.  
49. 9 May 1996, Christmas Island (Acacia) 55 - 31 adults, 24 children 
(Chinese). 55 departs.  
50. 10 May 1996, Christmas Island (Banksia) 66 - 46 adults, 20 children 
(Chinese). 66 departs.  
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51. 19 May 1996, Ashmore Islands (Correa) 6 adults (Sri Lankan). 6 departs.  
52. 26 May 1996, Christmas Island (Dahlia) 40 - 31 adults, 9 children 
(Chinese). 40 departs.  
53. 31 May 1996, Darwin (Erica) 23 - 16 adults 7 children (17 Chinese, 6 Sino-
Vietnamese). 23 departs.  
54. 5 June 1996, Christmas Island (Freesia) 86 - 58 adults, 28 children (85 
Chinese, 1 Sino-Vietnamese). 86 departs.  
55. 15 June 1996, Darwin (Grevillea) 67 - 45 adults, 22 children-plus 2 babies* 
(30 Chinese, 37 Sino-Vietnamese). 66 departs, 3 refs.  
56. 30 June 1996, Darwin (Hakea) 2 9 - 23 adults, 6 children (Chinese). 29 
departs.  
57. 7 September 1996, Ashmore Islands (Iris) 7 adults (Iraqi). 7 ref.  
58. 9 September 1996, Ashmore Islands (Juniper) 5 adults (Iraqi). 5 ref.  
59. 25 September 1996, Tudu Island/Torres Strait (Kerria) 21 - 11 adults, 10 
children (Irian Jayan - Indonesian Province). 21 departs  
60. 3 October 1996, Ashmore Islands (Lambertia) 8 adults (Iraqi). 8 ref.  
61. 8 October 1996, Ashmore Islands (Melaleuca) 24 - 23 adults, 1 child (16 
Iraqi, 8 Pakistani). 16 ref, 8 departs.  
62. 11 December 1996, Ashmore Islands (Nandina) 12 adults (10 Iraqi, 1 
Algerian, 1 Moroccan). 11 ref, 1 depart.  
1997 
63. 15 January 1997, Saibai Island/Torres Strait (Oleria) 4 adults (Iraqi). 4 refs.  
64. 10 February 1997, Ashmore Islands (Pilliga) 7 adults (2 Iraqi, 1 Iranian, 4 
Algerian). 7 refs.  
65. 6 March 1997, Darwin (Quercus) 70 - 54 adults, 16 children (70 Chinese). 
70 departs.  
66. 23 March 1997, Christmas Island (Red Gum) 9 adults (Iraqi). 9 refs.  
67. 30 April 1997, Darwin (She Oak) 44 - 36 adults, 8 children (Chinese). 44 
departs.  
68. 13 June 1997, Torres Strait (Telopea) 139 - 134 adults, 5 children 
(Chinese). 139 departs.  
69. 30June 1997, Coral Bay, WA (Urtica) 15 adults (Sri Lankan). 15 departs.  
70. 25 July 1997, Christmas Island (Viola) 15 adults (8 Iraqi, 1 Afghan, 4 
Algerian, 1 Sudanese, 1 Bangladeshi). 13 refs, 1 det, 1 departs.  
71. 4 September 1997, Christmas Island (Waratah) 25 - 17 adults, 8 children - 
plus 1 baby* (3 Iraqi, 17 Afghan, 4 Algerian, 1 Sudanese). 24 refs, 2 
departs.  
72. 11 September 1997, Darwin (Xyris) 3 adults (2 Algerian, 1 Moroccan). 3 
departs.  
73. 14 November 1997, Ashmore Islands (Yulbah) 6 adults, 2 children 
(Afghans). 8 refs.  
1998 
74. 4 January 1998, Tudu Island/Torres Strait (Zostera) 30 - 20 adults, 10 
children (30 Irian Jayan - Indonesian Province). 30 departs.  
75. 23 January 1998, Darwin (Archer) 22 - 20 adults, 2 children (Afghans). 22 
refs.  
76. 7 February 1998, Ashmore Islands (Barcoo) 4 adults (1 Algerian, 1 
Moroccan, 2 Senegalese). 3 departs, 1 ref.  
77. 19 February 1998, off NW Kimberley Coast (Clyde) 11 - 10 adults, 1 child 
(11 Chinese). 11 departs.  
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78. 21 February 1998, off NW Kimberley Coast (Diamantina) 7 adults 
(Chinese). 7 departs.  
79. 9 April 1998, Ashmore Islands (Eyre) 6 adults (Bangladeshi). 6 departs.  
80. 9 May 1998, Gove (Fitzroy) 9 adults (Bangladeshi). 9 departs.  
81. 27 May 1998, Ashmore Islands (Glenelg) 7 adults (Bangladeshi). 7 
departs.  
82. 5 June 1998, Ashmore Islands (Hawkesbury) 10 adults (Bangladeshi). 10 
departs.  
83. 3 July 1998, Ashmore Islands (Indulkana) 5 adults (4 Bangladeshi, 1 
Indonesian). 5 departs.  
84. 6 July 1998, off NW Kimberley Coast (Jardine) 3 adults (2 Bangladeshi, 1 
Indonesian) 3 departs.  
85. 4 September 1998, off NW Kimberley Coast (Kiewa) 6 adults 
(Bangladeshi). 6 departs.  
86. 9 September 1998, Saibai lsland/Torres Strait (Lachlan) 4 adults (1 
Bangladeshi, 3 Indians). 2 det, 1 ref, 1 depart.  
87. 11 September 1998, Ashmore Islands (Murrumbidgee) 2 adults 
(Bangladeshi). 2 departs.  
88. 24 November 1998, Ashmore Islands (Namoi) 7 adults (Sri Lankan). 7 
departs.  
89. 30 November 1998, Ashmore Islands (Ord) 15 adults (4 Iraqi, 11Turks). 14 
refs, 1 depart.  
90. 24 December 1998, Coburg Peninsula NT, (Paroo) 52 - 51 adults, 1child 
(Chinese). 52 departs.  
1999 
91. 4 January 1999, off NW Kimberley Coast (Queen) 9 - 5 adults, 4 children 
(Iraqi). 9 refs.  
92. 4 January 1999, Coburg Peninsula, NT (Roper) 3 adults (Iraqi). 3 refs.  
93. 4 January 1999, Townsville,QLD (Snowy) 2 adults (1 Kazakhstani, 1 
Papua New Guinean). 2 departs.  
94. 12 January 1999, Port Hedland (Tumut) 4 adults (Chinese). 4 departs.  
95. 3 February 1999, Hammond Island/Torres Strait (Uriarra) 5 adults 
(Afghan). 5 refs.  
96. 15 February 1999, Ashmore Islands (Vanrook) 10 - 10 adults, (5 Afghans, 
3 Algerians, 1 Iraqi, 1Pakistani). 7 refs, 2 det, 1 depart.  
97. 21 February 1999, Ashmore Islands (Warrego) 32 adults (Turkish). 19 refs, 
13 departs.  
98. 21 February 1999, Christmas Island (Xavier) 13 adults (9 Iraqis, 4 
Algerians). 13 refs.  
99. 24 February 1999, NW Kimberley Coast (Yarra) 3 adults (Bangladeshi). 3 
departs.  
100. 10 March 1999, off NW Kimberley Coast (Zetland) 12 - 5 adults, 7 
children (Afghan). 12 refs.  
101. 11 March 1999, Gove (Ainslie) 57 - 51 adults, 6 children (Chinese). 
57 departs.  
102. 12 March 1999, Holloway's Beach, Cairns (Bogong) 26 adults 
(Chinese). 26 departs.  
103. 26 March 1999, Ashmore Islands, (Constantine) 8 adults (2 Iraqis, 
2 Kuwaitis, 3 Afghans,1 Bangladeshi). 7 refs, 1 det.  
104. 10 April 1999, Scott's Head, Macksville, NSW, (Dandenong) 60 
adults (Chinese). 60 departs.  
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105. 13 April 1999, off NW Kimberley Coast, (Essendon) 10 - 9 adults, 
1 child (Afghan). 10 refs.  
106. 16 April 1999, Cape Leveque, (Franklin) 3 adults (Bangladeshi). 3 
departs.  
107. 21 April 1999, Ashmore Islands, (Gambier) 3 adults (Turkish). 3 
refs.  
108. 24 April 1999, Ashmore Islands, (Hotham) 15 adults (1 
Bangladeshi, 2 Pakistani, 12 Iraqi). 12 refs, 3 departs.  
109. 7 May 1999, Ashmore Islands, (Isa) 54 - 53 adults, 1 child (43 
Turkish, 6 Iraqi, 4 Afghan, 1 Kuwait). 39 refs, 2 det, 13 departs.  
110. 12 May 1999, Christmas Island, (Jagungal) 19 adults (12 Sri 
Lankan, 4 Pakistani, 2 Indian, 1 Iranian). 12 refs, 7 departs.  
111. 17 May 1999, NSW Coast adjacent to Port Kembla, (Kosciuszko) 
82 - 81 adults, 1 child - plus 1 baby* (Chinese). 83 departs.  
112. 19 May 1999, Christmas Island (Lofty) 20 adults (Iraqi). 20 refs.  
113. 20 May 1999, Ashmore Islands (Majura) 7 adults (Bangladeshi). 4 
det, 1 ref, 2 depart.  
114. 24 May 1999, Ashmore Islands (Nelson) 10 adults (5 Iraqi, 4 
Afghan, 1 Pakistani). 10 refs.  
115. 27 May 1999, Doughboy River (Ossa) 78 - 77 adults, 1 child 
(Chinese). 78 departs.  
116. 1 June 1999, Cape Leveque (Pinnacle) 9 adults (Bangladeshi). 9 
departs.  
117. 4 June 1999, off NSW Coast (Quin) 108 - 103 adults, 5 children 
(108 Chinese). 108 departs.  
118. 7 June 1999, Ashmore Islands (Roe) 10 adults (Afghan). 10 refs.  
119. 11 June 1999, Christmas Island (Selwyn) 8 - 7 adults, 1 child 
(Afghan). 8 refs.  
120. 12 June 1999, Ashmore Islands (Tabletop) 76 - 74 adults, 2 
children (57 Turkish, 10 Afghan, 9 Iraqi). 6 det, 35 refs, 35 departs.  
121. 13 June 1999, Yam Island/Torres Strait (Urah) 3 adults (3 
Chinese). 3 departs.  
122. 22 June 1999, Saibai Island/Torres Strait (Vigors) 2 adults (Sri 
Lankan). 1 depart, 1 det.  
123. 25 June 1999, Ashmore Islands (Weddin) 12 adults (Afghan). 12 
refs.  
124. 29 June 1999, Ashmore Islands (X-Keten) 53 - 46 adults, 7 
children (40 Iraqi, 12 Afghan, 1 Algerian). 51 refs, 1 det, 1 TPV.  
125. 12 July 1999, Ashmore Islands (York) 6 adults (Indian). 5 
departs,1 det.  
126. 12 July 1999, Ashmore Islands (Zeil) 16 - 11 adults, 5 children 
(Afghan). 16 refs.  
127. 20 July 1999, Christmas Island (Augustus) 5 - 4 adults, 1 child (Sri 
Lankan). 5 refs.  
128. 21 July 1999, Ashmore Islands (Buller) 7 adults (5 Afghan, 2 
Iranian). 6 refs, 1 depart.  
129. 28 July 1999, Ashmore Islands (Calder) 14 adults (Turkish). 14 
departs.  
130. 31 July 1999, Ashmore Islands (Druitt) 44 adults (32 Iraqi, 6 
Afghan, 5 Kuwaiti, 1 Sri Lankan). 1 det, 42 refs, 1 depart.  
131. 11 August 1999, Ashmore Islands (Eliza) 16 adults (11 Afghan, 4 
Sri Lankan, 1 Pakistani). 1 det, 10 refs, 3 departs, 2 TPV.  
132. 14 August 1999, Christmas Island (Fox) 140 - 126 adults, 14 
children (140 Iraqis). 130 refs, 6 det, 3 TPV, 1 depart.  
133. 23 August 1999, Ashmore Islands (Grenfell) 8 adults (Iraqi). 8 ref.  
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134. 26 August 1999, Ashmore Islands (Hawthorn) 12 adults - plus 1 
baby* (Afghan). 13 TPV.  
135. 30 August 1999, Ashmore Islands (Ida) 24 - 22 Adults, 2 children - 
(20 Afghans, 2 Palestinian, 2 Sri Lankan).  
136. 31 August 1999, Ashmore Islands (Jagged) 86 - 71 Adults, 15 
Children- (79 Iraqi, 2 Iranian, 2 Afghan, 2 Kuwait, 1 Bahr).  
137. 3 September 1999, Ashmore Islands (Kembla). 35 - 34 Adults, 1 
child. (34 Afghan, 1 Sri Lankan  
138. 14 September 1999, Bonaparte Archipelago (Leura) 14 adults 
(Afghan). 14 TPV.  
139. 17 September 1999, Ashmore Islands (Macedon) 6 adults (4 Iraqi, 
1 Bangladeshi, 1 Myanmar). 1 det, 4 TPV, 1 depart.  
140. 19 September 1999, Ashmore Islands (Nebo) 8 adults (8 Turkish). 
1 det, 5 depart, 2 TPV.  
141. 21 September 1999, Ashmore Islands (Owen) 6 adults (5 
Pakistani, 1 Afghan). 5 departs, 1 TPV.  
142. 24 September 1999, Ashmore Islands (Panorama) 49 - 46 adults, 
3 minors, (30 Iraqi, 10 Bangladeshi, 7 Afghans, 1 Syrian, 1 Indonesian). 10 
det, 33 TPV, 3 refs, 1 bridging visa, 2 depart.  
143. 26 September 1999, Ashmore Islands (Quakers) 8 - 7 adults, 1 
minor (6 Indian, 2 Indonesian). 8 departs.  
144. 2 October 1999, off NW Kimberley Coast (Richmond) 21 adults 
(Afghan). 21 TPV.  
145. 5 October 1999, off NW Kimberley Coast (Stromlo) 23 adults, 1 
child (Afghan). 24 TPV.  
146. 7 October 1999, Scott's Reef (Tamborine) 62 - 57 adults, 5 minors 
(51 Afghan, 6 Iraqi, 3 Sri Lankan, 2 Syrian). 49 TPV, 9 refs, 1 bridging visa, 
3 departs.  
147. 11 October 1999, Ashmore Islands (Unbunmaroo) 110 - 82 adults, 
21 minors - plus 1 baby*(102 Iraqi, 8 Afghan). 3 det, 100 TPV, 8 refs.  
148. 13 October 1999, Kuri Bay, off NW Kimberley coast (Victoria) 12 - 
10 adults, 2 minors - plus 1 baby* (Afghan). 13 TPV.  
149. 18 October 1999, Broome (William) 24 - 22 adults, 2 minors 
(Afghan). 20 TPV, 4 refs.  
150. 22 October 1999, Ashmore Islands (Xarag) 3 adults (2 Sri Lankan, 
1 Pakistani). 3 depart.  
151. 22 October 1999, Ashmore Islands (Yule) 140 - 136 adults, 4 
minors (126 Afghan, 14 Iraqi). 3 det, 137 TPV.  
152. 24 October 1999, off NW Kimberley Coast (Zephyr) 26 adults 
(Afghan). 26 TPV.  
153. 1 November 1999, Ashmore Islands (Adelong) 355 - 324 adults, 
29 minor - plus 2 babies* (299 Iraqi, 46 Afghan, 4 Iranian, 2 Algerian, 1 
Palestinian, 1 stateless). 20 det, 324 TPV, 11 refs.  
154. 5 November 1999, Ashmore Islands (Bogabilla ) 75 - 68 adults, 7 
children (63 Afghan, 12 Iraqi). 5 det, 70 TPV.  
155. 7 November 1999, Ashmore Islands (Cootamundra) 82 adults (80 
Iraqi, 1 Palestinian, 1 Kuwaiti). 4 det, 78 TPV.  
156. 8 November 1999, Ashmore Islands (Dapto) 25 - 23 adults, 2 
children, (Afghan). 25 TPV.  
157. 8 November 1999, Christmas Island (Eumungerie) 156 - 134 
adults, 22 children - plus 3 babies* (133 Iraqi, 16 Iranian, 3 Palestinian, 3 
Kuwaiti, 1 Jordan). 10 det, 142 TPV, 7 depart.  
158. 11 November 1999, Ashmore Islands (Finley) 23 - 23 adults 
(Afghan). 23 TPV.  
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159. 17 November 1999, Ashmore Islands (Goodoonga) 31 - 24 adults, 
7 children (27 Afghan, 4 Iraqi). 31 TPV.  
160. 18 November 1999, Ashmore Islands (Henty) 33 - 30 adults, 3 
children (17 Afghan, 15 Iraqi, 1 Iranian). 2 det, 31 TPV.  
161. 18 November 1999, Christmas Island (Ivanhoe) 62 - 41 adults, 21 
children (Chinese). 62 departs.  
162. 19 November 1999, Ashmore Islands (Jerilderie) 23 - 21 adults, 2 
children (Afghan). 23 TPV.  
163. 19 November 1999, Ashmore Islands, (Kyogle) 24 - 19 adults, 5 
children (Afghan). 23 TPV, 1 det.  
164. 26 November 1999, Ashmore Islands - formerly Ashmore Islands 
(Lockhart) 151 - 127 adults, 24 children (132 Afghan, 18 Iraqi, 1 Iranian). 8 
det, 1 depart, 142 TPV.  
165. 26 November 1999, Adele Island - NW Kimberley Coast (Mudgee) 
28 - 25 adults, 3 children (Afghan). 1 det, 27 TPV.  
166. 28 November 1999, Christmas Island (Nimmitabel ) 180 - 153 
adults, 27 children - plus 2 babies* (170 Iraqi, 9 Iranian, 1 Kuwait). 9 det, 
171 TPV, 2 depart.  
167. 1 December 1999, Ashmore Islands (Orange) 6 adults (Indian). 6 
depart.  
168. 6 December 1999, Ashmore Islands (Pokataroo) 135 - 114 adults, 
21 children (Iraqi). 9 det, 125 TPV, 1 depart.  
169. 8 December 1999, Ashmore Islands (Quirindi) 7 adults (Afghan). 7 
TPV.  
170. 16 December 1999, Ashmore Islands (Rappville) 127 - 118 adults, 
9 children(103 Afghan, 20 Iraqi, 1 Pakistani, 3 Kuwaiti). 13 det, 113 TPV, 1 
entry.  
171. 16 December 1999, Vanistaat Bay, NW Kimberley Coast (Scone) 
58 -32 adults, 26 children (Afghan). 57 TPV, 1 ref.  
172. 18 December 1999, Ashmore Islands (Tumbarumba) 53 - 33 
adults, 19 children - plus 1 baby* (50 Iraqi, 2 Algerian). 2 det, 51 TPV.  
173. 20 December 1999, Christmas Island (Ulladulla) 229 - 163 adults, 
65 children - plus 5 babies* (195 Iraqi, 26 Iranian, 4 Afghan, 2 Kuwaiti, 1 
Syrian). 24 det, 206 TPV, 3 depart.  
174. 21 December 1999, Christmas Island (Valentine) 73 - 67 adults, 6 
children (Chinese). 73 departs.  
175. 21 December 1999, Ashmore Islands (Warrawee) 35 - 20 adults, 
15 children (Iraqi). 4 det, 31 TPV.  
176. 21 December 1999, Powerful Island/Torres Strait (Xmas) 4 adults 
(Iraqi). 2 det, 2 TPV.  
2000 
177. 5 January 2000, Ashmore Islands (Yanco) 118 - 103 adults, 15 
children. 12 det, 105 TPV, 1 depart.  
178. 7 January 2000, NW of Darwin (Zahlie) 44 - 42 adults, 2 children. 
44 TPV.  
179. 17 January 2000, Hibernian Reef (Albany) 25 - 23 adults, 2 child. 
25 TPV.  
180. 22 January 2000, Cape Fourcroy (Busselton) 54 - 47 adults, 7 
children. 39 departs, 15 humanit.  
181. 26 January 2000, Cape Bougainville (Caiguna) 38 - 32 adults, 6 
children. 4 det, 34 TPV.  
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182. 1 February 2000, Christmas Island (Donnybrook) 281 - 231 adults, 
50 children - plus 3 baby*. 44 det, 232 TPV, 8 depart.  
183. 11 February 2000, Ashmore Islands (Eneabba) 47 - 41 adults, 6 
children - plus 1 baby*. 3 det, 45 TPV.  
184. 16 February 2000, Christmas Island (Fimiston) 22 - 21 adults, 1 
child. 5 det, 17 TPV.  
185. 16 February 2000, Ashmore Islands (Gnowangerup) 14 adults. 1 
depart, 13 TPV.  
186. 1 March 2000, Ashmore Islands (Hovea) 71 - 51 adults, 20 
children - plus 2 baby*. 3 det, 69 TPV, 1 escape.  
187. 6 March 2000, Ashmore Islands (Iluka) 21 adults. 1 det, 11 TPV, 9 
departs.  
188. 19 March 2000, Ashmore Islands (Joondalup) 47 - 31 adults, 16 
children . 3 det, 44 TPV.  
189. 22 March 2000, Cape Leveque, WA (Kalgoorlie) 34 - 24 adults, 10 
children. 5 det, 29 TPV.  
190. 26 March 2000, Ashmore Islands (Leederville) 70 - 62 adults, 8 
children - plus 2 babies*. 26 det, 45 TPV, 1 depart.  
191. 28 March 2000, Ashmore Islands (Manjimup) 19 adults. 19 TPV.  
192. 03 April 2000, Ashmore Islands (Nannup) 62 - 46 adults, 16 
children - plus 2 baby* 14 det, 2 bridging visas, 47 TPV, 1 depart.  
193. 24 April 2000, Ashmore Islands (Ongerup) 4 adults. 2 det, 1 
depart, 1 escape.  
194. 26 April 2000, Ashmore Islands (Pingelly) 78 - 72 adults, 3 
children. 9 det, 63 TPV, 3 depart.  
195. 09 May 2000, Ashmore Islands (Quinninup) 66 - 52 adults, 14 
children - plus 1 baby*. 6 det, 1 ref, 60 TPV.  
196. 16 May 2000, Ashmore Islands (Rockingham) 17 - 15 adults, 2 
children. 17 TPV.  
197. 01 June 2000, Ashmore Islands (Stonyville) 36 - 32 adults, 4 
children - plus 1 baby*. 9 det, 27 TPV, 1 depart.  
198. 19 June 2000, Ashmore Islands (Tambellup) 112 - 84 adults, 28 
children. 32 det, 78 TPV, 2 depart.  
199. 27 June 2000, Christmas Island (Utakarra) 3 adults - plus 1 baby*. 
4 det.  
200. 10 July 2000, Ashmore Islands (Varley) 30 - 30 adults. 16 det, 13 
TPV, 1 ref.  
201. 11 July 2000, Ashmore Islands (Wagerup) 36 - 33 adults, 3 
children. 16 det, 14 TPV, 6 depart.  
202. 11 July 2000, Cairns (Xwa) 23 - 22 adults, 1 child. 23 departs.  
203. 17 August 2000, Ashmore Islands (Yakamia) 74 - 54 Adults, 20 
children. 68 det, 6 TPV.  
204. 04 September 2000, Ashmore Islands (Zanthus) 77 - 69 adults, 8 
children. 31 det, 46 TPV.  
205. 14 September 2000, Water North West Western Australia 
(Augathella) 101 - 71 adults, 30 children - 1 baby*. 15 det, 87 TPV.  
206. 24 September 2000, Ashmore Islands (Bedourie) 2 - 2 adults. 2 
TPV.  
207. 27 September 2000, Ashmore Islands (Charleville) 47 - 37 adults, 
10 children . 38 det, 9 TPV.  
208. 02 October 2000, Ashmore Islands (Dirranbandi) 14 - 10 adults, 4 
children. 1 det, 13 TPV.  
209. 07 October 2000, Ashmore Islands (Emerald) 94 - 84 adults, 10 
children. - 1 baby* 64 det, 25 TPV, 6 depart.  
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210. 15 October 2000, Ashmore Islands (Fruitgrove) 33 - 28 adults, 5 
children, 20 det, 12 TPV, 1 depart.  
211. 25 October 2000, Ashmore Islands (Gargett) 32 - 25 adults, 7 
children, 4 det, 26 TPV, 2 depart.  
212. 28 October 2000, Ashmore Islands (Helidon) 116 - 98 adults, 18 
children, 70 det, 46 TPV.  
213. 02 November 2000, Ashmore Islands, (Innisfail) 69 - 62 adults, 7 
children. 64 det, 5 TPV.  
214. 10 November 2000, Ashmore Islands, (Jondaryan) 24 - 9 det, 15 
TPV.  
215. 16 November 2000, Ashmore Islands, (Kilkivan) 48 - 22 det, 26 
TPV.  
216. 27 November 2000, Ashmore Islands, (Leichardt) 100 - 51 det, 45 
TPV.  
217. 15 December 2000, Boigu IslandsIsland/Torres Strait, (Nambour) 
3 - 3 det.  
218. 16 December 2000, Ashmore Islands, (Maroochydore) 117 - 84 
adults, 33 children. 117 det.  
219. 17 December 2000, Ashmore Islands (Ormeau) 92 - 72 adults, 20 
children. 74 det, 18 TPV.  
220. 18 December 2000, Ashmore Islands, (Proserpine) 35 - 35 adults. 
35 det.  
221. 18 December 2000, Ashmore Islands, (Quinalow) 97 - 78 adults, 
19 children. 97 det  
222. 21 December 2000, Ashmore Islands, (Rosalie) 32 - 30 adults, 2 
children. 32 det.  
223. 21 December 2000, Ashmore Islands, (Sapphire) 30 - 26 adults, 4 
children. 30 det.  
224. 21 December 2000, Ashmore Island, (Toowoomba) 43 - 36 adults, 
7 children. 43 det.  
225. 27 December 2000, Ashmore Islands, (Urangan) 49 - 38 adults, 11 
children. 49 det.  
226. 30 December 2000, Ashmore Islands, (Virginia) 177 - 108 adults, 
69 children. 173 det, 4 TPV.  
227. 31 December 2000, Ashmore Islands, (Wallangarra) 68 - 49 
adults, 19 children. 40 det, 28 TPV.  
2001 
228. 03 January 2001, Ashmore Islands, (XQLD) 51 - 34 adults, 17 
children. 5 det. 45 TPV 1 depart.  
229. 06 January 2001, Ashmore Islands, (Yarrabah) 84 - 63 adults, 21 
children. 8 det, 72 TPV, 4 depart.  
230. 15 January 2001, Ashmore Islands, (Zillmere) 148 - 109 adults, 39 
children. 27 det, 119 TPV.  
231. 30 January 2001, Ashmore Islands, (Aberfeldie) 49 - 39 adults, 10 
children. 3 det, 45 TPV, 1 escape.  
232. 6 March 2001, Ashmore Islands, (Birchip) 115 - 79 adults, 32 
children. 11 det, 98 TPV, 2 departs.  
233. 7 March 2001, Ashmore Islands, (Culgoa) 179 - 151 adults, 28 
children. 23 det, 156 TPV.  
234. 8 March 2001, Ashmore Islands, (Darlimurla) 62 - 46 adults, 16 
children. 9 det, 53 TPV.  
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235. 24 March 2001, Ashmore Islands, (Echuca) 169 - 121 adults, 48 
adults. 10 det, 158 TPV, 1 depart.  
236. 25 March 2001, Christmas Islands, (Flinders) 196 - 135 adults, 61 
children. 14 det, 181 TPV, 1 depart.  
237. 27 March 2001, Christmas Islands, (Gelantipy) 22 - 18 adults, 4 
children. 21 TPV, 1 depart.  
238. 27 March 2001, Kerr Island/Torres Strait, (Hesket) 14 - 4 adults, 10 
children. 14 TPV.  
239. 9 April 2001, Ashmore Islands, (Illowa) 82 - 56 adult, 26 children. 4 
det, 76 TPV, 1 depart, 1 escape.  
240. 13 April 2001, Ashmore Islands, (Jumbunna) 43 - 35 adults, 8 
children. 9 det, 2 depart, 32 TPV  
241. 18 April 2001, Exmouth, (Kinnabulla) 24 - 24 adults. 5 det. 10 
departs, 9 TPV  
242. 18 April 2001, Ashmore Islands, (Lillimur) 94 - 82 adults, 12 
children. 7 det. 87 TPV.  
243. 20 April 2001, Ashmore Islands, (Mallacoota) 120 - 85 adults, 35 
children. 35 det, 75 TPV.  
244. 23 April 2001 , Christmas Islands, (Nullaware) 198 - 166 adults, 32 
children. 10 det. 1 depart, 185 TPV, 2 escapes.  
245. 4 May 2001, Ashmore Islands, (Outtrim) 65 - 38 adults, 27 
children. 19 det. 46 TPV.  
246. 4 May 2001, Saibai Island/Torres Strait, (Patchewolloc) 2 - 2 
adults. 1 depart. 1 escape.  
247. 9 May 2001, Christmas Island, (Quambatook) 131 - 110 adults, 21 
children. 131 TPV.  
248. 20 May 2001, Ashmore Islands, (Rokeby) 1 - 1 adult. 1 det.  
249. 4 June 2001, Ashmore Islands, (Serpentine) 54 - 29 adults, 25 
children, 8 det. 46 TPV.  
250. 5 June 2001, Bathurst Island, (Tamluegh) 5 - 5 adults, 5 depart.  
251. 6 June 2001, Ashmore Islands, (Ullina) 235 - 152 adults, 83 
children, 14 det. 220 TPV, 1 escape.  
252. 14 June 2001, Christmas Island, (Vinifera) 231 - 181 adults, 50 
children, 10 det. 221 TPV.  
253. 30 June 2001, Ashmore Islands, (Wahgunyah) 108- 99 adults, 9 
children 15 det. 92 TPV, 1 BVE.  
254. 2 August 2001 , Ashmore Islands (Xvic) 76 -64 adults, 12 children. 
28 det. 48 TPV.  
255. 4 August 2001 , Christmas Island (Yambuk) 147 - 97 adults, 50 
children, 2 det. 145 TPV,  
256. 13 August 2001, Ashmore Island, (Zvic) 60 - 47 adults, 13 children. 
18 det. 42 TPV,  
257. 16 August 2001,Christmas Island, (Alonnah) 345 - 191 adults, 154 
children. 21det. 324 TPV.  
258. 20 August 2001, Ashmore Island (Bacala) 225 - 152 adults, 73 
children. 3 departs, 45 det, 175 TPV, 2 escapes.  
259. 22 August 2001, Christmas Island (Conara) 359 - 264 adults, 95 
children. 125 det, 232 TPV, 2 escapes.  
260. 15 September 2002, Cocos (Keeling) Islands (Dulcot) 65 - 65 
Adults. 45 departs, 19 det, 1 TPV.  
261. 2 July 2003, Waters off WA (Emita) 53 - 38 adults, 15 children. 53 
det. 
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Appendix B — Defence and Immigration 
 
Immigration issues attracted interest among the electorate. However, defence 
as an election issue is a relatively new phenomenon that emerged during the 
time-frame of the case-studies.  
 
Table B1: Perception among voters who identified immigration and defence issues 
as election issues between May 1999 and October 2002. 
 
M
ay-99 
Sep-99 
Jan-00 
M
ay-00 
Sep-00 
Jan-01 
Jun-01 
Sep-01 
Feb-02 
Jun-02 
O
ct-02 
Defence   47 38 44 50 46 63
Immigration 32 28 37 25 36 37 30 50 49 43 44
 
 
Source for Table B1: Newspoll data: Political and Issues Trends, Importance of 
Federal Issues, taken between 1989 and 2002. Response to the question: 
Thinking about federal politics. Would you say each of the following issues is 
very important, fairly important or not important on how you personally would 
vote in a federal election? Downloaded 8 February 2006, from 
http://www.newspoll.com.au/cgi-
bin/display_poll_data.pl?url_caller=trend&mode=trend&page=show_polls&question_set_id=
4  
 
 
Figures depicted in Table B1 were copied from Table B2 below. Whilst the 
figures in Tables B1 and B2 are identical, it is easier to see a trend in Table B1. 
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Appendix C — Ministerial Interventions. 
 
Information below copied from Carrington, Kerry. (2003). Ministerial Discretion 
in Migration Matters: Contemporary Policy Issues in Historical Context (Current Issues 
Brief no. 3 2003-04). [Downloaded 15 September 2005]. Available from:  
http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/CIB/2003-04/04cib03.htm 
 
 
Figure C1: Number of Ministerial Interventions, Requests for Ministerial 
Intervention and Negative Decisions Affirmed by the Tribunals 1992-2003. 
 
 
Source [as per primary source]: Tables 8T and 9T DIMIA Submission to the Select 
Senate Inquiry into Ministerial Discretion in Migration Matters. Prior to 1996 
statistics were not kept in a format that enables comparisons to be made between 
Ministers for number of requests. 
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